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ABSTRACT. 
Tine Andersen: Who's in Power? A Comparative Investigation 
of the Forces shaping British and Danish Energy Poljcy 
1950-1980. 
The aim of the thesis is to establish a framework for eva-
luating current trends in energy policy through an histori-
cal analysis of British and Danish energy policy. The focus 
of the thesis is on changes in the issues, objectives and 
methods of state energy policy. For each country, these 
changes are recorded and sub-periods characterized by sta-
bili ty of goals and methods are ident if ied. A comparison 
between the countries shows similarity both as regard peri-
od characteristics and time of transition to another ap-
proach. Investigating the development of political activity 
related to energy it is found that changes in energy policy 
have reflected the ideas of different political groups in 
the period. Furthermore it is found, that these ideas re-
flect the cahnging character of energy-related problems. 
An investigation into the development of economic and re-
source conditions indicate that these conditions are them-
selves influenced by energy policy. The role of technologi-
cal change is then investigated and again it is concluded 
that energy technological change reflects state energy po-
licy. Hence, it is concluded that it is not possible to 
isolate one single set of causes which will allow us to 
explain why the focus of energy policy has changed across 
time. Considering the applicability of different theories 
of. social change to this problem, it is concluded that a 
non-determinist theory is necessary in order to explain 
the observed changes. Taking as a starting point the trial-
and error theory of social change developed by V. C. Peter-
sen, a framework for further analysis is presented. 
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PREFACE 
The present thesis is the most recent result of a process, 
which started back in 1979 when I was completing my cando 
sci~nt. degree at the Geographical Institute, University 
of Aarhus. Until then, my· work' had mainly been within 
fields related to planning and planning theory. Conse-
quently I approached energy policy from a planning point 
of view. I was mainly interested in establishing· whether 
the anti-nuclear movement in Denmark had influenced the 
outcomes of Danish energy planning since 1960. By compar-
. ing the objectives and issues of state energy policy with 
/ 
energy poli tical proposals mcrde by the most important po-
Ii tical groups since 1960, I found, that parallel to the 
campaigns of the anti-nuclear movement, successive govern-
~ments displayed increasing hesitation to adopt nuclear po-
wer in the Danish energy supply. At the same time an· in-
creasing number of poli tical groups were seen to engage 
themselves in attempts to influence the objectives of 
state energy policy after 1973. Along wi th this, the ob-
jectives ~nd methods of state energy policy changed. Dur-
ing the 1960s the policies addressed each fuel or power 
industry as a separate entity, and matters today being 
considered energy political were dealt with under the au-
spices of a number of different government departments. In 
contrast, after 1970, 'energy polic·y' was introduced, and 
emphasis was on the need for long term planning and coor-
dination. Also the idea that choice of energy technologi~s 
ought to. be informed by analyses of the external effects 
, , 
of each technology gained growing support from the early 
1970s, in particular as regarded possible environmental 
effects. 
All these observations pointed towards a wide-ranging 
change in the way society conceptualized and solved prt;>-
blems related to energy. The implications· of this, how-
ever, were only tentatively touched on· in 'the cando 
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scient. thesis. But when I was given the chance in 1982 by 
,the University of Aarhus to continue research within this 
field, it was natural to pursue in -more depth and width 
themes related to change in the energy policy field. 
A ~e1lowship from the Faculty of Natural Sciences, Aarhus 
University enabled me to register for the degree of Ph.D. 
at the Depar tment· of . Town· Planning, Oxford Polytechnic, 
where I stayed and worked from 1982 to 1984. A grant from 
Statens samfundsvidenskabelige SamfundsrAd, Danmark, per-
mi tted me to make a number of visi ts to the Geographical 
Institute which collaborated in the degree. 
A large number of people 
I 
were involved in· the·- work along 
the way.-Glen McDougall, Department of Town Planning, was 
my supervisor. She contr ibuted her insight into Br i tish 
·~politics, and through exacting and scrupulous criticism as 
well as valued linquistic assistance she tried to add con-
sistency.and legibility to the argument. Verner C. Peter-
sen, Geographical Institute, was my second supervisor. 
From his work the main ideas of the thesis as presented in 
chapter six were derived. His contribution extends far be-
yond what' can be demanded of a supervisor. Apart from the 
long discussions, to which he . lent his cr i tical faculties 
and interest. in my work, he kept me on the track, seeing 
to it that I never relaxed the demands on myself. 
The thesis could never have been completed without the 
collaboration of the institutions and groups whose poli-
cies I have described and analyzed. Everywhere I have been 
met wi th interest and willingness to provide me wi th the 
information I needed. Also'.the research teams at_the Size-
well Inquiry Project at the 'University of East Anglia and 
the Power. Stations Impact Project at Oxford Polytechnic 
were most helpful in supplying information. 
Along the way various fora presented :themselves for dis-
cussion of themes .related .to the thesis. In particular the 
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Poli tics, Philosophy and Economics seminar ser ies and the 
Research Seminars at the Department of Town Planning were 
sources of inspiration; and at the Geographical Institute, 
the students participating in my seminar series "Technolo-
gy: Power or Participation?" endured lengthy discussions 
which he~ped in clarifying the argument. While my partici-
pation in the acti vi ties of the women's group at the in-
stitute is not reflected ~irectly in the argument, it 
helped me to put my problems as a woman researcher into 
perspective. 
Friends·and colleagues, often the same thing, cared for me 
and my work in different ways. In particular my best 
friend, my husband Kurt B0je, belie~ed in me, bore with me 
and kept loving me through it all. 
My father offered me a place to work, where disturbances 
were kept at a minimum, which was indispensable. Lillian 
Jagd typed it all with great speed. 
Thus, although I did not have the access to the services 
of I the researcher wife' which, it appears from male re-
searchers' acknowledgements, include typing, proof-read-
ing, childcare and cooking, I have. received more support 
than I had dared wish for. 
A few comments on the form of the thesis. The evidence 
used in the analysis is mainly verbal, e.g. in the form of 
quotations •. This is in part due to the nature of the in-
vestigation, which emphasizes changes in attitudes. Also I 
prefer verbal evidence to tables and figures as I find 
that it aids fluency of argument. The drawback is that it 
adds to the length of the thesis. I have therefore, es-
pecially in chapter four., supplemented the verbal evidence 
wi th tables and diagrams. Whereever possible, quotations 
are from English and Amer ican edi tions ; otherwise I have 
translated the quotation into English myself, again in or-
der to achieve fluency. Finally, I have chosen to use the 
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pronoun 'we' throughout as an indication that knowledge 
and insight are always results of processes involving more 
than one person. Notes appear at the end of each chapter. 
I ~ 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
1.1- Background. 
The present inquiry into changes in the energy policy 
field may be viewed as a <;:ontinuation and extension of 
previous work l on the development of the Danish energy 
policy field since 1960. Out - of this work grew a 
realization that the energy policy field had been 
transformed through a number of developments which had 
occurred dur ing a short per iod of time around 1970. The 
I 
character of state energy policy had changed in terms of 
both its expressed objectives, its issues and its methods. 
This change was accompanied by the emergence of an anti-
nuclear movement as the earliest indication of the 
importance increasingly being attached to energy by 
political groups. Finally, the role of, theory in the 
energy policy field seemed to have changed. We had 
observed that theoretical literature on aspects of energy 
policy had grow? explosively. 
These observations highlighted an interesting problem: 
while the energy sector is increasingly subjected to 
-attempts at detailed, long-term state planning, the 
understanding of the forces which influence changes in the 
policy field is limited. In spite of the turbulent 
developments of the past, state energy policies as well as 
differen~ 'alternative energy strategies' of the 1970s 
indicated a trust in the ability of society to control all 
relevant aspects of energy supply and consumption in.~ the 
future. We felt that in a situation where energy research 
seemed predominantly con~erned with feasibility, there was 
a need for a more-broadly based analysis which would allow 
us to explain changes in the energy policy field. In order 
to evaluate the prospects, for instance, for the 
alternative strategies, we would suggest that knowledge 
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must be gained about the processes which connect the 
intentions of political groups, the intentions underlying 
state energy policies and the tangible results in the 
energy policy field. Hence the main intention has been 
that of establishing a theoretical framework for under-
~t~nding changes in energy policy in terms of a historical 
process. 
1.2. Aim of Thesis. 
The aim of the thesis is to describe and compare the his-
torical development from 1950-80 of the energy policy 
I 
field in Denmark and Britain" in order to establish which 
factors have contributed to changes in· the field and to 
establish, through this analysis, a framework for evaluat-
-ing the current trends in the energy policy field. 
If we want to explain changes in the energy policy field, 
we shall first have to locate and specify these changes. 
Hence, a subsidiary aim of the thesis is to identify and 
describe changes in the energy policy field between 1950-
80. 
Which factors may influence the energy policy field? If we 
accept that state energy policy to some extent structures 
the energy policy .field,we may look for factors influenc-
ing energy policy. Leaving aside. theoretical reflection 
for a moment, we will observe that a number of political 
collectives (political parties, fuel.and power industries, 
anti-nuclear groups, other interest groups) all attempt to 
influence policy. We will also observe that the-proposals 
of these groups as well as the policies themselves are re-
lated to a particu~ar section of existing reality, having 
to do with- economic· conditions, fuel sources, energy 
supply, consumption etc. 
. In short, we may identify two types of factors which must 
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be assumed to play a role in changing energy policy: 
'those who act', i.e. political collectives or groups, and 
'that to which they react', the structure of at any given 
time the energy policy field. 
In . this context, the collective ideas of these groups 
about the energy policy field are important. We want to 
investigate the relationship between ideas in energy 
policy and the ideas of political groups in order to 
locate the so~rces of policy assumption. 
, 
These considerations, together, wi th the results of pre-
vious work, led to the formulation of a set of hypotheses, . . ~, ' ' 
which specify causal connections between energy policy, 
. poli tical groups and structural conditions. In addition, 
hypotheses about the underlying process of change were de-
~ rived from work done by Petersen (1985) on planning and 
social change. 
1.3. Hypotheses 
Following the results of 'the work on Denmark, we expected 
to find a similar development in Britain. In Denmark a po-
liticization of' the energy policy field was marked by the 
emergence of new 'political -groups trying to 'influence 
state energy ~ policy, 'widening out of' the 'range of issues 
in 'energy policy and a 'conflict 'over' the objectives of 
energy' policy exemplified in the 'emergence' of large nu~­
ber~ of alternative'proposals for policies. This led us to 
formulate the first hypothesis: ' 
1. Between 1950 and 1980, the energy policy field in both 
Britain and Denmark became politicized. 
On the basis of the, discussion above, we want to suggest 
that poli tical groups,' as ~ell as economic and energy-
,related conditions, influence changes in the ~nergy:policy 
, ., ~ ; : " ' . " . , 
field. Changes in the actual structure, including' economic 
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conditions, access to energy resources, and existing me-
thods of energy production and consumption, are expected 
to be reflected in energy policy' to the extent that they 
are picked up as problems by political groups. Hence: 
2. Changes in the energy policy field are influenced 
directly by political groups. 
If 'this is the case, any particular state energy policy 
will reflect attempts by specific political groups atim-
pressing their version of energy policy problems and ob-
jectives upon the state's activities in the field. Groups 
presently attempting to influence energy policy include 
political parties, industries within and outside energy 
production, trade unions and different types of interest 
groups, ' in particular environmental and anti-nuclear 
groups. Hence: 
3. The objectives, issues and proble~sof state energy 
policy reflect objectives, issues and problems iden-
tified by specific political groups. 
We' have indicated that in Denmark the development of the 
energy policy field was character ized by the emergence of 
new groups addressing aspects of energy production and 
. , 
consumption which had until then not " been included into 
energy" policy formulation. Following the argument above, 
we want to suggest that the emergence of these groupsre-
flect altered conditions in the provision of energy. ,We 
would suggest, that problems in the access" to energy re-
sources" changes in, the relative, pr ices of fuels as well 
as rises, in the pr ice of energy relati ve to the income 
level' prompt political activity to overcome the economic 
problems created by such changes. Hence: 
4. The emergence of new groups in the energy policy' field 
and changes in the attitudes of existing groups reflect 
changes in the ma~~rial conditions in the field. 
Inaddi tion to this, • the ,Danish experience shows that· the 
new' groups in the field to a large extent focused on the 
negati ve aspects of particular energy technologies, espe-
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cia11y nuclear power. We would therefore suggest: 
5. The emergence of new groups in the energy policy field 
and changes in the attitudes of existing groups reflect 
reactions to, negative experiences of energy 
technologies on the environment as well as on social 
'conditions and quality of life. 
We suggest that the condi tions related to energy pr ices 
and the exper ience of energy techno10g ies are to a large 
extent common to Western Europe, including Denmark and 
Great Britain. Hence we would expect a parallel 
development of the energy policy field in the two 
countries. We would therefore suggest that 
- " ..., 
6. The development of state' energy' policy in terms of 
objectives, issues and methods I is parallel in Denmark 
and Great Britain. 
In addition to these hypotheses which address the rela-
tionship between changes wi thin the energy policy field, 
we want to examine the following ,hypotheses which are 
derived from Petersen's (1985) work, on ,change in social 
systems, in order to evaluate whether they can add to our 
understanding of change in the energy policy field: 
7. The process underlying changes in the 
field is assumed to contain elements 
error. 
energy policy 
of trial and 
This would imply 'that 'the' changing attitudes 'of' different 
.' - . 
groups are to be interpreted as reactions to condi tions 
which" on the basis of 'the expectations of the membeis of 
the groups,-~re exp~rienced as negative. 
In addi tion, we' want to suggest that fundamental social 
and technological conditions like (potential or real) 
inconsistencies between behaviour at the micro level and 
perceptible r~sults of the' agg'regate of such behaviour at 
, , 
the macro level 'imply that, excepi in the very short term, 
the effects of any policy which seeks' to universalize a 
particular pattern of behaviour will lead to results which 
are in conflict with the original intentions. Hence: 
8. Any attempt at purposive, long-term, state control of 
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the energy sector will lead to counterfinal results 
whose nature is in principle unforeseeable. 
If this framework is adopted, . it will be of consequence 
for our evaluation of the practicability of proposals for 
changing today's energy policies. 
1. 4 Method. 
Examination of the hypotheses stated above demands a 
translation of some of . the. rather abstract categories, 
e.g. '~nergy prices', 'environmental groups' into more 
specific ones. In addition, we need to specify the con-
di tions under which we will .. consider the statements made 
in the hypotheses plausible. In short, a method needs to 
be specified. 
As we are putting forward elements' of a new theory about 
change in the energy policy field, we can not' employ any 
one single established' theore~ical framework forour.e~a­
mination"of thehyptheses. In addition, the nature of the 
hypot~eiesis ~uch:tha~ we cannot expect to establish ~ny 
of them as a truth in a pos i ti ve sense.' At the most, we 
can hope to establish a certain plausibility of our hy-
potheses by showing that they represent a consistent ex-
'. , >, 
planatory framework over a long period of time as well as 
across different cou~tries. By using a" compa~a~ive and 
chronological perspective we also eliminate' the need for 
" , .-
considering key persons 'or other nationally specific cir-
cumstances as important sources of change. 
In order to examine the hypotheses, we need a p~rspective 
which will allow us to' inquire into changes in the rela-
- . 
tionship between e~ergy policy, activities which influence 
energy policy and the conditions which make up the object 
of energy policy. 
The first requirement of such a perspective is conceptual 
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clar i ty. We need to know what we are talking about, when 
we wr i te 'energy policy' and ' the energy policy field': 
we need definitions. We need, however, to be careful in 
defining too rigidly social and poli tical phenomena which 
we want' to investigate across a long period of time. We 
shall have to be aware of the historical situation in 
which the definition is made 2 • If we are not, our defini-
tions may give rise t~ theoretical myopia, which prevents 
us from understanding. why. energy policies of the past ~ere 
different than those of today. We will end up'imposing our 
interpretation of what energy policy ought to be like on 
the policies of the past as e. g. Lindberg (1977 II) does 
here: 
"To speak of "energy, policy" in the 1945-75 period is 
almost a misnomer. Energy considerations have been sub-
\ ordinated to other policy goals-, primarily to main-
taining economic output and national power. By and 
, , large, energy policy has only very recently emerged as 
a distinct area of concern in its own right. What has 
passed for energy policy is a' collection of decisions 
and nondecisions that have had their genesis in efforts 
of public and official actors to cope with other policy 
concerns that inevitably have energy implications. De-
cisions ,have' been taken in other spheres on the basis 
of criteria internal to them, and the energy consequen-
ces have toted up afterwards." (Lindberg, 1977, II, p. 
333) • 
Whereas we do not want to cast doubt ont~e correctness of 
Lindberg's observation, the narrow definition of' energy 
policy which they imply' is" insufficient' when we want to 
explain these changes rather than just evaluate their re-
sult. We 'need to make sure that our definitions are'suf-
ficently wide :to 'allow us to 'see' the problems to which 
the "policies of the past could be seen as adequate an-
swers, ,and we need to make sure that our defini tions do 
not prevent us from seeing the whole range of objectives, 
issues and methods of the 'energy policies of the past. 
We have already indicated that ,we want to differentiate 
'the' energy policy field', from 'energy, policy'. 'Energy 
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policy' will be reserved solely for state activities. We 
need, however, to specify further what we mean by 'energy 
policy' in order to differentiate from other policy types. 
Lindberg (1977 I) suggests, on the basis of an observation 
of the traditional :role of energy policy, that it has to 
do with 
"( ••• ) government and industry activities relative to 
the several stages' ( ••• ) of the supply of the various 
forms of energy ( ••• ) needed for individual and collec-
tive consumption and for. industrial production." (Lind-
berg, 1977, I, p.4). 
Although this defini tions is qui te broad, it is insuffi-
cient for our purpose. Lindber~'s inclusion of industry as 
energy policy makers is probibly due to the fact that Bri-
tish energy industry' is largely nationali zed •. We shall, 
however, maintain a definition of energy policy as offi-
~ cial state policy which is subject' to parliamentary con-
trol. Thus, although the industries may influence or even 
determine the content of state energy policies, they do 
not have the official policy making capacity. We may also 
observe that Lindberg does not include activi ties towards 
energy consumption, which represent an important component 
of today I s energy policies. In order to avoid these pro-
blems; we shall have to allow in our definition for 
var iations in the energy policy field which is addressed 
by state energy policy. Upon these considerations, we 
shall now define energy policy as follows: 
Energy policy consists of state activities relative to the 
stages of supply, distribution and consumption of energy 
as well as to issues which are at any time defined as re-
levant in relation hereto. 
This indicates that the policy field is not static. This 
definition does not imply any evaluation of the efficiency 
of a particular energy policy. Energy policy is simply 
descr ibed as a certain type of state acti vi ty towards a 
- 12 -
policy field. As the term energy policy is reserved for 
state activities, the activities of e.g. the anti-nuclear 
movement or the power plant industry are not included un-
der the heading of~nergy policy. Instead we shall examine 
how and to which degree these groups influence state 
act.i vi ties. 
Having established the, main categories of the inquiry, we 
need to specify the principles of the investigation. Above 
it has-been indicated that a dynamic approach has to be a-
dopted. We - shall need to' consider the problems that have 
been dealt wi th by energy policy over a per iod of time, 
look for changes in the range and character of these pro-
f 
blems 'and from this' extract ~ implications for our under-
standing" of the processes involved. As noted, above, our 
understanding of the process is important for our inter-
~ pretation of the attempts to solve today's energy politi-
cal problems. Therefore, in order to understand the future 
of energy' policy it ,is' necessary to' relate the -history of 
energy policy~ not in an anecdotal way but with the clear 
purpose of uncovering the processes which created the con-
ditionsfacing - today's attempts at purposively changing 
the'direction:of energy policy. 
Only a clearaccouni ,of the" historical succession of 
events and policies will show whether itis~warranted to 
interpret this process as one of a ser ies of tr ials and 
reactions 'to experienced 'errors' in relation to expecta-
tions.· Hence, chronology is a main' structuring principle 
of the investigation. The main drawback of chronological 
accounts is the risk of emphasizing-historically specific 
detail at the expense"of the analysis of, the nature of the 
socio-historical processes of which the specific details 
are only elements •. Whenever this is the case, the chrono-
logical, account ends up as a set of anecdotes ora 
'story', the historical account ,is reified and the reader 
is left to draw the implications for her own time and the 
problems at hand.-Energy political literature abounds with 
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stories of failures of the past serving as background for 
proposals for reform 3• 
In order to explain, change, however, it is necessary that 
the clear demarcation between energy policy, those who in-
flu~nce energy policy,' and that which they want to change 
by means of energy policy is upheld within the chronologi-
cal framework. Taking. this' into consideration, ~e have 
chosen to descr ibe the histor ical development wi thin each 
of these categories rather than describing the development 
of the entire energy policy field' simultaneously.' This 
means that a description of the development of energy po-
licy is followed by a descr iption' 'of' the development of 
I 
the acti vi ties of poli tical 'groups in 'relation to energy 
policy and so-forth. The events of one period will there-
fore be descr ibed ,several times, as seen from different 
. - angles. 
The analysis aims to cover the period from 1950-1980. The 
work on Danish energy policy had suggested that ~olitical 
conflicts related to nuclear power were an ,important 
component of the observed poli ticization of energy. This 
implied that we looked. back to the origin of civil nuclear 
power and investigated the policies which favoured an in-
troduction of nuclear' power. In addi tion, a preliminary 
literature review4 pointed to the 1950sand early'1960s as 
the end of an era of market control of energy. The~ inves-
tigation . might have been brought. further back.'" However, 
the World Wars are considered in this context to represerit 
per iods of abnormal social and economic condi tions 5 as 
are the immediate post-World War II years when' energy 
shortages were still prevailing in most nations JCh~sshire 
et.al. 1977). It must be 'emphasized, howeve~, that the 
choice of. per iod ~s fundamentally pragmatic. It may be 
-necessary to follow certain trends further back than 1950 
in order to understand' their or igins. Generally, however, 
1950 . is taken' as the starting point' for our discussion. 
Similarly, 1980 is chosen as the end point in order to be 
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able to distance ourselves' from the issues. The discus-
sions of the day are often not accessible in a form which 
allows a broad analysis of actors and issues, and keeping 
abreast of energy. political, developments in Denmark and 
. Britain in order to be up to date would demand more re-
sources. than are' at the disposal of the present proj ect. 
Finally the. preceding argument should have made it clear 
that being up to date is not crucial to the argument which 
we want to advance. 
'The analysis must allow us. to evaluate the relations be-
tween ,the development of energy policy and, the different 
factors which may have caused this development. A compari-
son between at least two nations .. allows for an assessment 
of the importance of local events and single centrally 
placed or otherwise influential persons as opposed ,to the 
influence of e.g. world market trends or' wider-ranging 
ideological shifts, as observed by Lindberg (1977): 
"To the extent that particular; factors appear systema-
tically as causes or consequences in nations as diffe-
rent as these (the anthology contains studies of energy 
policy in Britain, Canada, France, Hungary, India, Swe-
den and the United States. T.A.) we will be more confi-
dent' of their explanator~ (and predictive) powers". 
(Lindberg, 1977, I, p.2). 
We have limited the comparison to two nations: Britain and 
Denmark. The differences between these countries mean that 
the·above argument can still be considered ~alid, yet the 
limitation has made it possible to analyse the development 
ofenetgy policy in each country in some detail. 
Considerable amounts' of mater ial on Danish energy policy 
were: readily available, and it seemed obvious to seek to 
extend the scope of the project by extending the investi-
gation to another country and a wider time-span. For com-
par ison, Br i tain was chosen •. The country which was to be 
compared to" Denmark should be different in respect. to 
energy' resource", access, as similarities across countries 
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different in this respect would rule out an automatic re-
lationship between the material basis and the form of 
energy policy. On the other hand a certain similar i ty in 
respect to basic political and economic structures was de-
sirable, as this would ease the task of analysing the 
policy sY$tem itself. This does not imply, that the theses 
are only expected to hold for parliamentary-type 
democracies within"a capitalist economy6. It was, however, 
stipulated that the addi tional, gains in theoretical 
insight· which might be offered by choosing a country 
exhibiting a completely different political context, 
would be' outweighed by the extra burden on analysis which 
the demand for'" a thorough understanding of this context 
would represent~ 
I 
In order to investigate the assumption that changes in the 
energy policy field are influenced by political groups" and 
that new" groups have appeared, in this field in the 1950-
1980 period, a further specification of the meaning of 
'political groups' is needed. We deliberately use the term' 
'political groups' to avoid, terms like'decisionmakers' or 
'pressure groups' 7. Such terms focus on the relationship 
of a, group to ,the procedures of formal poli tical 
decisionmaking. But making decisions or exerting pressure 
on the institutions who make' these, decisions. is not the 
same thing as changing energy' supply and. consumption; in 
the real world. Dividing the population, into 
decisionmakers, pressure groups and the general public 
obscures the difference'between political institutions and 
the poli tical interests, and ideas that, are expressed 
through these institutions; and by focusing narrowly on 
institutionalized politics, they may prevent us from. 
perceiving the, implications of political' activities 
outside the institutions., 
Hence, 'poli tical' groups' or just "groups' is used to'" 
denote groups of individuals who act purposively to in-: 
fluence the development of the energy field through in-
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fluencing the political system. It is important to re-
member that in addi tion these: individuals influence the 
energY'system directly through their activities as consu-
mers and produc.ers. Wh,en we discuss, the groups,. however, 
we are predominantly interested in their purposive at-
tempt~ to change energy policies at the national level •. 
A further systematization, of possible types. of groups was 
desirable in order to provide for a structured search •. The 
preliminary literature review gave rise to'identification 
of the following wide classes of groups: 
1) Poli tical parties have tradi tionally provided ; for in-
dividuals' wanting to impress I a particular version of 
'the national interest' onto policies. 
2)- Industr ial interests, . including energy industr ies, 
which . in both countr ies have been deeply involved in 
energy decisionmaking (see ·e.g. Gowing, 1978~ Ince,· 
1981~ "Rasmussen, 1983), and industries outside the 
energy sector itself, which could be expected to seek 
to influence energy policies at.,least insofar as these 
concerned the price of energy. 
3) Trade union interestsi including trade unions with mem-
bers in energy industr ies, which could be expected to 
seek to· protect the interests :of. those members~ and 
other" trade unions, which could be expected to seek to. 
influence those aspects of. energy policy, . e.g. employ- .. 
ment, of direct interest to their members. 
4) Other interest groups, including environmental ~_groups, 
which. could' be expected to seek' to influence the as-
pects of .energy policy related to the environmental im-
pact of energy production, and other. interest groups 
who could be expected to seek to influence energy poli~ 
cy insofar. as it touched on the main issue of the. 
group. 
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upon identifying these groups,' a method was needed to 
enable an evaluation of'· their role in relation to state 
energy policy 'beyond that determined by. their formal 
position in relatio~ to state energy decisionmaking. 
Af~er having recorded the development of issues, problems 
and methods in state energy policy, we want to establish 
the or iginof . new problems and new ways of interpreting 
them and trying to solve them. 'Political influence' as 
such can never be establishedwithcertainty8, but we can 
establish whether paiticular problems are identified by 
particular groups before they turn up as problems for 
energy p6licy,- and whether the objectives and methods 
/ 
employed by energy policy' ar'e parallel to objectives and 
methods' proposed by, particular groups., To do so, 'we. need 
to record for" each" of the '" classes of political' groups 
- mentioned above its • energy poli tical history'. For each 
class this history will 'include an account of the range of 
grouP"s' wi thin the class involved in energy policy. This 
will allow us to' estimate the degree of politicizationof 
energy. It, will also include an account of the' groups' 
approach to energy policy in terms of problems, issues and 
solutions to· problems . related· to energy, which will then 
be compared to the development of· energy policy in order 
t6 establis~ parallels~ ~ 
The emergence of new problems will also be compared to the 
actual development of the, energy' policy field. "If' new 
issues can be shown to arise from identification by 
particular groups of·actual problems related to the actual 
condi tions in the energy policy field, this: will provide 
important' . support for' the suggestion that· the' process 
underlying . changes in" the field contains elements of 
tr ial-and~er ror •. ' " 
The' method· of recordi'ng for each group. those problems, 
issues and methods seen by the group itself as relevant to 
en~rgy policy cannot be stringently; applied, as it raises 
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the question of the group's own definition of the policy 
field. This becomes clear when it is remembered that it is 
assumed that coherent state energy, policies were not at-
tempted at a large ,scale before' the late 1960s. Hence it 
is not to be expected that before this time any group 
would have formulated issues in terms of 'energy policy'. 
Therefore,:we have had to ,employ our definition of energy 
policy as mentioned abqve for this period. ' ' 
The next step is relating the political expression to the 
material conditions. In order to assess 'the importance o'f 
these conditions as w~ll as the impact of state energy~o­
licy on' the 'material conditions, we need to specify how 
these conditions have developed through the period. 'Mate-
rial cond i tions ' are here understood as condi tions rela-
ted to energy as well as more general economic conditions. 
As it is assumed that'energy prices have bee~ an'important 
factor in influencing the development of energy policy, 
, ~ • ," < ~ ,< , 
the development of the 'prIce structure in the'energy sec-
tor has to be recorded for bot~ nations. Simil~rlY th~ de-
velopment of the, resource base needs to be descr ibed in 
terms of access to indigenous sources and dependence on 
energy imports, i~ order to' assess' whether this element 
had significantly' aff~cted energy ·'p6licy. Finally, the 
".\ > 
structure of consumption should" be': described 'in order' to 
assess the implications 6f'changes here: 
We' have • suggested that' an' important cla~s of problems in 
energy policy is related tci effects of energy tec~nologies 
on the physical environment', as well ,"as ,', on social' struc-
tures. Hence, !~n investigation into different ideas ab6ut 
state control of technology as' well as actual ' a~_tempts' at 
establishing institutional '; fra:meworks' for controlling 
technology was considered important. A compar ison 'between 
this debate and the issues raised in energy polic~ by~the 
political groups would 'then show if an extraction of spe-
cific themes and'issues was possible, and again the chro-
nology" sh~uld: help us to establish the origin of the for-
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mulation of these themes. 
The elements descr ibed above together make up the energy 
arena. This arena we define as follows: 
The energy arena is a social space in which political 
groups define the issues they see to be relevant to state 
energy policy. These issues are assumed to contain as one 
element identification ,of problems and as another formula-
tion of solutions to these problems. 
Thus the energy arena represents;at any time the range of 
attempts of groups in society at purposively influencing 
the aspects of energy that are considered to be of nation-
al importance. , I 
Descriptions of the development of state energy policy, 
changes' in the energy arena . and mater ial changes. in the 
energy field together make, up the components· for an 
inquiry into the process underlying changes in the energy 
field as well as changes in attempts at social regulation 
in this field. 
The amount of recent research on poli tical, economic and 
institutional constraints on the'free scope of state "ener-
gy policy is considerable9• In contrast, research is scant 
when, it comes to investigating the development of· the 
energy policy' field in terms of the changing relationship 
between that which is regulated - society's production and 
consumption of energy - and the regulatory mechanisms em-
ployed. This observation will be examined in chapter six'-
for now it· will have to stand as a:postulate. It implies, 
however, that we shall concentrate first ,. on establishing 
the nature of 'the changes in the energy. policy- field' as 
far as possible independently of later evaluations of 
these' changes. We' simply want to record chronologically 
the development of the. obj ecti ves, 
state energy policy, what it is 
issues" and methods of' 
and what it should be 
likei again in terms of objectives, issues and methods. 
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The sources for an investigation of this type have yet to 
be discussed. In order to gain knowledge about the energy 
policy field and identify major changes in the field in 
both countr ies, histor ical analyses lO of the development 
of energy policy were consulted., This led to identifica-
tion of further sources of the changing objectives and is-
sues of state energy policy, including state energy policy 
documents. These were ,then consul ted in order to identify 
issues and locate them within a chronological framework. 
From the~resulting description of the historical develop-
ment of state energy policy in the two countries, a perio-
disation could be derived, which could .then serve as the 
basis for examining whether. changes between periods in 
I 
energy policy ,reflected changes in. the. energy poli tical 
activities of the political groups. 
As for the groups, it ~ollowsfrom the aim and hypotheses 
of the. present investigation, that our main focus·, should 
be on the group's ,attempts ~o ~nfluence.the objectives and 
methods of state energy policy, ,again posi ted wi thin a 
chronological framework. While,more .traditional sociologi 7 
cal analyses, analysing ,political actors in terms of 
socio-economic background variables such as class, income, 
education, sex or age ll , have been of some help .. in 
identifying. at different times the range. of groups 
involved .in activities to do with energy, our concern with 
the, historical process means that we have had to look for 
sources to. the issues advanced by the groups in relation 
to energy. Evidence of these issues, including the group's 
interpretation of the process, of energy policy and its 
own role in relation hereto, is to be found in the records 
of the. groups . ~ themselves. Important sources of the at-
ti tudes and acti vi ties of poli tical 
cluded: policy documents on energy; 
ternative energy strategies; annual 
groups has-- thus in-
proposals, for al-
reports; public re-
on energy and finally 
of different ,groups. 
lations 
informal 
or information. documents 
interviews . with members 
Sources of the material conditions include mainly. sta-
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tistical data on energy production and consumption as well 
as on the economic aspects of energy. 
Sources of information on the question of the social con-
trol of technology include policy documents from Denmark 
and Britain as well as from other nations and or-
ganisations. 
These sources are supplemented wi th academic analyses of 
the different phenomena: of groups in energy policy, of 
the politics of technology and of the relation between 
energy policy and ,economy. Such analyses are assumed to 
reflect, at any ,time, a contemporary interpretation of the . . ,. / . 
issues, problems and relevant actors. The academic 
Ii teratuie is thus understood as a generation I s reflec-
tion, at a given point in time, of its own problems and 
solutions. Hence, we expect' to find in the academic li-
terature a range of issues parallel to those identified by 
the political groups; but in addition we would expect to 
find here the role of the political groups reflected. 
Generally speaking, theoretical elements which address any 
specific part of the analysis will be considered in the 
course of the investigation. Particularly the analysis of 
politIcal groups give rise to consideration of different 
theories of poli tical, decisionmaking as well as to 
suggestions that the emergence ~of new types of political 
actors signify a paradigm shift from' a set of values and 
world ,views oriented towards economic growth to a growing 
emphasis on environmental~and non-material values l2 • 
1.5 Structure of the thesis~ 
It has been the intention, 
thesis should itseif' reflect 
above. Fig.l sums up in 
.that the structure of the 
the aim and "suggestions made 
a graphical form these 
suggestions. Here, energy policy and the energy arena are 
depicted in a chronological structure. The vertically 
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oriented line represents time; its slightly winding course 
indicates the suggested non-linearity of historical 
processes. The intersecting horizontal planes represent 
I snap-shots I of, on the one hand (hatched circles) 
material conditions related to energy, on the other 
(dotted circles) attempts at poli tical control of these 
condi tions. Here, the large circle represents the energy 
arena, whereas the smaller circles within these represent 
state energy policy. The increase towards the present in 
size of .these circles, illustrate_ the hypothesis ,_that 
energy. has been politicized during the period. The dots 
represent the political groups" and, the increase in the 
number, of dots reflect the hypothes i zed 'incre~se in the 
, :j , • 
number of groups engaged in.e~er9Y political activities. 
-
Fig. 1.1 Energy Politics in a Chronological Framework 
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In the language of this graphic representation, the thesis 
aims at investigating the nature of the invisible lines , .. 
connecting one set of planes to the succeeding set as well 
as the co'nnections between the planes within the specific 
period in order to add to our understanding of what these 
relationships may look like in the future. 
The succession of chap,ters wi thin the thesis reflects the 
main structuring principles described above. Four chapters 
each deal wi th; ~ne aspect of the development o.f the 
energy policy field: the development of state energy 
policy 7 the development of the energy arena; changes in 
conditions related to the economy, resources, energy 
production and consumption7 and the emergence of problems 
,. -, , 
:e1ated, to the effects of ,technology,. Within each of these 
c~apters, the chronological pr incip1e, is employed, so that 
the chapter describes the development within. the 
parti~u1a~ aspect during, the, 1950-1980 period. Ideally, 
this principle should have ,overruled the comparative 
'" ' ,-" 
principle, so thatpara~le1s could be drawn. between. the 
countries for each point in time. It turned out that this , , 
procedure would mean that we would have to renounce in 
, " , 
part illustrating clearly the relationship across time 
between the policies of each country." Instead we chose to 
spli t each chapter up in a section on Br i tain, a section 
. . . ~ 
on Denmark an~ a,secti?n which. compares and concludes. 
Chapter 2 describes the development of state energy policy 
in Britain and Denmark in te!ms of objectives,. issues and 
methods and. aims. at establishing the extent to. \fihich . it 
is valid to regard these, developments as parallel. 
Furthermore important breaks in the conduct of energy 
policy will be extracted from this chapter. These breaks 
are" thus the obj ect of the. investigation in the following 
chapters. 
Chapter 3 describes the development of the energy arena"in 
terms of the political groups. The issues brought forward 
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by' political parties, energy industries, industry outside 
the energy sector, trade unions and other environmental 
and energy groups are recorded and compared to the issues 
we have found to be ,important in chapter 2. 
Chapter 4 describes the material conditions in ,the energy 
field as they, hav,e presented' themselves to" the' poli tical 
groups as well as to the 'sin~le energy consumer or 
producer., Again the emphasis is on establishing 
correspondence wi th the problems and, issues identi f ied by 
the political groups and' with' the (attempts at state 
control. ' 
I 
Chapter 5: is devoted to, a discussion of" poli tical" reac-
tions"to~ effects of' 'technology. The development of 
problems stemming from the unintended effects of 
technology, is illustrated by recording technology-related 
problems as these" are "identified by policies:' addre'ssing 
energy technology',' in ; general. We shall "also" discuss 
." ' 
different proposals which have been made for 'solving these 
problems ,and compare the ideas inherent in these proposals 
to the ideas and objectives of energy policy. 
i 
Chapter 6 which pulls together, the threads in an inquiry 
into the process of change in a policy field. Changes in 
energy policy, as found in chapter 2, are evaluated on 
the background" of ,the development of," the arena, the 
material conditions and the effects of technology. In this 
, " 
context, ',the questions of the relationship between 
intentions and effects/results and, between, the' micro and 
macro levels of society are important and will be 
.' . , 
discussed at some lenght. 
Finally, . Chapter 7 is" devoted, to. dr'awing" up the concl;~:'" 
sions and evaluating the extent to which we have succeeded 
in rendering plausible 'the hypotheses. 
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NOTES TO CHAPTER 1 
1. Andersen (1982). 
2. For an e1aboratio~ of this observation, see Petersen (1985), pp. 
XXI-XXII. 
3., Pearson (1981) and Ince (1982) are examples of the approach which 
aims at developing proposals for 'better'energy policies by iden-
tifying the failures of past policies. 
4. Chesshire et.a1. (1977); Poulsen (1978), Solomos (1980). 
5. This· should not be taken to indicate that the general i~terpreta­
tion of the basic processes shaping energy policy would not apply 
to such a situation., For the sake' of clarity, however, we have 
chosen a period of relative social stability so as to limit the 
number of possibly significant factors. 
I , , 
6. Indeed" the analysis presented' in Lindberg (ed) (1977) seems to 
, suggest' similarities across a variety of political and economic 
conditions. 
7. see' e.g. Pearson (1981) who lists pressure groups under the head-
ing of "The electricity industry"; Ince (1982), distinguishes be-
tween "policy makers" and "work-forces, pressure groups and poli-
ticians" but fails to evaluate the significance of the different 
groups in actually altering' the system of' energy, production and 
consumption. 
8. If I tell politician A to work for· the closure of a polluting in-
dustry, and he does, and it is closed, we can observe a harmony 
between my intent and the outcome. But did I influence the deci-
sion? This could only be established with certainty if we could 
show, that in the absence of my proposal, the factory wouldn't 
have been closed. But being counterfactual, this procedure is of 
little interest. 
9. See e.g. Tietenberg' (1976); Lindberg. (ed) . (1977); Lawrence (ed) 
(1979); Pearson (1981). 
10. On Danish energy policy, see e.g.: Andersen (1981, 1982); Poulsen 
(1978); Rasmussen (1982). On British' energy policy, see e.g. 
Chesshire et.al. ~1977)' Ince (1981); Reid and Allen (1970). 
11." Examples of such an approach are Gundelach (1980), Lowe and Gay-
der (1983). 
12. whereas .this discussion is taken up later, it can be noted here 
that this there has been explored by Colgrave (19 
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2. STATE ENERGY POLICY IN DENMARK AND BRITAIN 1950 - 1980. 
2.1 Introduction. 
The' following chapter is devoted to: an investigation of 
the historical development of state· energy policy in 
Britain and Denmark. Through a description of this de-
velopment, we want to arrive at an identification :of sub-
periods within the 1950-1980 period according to the 
character and intensity of state energy political activity 
within these periods. We want to investigate whether it is 
possible to identify period~ of relative absence of 
conflict in energy policy i~ainst periods dominated by 
conflicts, . and we want to describe these periods and the 
shifts from one period to the next. In this way we hope 
to arrive at a periodisation within the 1950-1980 period. 
Before proceeding to describing the development, a further 
specification of its object is needed. In Chapter one we 
defined state energy policies as state activities·r~lative 
to the different stages of energy'supply, distribution and 
consumption : as well as· to issues which are at any time 
defined as relevant, in relation hereto. By 'state 
acti vi ties' we understand explici t intentions, plans and 
policies formulated or endorsed by, parliament, ministr ies 
formally responsible for energy, relevant branches of the 
civil service and such advisory bodies which may be set up 
specifically to deal with energy. This implies that we'do 
not regard the activities of nationalized industries as 
part ,., of state energy 'policy. Although the activities. of 
e. g •. the National Coal Board undoubtedly have~, profound 
implications for state energypolicyl, they represent only 
one input·· into policy considerations. Therefore' ", the 
activi ties' of the '. nationalised industries will' be dealt 
with in the next chapter along with those of other groups 
attempting to influence state energy policy. 
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To assess the development of these activities, we are 
going to investigate the development of·· three, indicators 
of the range and intensity of state involvemen~ in energy 
policymaking. The first indicator is the issues dealt with 
in energy poli tical terms: . which issues have' been 
important at different times? Has the range of issues 
changed? These questions will be answered through an 
analysis of official policy documents. The second 
indicator is the range of methods employed as policy aids 
at different times. It is assumed that particular methods 
reflect particular assumptions about the policy field: 
which factors are important? How are they' seen, to 
interrelate? Are they. reQarded. as exogenous or 
manipulable? The third indi~ator is the institutional 
setting, its extent and complexity. 
In addi tion to recording the chronological development of 
state energy policy, we want· to examine' whether· this 
development has been parallel in Britain and Denmark, i.e. 
if specific periods have been dominated by the same· types 
of issues,· methods and institutions during the: 1950-1980 
per iod .In order:. to achieve clarity for each, country, we 
have divided the chapter into two' sections; one for each 
nation. 
Let us briefly look at some alternative interpretations of 
'energy policy' .It will' be noted that our definition of 
energy policy is' quite broad. On purpose'we have used the 
word 'energy' without specifying what it 'includes. The· 
reason for this .orginatesin the considerations .ofthe 
historical· specificity of socio-political concepts 
mentioned in Chapter one. More specific definitions are 
more often than not saturated. by ideas· of what energy 
policy ought to. be. Ii ke, as when Nigel Forman (Br i tish 
Conservative member of Parliament) defines energy policy 
as: 
:.. 28 .;,. 
,. 
" ( ••• ) an honest attempt to set a framework of poli-
tical decisions within which the various sources of 
energy supply are encouraged to make their most ap-
propriate contributions towards satisfying the likely 
levels and categories of future energy demand. ( ••• ) 
the meaning of energy policy must also comprehend a 
fair minded attempted by government to influence future 
levels and categories of energy . demand ( ••• ). (Forman . , 
1977, p. 8). 
At the other end of the " political spectrum we' find the 
following conceptualization: 
-. ",. 
"Energy policy is·.!!2.! a purely technical' issue ~. the 
. politics of energy is about the interplay between 
resources and. technology on one hand, and class in-
terest on the other." (Spence, n.d., p.4) • .. 
. j ',,, ' .. ' 
The first of these definitions is overtly normative. Using 
this defi~ition, Forman could: deny ,the existence of :energy 
policy, during periods of Labour. government. Furthermore 
'" " " . 
Forman assumes that,energy policy should influence future 
".' ~. k ~ 
energy demand. As: we shall. see, ,howeve r '" this has not 
until recently been an accepted task for state energy 
, , 
policy. Hence, a definition lik~ this can, be of .little use 
for an investigation., of the developmen~, of state energy 
policy, including ,the energy· policy "concept itself • "The 
second definition may seem more promi~ing, as_it ~pecifies 
some' (presumed) ,invar iant components of energy poli~y. ,For 
our p~rpose, however" it is far too imprecise. Substitute 
the word ,'ene'rgy' with 'food' or "health'~ and see -~hat 
happens -the defini tio~ rem,ain~' mea'ningful •. Thus, whereas 
it offers,a descriptio~ of som~ cruci~l factors of'e~erg~ 
policy (resources, technology and class interest), it does 
not say anything about the way they inter~relate. 
Ourdefiriition as stated. above" while open, in~~n~s to 
avoid, these pi tfails s~ as' to allow an investigation' on 
the '.' basis' v of , .. the .:, histor ical i development" of aspects' of 
energy dealt with' by' the state as ", well ': as changes 
regarding 'int~rpretat,ions of what, ,e~ergy 'policy ought 
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to include and which means should be employed. 
2.2 British Energy Policy 
Some authors, e.g. Lindberg '(1977, II) and' Chesshire 
et.al. (1977) proposes that a prominent feature of British 
energy policy since World War II has been its stability: 
"( ••• ) since the Second World War, Britain has had an 
identifiable framework of energy policy that has 
, permi tted a var iety of national interests to be, taken 
into account in addition to purely commercial 
considerations. ( ••• ) there' has been a degree of 
consistency in the approach to, policy formulation in 
the institutional structure over a period of' three 
decades." (Chesshire et.al.,1977, p.33). 
This" emphasis on the stability' of energy policy may be 
explained by two factors. Firstly, :Chesshire et.al. use 
'energy policy' to mean fuel policy. Therefore, the 
emergence.' of new issues like energy conservation is not 
recorded as an indication of change. Secondly, and more 
importantly,' 'change', 'stability' or 'consistency" are 
not absolute concepts. Chesshire, et. al. actually do 
observe change. within the 1945-1976 period they propose a 
per iodisa tion into four sub-per iods· character i zed by 
different supply, and demand condi tions. They argue' that 
successi ve governments have responded to these condi tions 
in a consistent manner. In contrast, Ince (1981) considers 
that'change has been a prominent factor in the development 
of British energy policy: 
"Until the last decade (the 1970s, T.A.), there was no 
government department dealing solely with ~energy _ 
al though one had existed under var ious guises before _ 
and whatever energy policy Br i tain and other countr ies 
had waS scarcely of interest to any but afficionados of 
coal output, North Sea-gas, power station· construction 
or whatever else was the fuel policy issue of the year. 
Now there is a Deparment of Energy and a large number 
of other bodies, more or less officic~l, which worry 
about energy policy." (Ince, 1981, p.2). 
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We shall now examine the development in state involvement 
more systematically in order to assess the relative impor-
tance of change and stability in the 1950 - 1980 period. 
Beginning from the 1950s, the responsibility for oil, coal 
anq gas was located with the Ministry of Fuel and Power 2, 
whereas the nuclear energy project before the creation of 
the Uni ted Kingdom At~mic ,Energy Author i ty in' 1954 3 was 
located with the Ministry of Supply. The Authority was 
established as an independent body under the 
responsibility of the Lord President of the Council. A few 
years previously, nationalisation of the major fuel and 
power industries had ,taken place: the gas and electricity 
industries were nationalised 'in 1947follo~ed by the coal 
industry -in 1948 (the oil industry, then occupied with 
processing imported oil, stayed wholly in private hands 
until 'the setting up in 1974 'of the Br i tish National Oil 
. - . . 
Corpor~tion). However,. in spi te of the evident potentials 
for a coordinated, energy policy offered .. by public 
ownership, policies towards energy in general and the 
nationalised industries in particular remained fragmented 
th~ough'out 'the: 1950s.'· Reid and Allen (1975) identify the 
following characteristics of the policies of this period. 
1) Industries ,were given no real guidance on the type 
, of pricing policies. they ought to follow. Prices 
. were based on,vague notions of 'social desirability' 
rather than on actual costs. 
2) Control and appraisal of capital investment was in-
adequate. 
3) Nationalised industries tended·to be regarded as in-
"dependent entities. 
We may take this absence of attempts at,co-ordinating the 
activities of the industries as an ,indication that compe~ . 
tition between fuels was not seen to present a problem. , 
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This is confirmed by a report from the Committee on 
National Policy for the Use of Fuel and Power Resources 4• 
The Committee concluded that the best pattern of fuel and 
power use would be promoted by the consumer's exercise of 
free choice between competing services, provided the 
competi tion was based on pr ices which reflected relevant 
costs. The existence of nationalised industries meant that 
the market would not ensure that costs were reflected in 
prices. Therefore, pricing policies were necessarY'within 
each industry to ensure correspondence between costs and 
prices. 
Alongside these attempts at recreating market circum-
I 
stances in the energy sector" we find arguments for long 
term fuel· supply ,planning based on an assumption' of a 
positive correlation between energy consumption and 
economic growth. Energy demand was observed to increase 
and the future growth in the demand for energy was thought 
to provide room for' growth in all fuel' industr ies. This 
was, for instance, an important argument for the ini tial 
introduction of nuclear power as well as for later expan-
sions of the nuclear programmes: 
"The principal objective of the United Kingdom's nu-
clear power programme is to provide an additional 
source of energy to. meet the country's ever-expanding 
needs." (Central Office of Information, 1957, p.17). 
The. fear. of the 'fuel gap' 5 
lization in 1956 that the 
could not be guaranteed 6• 
; .. : 
was strengthened by the rea-
future supply of foreign oil 
Observing the present situation in the energy sector, one 
may ask how' it was possible to envisage' ever-expanding 
increase in energy-~emand. The actual experience, however, 
supported such expect~tions. Economic growth was almost 
synonymous ,with growth in the industrial sector, 
especially in, energy intensive branches of industry such 
as iron and steel. Therefore, if economic growth -was to 
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continue energy demand would grow. Towards the end of the 
1950s, actual developments like e.g. substitution of 
diesel for steam on the railways, increase in car 
transport and the (albei t marginal 7) use of nuclear power 
and oil for electricity generation had made it clear that 
the' demand for coal had not increased as rapidly as had 
been expected ten years ago. But this seemed to be 
, 
outweighed by increasing demand for electricity, whose 
share of energy supply had been rapidly increasing. The 
Central Office of Information (1957) observed, matter-of-
factly: 
"An increasing pro~ortion o~ energy is required in the 
form of electricity, consumption of' which ,in Britain, 
has doubled every ten years over the past three 
decades." (Central Office of Information, 1957, p.17). 
Today, the idea that electr ici ty consumption could 
continue. growing exponentially .. seems naive. But again' we 
. - . ~ . 
must remember the historical context within which such 
prognoses were conceived." Along these lines, Chesshire 
et.al. (1977) make the following observations on the 
general mood of the period: 
"As a ge~eralisation, the mood (of the period 1946-57, 
T. A.) was . one of expansion following two decades' of 
depression and wartime austerity. The election of 
Conservative governments" in 1951, 1955 and'1959 re-
flected a popular concern for rising material stan-
dards. In 1955, a senior minister was able to predict 
that the material standard of living would double over 
·the next· twenty-five years". (Chesshire et.al., 1977, 
p.42). 
Following this argument, .. the. primary objective of energy 
policies during the 1950s. was to ensure. that future fuel 
~ 1 _ • • 
supplies would not fall short of the predicted demand. 
d 
This was to· be achieved through increased efficiency in 
,\ ~ ~ 
the: fuel, and power. industries and" state-financed" 
development of nuclear power, which would solve the threat 
of a 'fuel-gap' once and for al18. 
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One of the means of achieving 
reorganisation. By concentrating 
large hierarchical organisations 
Atomic Energy Author i ty and 
improved efficiency was 
management of energy in 
like the United Kingdom 
the Central Electr ici ty 
Generating Board, it was hoped that greater efficiency 
would ensue. 9 
The role of the state in the development of nuclear powe r 9 
is character istic of this approach to energy. Before the 
setting up of the Uni ted Kingdom Atomic Energy Author i ty 
(from now: the Authority) in 1954, nuclear technology had 
been developed under the auspices of the mili tary 
establishment in extreme secre~y.The argument for setting 
up, the authority contained elements. of the rationales we 
have alre~dy identified as characteristic of state energy 
policy in this period: 
"The reason for the change is because of the growing 
importance of the possibilities of adapting atomic 
energy to industrial and other civil uses. The Go-
vernment thinks that this makes necessary a form of 
control more akin to that of a big industr ial orga-
nisation than to that of a Government department." (The 
Times,.13 February 1954, p.6). \ 
The expectations, of ,the potential of nuclear power for 
closing the hypothesi zed energy gap forever was coupled 
, " . 
wi th . confidence in capabili ty of the nuclear industry to 
achieve res~l ts ina very short timell • Also it should 
not be forgotten that in addi tion to. economic considera-
tions," a strong pioneer spirit saturated the early nuclear 
energy development. This is evident from contemporary 
statements about nuclear power like that of the Minister 
of Wor ks (who was responsi ble for nuclear powe~) wishing 
the first chairman of the Authority success in:. 
"( ••• ) what must be: one of the most responsible and 
romantic posts open;to a British subject." (The Times, 
2March 1954, p.4). 
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A statement for a similar occasion could hardly have been 
formulated along these lines 20 years later, as we shall 
see. This indicates that public acceptance of nuclear 
power was to a large extent taken for granted. In favour 
of nuclear power was also the potential for national 
scientific and engineering prestige 12 • At the time, the 
origin of the civil nuclear project in the military uses 
of nuclear fission and the link between the two was openly 
recognized. One of the prime proponents of the creation of 
an independent atomic energy authority, Lord Cherwell, who 
was closely involved wi th the nuclear proj ect, expressed 
the need for such an author i ty as a solution to the main 
I 
problem, which was def ined as 'the: 
" ( ••• ) slow progress ( ••• ) in developing atomic energy 
for peaceful and warlike purposes". (Motion for the 
House of Lords by Lord Cherwell, 1951. Quoted from 
United Kingdom Atomic Energy Authority, 1979, II p.6). 
The development of nuclear power was thus seen to serve a 
number of purposes: it would obviate the fear of a future 
energy gap; it was expected to produce electr ici ty at a 
lower kW-cost; the project itself would be beneficial for 
the ·scientific prestige of Britain; and the civil project 
would help in gaining experience which might aid the 
military.uses. Nuclear power was expected, on balance, to 
solve more problems than it would create, and this 
expectation served as the rationale for state support for 
the,project. 
This .is confirmed by the presentation of nuclear pro-
grammes 13 subsequent to the setting up·· of the ·Authority. 
These were presented as government's programmes (rather 
than as the industry's). There is, however, reason to 
believe that important.decisions regarding the development 
of nuclear power was in reality not in the' hands' of 
government or Parliament. The Autho~ity was not 
accountable to Parliament but ,to a Minister of High 
- 35-
Cabinet rank. The fact that it was not made responsible to 
the Minister for Fuel and Power again indicates that the 
fuel industries were not regarded as different aspects of 
an energy policy ar~a, but as separate undertakings. The 
Minister was empowered to give directions to the 
Authority, but was not normally to intervene in its 
affairs14. Thus government intervention was limi ted when 
it came to detailed control of the operations. Instead, 
the state was to create the institutional structures which 
were seen best to enhance the growth wi thin the industry 
and to fund the project15 • All this leads us to conclude, 
. that the state support. for nuclear power during the 1950s 
were based on a belief in the capaci ty of the nuclear 
industry, given suff icient· financial 
educational resources, to develop nuclear 
benefit of society. 
support and 
power to the 
These assumptions, however, were' partly given up " towards 
the end of the decade. The Nuclear Installations 
(Licensing and ·Insurance) Act, which was passed in 1959, 
and the ini tiation of public information campaigns about 
nuc~ear power from the early 1960s indicated that science 
and the industry alone were no longer relied' upon to 
create· a publically acceptable' and problem-free ?ystem of 
nuclear, electr ici ty production. The Nuclear ~ Installations 
Act provided for a system of social control of si ting, 
design, .,. construction and operation of nuclear 
installations and set .. up a 'watch-dog' body, the .In-
spectorate of Nuclear Installations, which was to secure 
public accountability in the. conduct of nuclear power 
operations. This indicates that it was now thought 
necessary to establish an independent body to control an 
industry .which was formally accountable to government. 
Also. dissemination' to. the public of information about 
nuclear power appeared;asa novel~y in 1960. In the 1950s, 
apparently, there had been no need fo~ such campaigns. 
It would not be true to say that this absence of state 
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· awareness of public opInIon about nuclear power was the 
result of an orchestrated attempted to suppress the facts 
about nuclear power. Public awareness about nuclear·. power 
seems simply to have been small. This is difficult to 
demonstrate, but the events surrounding the Windscale fire 
in "'1957 may be taken as an indication. After the fire 
during which a number of radioactive substances were 
released into the environment 16 , an inquiry into the 
accident was staged;- but there is no evidence of any 
sizeable public concern about the wider implications of 
this accident until almost twenty years later, when a 
public inquiry was to look into plans for" a new plant·· at 
the site. 
/ 
From 1962",. however, a ser ies of pamphlets was issued by 
the Central Information Office under the title of "Nuclear 
Power in Britain". The pamphlets described the technology 
and presented arguments for further nuclear developments. 
The proj ect was presented as a scientif ic venture wi th a 
growth-enhancing potential: 
"With. "technical development, it is also likely to 
become . increasingly competitive with conventional 
sources of electr ici ty. ( ••• ). nuclear energy will, from 
about 1970 onwards, tend, in suitable circumstances to 
be as cheap or.· cheaper than conventional fuel." 
(Central Office of Information, 1962,p.17). 
We observe that _ profi tabili ty was only expected to ar ise 
under 'suitable circumstances'. But this did not represent 
an ·argument against the investments; on the contrary, 
reliable predictions of future costs· were condi tional on 
further.operatingexperience 17 • 
Even though the public was addressed, it was not given an 
active role in decisionmaking procedures. The consultative 
procedures of the nuclear project made for a closed 
decisionmaking. No independent technical staff was 
available to the responsible minister 18 • When consultation 
was available, it was 
fora, for example the 
Committee was under a 
limited to 
Radiological 
duty to 
technically oriented 
Substances Advisory 
consult "scientific, 
professional and technical organisations and. persons such 
as Ministers think appropriate" prior to giving Ministers 
adv·lce 19 • 
Parallel wi th the information campaigns, the state from 
the late 19S0s took over direct control of an" increasing 
number of regulatory functions in relation to nuclear 
power. In this per iod it was increasingly reali zed that 
. the utilization of~nuclear power was accompanied by a need 
for· auxiliary services in relation to the var ious aspects 
I 
of the nuclear fuel cycle 20 , e. g.' ·'transport of spent 
fuels, . reprocessing and waste disposal. Towards the mid 
1960s the' health and safety problems accompanyi ng nuclear 
power were increasingly recognized. Thus it was 
acknowledged 2l ' that the' responsibility of the state 
nuclear power included the following areas: 
1) Health and safety. 
(discharge of waste: monitoring, measuring, setting 
standards: 
regulation of contamination of water; 
regulation of contamination of food; 
transport of radioactive materials; 
.' regulation of hazards ar ising from medical uses of 
radio-activity; 
research into biological effects and protection 
-against such effects; 
setting standards for human exposure to radiation: 
monitoring nuclear fall-out: 
protecting the general public). 
2) Liability regarding nuclear hazards. 
3) Licensing andinsu~ances. 
4) Radiological protection. 
5) . Disposal of wast.e. 
6) Transport of materials.' 
.. 
7) Tr~ini~g 6f manpowei. 
In practice the implementation of these areas was left to 
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the Authority, subject to the licensing procedures of the 
Inspector on Nuclear Installations, later the Nuclear 
Installations Inspectorate. Thus, the problems raised by 
the nuclear project were predominantly to be solved by the 
industry under a number of obligations to the state. Again 
the" promise of future economic growth aided by access to 
cheap nuclear electr ici ty served as a j ustif ication for 
having to accept these side-effects 22 • In addition, it was 
expected that technological change would contribute to the 
. . 
solution of these problems. It was also expected that the 
problems of low load' factory which had been exper ienced 
. during the first years of operating could be solved by 
further technological refinement~23. 
. I 
This tec~nological optimism also includ~d the prospects 
for renewable energy. In the 1950s, a national committee 
., 
was to co-ordinate a wind R&D programme and' three 
prototype wind machines were erected 24 , but this deve-
lopment was' stifled' in the 1960s. Flood (1983) explains 
this development by referr ing to the falling oil pr ices . , 
coupled with the expectation that nuclear power in the 
near futute would provide cheap'and abundant electricity. 
This expectation, as we have seen, was related to the 
understa'nding of nuclear power as part of scientific and 
technical progress. 
Symbolic values aside, we'have seen that. policies towards 
nuclear power were characteristic of fuel policies of the 
1950s and early - 1960s, which were predominantl~geai~d 
towards' regulating the· supply of energy. The emphasis on 
-. , , 
the .' supply side' of energy has remained' strong' ever sinc~ 
the 1950s,and in this sense it is justifiabl~ to' claim 
'-., : ~ i: 
that Br i tish energy policy has been consistent. The" 1965 
White Paper on Fuel Policy (Cmnd 2798) emphasized the 
importance ot the consumer's freedom to choose between 
fuels and set out consequences of chan'ging relationships 
between the pr ices' of, main fuels; and the 1967 Fuel Policy 
'(Cmnd . 34'38); which was published in reaction to the 2nd 
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nuclear programme of 1965 and the finds of natural gas in 
the North Sea, had as its main aim a cheap supply of ener-
gy. This aim warranted a plan for a run-down of the coal 
industry in the face of cheap oil-supplies from the middle 
East in addition to the above mentioned developments. 
The emphasis on supply was still evident, though in a 
different way, as late as, by the end of the 70s, when 
central documents on energy policy were organised, around 
forecasts for each fuel sector. But supply orientation is 
only one dimension of energy policy, and on other scores 
considerable changes occurred in the issues and methods of 
state energy policy. Towards the end' of the 1950s the 
interplay between the development within the fuel 
industries had begun to'create problems viz. the plans for 
a run-down of the coal industry. This indicates a dawning 
recogni tion that simul taneous growth in all fuel sectors, 
as had been expected only ten years previously, had now 
, -
shown impossible. Now the - state was being called upon to 
ensure not only sufficient energy but also the cheapest 
possible energy for industry. In addi tion to these pro~ 
blems of, coordinating the acti vi ties of fuel industr ies 
and adapting to changes from the external world came 
problems related to the energy political process itself. 
The New Problems in Energy Policy. 
The creation of the Inspectorate of Nuclear Installations 
in 1959 is, one indication that the nuclear industry in 
particular' was not able to handle externali ties' ar ising 
from the production of nuclear electr ici ty. But" also at 
the - more g'enerallevel attempts' wer~ , made, to ;nsure, by 
means' of planning to that u~wantedeffects would not ' arise 
from energy - production and consumption. The attempts at '. ~ " , . ~- .' ~ 
planning started by the ,end ,of the' 1950's and' a'cceler~ted 
unt il the mid-19 70' s. Three 
tervention can be identified 
tendencies wi thin state" in-
, 
as character istic of' these 
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planning attempts: 
1) From about 1960, intensified efforts to secure trade 
union and industr ial approval of energy policy through 
formal hearing procedures. 
2) From the late 1960s, introduction of mathematical and 
-statistical tools in state energy planning~ 
3} From the late 1970s, increasing emphasis on the cost of 
energy production and, consumption in a" national- eco-
, nomic perspective coupled wi th increasing concern about 
, public acceptance of state energy policy. 
1) The first important attempt to ensure interest group 
consensus with regard to energy policy was the creation of 
the Energy Advisory CouncU: in 1965 by a Labour 
governmen~.·The Council, which was t6advise government'in . 
energy matters, drew its membership from the top levels of 
the fuel industr ies, trade unions and a number of 
government departments 25 • Hence the Council represented an 
attempt to incorporate the interests related to energy 
production' into' the energy decision-making process. The 
Energy 'Commission which was set up, in 1977 served a 
similar political 'role. The Commission 'was to' provide 
background mater ial' for energy decision-making. Its mem-
, , , 
bershipconsisted of representatives' from -energy in-
dustries and" from the TUC Fuel ~nd Power Industries 
Committee as well as persons representing consumer and 
'othei interest'26 -and ministers in charge of energy, the 
e~vironment, industry, prices, and the Tr~asury~ 
2)"From the late 1960s,the use of statistical and 
mathematical modelling became increasingly prominent in 
energy forecasting. As we S~wi the' domina~t assump~i6n of 
energy policy in th; 1950s wa~ that the~~conomy ~ould keep 
expanding. This led to forecasts based on extrapolation of 
consumption - trends of the last ten to twenty years. 
Whereas such 'rudimentary' forecasting methods were still 
used by 'the late 1970's27,more refined models were 
increasingly introduced ~ In 1977,'" for ,,- example, the 
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forecasting procedures employed by the Working Group on 
Energy Strategy assumed as key var iables estimates of the 
average annual rate of GOP growth 28 and future oil prices; 
however, the estimates were modified by taking into consi-
deration trend forecasts of final energy demand by sector. 
Finally the forecast total energy demand was adj usted in 
accordance with conjectures about possible effects of 
techno log ical change, changes in pr ices and. conservation 
efforts. The result was a single set of target for total 
future energy supply, distribution between fuels and tech-
nological change in the fuel and power industries; but the 
step· towards dr awing up scenar ios, i. e. descr iptions of 
possible future states of energy supply and consumption 
I 
given different sets of assumptions ~bout the future, was 
not far off. 
Only a year later, the 1978 Green Paper on energy poli cy 29 
considered the possibility of constructing a number of 
different scenar ios.' Only one such scenar io was presented, 
however, although it was acknowledged that large uncer-
tainties were involved in this procedure. The same year 
Energy Paper No. 29 on 'Energy forecasting Methodology' 
indicated that the future was becoming an important issue. 
The paper ~resented an over-all energy ,forecast arrived at 
by manipulating a set of models. Each model described one 
~s~ect ~f energy supply or demand by a number of mathema-
tical_equations derived from empirical observation of im-
pacts. of different types of events on energy supply or 
, . 
consumption. In contrast to, the forecasts of the 1950s and 
1960s which extrapolated fuel supply. and demand sectoral-
ly, the new forecasting 'procedure extrapolated past rela-
tionships'between different types of events. 
Energy. forecasting': as an element of state energy policy 
represents a differen~ approach to energy problems than 
the creation of new institutions and attempts at invoiving 
interest groups in decisionmaking. Forecasting was presen-
ted as a neutral, tool for ~ssessing .the future implica-
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tions of developments of energy demand and supply. It 
would enable politicians to establish which policies would 
be needed in the future. The policy documents of this 
per iod never entered into discussions of the whole range 
of problems raised by forecasting: is it desirable to 
construct the future on the basis of the past? Is a 
surprise free future conceivable on the basis of past 
experience? And from whom do we get the data? British 
energy forecasts rely on data supplied by the' energy 
producing industries. This may lead to an adoption of 
overly optimistic demand forecasts, as Ince (1981) has" 
pointed out: 
/ 
"The electr ici ty industry "thinks ~ as industr ies will, 
that it is the thing of the future. The people who make 
the electricity demand forecasts are members of the 
industry that generates the '., electrici ty. It would be 
foolish to expect them to be cynical about their own 
. prospects." 
It is possible to interpret the function of forecasts as 
tools which illustrate, in terms of a limi ted number of 
parameters, the consequences of 'business as usual' 
provided nothing unexpected happens. But in the real world 
spectacular unexpected events like the oil crisis 
happened, and unexpected costs of 'business as usual' were 
increasingly identified. 
3) Towards the end of the 1970s, the subject of costs, and 
in particular external costs, became increasingly 
prominent in policy formulation, and procedures and 
methods were developed to allow assessments of costs of 
particular projects as well as alternative options. The 
increasing use of tools 'like cost-benefi t analysis 30 and 
environmental imp~ct analysis is indicative of this 
development: This new" emphasis on cost first· appeared in 
the' 1977 Energy·Policy.'Review: 
"In principle the cost of reducing the impact' (of' any 
conceivable system of energy supply, T.A.) can be 
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balanced against the benefits and an optimal solution 
sought." (Energy Paper No.22). 
Also the 1977 Working Document on Energy poli cy31 and the 
1978 Green Paper 32 were concerned wi th the possibili ty of 
balancing costs against benefits, especially as 
the environment, employment and public safety. 
subject, the Green Paper concluded: 
regarded 
On this 
"We therefore need to make decisionmaking in this area 
as objecti ve as possible by establishing the facts on 
as firm basis as practicable." (Department of Energy, 
1978, p. 64). 
The external effects of energy' production and consumption 
were now regarded as . so important as to necessitate their 
inclusion in the decisionmaking process, albeit only 
insofar as they could be" translated into economic terms 33 
But the main emphasis was on the direct economic costs to 
the nation and. this emphasis was stable regardless of 
which party held government. Thus, in 1977 (when Labour 
was in government) the Energy Commission argued that 
energy~olicy could not and should not deal with the 
social effects of retail. prices of energy34. Also: en-
vironmental protection was a secondary concern for energy 
policy: environmental standards, e.g. limits to discharges 
of radioactivity, air pollutants or cooling water, should 
only be adopted insofar· as.-it could be shown "on a 
reasonable balance of probability" that they. were 
justified by the resulting benefits 35 • 
Not· only was the toolbox of energy planning being newly 
equipped, the increasing state· interest in." energy policy 
was' also marked by attempts to introduce new and more 
efficient frameworks for ·policy and. planning in, order to 
allow better coordination between the energy industries as 
well as between the energy sector and other sectors of the 
economy. We have already mentioned the Energy Advisory 
Counci11 the su~sequent Labour government in 1975 set up .a 
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working Group on Energy Strategy drawing its membership 
from the fuel industries and different divisions within 
the Department of Energy to explore 
"( ••• ) a coordinated approach between Government and 
the industries to the formulation of energy strategies 
-, and energy policies" (Working Group on Energy Strategy, 
1977, foreword). 
The remi t 36 . of the Energy Commission on its creation in 
1977 was a major policy document. Here, it was acknow-
ledged that energy. policy cannot be conducted in se-
paration from the rest of society. Instead of planning 
wi thin. the single industry, energy policy should aim at 
arriving at one single but coherent and robust strategy, 
an idea which was supported by the Working Group on Energy 
Strategy, although this group emphasized the necessity of 
maintaining a flexible approach 37 • In view of this aim, 
general adoption of a long-term planning horizon of 20 
years for. corporate planning was recommended. This would 
ensure that state energy planners were provided with 
sufficient input for the preparation of at least one over-
all long~term energy plan. Up till this time, planning had 
been related to single industries,one at a time. The idea 
of one over-all energy plan was new. 
Also during the 1970s the framework for energy policy 
decisionmaking had been altered and new state 
. insti tutions created wi thin the energy sector. For 
example, in 1971 a number of processes involved in the 
production of fuels for nuclear reactors, which had 
earlier been undertaken' by the UKAEA, were gathered to-
gether wi thin a new state owned company, Br i tish Nuclear 
Fuels Ltd. (BNFL) •. BNFL was to undertake enrichment, 
production, repro~essing and disposal of nuclear fuels. It 
was to operate on "similar lines to any other private 
industry,,38. 
Up to 1973, the responsibility for the fuel industries was 
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divided between different Ministries 39 . with the creation 
over Christmas 1973-74 of the Department of Energy by a 
Conservative government, all fuel industries, including 
the nuclear industry, were for the first time brought to-
gether in one institutional setting (see fig. 2.1.). Even 
though the staff remained largely unchanged, as observed 
by Ince (1981), the creation of a separate energy depart-
ment must be regarded ,as a significant event. Both Ches-
shire et.al. (1977), Ince (1981) and Pearson (1981) inter-
pret the creation of the Department of Energy as a direct 
government response to the 1973 ·oil crisis coupled with 
the fear of coal shortage following a national miners' 
strike. Whereas this may explain the date of formation of 
the Department, it does not explain why the fuel and power 
industries and the nuclear project had come to be seen as 
parts of one identifiable area of policy: energy policy. 
The change of label from 'Fuel' to 'Energy' 
Fig.2.1 The Department of Energy and its resort areas. 
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British National 
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~ i 
Department of 
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Coal 1 - B rd 
The Electri-
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. Nuclear 
Fuels Ltd. 
united King-
dom Atomic 
Energy Authority 
(After Chesshire et.al., 1977). 
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indicates more than just that the national economic 
implications of a coal strike or an oil embargo had become 
very important. It indicates a recognition, that these 
problems, and the civil nuclear proj ect, and electr ici ty, 
were now conceptualized as different aspects of one 
complex of problems. This conclusion is supported by the 
emergence of new institutions like the Advisory Council on 
Energy Conservation which was established in 1974 to 
advise and assist the Secretary of State for Energy in 
promoting economy and efficiency in energy use by iden-
tifying methods for improvement and methods of conser-
vation. A 'Save-it' campaign was launched by the 
Department in early 1975 to inform the public abo'ut the 
need to save energy; and the U:K. signed the International 
Energy Agency agreement on an International' Energy 
Program 40 • 
Parallel to the emergence of energy policy as an iden-
tifiable area of state intervention, with a responsible 
department, with investigation' into policy models, and 
wi th tools for evaluating concrete energy developments, a 
new concern for this branch of policy had appeared: formal 
integration of different interests into the decisionmaking 
procedures. 'Different interest groups (especially trade 
unions, industrial interest organisations and consumer 
organisations), were given the opportunity to participate 
in com~issions and conferences. The Energy Commission was 
presented 4l as an example of' public - participation in .. 
,e~ergy pOl(cy' for different 'interests' to be taken into 
account. 'Bearing in ~ind the composition of the ,. 
Commission " it is 'tempting to conclude that 'interests' 
were interpreted a~ synonymous wi th 'established interest 
groups I, ,', and 
". . 
interpreted' 
, 
production. ' 
that interest '" 'in 
as -. economic interests 
energy policy 
relating to 
was 
fuel 
It was an explicit objective of involving interest groups 
in energy decisionmaking to ensure . consensus . among' these 
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groups, but also wider public acceptance was hoped for. 
Parallel to the introduction of new participatory struc-
tures, the Minister of Energy observed that there was a 
need to ensure 
"( ••• ) the democratic accountabili ty of energy planning 
to the taxpayer, consumer and workers in supply indus-
tries." (Energy Paper No.22). 
We observe that the idea that public ownership ~"se was 
a sufficient guarantee of public accountabili ty had been 
discarded. New safeguards would have to be established to 
ensure "accountability, and we saw that interest group in-
volvement was one solution to this problem. Another was an 
,- " 
increased effort to inform the general public about energy 
problems and energy policy, for example the Depar tment of 
Energy's Energy Paper series which was started in 1975 was 
" ( ••• ) pr imar ily intended to create a wider public un-
derstanding and discussion of energy matters, though 
some technical papers" may appear from time to time." 
(Energy Paper No.9, p. ii). 
Goingthro~gh the issues dealt with in the Energy Papers 
from No.1 (1975) to No.45 "(1981), we see that almost"one 
half of the" papers (17) dealt wi th aspects of energy" con-
servation, while"12 papers were devoted to one particular 
Source of energy. Of these, one dealt with nuclear energy 
and six with renewable sources. This distribution indica-
tes a w~i~hting ~f issues which is crucially at odds with 
the amount of government funding allocated to the respec-
tive areas of e~~rgy policy during the same period42 • The 
", 
apparent over-emphasis on issues related to energy conser-" 
vation can "possibly - at least in part:": be ascribed to 
the Advisory' Council on Energy Conservation' choosing the 
Energy paper series as an outlet for' its reports. 'In addi:" 
tion, it may be argued that the fuel industr ies, . and in 
particul'ar" the nuclear industr ies, were ~lready publishing 
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sUfficient informative 
mater ial as to make any 
series was presented as 
and public relations oriented 
further coverage redundant 43 • The 
a 'database' available to the 
general public. It was to serve as a input into a public 
debate about the means and ends of energy policy; 
therefore the bias towards issues that do not involve 
discussions about the energy industries is conspicuous, 
and suggests that not all energy issues were thought 
suitable for public debate. 
" Towards the late 1970s the focus on the role of the ge-
neral public had become stronger, while on the other hand 
the earlier attempts to ensure concensus between the 
/ 
energy production interests were to some extent given up. 
Both the'~Energy Adv:i.so~y Council and the Energy Commission 
were disbanded in 1979. The reason given was that the 
Secretary, of State for, Energy considered that there were 
better forms of consultation for energy policy44. From the 
mid-1970, procedures involving economic interest groups 
directly in decisionmaking were gradually replaced by 
efforts ,aimed at ensuring the, approval of the general 
public,' mainly by information. Also the use of planning . 
inquiries for energy projects is an element in this trend. 
This seems to indicate that the workers in the energy 
industry were no longer thought to present as large a 
problem as the attitudes of the general public. 
New Objectives of Energy Policy. 
The emergence,. of an explicit energy policy by the late 
1960s was also marked by ,the emergence of stated aims for 
this policy area. In the 1950s partial. objectives for 
single industries and projects were derived from the over-
all obj ecti ve "of economic growth, and technical progress. 
Growth, in . the energy supply industry was necessary to 
ensure ongoi~g economic growth. This is sharply contrasted 
by the remarkable set of stated aims of a national energy 
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policy which appeared originally in the 1977 Energy policy 
Review: 
"(i) Everyone can afford adequate heat and light at 
home 
(ii) Industry's needs for energy are fulfilled at a 
pr ice which reflects fully resource cost and has re-
gard to long-term availablity of the various fuels. 
(iii) These objectives are met on a long-term basis, 
taking account of risks; the depletion of our' reserves 
of oil and gas is regulated; research and development 
in energy supply and use is adequately funded; and in-
vestment in energy industries to meet these objectives 
is properly planned. 
(iv) Freedom of the consumer to choose between 
fuels provided a minimum 'pr ice which reflect economic 
cost, ,. should, where possible, be maintained and in-
creased." (Energy Paper No.22). 
These objectives were repeated in consecutive government 
energy policy documents 45 • They marked interest in new is-
sues in energy policy: consumer protection, resource de-
p1etion, inves tment planning. Alongside these new obj ec-
tives, a number of 'traditional' objectives of energy po-
licy w~~e cited: achieving the lowest po~sib1e cost in en-
ergy production, aiming at a secure and continuous energy 
supply and achieving efficiency in use. 
The interpretation of these goals however, has changed 
considerably. Interpreting this set of goals' demands a 
specification of the cost concept.'and of the time-horizon 
wi thin which costs should be minimi zed. There has been a 
tendency ~6 widen out the cost-concept from inc1udin~on1y 
direct costs of producing and transmi tting energy to in-
cluding exte~na1' costs stemming from e.g. environme~~a1 
, . . 
pollution. Likewise, there has been incr~asing emphasis on 
10ng-term;c~st ~nd hence. on the need for sensitivity of 
analysis in co~t calculations. For example, whereas' the 
original long-term aim of the nuciear'project ~as achiev-
ing a stable, low-cost electricity supply, competitiveness 
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was only expected in the very long term. From the mid-
1970, mere expectations of low cost in a far away future 
could no longer be afforded. Proof of the competi ti veness 
of energy technolog~es was now demanded, witness e.g. the 
Sizewell Inquiry debates on the costs of the American 
P~essurized Water Reactor 46 ). 
In this context, energy conservation and renewable energy 
have increasingly been considered as possible ways to cut 
the social costs of energy production. 
In order to illustrate this in more detail, the role in 
state energy policy of nuclear power on the one hand and 
renewable energy on the other will be looked into in 
greater detail. 
As far back as 1965, ,. nuclear power had· been established 
as a component of a national· energy policy47. This did 
not, however, result in attempts by government to direct 
the development of the technology. On the contrary, the 
governments, between 1965 and 1973 were lying low on nu-
clear power: no nuclear programmes' were issued, no policy 
. '.
statements on nuclear power or the' nuclear industry were 
produced, no initiatives taken towards the nuclear 
industry. In 1973, however, the Nuclear Power Advisory 
Board (NPAB) was established as a top-level body wi th the . , 
ai~ of advising government on all aspects of nuclear 
generating p~licy48. This indicated a renewed interest in 
nuclear power, (probably,prompted by the increasing tension 
between the OPEC, countries and Israel); and immediately 
upon the oil crisis in 1973/74, a third nuclear programme 
was pres~nted. It, consisted of 4000MW of Stea.m Generating 
Heavy Water Reactors, a new design. The programme was 
rejected only two years later 49 , and in 1978 it was 
J 
replaced by a less ambiti6us programme of two Advanced Gas 
Cooled Reactors, to start in the 1980s. These policy 
changes wer~ explained 'inpolicy documents; 'which h~~ not 
been the c~~e ~ith earlier ~hanges in nuclearp~ogr~~mes. 
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In 1976, the official principal objective of the nuclear 
project was 
"( ••• ) to develop an alternative source 'of power to 
supplement, in particular, exhaustible supplies of fos-
sil fuel - coal, oil and natural gas." (Central Office 
of Information, 1976, p.1). 
The rationale for developing nuclear power was no longer 
ever-expanding needs as in the 1950s and 1960s - instead 
the fuel gap would result from fossil fuels being exhaus-
ted. Hence, the project was justified by referring to new 
problems leading to the same,result: fuel shortage. 
The increasing importance of ptiblic opiriion was evident in 
the third" nuclear programme, which referred to the need to 
maintain public confidence 50 , and in 1977 government. en-
COuraged public debate on nuclear power 51 • Nuclear power 
was still regarded an important component of a national 
energy strategy, but not unconditionally so: 
"The amount of nuclear power that could be made avail:-
able in 1980s will depend critically on the nature and 
timing of current decisions about the reactor 'program-
me, and these in turn will depend on the relative costs 
and acceptability of nuclear power." (Energy Paper 
No. 20)· (Emphasis added). 
This somewhat· half-hearted commitment to nuclear power was 
replaced by a strong commitment when the Conservative Par-
ty took over government in 1979. The new government an-
nounced a'new nuclear programme. One new station was to be 
bUi td 'each year in ten years starting in 1982, and al to-
gether 15,000, MW of" nuclear capaci ty was to be added to 
the grid. Later, this commitment waned somewhat. The rea-
sons given' were the increasing cost' of nuclear power and 
.. 
the increasing excess capaci ty in electr ici ty production 
leading the government· to state, in 1981', 'that each order 
of a' new' power station should be justified in terms of 
cost efficiency and need 52 • Again it is evident, that the 
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costs of energy production had become prominent amongst 
policy criteria. 
Also the public acceptance of energy decisions was 
thought to rely on an assessment of costs. The information 
about nuclear power which was to be given to the public 
should serve ,the objective of 'making clear the ec~nomic 
advantages of nuclear, power. Implicity it was assumed, 
that the public, given insight into project economics were 
able to arrive at a rational assessment of nuclear power: 
. "( •• '.) as much information, as possible about the econo-
mics of the proposed future power stations should be 
made available to the public." (Depar tment of Energy, 
1981, p.14). ,~ 
In this way, economics was established as the appropr iate 
language in which to discuss energy. 
Just like nuclear power· received a renewed attention when 
it became clear that future oil and coal supplies could no 
longer, be guaranteed, so renewable energy technologies 
were drawn, into the focus of energy policy in the mid-
1970s. But whereas the nuclear industry was, 'standing-by' 
as was the power plant industry, nei ther organisation nor 
capital were present to ensure that the emerging political 
demand for 'alternative': sources of energy ,(alternative to 
coal and oil) was readily transformed into commercially 
viable 'technologies •. Development of the renewable energy 
technologies was defined as a field for state initiatives, 
but without any economic or organisational rationales to 
ensure its implementation. 
State involvement in renewable energy has mainly consis~ 
ted in informini the public of the ,existence of the tech-
nologies and contr ibuting to" R&D. " R&D funding has relied 
on assessments of the potential contribution to total en-
ergy supply from, renewable sources, and as 
COntr ibution has been expected to be minute. 
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a, rule this 
In 1977, 
Sun, wind, tides, waves and biomass were expected to con-
tr i bute 0.9 - 2.4 per cent of pr imary fuel demand by the 
year 2000 53 • In 1979, these sources were not included in 
the energy projections of the Department of Energy. It was 
argued, that they seemed 
"( ••• ) unlikely to be able to contribute to supply or 
to be economically preferable to other fuels over the 
period to 2000." (Department of Energy, 1979): 
Again we notice the increased emphasis on economic cr i-
teria. The role, of state funding for future competi-
tiveness was not discussed. In contrast to the large state 
expenditure for nuclear R&D, funding for renewable R&D was 
minute 54 • Around 1980, the Conservative government argued . ~ 
a return to market principles. The difference between 
nuclear power and renewable, energy technologies in this 
situation was that' renewable energy technologies were now 
in approximately, the same phase of technological 
development as nuclear technology had been in the early 
1950s: it was not developed into a commercially viable or 
cost efficient technology, only further research and deve-
lopment' would show if it ever" could be cost-efficient, and 
the ,R&D would demand sizeable funding. R&D into renewable 
sources was both costly and risky, and therefore private 
industry was reluctant to inves t. But whereas funding in 
the 1950s for nuclear energy ,could be justified by 
referring to 
renewable energy 
policy , cr iter ia : 
ficiency. 
expectations for future performance, 
technologies were now being subjected to 
which emphasized short-term cost 'ef-
Bri tish state energy policy' has tended to emphasize the 
capaci ty of any energy source for producing energy,' in 
bulk'. Hence," re~ewable energy 'technologies have 'been' seen 
to be· relevant to state energy policy only insofar as they 
were thought capable of feeding electricity into the 
national gr id. Policy statements' on renewable energy have 
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shown a clear preference for technologies compatible wi th 
the existing infrastructure, first and foremost the 
national gr id 54 • This implies a bias toward large-scale 
technologies like tidal barriers, wave power and large-
scale wind machines. The renewable sources' have been 
divided into two categories 56 : 
1) sources mainly suited for electricity generation; 
2) SOurces mainly suited for local production of heat. 
Of these, the fi rst group has 
tention: 
! 
received the bulk of at-
"Wave power offers a greater potential for the Uni ted 
Kingdom than any other natural renewable source.,: It is 
a concentrated source of power that can be harnessed 
into volume' to the gr id and there' is a good chance of 
Solving the technical problems." (The Department of 
Energy, 1978, p. 59). 
§ummary of British Energy Policy. 
Table 2': 1 sums up the developments in Br i tish state energy 
policy descr ibed above. For the sake of clar i ty we have 
divide~ the 1950-1980 period into five-year i~tervals.· 
The first period was dominated by initiatives on nuclear 
energy. We have seen that the main aim of fuel policies in 
this period was maximising output.· The 1956-1960 period 
. , , 
gives evidence of attempts by the state to advance effi~ 
ciency in the fuel industries through restructuring'of th~ 
industrie~. By the end of th~t dec~de, we saw the'ci~ation 
of the' Inspectorate of nuclear installations- as a sign 
that the nuclear industry was no longer relied upon to 
handle " the exter"nali ties' ar ising from' nuclear electr ici ty 
generation: 
The first' five years of the 1960s witnessed new practises 
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in relation to energy: establishment of formal procedures 
for interest group participation in decisionmaking as well 
as the first proposal for a coordinated fuel policy. 
Between 1966 and 1970 the fuel industries including the 
nuclear industry were gathered within the Ministry of 
Technology, and yet another fuel policy was issued. The 
state increasingly intervened in industrial affairs. The 
national coal industry was protected by means of subsidies 
in order, to prevent imported oil from displacing coal. 
Between 1971 and 1975 the institutional setting of energy 
decisionmaking was restructured so as to define energy 
policy as a central concern of the state. An increasing 
number of' state bodies were set up to handle different 
.I 
aspects of energy'and to ens~te the influence of interest 
groups. Attempts at' coordination between the policies of 
the fuel industr'ies were intensified. A nuclear programme 
was presented in an attempt to cope wi th the oil pr ice 
rises and the political volatility making coal a risky 
option to the electricity industry. 
From the mid-70s, state energy bureaucracy stopped 
multiplying, and by the end of the 1970s,'. state 'bodies 
\ 
were even disbanded. Interest group participation in 
energy policy was no longer regarded impo'rtant. Instead, 
efforts were made at securing public acceptance through 
participatory structures like the public inquiries and 
th~ough information campaigns. Towards the end' of the 
1970s, cost became a dominant issue in energy policy. 
Hence, emphasis was on enhancing efficiency in 
consumption. At, the level of planning, attempts were being 
made to assess future costs of alternative projects and 
scenarios through a number of econometric techniques. 
We shall now return to our objective of identifying within 
f 
the 1950-1980 years possible periods of political 
qUiescense in energy policy as against possible periods of 
Conflicts. Looking at the events described in this section 
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Table 2.1 Events in British Energy Policy 1950-1980. 
Time 
(5 year 
inter-
vals) 
1950 
1955 
1956 
1961 
1965 
1966 
1970 
Institutional 
changes 
Formation of 
UKAEA ( 19 5 4) • ' 
Ministry of 
Fuel becomes 
Ministry of 
Power (1957)~ 
Central Elec-
"tricity Author-
ity replaced by 
The Electricity-
Council plus the 
electricity 
boards (1957) • 
Inspectorate of 
Nuclear Instal-
lations (1959). 
Energy Advisory 
Council (1965). 
Ministry of Po-
wer + the UKAEA 
absorbed in·the 
Ministry of 
Technology 
(1969-l970) • 
Legislation 
and impor-
tant policy 
documents 
Methods and 
practices 
(changes) 
Atomic Ener-
gy Act (1954). 
Electricity 
Act (1957). 
Clean Air Act 
Nuclear In-
stallations 
Act (1959). 
'Fuel Policy' 
(Cmnd·2798) 
(1964) • ' 
'Fuel Policy' 
(Cmnd 3438) . 
(1967) • 
Coal Indus-
try Act. 
(1967) • 
Public Infor";' 
mation on nu-
clear energy 
(1962-). 
Subsidies· for 
power station 
coal purcha-
ses ." 
Forecasting 
adopted in 
'Fuel Policy'. 
(table contnd. next 
page) 
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1971 
1975 
1976 
1980 
1 BNFL formed 
(1971) • 
2 British Gas 
Corpooration 
replaces Gas 
Council (1972). 
3 Department of 
Energy formed 
(1973) • 
'Nuclear Re-
actor sys-
tems for 
Electricity 
Generation' 
(Cmnd 5695). 
4 Nuclear Power Ad-
visory Board . 
(1973) • 
5 Advisory Coun-
cil for Energy 
Conservation •. 
(1974) • 
6 Working Group 
on Energy Stra--
tegy (1975). 
. .' . . 
Energy Commis-
sion (1977) 
- disbanded -
(1979) • 
Energy Advisory 
Council disban-
ded (1979). 
, . 
;-
- I 
'Energy Con-
servation' 
(Crnnd 6575). 
(1976) • 
Energy Po-
licy' (Cmnd 
Re-organisa-
tion of the 
Electricity 
Industry' 
(Crnnd 7134) 
(1978). 
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Adoption of 
national ener-
gy forecasts. 
Publication of 
Energy Papers. 
'Save-it' cam-
paign. 
Mathematical 
modelling 
-adopted. 
Introduction 
. of '. non-econo-
miccost. 
First alloca-
tions for R&D 
into renewable 
energy. 
First public 
inquiry into 
energy-related 
. project. 
- Public· parti-
cipation poli-
cy issue. -
and the chronological order of these events as they are 
represented in table 2.1 we find it warranted to identify 
four periods characterized by distinctly' different 
patterns of energy political approaches. 
1) 1942-1959. This per iod began before the starting point 
of our analysis, and ended about 1959. It was 
character i zed by limi ted state intervention in the energy 
sector 'compared to the later periods. Energy policy 'aimed 
at secur ing' energy output so as to ensure that economic 
growth could continue. In this strategy, besides aiming at 
increased efficiency in the tradi tional fuel industr ies, 
the development of nuclear power played a major role. This 
I 
technology'was expected to increase productivity in energy 
immensely; 'thus ensur ing an increasing energy output even 
beyond full employment. It was character istic that these 
expectation, on a background of' rapid economic growth, 
were sufficient to justify a major state investments in 
developing this new technology. The optimism with regard 
to the future role of technology was also reflected in 
state" involvement, in other technological projects related 
to renewable energy. and . technologies ',' for increasing 
efficiency in other fuel sectors. 
2) 1960-1973. This period was characterized by intensified 
state involvement in all aspects of energy supply. The 
SUPply of fuel was influenced by the prices on the World 
Market, and the state reacted by subsidizing the national 
Coal, industry. The development of nuclear power was' not 
happening as rapidly as had been expected,' and, it was 
realized that the environmental 'problems in utilizing 
radioactive processes had not been solved as e~sily_as had 
been expected. As a reaction, new state ,institutions were 
formed, for handling these problems. Increasingly the' sta te 
during thi~ period took. over energy planning as well, and 
towards the end of the period we saw an increased interest 
in methods for diminishing future uncertainties in energy 
SUPply. The main characteristic of this period were in-
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tensified state attempts to cope with the increasing 
number of uncertainties related to energy. But that also 
meant that a growing number of decisions 
been taken wi thin t!:le single industr ies 
in the political sphere. 
which had earlier 
were now taken 
3) 1973-1977 (approx.). This period was characterized by 
a dramatic increase in energy supply problems. In Britain, 
two events contributed hereto: the 1973/74 oil crisis and 
the natiomil coal miners'" strike in 1973~ These e'vents 
presented the energy poii tical system wi th problems 'which 
it was', not' designed to ~ope with. We interpret both the 
" .' , 
attempts to coordinate energy decision-making and the 
" ,,1 --' , ,",' 
multiplication of-committees, "advisory 'councils etc. as a 
reaction to these problems. Also the renewed 'interest in 
nuclear pow~r an~ in energy conservation w~re presented'as 
, ~ i- r ~. 
SOlutions to the problems stemming from dependence on oil 
and coal. This 
energy sector. 
4)' 1977-. The 
physically the 
implications of 
important issue. 
, , 
accelerated state intervention in the 
" ' 
immediate problem was no longer securing 
, " , , 
energy supply~ The national economic 
energy supply became an increasingly 
Energy policy' increasin'gly 'becam~ a.mearis 
to '~conomic end~. Whereas this 'was also the case' in th~' 
1950s, when the objective was economic growth, the 
Objectiv'e is now efficiency of state investme~t'in order -, , 
," 
to straighten out the ailing .. economy. But at the same 
time, the problems of the 1960s and early 1970s still' 
persisted. " The "environmental effects' of ene'rgy production 
were' answe~~d" by state intervention insofa'r as' they" were 
expected 'to give rise to future costs for;soglety.' Added 
to this carne an increased 'interest' 'in me'thods'which 
allowed for e5ti~ating and comparing future costs of 
/-; :. ~ 
different pro'jects an,d energy' futures. Hence, this per iod 
was characterized' by' a political emphasis' on' the: nat;ion'al 
'.'. , - > 
economic cost of energy. 
, :., 
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Before we discuss the significance of these changes, let 
us examine Danish energy 
order to assess whether 
Britain or whether a 
identified in Denmark. 
2.3 Danish Energy Policy. 
policies of the same per iod in 
the, changes are particular to 
parallel development can be 
In Denmark, state intervention in the energy sector during 
the 1950s and early. 1960s was' even more -modest· than' in 
Britain. Taking into account the level of available 
technology and the price of importing, coal and, oil, 
Denmark did not have access to/any fuels of interest for a 
national energy supply (we shall look into ,this in greater 
detail in' chapter four)., The accessible; indigenous 
resources, like peat or· firewood, were used directly for 
space heating in the homes. The organisation of energy 
production and distribution differed considerably from 
that of Britain. The energy industries were privately or , 
Collectively owned. Some undertakings ~ we~e ,1imit~d 
companies while others, were owned by local authorities.' 
The industry was only to a. ve'ry limited extent subject t'o 
. , ~, . - . - . 
state, control. ,In particular, the state did not control 
, , ,~ , 
directly the. pr ices of the, most important fuels, which 
Were imported ,coal and. oil. State ~organisati~n :in t~e 
energy field was scant. The most ·important body, until 1976 
was .,The Electricity Council (E1ektricitetsrAdet) who .was 
;, > ", • , 
to advise the Minister of Public Works on issues related 
to' electr i~i t~ . supply and wh'ose, member~hip was drawn 
from the electr ici ty industry, uni versi ties and the Mi-
nistry57.,The ,1935 : ~lect~icity Act had given the 'Electri-
city Council the responsibility of licensing installations 
and drawing up limits between the, supply areas ... of 
different:electricity companies. However, during World ~~r 
• '.,,' ' , -. >~ • "" '" ' 
II, as an, aspect 6f economic planning, ,the. first high 
.' .". ",. '. 
Voltage lines wer~ construct,ed by means of state funding. 
The . phYSical. basis ,for a centralised ,energy, supply was 
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thus presen t by 
development of the 
the private sector 
state. 
the beginning of the 1950s. The 
industry through the 1950s happened in 
without much interference from the 
rhe interest in a pub1icallysupported civil nuclear 
project was evident in Denmark, as in Britain. In 1955 an 
Atomic Energy Act was passed which set up the Atomic 
Energy Commision (Atomenergikommissionen). This 
institution was akin to UKAEA and had' as its m~inpurpo~e 
the peaceful utilization of atomic energy •. Contrary to the 
British situation, no established organisations existed in 
the nuclear field' nor did an established nuclear 
industry. Hence the Atomic En~rgy Comrniss'ion had to draw 
its membership from the scientific community, from the 
electricity; industries and from' other important indus-
tries. The Commission was not the responsiblity of any 
ministry. 
, 1 
Our ing the 50s and early 60s, nuclear power was expected 
to be introduced in Denmark by the end of the 60s~' and in 
1962 an Atomic Installations Act '(A~omanl~gslo~en) was 
passed in Parliament, which gave the National Health 
Inspectorate (Sundhedsstyrelsen), the !Atomic Energy 
Commission and the Minister for, Education 58 'the right 'to 
initiate the introduction of nuclear ,power in~ Denmark 
wi thout further" consultation. As' it· turned out, nuclear 
power was never introduced, as the go-ahead collided wi th 
falling oil pr ices . making , the , electr ici ty industr ies' 
interest 'in nuclear power wane 59 ~But, the nUClear, research 
establishment Ris0 which had been set up in' 1955, 
Continued its activities funded byt~e state. 
Th~ Ministry of,. c~mmerce60 ,~as responsibl~ for policies 
concerning' fuels other 'than 'nuclear , but no, attempts "were 
made ,to coordinate t'hese policies61• "The" fragmentation of . . 
PoliCies was reflected in the lack of interest, in the 
Danish reserves ~f North Sea oil and gas. The existence of 
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this resource had been known as far back as in the 1940s 
when Gulf and Esso (Exxon) prospected for oil in the 
Danish part of the North Sea. Concession to prospect and 
exploit North Sea oil was in 1962 given by government to a 
Consortium consisting of Gulf Oil, Shell Oil and a Danish 
,shipping company. Later, this decision was heavily 
criticized, but as Wilhjelm (1979) notes: 
"It is probably redundant to note, that the; steps of 
government in relation to the 1962-license' were de-
finitely not underpinned by energy policy considera-
tions. Possibly that was asking too much as far back as 
1962. Indeed this happened towards the end of the 
fantastic process of swi tching from coal to oil which 
was never decided upon or even i discussed 'by any 
political authority, but was nevertheless implemented 
in record time, making De'nmark the country more than 
any other in', the pocket of 'the seven. sisters', the 
multinational oil companies.~ (p.55). , , 
." :. 
Developments in ,energy supply were I left . to private 
industry except for the nuclear power project which was 
fUnded by the state. The conduct of the project was, 
however, largely left to the scientific community, and no 
poli tical procedures or insti tutions existed to check the 
develo~m~nt of the project. As Poulsen (1978) observes: 
~. '''',. ~ >--
"Only in the area of scientific research {nto' ~nergy 
was the influence of the state pronounced as., a 'result 
of its financial control, of the activities of the 
Atomic Energy' Commission, i.e. the . control of grants 
within the framework of the budget." (Poulsen, .1978, p • 
. 52) • 
This situation lasted until the'early70s, when a growing 
interest in" coordination 'and' planning" of, the' energy area 
bec~me vi~ible. The, Danish state was' not faced 'with, the 
proble~~' 'of coordinating nationalised fu~l'-:- i~dustr les • 
., -" ,~. / , ~ " 
Still, in 1971, the, ,Ministry of Commerce set up ,an 
Advisory '~Commiftee consisting of representatives of 
government departments and branches of industry to assist 
government . in investigating the ,possibility' of 
- , " * 
~stablishing a natural gas supply from the North ~ea. ,The 
\ : 
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Committee negotiated a possible pipeline for North Sea 
gas with a multinational corporation, but the negotiations 
ended without any result. This led to the setting up of 
the' state-owned limi ted company Dansk Naturgas A/S which 
was to ensure state influence in future natural gas 
activities. But intially the company was given only a 
very small operating capital indicating that the immediate 
interest in natural gas was. limited. 62 The Advisory 
Committee had only been concerned wi tha single fuel, but 
in early. 1973 it was. replaced by a civil service Energy 
Policy Committee (Energipolitisk Udvalg) which was to 
coordinate energy administration across departments as 
well as advise government in energy policy matters. 
Beyond doubt, state involvement in energy matters was 
accelerated by the 'energy crisis' in 1973/74, but it is 
important to bear in mind, that when the rise in oil 
pr ices hi t the national, economy, the organi zation of a 
coordinated state ~energy policy had already begun. 
The oil price rises' sparked' new initiatives. Immediately 
" : 
upon the pr ice rises, a new cent're-r ight government 
(Venstre; det Konservative Folkeparti; det Radikale 
Venstre) voiced its intention to achieve control and 
coordination of the energy area and to coordinate the 
diffeient . policies within this area. The Minister of 
Commerce was to be responsible for implementing coor-
diriatio'n. He was to be responsible for all aspects of 
policies and plans for energy supply and consumption, 
whereas aspects related to public safety or 'the 
environment was not regarded as par ts of the Minister's 
" -- , 
responsibilities 63 • In 1974 the Minister issued the first 
energy policy revi~w outlining energy' problems and the 
aChievements in .. reorganizing energy policy organisations 
so far. 
After the oil cr isis 
.! : 
in 1973/74,' attempts at creating an 
energy planning framework were . intensified. A' Heating 
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Methods Committee was set up by the Ministry of Housing in 
1975 to be in charge of an investigation of the appropri-
ateness of different heating methods in a wider energy-po-
litical perspective~ In the remit of the committee it was 
observed that 
"Substantial changes have occurred in the market.condi-
tions for energy, and the present development of tech-
nology supports an .assumption that heat supply in the 
years. to corne will be characterized by a·· shift be-
tween heating methods and possibly introduction of new 
methods." .' (Boligministeriets Opvarmningsmetodeudvalg, 
1975, app. 11 (remi t to the Commi ttee from the Minister 
of Housing». 
, " 
These ob~ervations were used to motivate state involvement 
in energy. It wa~ noted that the cost of heating had be-
come an important element in the balance of payments, and 
that achieving the aim' of a secure' fuel supply was to a 
large degree dependent on the methods of h~ati~g' used • 'The 
national economic' argument fo~ 'en~rgy' planning' was'promi-
nent, a~d indeed the twin aim 'of achieving fuel 'supplY' se~ 
CUr i ty ,and diminishing the effects, of fuel imports, on the 
balance of payments, was the foundation of Danish energy 
POlicy:throughout the 1970s. 
In Britain, we identified three dominant tendencies in en-
ergy policy since the 1960s: attempts, " especially in the 
early part of the period, to secure consensus around ener~ 
gy, policy: ,in'troductionof pl"mning' tech'niques, 'SUCh as 
forecasting and mathematical modelling, into' energy poli-. ' 
cy; an'increasing emphasis on national economic aspects of 
energy projects toward,S the' end of.' t~e 19706 coupled wi th 
an increasing concern about public acceptability of' energy 
policy from the mid 70s. Furthermore we saw that new is-
sues were introduced in energy policy:~the nuclear project 
was redef ined and nuclear power was clear ly def ined as a 
power-producing technology which would have~to be .assessed 
in the. context of energy policy and energy economy; 'tech--: 
no1ogies for utilizing renewable energy were 'debated; 
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energy conservation was introduced as an important issue. 
The same tendencies can be identified in the Danish energy 
policy of the perio~, albeit with differences in emphasis. 
Early attempts to secure consensus are not as evident in 
,Denmark as in Britain. The Advisory Committees of the 
early 1970s drew their memberships from government and in-
dustry. Unlike in Brit~in, trade unions were not formally 
represented in energy decisionmaking until 1976 when the 
Energy Political Implements Act 64 set up the Energy Board 
- . 
to advise government in the preparation of energy policy 
reviews. The Energy Board drew its membership from trade 
unions as well as from industry and the. scientific commu-
nity. 
\ 
In Denmark as well as in Britain, an increased emphasis on 
th? use of planning techniques in energy policy during 
these years can be observed. Looking ahead became increas-
ingly important, .as indicated by the ,creation in 1974 o~ 
an Analysis and Prognoses Committee under the Ministry of 
Commerce. The forecasts prepared by the Committee were ba-
'. . ..' 
sed. on, in mathematical-statistical models describing for 
each sector energy supply and demand. Hence the forecasts 
included-
" ( ••• ) the development of energy demand and the con-
sumption of resources available for satisfaction of 
this demand, disaggregated into sectors of consumption 
: -and different fuels and . including.; a statistical-
economic analysis of the impact which would result from 
e.g. the relation between - prices and tariffs, 
efficiency in energy consumption and - from the 
development of production, transport and ,consumption." 
(Handelsminister iets -analyse- og prognoseudvalg, 1975, 
,·p.S.). 
. ( .' 
The need· for· using mathematical models in energy policy 
was explained to' the public in a book on energy economics 
and planning which is one of a series-published as:part of 
a major energy information exercise conducted by the:state 
during these years: 
- 66 -
"Energy transformations are influenced by a multitude 
of social factors, and for an energy policy to be effi-
cient and balanced, all these factors need to be taken 
into account in its preparation. In order to implement 
energy policy, a· long term, coordinative energy plan-
ning is a necessity. 
The content of this planning has to be founded on a de-
tailed analysis of the character and background of pre= 
sent circumstances and a description of alternative fu-
tUre trends and the i r requi remen ts." (Energ i Oplysnings 
Udvalget, 1975, I, p.7) (emphasis added). 
Recognition of the vulnerability of sectoral for~cast~ led 
to the development of increasingly sophisticated forecast-
ing procedures. The adopti~nof scenario techniques around 
1980 seems to reflect growi~g/u~certainties about the fu~ 
tUre. For example, the 1981 energy plan examined the im-
plication of three sets of basic assumptions about future 
levels of economic growth and future types of social con-
tro1 65: 
1) GOP growth: 2% p.a. until 1984, 3.5% from 1985-2000. 
Unchanged social control. 
2) GOP growth as above. Strong social control ( .. ( ••• ) a 
more radical effort to reduce energy consumption" (En-
. ergiministeriet, 1981, p. 76». . .. 
3) GOP growth: 1.5% to the year 2000. Unchanged ~ocial 
control. 
Generally, the policy statements of. the late 1970s dis-
played an increasing awareness of the social costs genera-
ted by energy production and consumption. In 1978 and 1979 
the Ministry of, Finance published long-term economic .. pro-
jections6~ which.included for each.major future energy in-
vestment programme.~ (nuclear. power, . establishment of a gas 
distr ibution network) calculations. of long: term costs and 
benefits of the programme. 
At the same time as:methods were being developed for com-
Prehensive ex ante evaluation of energy investments, 
increaSingly attempts were being made. to subject the 
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energy sector to economic control in terms of budget 
constraints. The abovementioned long-term projections from 
the Ministry 'of Finance were tools for coordinating public 
expendi ture wi thin firmly set budget limi ts. In the con-
text of economic planning, energy was seen to be a par-
,ticularly 'important component of the national budget for 
two reasons: 1) energy imports was a major factor in 
Denmark's increasing trade deficits, and 2) the export 
potential of Danish industry relied on a sufficient and 
reasonably priced energy supply67. In addition, the energy 
sector was seen to offer large potentials for increasing 
efficiency of public investments, partly by enh,ancing 
energy conservation, partly by controlling investment 
directly. This is evident from' the the Budget reviews of 
the Budget Department wi thin the Ministry of Public Fi-
nances which represent 
investments to' evaluation 
economic efficiency criteria. 
New institutions 
attempts 
on the 
to subject energy 
basis of national 
The years after 1973 also wi tnessed a rapid expansion of 
the institutional framework for state energy poli cy68. 
Until 1976 various government departments had been 
responsible for different aspects of energy production. In 
1976, energy was formally incorporated as a responsibility 
of·' the Ministry of Commerce and an Energy Agency 
(Energistyrelsen) was set up to be in charge of this area. 
Hence, energy was formally defined as a policy area. 
Whereas the importance of this area was finally 
acknowledged; by the creation in 1979 of the Ministry of 
Energy, the; number of state bodies involved in energy 
decisionmaking ~ad been increasing from 1974. Fig. 2.2 
shows, the organization of the energy area which developed 
dUring the 1970s. 
Public participation" in energy decisionmaking was another 
! 
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. Fig.2.2 Organisation of Danish Energy Policy 1973-78 
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concern of the Danish as well as the British state from 
the mid-70's. Or iginally, the object! ve was informing the 
public about energy as a means to national economic ends, 
as it was succintly stated by the Ministry of Commerce in 
1976: 
"The campaigns to save energy must, also in the future, 
aim to influence the attitude and behaviour of the 
public towards waste and energy,' to" draw attention to 
improved uses of proven technologies and to 'keep public 
attention focused on the fact that energy supply is not 
a temporary problem." (Handelsministeriet, 1976, p. 
85) • 
The scope for, public information was ,however widened 
considerably,during the next couple of years. In order to 
implement" a public information campaign, the Minister of 
Commerce s~t ,up, the Energy Information Commi ttee ,(Energi 
OPlysnings Udvalget). The commiftee was a' relatively 
independent body consisting of representatives of 
educational establishments but funded by government.. The 
main activity of th~ committee' was the publication <if a 
ser ies of six books descr ibing different as'pects of ene~gy 
politics in publicly, accessible lang~~~e~ The publiciati~ns 
of the' commi ttee supported the government view that 10ng-
term' c~mprehensi ve Pla~ni'ng' of 'energy w~s' bo'th necessary 
. ,. , ' ~. , . ~ ." , 
anddesirable~ 'But in insisting that environciental and 
Social ,- factors' should b~' taken in'to account as, well as i~ 
I, " 
its vi~ws on public participation it ~iffered iather 
Widely fro~ g~vern~entPolicy: ' . " 
-,' l t 
"Energy problems are not just technical probl~ms. They 
are economic and poli tical problems which in Denmark 
must find a democratic solution. Perhaps single issues 
must be subjected to referendum, perhaps not. Anyhow, 
it .is~the express wish of both Parliament (Folketinget) 
and the most recent governments that decisions must be 
based on a thorough public debate: that we are all 
involved in the '·decisionmaking process." (Energi 
Oplysnings Udvalget, 1975 III) 0, -
The committee was not given along lease of life: ,when the 
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original grant ran out, no additional funding was 
allocated for the activities of the committee, and it was 
disbanded in 1976. No official reason was given for this. 
Procedures allowing for public participation in energy 
decision-making were never introduced, but there was a 
,growing awareness of the importance of public opinion. 
Thus, the 1979 Energy Report from the Minister of 
Commerce 69 stressed, the need for posi ti ve cooperation of 
the gener al . public in implementing' the plan, but did not 
Specify how this cooperation was to be achieved. The 1981 
Energy Plan 70, however, was more specific on this issue, 
; " , ~ 
mentioning i~formation campaigns' as an instrument for 
achieving public consent' and cooperation. Such campaigns 
would include 
We 
" ( ••• ) information' acti vi ties focusing on rational use 
of energy and energy efficient technologies." 
(Energiministeriet, 1981, p.35). 
may say 
opinion was 
objectives 
that ,the .··~rowing recogni tion . th~t " public 
vi tal 'to the success 'in implementing energy 
}. i < 
was ' not . transformed into procedures for 
" " 
ensuring that"' the attitudes and ideas of the public was 
incorporated in energy policy. In contrast, procedures for 
involving tradi tional interest groups' were established as 
soon as state energy policy had been defined as a separ~te 
concern. ", For . example, the Energy Board ~ ", wh ich '" was "to 
advise the Minister of Commerce'on energy matters' drew, 
its, membership from.' the energy industr ies, the employers' 
organization, and the trade union council (the LO).~ 
!Lew Object! ves 
In Denmark as in Britain the objectives of national energy 
POlicy changed during the 1950-1980 period. Before 1973 
there had been no formulated over-all objectives for.state 
Policies towards energy.' The 1975 discussion document on a 
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national heating plan 71 cited the long-term aim as 
diminishing 
(imported) 
energy consumption 
oil in space heating. 
and 
The 
dependence 
reaction to 
on 
the 
economic repercussions of the oil price rises were evident 
also in the objectives cited in the 1976 Energy Plan 72 : 
1) Reduction of Denmark's dependence on oil by means of 
a) Implementation of a diversified system of energy 
SUPplY1 
b) Accumulation of emergency stocks. 
2) Deceleration of growth in energy consumption. 
3) Coordination and intensification of energy R&D. 
In 1979, -these remained fundamental objecti ves, but they 
were supplemented with an objective relating to energy 
consumption: 
"(It is an objective) to cut growth in energy con-
sumption, with special emphasis' on measures which can 
be '. implemented relatively quickly, in conjunction with 
the, efforts to co-ordinate and intensify research and 
development in the energy . sector." (Ministry of 
Commerce, 1979, p.3). 
The' emphasis on cutting growth in energy consumption is 
parallel to the increasing emphasis on the role of energy 
in:the national budget. Where the main concern of the 1976 
Energy Plan was, a' reduction of 'oil imports by" ,replacing 
imported oil with ot~er sources of energy, towards the end 
of the' 1970s reduction in oil imports was to be achieved 
by reducing consumption. The emphasis shifted from, supply 
security' in the long term to effects, immediate as well 
as long-term, on the national budget. 
New Issues 
The concrete . issues of Danish. energy policy. differed 
somewhat from those of, Br i tish ',energy policy. While, the 
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potentials of North Sea oil and gas supply, nuclear power 
and renewable energy commanded interest in both countries, 
the concern for heat occurred only in Denmark. This was 
due to the fact, that energy consumption in the form of 
heat in 1972 amounted to 43% of gross consumption, and 
that this heat was obtained largely by burning imported 
oi1 73 • 
Shifting fuel consumption in this sector away, from oil 
became a prime concern of energy policy. A Heat Supply Act 
passed in 1979 aimed at regulation of energy consumption 
for ~pace heating74 • The Act gave the Minister the power 
to divide the country into heating regions. Each region 
I 
was in pr inciple' to be supplied wi th ei ther one of two 
types of collective heating: district heating from 
combined heat and power station or natural gas. In the 
case' of rural'areas wi th low densi ty of buildings, other 
heating methods like electrical were' drawn up with due 
regard to the natural 'gas project, the existing and 
projected combined heat' and power stations as well as 
projections ~f heat demand density. 
Energy conservation was' another important area for state 
intervention. I Car-free Sundays I and I Save-I it I campaigns 
of the immediate post-oilcr isis "years w'ere replaced' by 
more ,direct state intervention when the building 
,regulations were tightened considerably in 1977. The new 
regulations set standards for insulation, heating and 
ventilation installations etc. Also in 1977 the Process 
Energy' Act '. (Lov om stat'stilskud til energ ibesparende 
foranstaltninger i forbindelse med industrielle processer) 
was' passed in Parliament- whi~h pro~ided_' for' state 
subsidies of up' to 40% of' costs of investment of private 
trade and industry in energy conservation and efficiency. 
The ~partial nationalisation of Danish reserves' of' oil and 
gas in the'North Sea 'also fits in this context.' In 1973 
the gas company was extended to deal ~ithoil'andbecame 
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the Danish Gas and Oil Company (Dansk Olie og Naturgas, 
A/S), a limited company in which the state owned all 
shares. It was to operate like a private firm on the oil 
market, for example by setting up direct trade agreements 
with Middle East oil producers. The first task of the 
company was to renegotiate the licensing conditions of the 
private consortium prospecting in the North Sea. A 
contract for gas sales from the consortium to the 
nationalised company was set up in 1979. This contract is 
generally considered very unfavourable to the Danis~ 
state, which is contractually bound to purchase 55.000 
millions m3 of gas before 1994. The gas is to be purchased 
evenly over the period, and the price of gas is to follow 
the price of oil in the world.~arket75. In 1981 a contract 
was signed which gave the Danish national oil and gas 
company ,option to purchase 40% ,of oil recovered after 
1982., In addition the contract defined the terms for a 
gradual handing over of sectors of the North Sea to the 
Danish state. According to the contract, sectors. in which 
oil recovery had been or were to be initiated shortly 
after 1981 were to be handed back to the state. The North 
Sea negotiations give evidence to increased state activity 
in relation to energy supply and can be seen as one side 
of the efforts .. to replace. the imported Middle East oil 
with other fuels. Parallel to these efforts, increased 
attention were given to technologies which seemed to offer 
other ways of getting rid of the dependence on oil im-
ports. 
The prospect of fuel shortage also led to renewed 
consideration of .nuclear power.' In 1975, the Social 
Democratic government put forward a Nuclear Installations 
Bill to. supersede the 1962 Act, which had never been 
implemented. ,Ac:.cording to this. bill, the decision to 
introduce nuclear power was to be taken in Parliament. 
Siting was also t~ be a question for the state, which 
would issue planning directives to local authorities 
reserving 1 areas. for future nuclear power plants. The Act 
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was only passed, however, after an escape clause had been 
added. According to this clause, the Act would only become 
operational if and when Parliament passed an addi tional 
bill putting it into force. This bill reached the 1st 
committee stage. The bill was presented thus: 
"I think that nuclear power is necessary for our supply 
situation. It cannot be replaced by natural gas. We 
will have to use it to rid us of two thirds of our 
reliance on oil and coal. That is essential." (Speech 
by Erling Jensen, Minister for Commerce, in Parliament 
21 May 1975. Quoted here from Hertz and Nielsen, 1979, 
p. 8) • 
This bill, however, never went beyond the commi ttee stage 
and in 1976 it was removed from the agenda. This did not 
imply" however, that nuclear power was taken out of energy 
planning. Both the 1976 Energy Plan, the economic 
prognoses of the late 70s, the 1979 Energy Report and the 
1981 Energy'Plan included a nuclear 'component, which was 
maintained even' after the Social Democratic government in 
1979 ,declared a moratorium on nuclear power until a full 
inquiry' into questions of reactor, safety" waste disposal 
and 'economics of nuclear power gerieration had'been 
conducted. 'The mora tor ium ind ica ted growing uncer tainties 
about the future costs of nuclear power. In add i tion it 
was decided that' 'any, decision to introduce nuclear power 
in Denmark would be subjected to areferendum~ This 
. 
reflects growing government concern about the public . ' 
acceptance of nuclear power, a concern which' was also 
present in the 1981 Energy Plan. The plan stated, that 
although large economic benefits would be' expected to 
arise from the introduction of nuclear power, just as this 
would mean a further dec~ea~~ i~ 'the impo~t of oil, there 
,-", " 
~as no need for a quick de6isi~n on nuclear power, as the 
present generating capacity was sufficient 
(Energiministeriet, 1981). 
. ,-,' 
Hence, . nuclear power has' not as yet' been introduced in 
Denmark although successive' governments have regarded it 
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as a favourable option. The development in the. arguments 
for opting for nuclear power has been parallel to what we 
have seen to be the case in Br i tain: In the 50s nuclear 
power was portrayed. as a major scientific and technical 
achievement. Later, the emphasis was on the abili ty of 
nuclear power to displace impor ted oil, and by the end of 
the 70s focus was on the relationhip between costs . and 
benefits of nuclear electricity generation. 
In Denmark, as in Britain, renewable energy received more 
poli tical attention in the 70s than in the 50s •. Al though 
renewable energy was mentioned along with other sources in 
the. policy documents of the 1970s, the expectations for 
I 
the future supply' potential of the renewable sources were 
minute. Thus the 1979,Energy Report noted: 
"The possibilities of switching to renewable energy 
sources in 1985 and 1995 are just as hypothetical as 
they were at the time of preparing the 1976-Report. 
Considerable research and' developmental work is going 
into this fields, bu there are as yet no thorough 
appraisals that enable a realistic quantification of 
,the contributions' that renewable energy sources are 
likely to make to our energy supply". (The Ministry of 
Commerce, 1979, p. 11). 
In the 1981 Energy Plan it was observed that increases in 
fuel prices had improved the competitivenesi of ~eriewable 
energy techno log ies. The supply scenar ios assumed a 
contribution from renewable sources at 3.3 to 7%~ The 
'high' 'case of 7% assumed a laige percentage of renewable 
sources in heating whereas no contribution from these 
sources to electricity production was expected. Taking 
into account the present interest in wind machines from 
Danish industry, this assumption seems somewhat odd. 
" ' ,1 . 
The, policy instruments used by' the state in relation to 
renewable energy have mainly fallen in two categories: 
funding'for technological R&D in places like Ris0and th~ 
universities, and subsidies 'for local experiments with 
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renewable energy systems. R&D funding for renewable energy 
was increased dramatically from 1977. Before then, 
renewable energy had received 2-3% of R&D expenditure (for 
compar ison 62-65% were allocated for f issi,on and fusion). 
After 1977, this percentage was increased so that by 1980, 
~2% of energy R&D went into renewables as compared to 24% 
for nuclear power 76 • The stakes were being placed more 
evenly, reflecting that nuclear power had become a risky 
proposition. The sizeable R&D figure for nuclear power 
shows, however, that it was still expected to playa role 
in future energy supply. The bulk of renewable energy R&D 
went into technologies expected to be compatible with the 
existing infrastructure, for example about 42%, of the 
I 
total renewable 'energy R&D "expenditure' went into wind 
power (ai odds with the assumptions mentioned above of the 
role of renewable energy in the future energy supply). 
Summary of Danish'Energy Policy 
Table 2.2 sums up the most important developments in 
Danish. energy policy from 1950-80. The period is divided 
into five-year 'intervals. 
From 1950 to 1955, the most important concern of the state 
in 'relation to energy was the development of nuclear 
power. State ini tiati ves were taken to support the 
development of the promising technology.: In Denmark, no 
nuclear establishment existed at the time, so the Atomic 
Energy Commission was to start up the nuclear project from 
scratch. 
From 1956-1960, the state did· not intervene in energy 
affairs at all •.. From 1961-1965, we notice" an attempt· to 
strenghten nuclear research by·. setting up Ris0,· the nu-
clear research station,' as well as renewed efforts to 
ensure introduction'of nuclear power by passing the Atomic 
Installations Act. The government's handing, over the li-
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cence to exploit North Sea resources to a private consor-
tium indicates that the possible. access to indigenous oil 
and gas was not regarded important to the Danish fuel sup-
ply or the national. economy in the long term. Again from 
1966-1970 a quiet period indicates that energy supply was 
·left to fuel and power industries. 
From 1971, however, we notice a sudden activity in energy 
policy. A number of state bodies were set up to look into 
different aspects of energy supply and consumption. The 
problem of ensur ing suff icient supplies of fuels in the 
future were addressed by attempts to analyse, forecast and 
control vi tal factors determining the need for fuels in 
/ 
the future. Such vital factori were the size of future en-
ergy consumption and' the composi tion of fuels in the na-
tional energy supply. 
The. interest in fuel diversification was reflected in re-
.~ 
newed interest in the North Sea and in nuclear power. In 
addition, ··the period was characterized by attempts to in-
volve interest groups in decisionmaking, the attempts to 
control consumption through.proposals for heating plans as 
well as directly through information campaigns, and final-
ly, energy. was now being regarded as an integrated and 
important policy area located within one Ministry, the Mi-
nistry of Trade. 
Fro-m 1976,. the state energy policy establishment did not 
develop as rapidly as in the previous period, but' the 
establishment of an energy department and more formalized 
administration procedures signals that the energy area was 
now regarded a stable concern of the state. This is also 
indicated by the incre~se' in the number of Acts on energy 
being passed in .. this period and the institutionalisation 
of Energy Policy Reviews. Towards the end of the decade, 
national economic costs of energy production and consump-
tion became an important issue in state energy policy, and 
emphasis was· increasingly on efficiency in consumption as 
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Table 2.2 Events in Danish Energy Policy 1950-1980. 
5 year 
period 
1950 
1955 
1956 
1960 
1966 
1965 
1966 
1970 
1971 
. 1975 
1976 
1980-
Institutional 
changes 
Creation of 
the Atomic 
Energy Com-
mission (19551 
Rise set up 
(19551 
Advisory Com-
mittee on North 
Sea Resources. 
(1971) 
Danek Naturgas 
AIS set up (1972) 
Energy Policy 
Committee. 
Analyses and 
Prognoses Com-
mittee (1974) 
Heating Methods 
Committee (1975) 
D.O.N.G. AIS 
set up 
Ministry of Com-
merce given re-
sponsibility for 
Energy (1976) 
Energy Board 
(1976) 
Energy Agency 
(1976) 
Ministry of 
Energy (1979) 
Legislation 
and impor-
tant policy 
documents 
Atomic Energy 
Act (1955) 
Licence to 
exploit North I 
Sea to DUC 
(1962) 
Atomic Instal-
lations Act 
(1962) 
1st energy 
policy re-
view (1974) 
Discussion 
document on 
a national 
heating 
plan (1975) 
Nuclear In-
stallations 
Bill (1975) 
-Danish 
Energy Po-
licy- (1976) 
-Energy Re-
port-
Electricity 
supply Act 
(1976) 
Energy Po-
litical Im-
plements Act 
(1976) 
Building re-
gulations 
(1977) 
Investment 
surveys (1978-) 
Budget reviews. 
Moratorium on 
; nuclear power 
(1979) 
-Heating Sup-
ply Act- (1979) 
79 
Methods 
and practices 
- changes 
Information 
campaign 
'Save-it' cam-
paign 
Scenario tech-
nique. 
Cost-benefi t 
analysis. 
Funding of re-
newable energy 
R'D. Budget-
oriented ener-
gy planning. 
well as (long and short term) efficiency in energy 
investments. Finally, the public acceptance of energy 
political aspects, especially nuclear power, had become 
important • 
.. Looking across the five-year periods in order to identify 
periods of stable concerns, periods of conflicts and 
phases of transition, we note that state activity towards 
energy was limi ted until 1971, whereas the picture after 
1970 is more complex. Looking at the character of events 
leads us to identify the following periods: 
1) 1950 to 1970. In this period the state' did not 
/ 
interfere wi th the already established system of energy 
supply and consumption. Only on the fuel side, did the 
state become involved. The nuclear project was a state 
venture which was to increase eff iciency in electr ici ty 
production which would mean that full employment would not 
be an obstacle to continued growth. Besides, energy supply 
was left to private and local industry and to individual 
ci ti zens.-
2) 1970 to 1973: growing uncertainties in relation to fuel 
supply expressed in attempts . to coordinate policies 
towards fuel and power and establish _ future state 
influence in fuel supply. 
3) --1973 to approx 1978. The years immediately after the 
oil crisis were marked by attempts to change the structure 
of Danish energy supply in order to ensure that Denmnark 
would not in the future again depend on only one fuel. 
. . ," 
State energy policy institutions were created. As a 
novelty, it was attempted to control energy consumption. 
Energy had become a problem on its own. .. -
4) After 1978. Towards the end of the, 1970s, state 
intervention in the energy. sector had been firmly 
established. But new problems had replaced the concern for 
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a stable fuel supply. The cost of. energy was set against 
the context of a contracting national economy. In 
addition, the costs to society of the negative higher-
order effects of. energy production had also been 
recognized, and attempts were being made to develop 
planning methods which would ensure that such costs were 
diminished. Project evaluation had come into focus. 
Likewise, energy conservation was seen as an instrument to 
cut down energy imports and thus help trade defici ts. At 
the same time, public acceptance of energy policy was 
important. Thus, energy policy no longer reacted to a one-
dimensional problem like in the 1950s or 1960s when the 
problem was ensuring economic ~rowth, or immediately after 
the oil crisis. A multftude of objectives have 
increasingly been imposed on state energy policy since the 
mid-1970s. 
2.4 Conclusion 
This chapter set out to analyse the historical development 
of Br i tish and Danish energy policy in order a) to· assess 
whether our assumption of a parallel development of energy 
policy in the two nations is sustainable, b) to 
i~vestigate whether a poli ticisation has occurred in this 
area in the specified period and c) to establish the 
content as well as the chronologi of this politicization. 
Table 2.3, which in its lay-out resembles tables 2.1 and 
2.2, shows developments in terms of institutional changes, 
. ., ' 
policy issues and changes in practises and methods which 
are common to the two nations. 
Looking at table 2.3, we observe that only' as regards 
nuclear policy. was the development of energy, policy 
parallel to Denmark and Br i tain before' , 1970. The 
development of poli ticalinsti tutions .. to do . with nuclear 
power as well as of legislation in the field was almost 
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Table 2.3 British and Danish energy policy 1950-1980. 
Common trends. 
Time 
(5 year 
periods) 
1950 
1955 
1956 
1960 
1961 
1965 
1966 
1970' 
1971, 
1975 
1976 
Institutional 
changes' 
Institutions 
for preparing 
civil nuclear 
projects 
Energy remit of 
one ministry. 
Advisory coun-
cils esta-
blished. ' 
Bodies to look 
into methods for 
energy planning. 
Strengthened 
control of in-
digenous sources 
Attempts to in-
volve interest 
groups in deci-
sionmaking (gi-
ven up towards 
end of period). 
Legislation 
tendencies 
Changes 
in practices 
Legislation 
establishing 
civil nuclear 
energy 
/ 
Legislation 
and policies 
,for ensuring 
future fuel 
supplies. 
Plans for 
new nuclear 
programmes. 
Comprehen-
sive energy 
policy re-
views. 
Legislation 
on energy 
, conserva-
tion 
Legislation 
on e1ectri-
ci ty. ' , 
Adoption of 
national ener-
gy forecasting 
Efforts to 
make general 
public aware 
of energy pro-
blems .. 
Intensified, 
planning. 
'Attempts to 
include non-
economic costs 
Considerations 
of new aspects 
of-energy sup-
ply: 
Environment; 
employment; 
public parti-
" pation., . 
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synchronized in the countries in contrast to the 
development of other fuel policies. As we shall see in 
chapter 4, this may be explained in part by differences in 
the fuel base and energy supply systems of the two 
countries, coupled with the character of nucelar power as 
a non-geographically specific, highly specialized source 
of energy, which was widely thought to represent a long-
term solution to the shared problem of prospecti ve energy 
shortage. 
After 1971 energy. policy tendencies converged in the', two 
nations. In both nations (and especially in Britain), 
state involvement in the ener~y sector was increasing up 
to 1973. In 1973 and 1974 both countries experienced large 
problems ~elated to fuel supply and ·fuel prices. Both the 
Danish and the Br i tish state reacted by trying to extend 
the capaci ty for planning and controlling energy supply. 
In both countries, new. fuels and. technologies were 
considered as a. means towards fuel diversification. In 
addi tion, the states sought to control energy consumption 
by attempts to clarify the national (-economic) effects of 
individual energy consumption ( 'was te of energy') to the 
consumer. The idea that growth in energy consumption was a 
nec:essary prerequisi te of, economic growth. had been 
temporarily suspended in the light of the consequences of 
depending on very few fuels for energy supply. State 
energy planning. became firmly established as. a necessi ty 
in - order . to avoid future similar s i tua tions. . Immediately 
after the oil crisis and the British coal strike, the 
state attempted to avert the immediate consequences of the 
threatening breakdown in fuel supply and develop 
strategies which would insure. against similar events in 
the future. 
The problems o~ the1960s and 1970s, however, had not been 
solved. The' environmental' effects of 
stilL' presented a problem,· which 
energy production 
came further into 
prominence when nuclear power programmes were presented as 
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part of fuel diversification strategies in both countries. 
Likewise, the political conflicts between political 
groups, specifically trade unions and industrial 
interests, were still latent. 
-These problems were now integrated into a growing state 
energy policy complex in both countries. The comprehensive 
energy policy reviews of 1974-1977 included considerations 
of a very large number of aspects related .to energy 
production and consumption in order to arrive at 
. , 
strategies which were robust against economic as well as 
political problems. 
Towards the end' of the 19705, in both countries, . energy 
.' 
was to a still larger extent subjected to national budget 
considerations. While state policy insti tutions were 
consolidated, the proliferation of state bodies had come 
to a halt. Still, however, new planning methods were being 
developed, partly in order to ensure future cost-
minimization, partly in attempts to accomoda te the 
increasing number of uncertainties in relation to energy., 
In table 2.4 we have attempted to draw these observations 
together wi th the per iods we der i ved from our surveys of ~ . 
national energy policy in the two nations to arrive at.' a 
common periodization. The table is divided into' four 
columns, showing - the· basic problems forener9Y policy, the' 
fc;>cal ,points of state policies, . the solutions to' energy 
problems in terms of state involvement and finally 
important divergences between the two nations. 
We have seen,' that energy policy in the two n.~tions in the 
1950s were similar with respect to nuclear power. The fact 
that Br i tish fuel industr ies were' nationalised made for 
state involvement in fuel production, but this involvement 
was not subjected to political discussion in terms of the 
·overall energy supply. As in Denmarkienergy planning was' 
the task of the energy industry. The basic problem of the 
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Table 2.4 Problems, issues and solutions in energy policy 1950-1980. 
2enmark and Britain. 
Period Problems fac-
ing the state 
in. relation 
to energy 
1950s 
1960s 
1973 
Future fuel 
~ 
Energy infra-
structure in-
sufficient to 
cope with 
growth 
Growth in 
energy con-
suml?tion not. 
limltless 
control of 
energy sup-
ply-
conflictin9 
interests In 
energy pro-
duction 
Environmental 
problems 
Focal points 
Economic 
growth 
Technological 
progress 
Inability of 
industries to 
control ex-
·ternalities 
and to coor-
dinate pro-
duction 
Environmental 
effects of 
nuclear power 
/ 
Policy so-
lutions 
Closing 
fuel gap: 
State fi-
nanced de-
velopment 
power; 
centralisa-
tion of 
electricity 
industry; 
state sup-
port for 
technolo-
gical 
change in 
fuel pro-
duction; 
extension 
of grid. 
State ener-
gy planning 
Energy fo-
recasting; 
state fi-
nanced 
energy R&D; 
state bo-
dies for 
control of. 
external 
effects; 
involve-
ment of 
trade 
unions and 
industrial 
interests 
in state 
energy po-
licy. 
Divergences 
DK/UK 
Nationalized 
industries 
specific 
problem· of 
the UK. 
Danish in-
frastructure 
and fuel 
production 
concern of 
private 
sector. 
British coal 
not competi-
tive with 
oil: . Subs i-
dies for 
coal; propo-
sals to wind 
up coal pro-
duction; 
problems 
with mine-
workers' 
union. 
1973 
and 
the 
next 
couple 
of 
'Energy cri-
sis' 
Future energy 
supply threa-
tened 
dependence on 
few fuels 
Supply secu-
rity 
Fuel diver-
sification 
Energy con-
sumption 
Intensifed 
state acti-
energy area 
new insti-
tutions 
support for 
develop-
ment of 
new sour-
ces: 
North Sea, 
nuclear 
Power. 
British coal 
miners' 
vities 
instrike 
adds 
to fuel un-
certainties. 
Danish de-
pendence on 
oil implies 
that oil 
crisis was 
more impor-
tant in DK. 
------------------------------------------------------------------------
late 
1970s 
Economic 
stagnation" 
Costs of e---
nergy in na-
tional econo-
mic perspec-
tive: 
Profitabili-
ty: 
Costs of"ex-
ternal effects:" 
Cost of excess 
capacity: 
Public accept 
of energy po-
licy 
Indigenous 
energy sup-
£!Y 
Efficiency 
of investments 
New energy 
technolo-
gies 
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I 
State sup-
. port for 
development 
of indige-
nous sour-
ces 
Energy con-
servation 
Public par-
ticipation. 
Nuclear po-
wer problems 
lead to mo-
ratorium in 
DK and pub-
lic inqui-
ries in the 
UK. 
state was ensuring sufficient energy output to support 
economic growth. 
The 1960s in Britain stands out as a period where state 
management of energy production led to an increasing 
number of problems concerning the labour force, 
competitiveness of coal in the world market and the 
environment. These problems prompted state attempts to 
develop new procedures for planning energy production. 
This development was also marked in Denmark, where the 
problems were not the concern of the state but of the 
energy industries and the consumers~ Only by the early 
1970s ,did state involvement in energy occur here. 
/ 
Throughout the 1960s, the av'ailabili ty and cheapness of 
oil had meant that energy did not constitute a problem. 
The only indication that the energy situation were 
" 
different from that of the 1950s was the quiet which fell 
upon' nuclear power after the enthusiasm of the 1950s. 
Thus, whereas state involvement in energy policy increased 
up to 1973 in both countries, this happened considerably 
later 'in Denmark than in Britain. Hence, the period which 
we have' termed 'the 1960s to 1973' only to 'a limited 
extent covers a parallel development of energy policy. 
This' indicates that ownership of energy production was an 
important factor determining state energy policy in this 
period. 
The shift around 1973 is very marked in both Denmark and 
Britain; and the development of state energy policy after 
1974 strikingly similar. In both countries' the hectic 
sfate acti~ities in thesey~ars marked a dis~inct 
departure' from the paradigms or frameworks' of state' in': 
tervention in e~ergy up to 1973. State energy planning :wa~ 
, .. . '\ . '. . ' .' . 
intensified'with the strateglc alm of ensuring future fuel 
supply ~ We have marked 1973 with a bold line in the table 
t~ indic~te,that this year represents a significant break 
which'is common to both countries. 
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The fourth period starts about 1977, although no clear 
da te separates th is per iod f rom the 'per iod of panic' im-
mediately upon the oil crisis. During this period the 
emphasis on expanding state capacity to deal with all 
-aspects of energy, first and foremost the problem of 
ensur ing future energy supply, was gradually replaced by 
emphasis on the role of energy investments in adding to 
national economic problems. Thus on the 
policy was increasingly regarded as an 
economic policy while on the other the 
one hand energy 
instrument of 
need to ensure 
public accountability led to the adoption of new 
procedures for public participation. In both countries the 
number of alternative objectives and concerns for national 
energy policy accumulates in this period, and so the 
problems ~ related to state control of energy becomes 
increasingly evident. This period is thus characterized by 
a clash of different concerns wi thin state energy policy 
and between state energy policy and other concerns of 
which the concern for the national economy appears to be 
most important. This per iod is therefore character ized by 
moves- away from the strong state efforts at politically 
controlling energy supply in the national interest and 
increasing recogni tion that a unifying national interest 
beyond cannot at present be identified. 
We have now identified within the 1950 - 1980 period four 
-. 
sub-periods characterized by different approaches to state 
intervention in energy policy, both as regards its form 
and content. In both Denmark and Britain, the emphasis on 
economic growth was strong in the 1950s leading to market-
or iented policies. This was followed in both - countr ies by 
a phase, most marked in Britain, of increasing emergence 
of problems in '~nergy supply, leading to increaSing state 
involvement. The events of 1973/74 marked a significant 
shift in both countries and was followed by the definition 
of energy policy as a national concern. Towards the end of 
the 1970s, problems of accommodating different possible 
objectives as well as possible future developments in 
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state energy policy became increasingly visible. At the 
same time, the cost of energy production was increasingly 
important. 
We are now left with explaining these shifts in approach. 
This means that we will now have to investigate our as-
sumptions about the influence of different factors on 
energy policy. The following chapter is devoted to an 
investigation of the impact of political groups on energy 
policy. 
I 
• >.. \ 
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NOTES TO CHAPTER 2 
1. See e.g. Ince (1981), who includes as policy-makers nationalised 
and private industries in energy production as well as government 
departments and their divisions. 
2. The name of the department was changed from the Ministry of Fuel 
and Power to the Ministry of Power in 1957. The responsibilities, 
however, remained unchanged. 
3. For.an account of the formation of the UKAEA, see Gowing (1974): 
UKAEA Authority Historian's Office (1979); Connell and Chudleigh 
(1983) pp. 30-32. 
4. The Committee was set up by government to look into whether, in 
view of growing demands for energy arising from full employment 
and the rearmament programme, any further steps could be taken to 
increase efficiency in fuel production and consumption. 
/ 
5. 'The fuel gap' denoted a possible excess of demand for energy 
over s·upply. Hence, when in 1955 the Conservative Minister of 
Fuel and Power, Geoffrey Lloyd, presented government measures for 
reducing coal export and support for an expansion of the nuclear 
power programme, these were motivated by the need for "bridging 
the fuel gap" (The Times, 21 July 1955). 
6. See Chesshire et.al. (1977), pp. 40-41. 
7. R~id and Allen (1975), p.33. 
'8. Chesshire et.al. (1977), p.40. • 
9. This is exemplified by the brief of the committee which preceded 
the Electricity Act of 1957: "to enquire into the organisation 
and efficiency of. the electricity industry in England and Wales 
in the light of its working under the electricity Act 1947." (The 
Electricity Council, 1982). 
10. A full a~count of the development of the nuclear project is be-
yond the scope of this thesis; for detailed accounts, see e.g. 
Patterson (1976) pp. 189-233; Gowing (1974), Stott and Taylor 
(1980), Canell and Chudleigh (1983) pp. 27-63. 
11. Government expected 10,000-15,000, MW of nuclear plant to be in-
stalled by 1957 (The Times, 8 August .1954). For comparison, the 
total capacity of all British nuclear plant in 1975 was 12,256 MW 
(UKAEA, 1979, II, ,appendix 7). 
12. The Times of 13 February 1954 cites as one of the objectives of 
the creation of the Author! ty the need to· keep Britain in· the 
lead of development of the ."sane uses of atomic energy". 
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13. The nuclear: power programmes were presented and revised as fol-
lows: 
year official number size, 
of programme 
1955 1 
1957 revision 
1957 revision 
1960 . revision 
1964 2 
1965 revision 
1974 3 
1978 revision 
1979 4 
(from Cannell and Chudleigh (1983». 
time horizon 
MW 
1,500-2,000 
5,000-6,000 
5,000-6,000 
5,000 
5,000 
8,000 
4,000 
. 2 Advanced 
gas cooled 
reactors 
possibly pres-
surized water 
;eactor 
.·15,000 
of programme 
10 years 
by end 1965 
by end 1966 
by end 1968 
by end 1975 
by end 1975 
by end 1978 
immediately 
1980 
1982-1991 
14. united Kingdom Atomic Energy Authority (1979 II), p.7. 
15. To give an idea of the economic implications of ·the project, the 
expenditure in 1954 for the UKAEA come to $53,675,000 £36 mill. 
(Camilleri, 1984). 
16. For an account of these events, see Stott and Taylor (1977). 
17. Central Office of Information (1962) p.17. 
18. Camilleri (1984), p.40. 
19. Central Office of Information (1962), p.62. 
20. 'The Nuclear fuel cycle' denotes the processes involved. in min-
ing, . enrichment, fuel fabrication, fuel use in reactor, reproces-
sing and storage (see e.g. Patterson, 1976, p.88). 
21. Central Office of Information (1962, 1965, 1967). 
22. The assumption of a correlation between GOP-growth and growth in 
electricity demand is repeated in Central. Office of Information 
(1965). The costs of the first nuclear power stations had turned 
out to be considerably higher than had been forecast. This did 
not, however, affect the presentation of cost forecast for the 
future stations. 
23. For instance it was assumed that load factors of 75% would be 
feasible (Central office of Information, 1965). The, load factor 
is the ratio of units actually generated over a period to those 
which could have been generated if the plant had worked conti-
nuously at full power for the period. Data on actual. load 
factors are difficult to find. The second generation of 'British 
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reactors, however, have load factors at about 25% (Pattersen, 
1976). 
24. Energy Paper No.2l. 
25. Pearson (1981), p. 171. 
26. Central Office of Information (1975, 1977). 
27. Although increasingly sophisticated forecasting procedures were 
developed, more primitive models based on linear extrapolation or 
assuming simple relationships between energy demand and a very 
small number of other parameters remained at the foundation of 
British State energy policy. For example, a model presented in 
Energy Paper No.12 assumes that = GOP, where = growth in energy 
demand and e(the energy coefficient) is constant. In addition it 
was assumed that no radical price changes would happen: "( ••• ) 
the UK is assumed to develop in a world unconstrained by energy 
scarcity and with only moderate changes in energy prices." 
(p.2s). Likewise, Department of'Energy (1979) projections of en-
ergy supply and demand to the end of the century used expected 
trends in GOP growth and oil prices as key indicators of energy 
demand growth. 
28. Energy Commission (1977,11). For critiques of the use of GOP as 
an,indicator in energy forecasting, see Chapman (1975), Hvelplund 
(1980); Ince (1982). 
29. Department of Energy (1978). 
30. For, a discussion of the use of cost-benefit analysis in public 
policy see e.g. Flyvbjerg (1979). 
31. The Energy Commission (1977 I) • 
. 
32. Department of Energy (1978). 
33. For different angles on the political and ethical problems in 
quantitative measures of social variables, see Schrader-Frechette 
(1983) and Zimmerli (1983). 
34. The Energy Commission (1977 I) stated that it should be of no 
concern to" national energy policy whether the poorer members of 
society were in a position to buy adequate warmth and light. 
35. The Energy Commission (1977), p.32. 
36. Ibid. 
37. working Group on Energy Strategy (1977). 
38. 'At the Heart of Nuclear Power', pamphlet, BNFL, 1982. 
39. UKAEA had been accountable in turn to the Ministry of Science and 
the Ministry of Technology (from 1966). The Ministry responsible 
for coal, oil and gas had its name changed a couple of times, 
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from the Ministry of Power to the Ministry of Fuel and Power 
(1957-59). It was absorbed into the Ministry of Technology as was 
responsibility for the UKAEA. 
40. The Electricity Council (1982). 
41. Ibid, pp.1-2. 
42. The allocation of government expenditure on R & Din energy in 
1980/81 was distributed thus: nuclear, electricity, gas, coal oil 
(in order of importance) 95%; renewable sources 2,5%; conserva-
tion 0.5% (Energy Paper No.11). 
43. The bibliographies of e.g. the UKAEA are impressive. See: United 
Kingdom Atomic Energy Authority: Nuclear Power Publications. Lon-
don: UKAEA, 1982; Nuclear Energy: A Select Bibliography. London: 
UKAEA, 1983. 
44. The Electricity Council (1982). 
45. The Energy Commission (1977); Department of Energy (1978). 
46. See e.g. Cannell and Chud1eigh (1983); Kemp et. a1. (19849. 
47. The White Paper "Fuel Policy" (mnd. 2798) had established nuclear 
power as fuel. 
48. The Membership of the NPAB consisted of: The chairman of the Uni-
ted Kingdom Atomic Energy Authority; a full time member of the 
Authority; the Chairman of the Electricity Council; representa-
tives from the electricity boards; plus 'independent nuclear ex-
perts' (United Kingdom Atomic Energy Authority Report and Ac-
counts 1973/74). 
49. Cannell and Chud1eigh (1983), p. 50. 
50. Department of Energy (1974). 
51. See The Energy Commission (1977). 
52. Department of Energy (1981). 
53. The Energy Commission (1977); Energy Paper No.21. 
54. See note 39. For a detailed account for government R&D expendi-
ture on renewable sources, see Flood (1983) p. 181 ff. 
55. See the Energy Commission (1977); Energy Paper no.22. Also the R 
& D Funding reflects these preferences. Hence, between 1978 and 
1980, 73% of total government expenditure on renewable energy 
sources went into R&D in tidal power, wave power and geothermal 
energy (FLood, 1983, p. 182). 
56. The Energy Commission (1977). 
57. Rasmussen (1982), p. 144. 
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58. The involvement of the Minister of Education was probably due to 
the absence of nuclear industry as well as science being a remit 
of that Minister. 
59. Mouritzen et.al. (1978). 
60. Equivalent to the British Ministry of Trade 
61. Poulsen (1978). 
62. Ibid., p. 53. 
63. Statsministeriets svar til det energipolitiske udva1g 26/5/1975 
pp. 1-2. Statsministeriet 26/5/1975 j.no.12-90-34. 
64. Lov om Energipo1itiske Foranstaltninger. 
65. Energiministeriet (1981). 
66. Finansministeriet 1978, 1979). ~ 
67. Finansministeriet, Budgetdepartementet (1979-) 
68. For a detailed account, see Poulsen (1978), pp. 52-63. 
69. Handelsministeriet (1979). 
70. Energiministeriet (1981). 
71. Boligministeriets opvarmningsmetodeudvalg (1975). 
72. Hande1sministeriet (1976). 
73. ·Op.cit. note 67, p. 4.1 ff. 
74. Lov om varmeforsyning af 8/6/1979; 
75. This. contract has been heavily criticized (see e.g. varmeplan-
gruppen, 1981) for placing severe constraints on the manouvering 
capability of local authorities in heat planning. Furthermore the 
price at which the gas is purchased at platform and world market 
oil price index is seen as unfavourable considering the actual. 
cost of extracting the gas. 
76. See: Ministry of Commerce (1979) p.10l; Energiministeriet (1981) 
p. 104 ff. supplement 1. 
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3. POLITICAL GROUPS AND ENERGY POLICY 
3.1 Introduction. 
The analysis in the preceding chapter of the development 
of energy policy in Britain and Denmark led to the 
identification of four periods each showing different 
characteristics of state energy policy. In this chapter we 
shall.look into ,the possible influence of political groups 
on this development. In particular we shall examine Our 
assumption that changes in energy policy are subject to 
direct influence by poli tical groups, while economic and 
/ 
resource conditions as well as the effects of the existing 
systems of energy provision influence the attitudes of 
these groups. 
We have, seen that in both Denmark and·· Britain energy 
became politicized in the course of the 1950-1980 period, 
in t~e sense that the state administration concerned with 
energy:multiplied, the number of issues defined as energy 
policy grew and an increasing number of new methods· were 
adopted in state, energy planning. These tendencies were 
closely related to the imposition of multiple objectives 
on ' state energy policy. The most important of the 
secondary objectives present in the energy policies of 
. both countries were related ,to the impact of. energy 
technologies on. the. environment and on employment. At a 
more specific national level, the process of 
politicization itself as well as the specific issues taken 
uP. in . energy policy was seen to exhibit characteristics 
peculiar-to the nation. Thus we found that the increase. in 
state involvement. 'in energy planning started ear lierin 
Britain than. in Denmark, and that different weight were 
attached to different issues in the two nations: nuclear 
power and·· renewable energy being 
different importance attached . 
technologies. 
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extreme examples of~the 
,to different energy 
In the following we shall investigate political groups as 
a possible source of the changes in energy policy. We 
shall do this by chronological accounts of the energy 
political statements of different classes of political 
groups during the 1950-1980 period. We shall seek to 
locate in the chronology the groups' perception of the 
energy policy context, the range of issues considered 
important and the specific proposal for solutions to 
problems identified in relation to energy. We shall' then 
be able to relate this to the development of state energy 
policy and trace whether there are parallels between the 
energy political ideas of particular groups and state 
'energy policy.' This will gi vie us an indication of the 
dire'ction of the possible influence of particular groups. 
It must be noted that the method does not allow us to 
achieve any proof of' causality. If, however, a specific 
issue appears· in,the policy statement of a group prior to 
it showing up in state energy policy we are satisfied that 
the group is a possible source of influence. 
In addition we want to investigate whether the increase in 
the range of energy political issues and secondary 
objectives is paralleled at the level of political groups. 
We have suggested that new groups have. emerged in the 
energy field and that existing groups have taken up energy 
questions during this period. We want to locate these 
'changes within the chronology, and again establish possible 
parallel developments. 
-To establish these parallels i tis necessary to look at 
British and Danish groups separately, as we have found 
' .. 
differences in the energy policies of the two nations. 
Hence, for each class of groups, the account is divided 
into a British and Danish part. Furthermore 'it ; is 
necessary to identify more -- precisely the poli tica'l g~o~PS 
for investigation. Also' we need to specify what we mean 
political groups. Let us therefore look at some proposals 
for the' , identification' and analysis of political 
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groups in relation to energy policy. 
Pearson (1981) as well as lnce (1982) include in their 
analyses of British energy policy 
groups and workforces not directly 
'policymakers', and 
involved in state 
energy 
called 
decisionmaking. lnce operates with a category 
'the energy establishment' which includes ,diverse 
groups such as trade ,unions, the environmental movement, 
the House of Commons Select Committee on Energy, political 
parties and ,extra-parliamentary insti tutions' like the 
Monopolies and Mergers Commission and the Electricity 
Consumers' Council. The inclusion of these groups in the 
descr iption ,of Br i tish, energy poli tics is not argued 
beyond the observation that 
"Any account of Britain's energy affairs must recognize 
that much power lies with bodies outside the mainstream 
of official decisionmaking." (lnce, 1982, p.4l). 
The questions raised by this apparently common sensical 
" 
observation is not addressed in any depth by lnce." What 
are we to understand by 'power'? How are we to identify 
th6se groups in power? lnce's actor analysis does not 
provide us wi th an answer since it merely descr ibes the 
activities'of a number of groups on whose agendas energy~ 
related topics appear. But to say that an issue occurs on 
the agenda of a group obviously does not establish whether 
, or . not the group commands any power in chang ing 'energy 
~ffairs', whether we understand by' thii the physical 
, , 
supply structure or the policies of the state towards this -, 
structure.' Likewise,' the' politicization of' energy is 
reduced to a fact, as when lnce observes that: 
"( ••• ) trade unions have become increasingly aware of 
the importance of energy problems ,and ,the ;nuclear 
programme in particular. Even unions whose members are 
not employed in the energy industries now" take "an 
interest in energy policy." (Ince, 1982, p. 41.) 
This observation,' however, ,is not, used for' any 'further 
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discussion of why these unions have become interested in 
energy or the influence they command in relation to state 
energy policy. The claim that much power lies wi th these 
groups is not substantiated and what remains is ,a 
documentation of the extent of the occurence of energy-
related issues on the agendas of a number of poli tical 
groups and state agencies in the years from about 1979. 
Pearson (198l) in a similar fashion identifies a number of 
groups which have taken interest in energy issues. Under 
the, heading 'Th~ energy industry' (which is contrasted to 
groups involved in policymaking) she lists, beside the 
industr ial undertaking in energy production, a number of 
I 
'cause groups' (which are "fdrmed for specific purposes to 
campai~nMor act as a pressure group for particular causes 
or 'ideas" (p.135», 'interest, groups' (which ',"maybe 
'. 
defined, as those people who come together out .. of 'a given 
common interest" (p.13S», groups with 'fairly direct 
interest in energy', academic institutions and 'fringe 
involvement'. Under each of these headings she lists' a 
number of groups and describes in short their energy 
political' objectives. This approach gives rise to a number 
of peculiarities beside that of including e.g. 
environmental groups under the heading of 'The energy 
industry'. For example, the trade unions ~re excluded f~om 
this category because they have a "basic political stance" 
(p.l3S), while the Socialist Environment and Resources 
Association, SERA, which is closely connected to sections 
within the trade union movement as well as within the 
Labour Party, is included here as is the soclalist British 
Society 'for Social Responsibility in Science. More 
important, however, is that again the detail in account 
seems to have been achieved at the expense of a discussion 
of the significance of what is described. In this case the 
range of ,groups which 'address' themselves to energy 
questions. 
This problem is addressed briefly by Lindberg (1977,:11), 
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who comments on the lack of organisation and resources at 
the disposal of environmentalist and conservationist 
groups compared to e. g. the energy industry., He concludes, 
that the apparently growing impact of al ternati ve energy 
proposi tions are unlikely to amount to more than incre-
mental modifications of. present policies. Although the 
multiplication of actors at the level of pluralist debate 
may create a certain amount of stalemate and immobilism in 
public energy policy, this is a superficial phenomenon: 
"I reach this conclusion because the energy consumption 
patterns and govermentalpoli tics that have supported 
them seem to me to conform closely to the long-term in-
terest perceptions and survival imperatives of some of 
the most. decisi ve social ,groupings in advanced indus-
tr ial ~ societies. And these are not readily subj ect to 
change because· they are imbedded in deeply seated or-
ganisational, cultural and political/ideological fac-
tors that interact with and reinforce the pluralist and 
eli tist constraints on policy adaptation ( ••• )." (Lind-
berg 1977, II, p. 338). 
! 
This ·conclusion is implicitly supported by Ince (1981) in 
his assessment of the future of the Br~tish electricty'in-
dustry. In his evaluation of the future options and con-
straints, the activities of e.g. environmental groups are 
not brought into consideration .in contrast to.the activi-
ties of the energy.industry and of state energy polic~ bo-
dies. Hence, whereas Ince's actor analysis implied that 
the emergence of new groups outside the mainstream of 
energy decisionmaking must be regarded as significant, 
this suggestion is implicitly contradicted the conclu-
sions. The question of the significance of the arrival of 
new groupS in energy policy thus remains unresolved. 
Inorder.to achieve a more ,systematic understandin~ of the 
influence. of . political groups upon ~nergy PolicY'·we have 
chosen not. to make any preliminary inferences about the 
relati ve power of different groups. ,Instead, . we want to 
establish whether the aims, issues. and attitudes of part i-
cular groupS correspond to.those expressed ine~ergy p~li-
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cy at different times. 
Leaving out assumptions about the distribution of power 
implies that the term 'political groups' is, and is inten-
ded to be, very open from the outset. The necessary opera-
tional classification was established by initially identi-
fying l groups (widely understood as groups of individuals) 
which are at present involved in activities which at some 
level are intended to influence national energy policy and 
planning. This includes energy industries as well as trade 
unions and environmental groups. These groups were roughly 
divided into the following categories: 
political· parties; 
Industrial interests; 
Trade unions ;' 
Other interest groups. 
wi thin these' categor ies, those groups were identi fied . who 
are today' most prominent' in energy policy . and. in public 
debates abou~ energy issues. These included for both Coun-
tries typically the following groups: political parties 
having been in government during the period; energy indus-
tries and industrial interest groups; trade unions in the 
energy sector; and anti-nuclear or: environmental groups. 
Starting from these groups, the whole, spectrum of groups 
involved in national energy, politics' was' identified. The 
involvement of the groups was then traced back to 1950 
where possible, and the following questions were examined 
for each category:' how man~ arid which' typeo-f groups with-
in . the category were· at '. the particular time interested in 
energy? What a~titude did they take to state energy poli-
cy? And how did they perceive the role.of different energy 
technologies? 
Although the research process involved one of tracing 
backwards, the account as it'is reproduced here follows ,a 
forward chronology starting from 1950. This makes possible 
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a direct comparison between the political 
attitudes to energy policy and the actual content 
energy policy as recorded in the preceding chapter. 
3.2 Political Parties. 
groups' 
of state 
If, as we have assumed, changes in energy policy are 
subject to direct influence by political groups, what 
springs to mind first as a possible source of influence is 
the. poli tical parties, which in both the Danish and the 
Br i tish poli tical system are the main fora for poli tical 
action. More specifically, we would expect that the energy 
I 
policy of a country in a spedific period would reflect the 
political ideology of the party in government during that 
period. We would also expect that the politicization of 
energy is recognizable at the level of the political 
parties; more specifically we would expect a growth in the 
number of parties addressing energy problems and an 
increase in the issues taken up within an energy-political 
framework. If changes in state energy policy reflect the 
impact of poli tical parties, we would furthermore expect 
to find the same themes, problems and issues to be 
important here as we have seen to be important in state 
energy policy. Finally, we would expect to be able to 
locate significant ideological shifts especially around 
1973, when we have identified a period of turmoil in state 
energy policy. 
Comparing the energy political attitudes anff activities.of 
political parties of two different nations presents a 
specific metnodo1ogica1 problem stemming from the 
difference in the historical origins of the parties and.in 
the political system of the two nations. For example, the 
different electoral systems of Denmark and Br i tain 2 . have 
given rise to different numbers of political parties. The 
Danish· system 
parties than 
is 
the 
considerably more 
British system, 
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favourable 
which .1eads 
to ; small 
to ,·much 
greater differences being contained within the two to 
three major parties. 
Rather than examine in detail the attitudes of all 
political parties during the 1950-1980 period, we have 
concentrated on those parties who have been important in 
relation to government., In addi tion to this we have mapped 
out changes in the range of energy poli tical at ti tudes 
within the, parliaments of the two nations. For Britain 
this meant looking into the energy political ideas of 
groups within the' l~rge parties; for Denmark it implied 
looking' for the energy political opinions and' atti tudes, 
as well as activi ties aimed o:t _, implementing them. It was 
decided to c~ncentrate' on official policy expr~ssions of 
the. parties: conference resoluti'ons,. program~e's and other 
material endorsed by the party (or,'in the case of 
Britain, the party sub-group). 
Britain. , 
In the period- under ~ di~cussion the major political 
parties of Britain were the Labour Party, the Conservative 
Party and the Liberal Party. The Labour Party was -in 
government. 'until ,1951, while successive Conservative 
governments ruled from 1951 to· 1964, followed by another 
period of Labour Government from 1964-1970. 
Our ing' the 1950s economic growth was a major concern of 
-
both the 'Labour " and Conservative Parties. ," The 
nationalisation in the 1940sof" the fuel and power 
industries had been orchestrated by a Labour government 
and was in line' wi th the Party's ideas about· public 
ownership. But public ownership was not just a m~tter of 
political principle, it was also a means for ensuring 
efficiency' in production. Public ownership opened up' the 
possibility for 'planning as a means. for ensuring future 
growth' ·in output. The 1950 Labour ~Party manifest03 
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emphasized the need of the electricity and coal industries 
to plan for future expansion enabling them to supply 
"( ••• ) more electricity for the homes and more horsepo-
wer for our factories." ,(Labour Manifesto, 1950). 
The 'size of output was the most important figure in La-
bour's energy, discussi~ns of these years followed 
internal economic efficiency of' the nationalized 
tries. Of three energy-related campaign notes from 
by the 
indus-
1951 4, 
two were on the development of electr ici ty pr ices since 
nationalisation, and concluded ~hat pr ices had' been kept 
down due to,public ownership. The third emphasized the ad-
vantages of nationalisation in/terms of the benefit to the 
general public. It was argued that nationalisation should 
be implemented because it would cause output to-rise. Out-
put growth appeared to be the major objective of the fuel 
industries along with higher efficiency and higher pro-
fits: 
"British Electricity last year after' meeting all its 
interest charges made a profit of£13~000,OOO bringing 
the total profit since natinalisation' to £41,000,000. 
Because of improved efficiency electricity charges have 
risen far less than most privately supplied goods and 
services. Gas made a £2,000,000 profit, "bringing "its 
total profits to £8,500,000." (Labour. Party campaign 
leaflet: I socialism Succeeds I.' From a ser ies enti tIed 
'We ,can't afford t~e Tories!"). 
The main focus of policies related to energy of the Labour 
Party in the 1950s WelS t~e ne~d to ensure future growth in 
th'e output ,of energy in o~der' to' support economic growth 
in general. Nationalisation and planning were instruments 
towards "these 'ends. A national energy policy would fur-
thermore contribute to attempts to avoid increasing im-
ports of fuelS. 
Besides nationalisation, another means for securing future 
energy supply was nuclear power. After the formation of 
the Uni ted Kingdom Atomic Energy Author i ty in 1954, the 
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Labour party identified potentials for scientific and 
technological progress as well as a potential for economic 
growth inherent in ,the project: 
"Atomic energy and other new inventions can bring dra-
matic increasese in productivity and therefore in 
weal th and leisure. They will also demand new skills. 
To meet this demand, Labour will" enlist the, help of 
scientists, trade unions and progressive management and 
begin a real drive for better education." (The Labour 
Party. Manifesto 1955, p.4). ' 
The Labour Party's arguments for state involvement in the 
development of civil nuclear power were built on four ba-
sic assumptions: I 
1) More energy would be needed in the future to support 
economic growth, which was seen as a necessary pre-
condition,for heigthening the welfare of the popula-
tion. 
2) Nuclear power was a potentially promising technology 
in respect to productivity and output capacity. 
3) Nuclear power' was a result of·' scientific research 
(as is evident above,. the mili tary or igins of the 
technology were played down). As such, it represen-
ted ,scientific progress, and keeping up with- this 
progress was crucial., Hence, the, technology could 
'demand' (more education and' training, for example). 
4) Finally, it was assumed, that'providing support for 
this kind of technological project was a task for 
the state rather than private industry; 
For example, the Labour'paty in 1958 expected that the in-
dustrial life of the country would' increasir:gly be related 
to nuclear development: 
"Our- industries to a greater or lesser extent will be-
come. dependent . on nuclear power and nuclear develop-
ment" (The Labout Party,l958, p. 30). 
i 
Also, the. role _ of the, s t~ te was' emphas i zed as was the con-
fidence in. the capacity of the. technology for creating 
prosperity: 
• 
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" ( ••• ) the Atomic Energy Author i ty - a public body -is 
pioneering new techniques, new uses and new methods for 
harnessing the atom to the service of the community." 
(The Labour Party, 1958,p.30). 
The confidence in science to be able to deliver the me-
thods and tools that would secure welfare in the future 
was not restricted to discussions about nuclear power. The 
1964 Manifesto referred to the 'scientific 'age' in which 
we were living, and the new 'scientific revolution' in 
industry. Scientif ic expertise was also seen as a remedy 
for the problem of, low efficiency in the, coal and gas 
industries. In order to provide for expansion in the coal 
industry. 
"We need: the best' brains, the most competent managers 
and specialists of all kinds." (The Labour Party, 1953, 
" I, p. 13). 
Hence, growth in the energy sector depended partly on the 
activities of the state, partly on the development of 
science and technology. Public 
aided by' the tools de~elop~d 
ownership 
, 
by science 
and planning 
would ensure 
e-fficiency,' and efficiency would result' from obeyin9the 
technological imperative of e.g. nuclear power' and 
supporting ,the development of this technology. 
The Con~ervative p~ity ~tiich was in government for a large 
. part of the' 1950s . issued'. considerably fewer' policy 
statements on energy during this period than did the 
Labour Party, in spite of the Conservative government 
actually being in charge of fuel'and ipo~er' production via 
the nationalised industrie~. Thi~ indicates that the 
Conservative Party did not conside'r' fuel policy a matter 
for public debate.' 'This fOll~ws.!from the Party' s ~ general 
interpretation' of the role of' the' stat~ versus the market 
", " 
in industrial ' affairs.· The' role of the state in relati'on 
to the energy industries was "to' ascertain that market 
forces were not impaired,; and proposals for financial' 
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support were to be evaluated against the expected effects 
on the competitiveness of the particular industry. The 
Conservative governments as we have seen never went as far 
as actually pr i vatising fuel and power in spi te of calls 
for 'de-nationalisation' from within the party6: as a mat-
ter of fact, nationalisation was not mentioned in Manifes-
tos after 1950 (when the Party was in opposition), when 
re-organisation (rather than de-nationalization) was cal-
led for. 
The nuclear" industry consti tuted· a ,noticeable exception 
to the demand for competitiveness within energy indus-
tr ies. The Conservative Party cons istently supported the 
l 
nuclear project. In the 1955 and 1959,Manifestosthe Party 
commi tted itself to 'pressing ahead' wi th the technology 
without any arguments to. motivate, why the, state should 
support exactly 'this venture~ The 1959 Manifesto, however, 
indicated that the Conservative Party also considered 
technoligical progress important: nuclear power was men-
tioned alongside other technological projects under the 
heading of 'Technological Advance'.' In this context, the 
danger of radioactive releases from nuclear reactors into 
the environment was considered to be of less importance7 • 
The absence, of party discussion ~ about nuclear power" can 
again. be interpreted as stemming from the ~ Conservati ve 
conviction that the state, except.' for, supporting the nu-
clear industry financially, should not interfere with its 
day-to-day affairs.' 
Similar observations as above, apply to the energy politi-
cal statements. of the Liberal' Party until the mid-1970s. 
Here statements on energy were very thin' on the ground. 
Energy .• was only discussed in terms of the plan/market 
question related to the nationalized industries, and this 
discussion only surfaced ,towards the end of the 1950s, 
when it was argued that' decision-making ought to ,take 
place, to, a large extent, wi thin the . single industry, and 
that employees in nationalised industries ought to be gi-
- 103 -
ven options to buy shares in their own industry and thus 
obtain a more direct form of influence. Presumeably this 
was an argument against the policies of the Labour Party 
- and the TUe which aimed at increasing the political influ-
ence of the working class by more state intervention and 
more central control in the interest of the working class. 
In the 1960s, party-political discussions about energy 
died down. No mention was given to energy in the parties' 
official statements during< the 1960s until 1967, when a 
Labour party conference decision emphasized the need to 
ensure that nuclear power would not displace 'indigenous 
sources', i.e. coal. Again we, notice Labour's inclination 
to protect this industry, but also we notice that it was 
no longer believed that < all fuel industr ies could expand 
simultaneously. The<development of nuclear power was turn-
ing into a threat to a 'specific group in society: the coal 
miners. This< threat to a particular group was presented as 
a threat to society.< Now energy policy would be necessary 
in order to foresee future energy demand and < ensure that 
the nationalized industries were not pressed out of busi-
ness. 
These discussions of whether nationalization and planning 
or.market provision of energy would. best ensure the growth 
in energy output and increased efficiency in the indus-
tries were abruptly < interrupted by the events of 1974. 
Since .1970, a Conservative government had ruled: it was 
brought down by a national coal miners' strike in response 
to the government's anti-inflation policies including < an 
incom~s freeze. A per iod of «L'abour' gov~rnments started, 
. . t • 
which lasted to 1979, when the present period of Conserva-
tivegovernmen~started~ 
After the events of 1973/74, energy policy was again given 
a prominent position in Party political documents. The La-
bourParty Manifesto of 1974 called for the following mea-
sures to be taken by government after the election: 
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The future of coal should be re-examined; 
public control of the newly discovered North Sea re-
sources should be ensured in order to achieve "maximum 
public advantage"; 
a shift from road to rail transport should be initiated 
and public transport should be developed; 
international cooperation on exploitation of energy re-
sources should be encouraged; 
government should take the initiative in the establish-
ment of an international EnergY.Commission which would 
have as its main task ensuring a rational allocation of 
oil at the international level. 
Whereas the policies of the L~bour Party of the 1950s and 
1960s had focused on ensurihg economic growth as a pre-
condi tion for social welfare, the focus of the measures 
proposed in 1974 was considerably more narrowly related to 
the immediate brises in energy ~supply and, the pressure 
from the National Union of Mineworkers. Two main objec-
tives in thissi tuation were getting rid of the oilim-
ports which had severe effects on the balance of trade and 
ensur ing a future for the coal industry satisfactory to 
the National union of Mineworkers. 
Against· this background, the Party proposed an increased 
state involvement in the 'development 'of other ·fuels as al~ 
ternati ves to oil;; The' Conservati ve government was cr i ti-
cized for not having' supported" sufficiently the develop-
ment of nuclear power: 
"A highly developed nuclear sector is esiential to the 
future economy of this country and calls on the nation-
al' Executive committee to approach the Government to 
br ing abou~·. substantial expan,sion' of' the nuclear pro-
grammetaklng regard to publlC health ,and environment 
within the context of an 'integrated national fuel poli-
cy." (Labour Party Conference decision 1973). 
It will be noticed that in addition to the call for an 
expanded nuclear programme,' the· decision emphasised that 
the expansion must not be at the expense of public health 
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and the environment. This is a significant change from the 
1950s and 1960s when party political interest in the side-
effects of the technology was absent. 
Also the Conservative Party gave energy a high priority in 
1973/74. The Conservative Manifesto for the 1974 election 
addressed the problems under the heading 'Beating the 
Energy Crisis'. It was claimed that a Conservative energy 
policy had been developed prior to the problems of 
1973/74. The main objectives of this policy were reducing 
dependence on oil imports and achieving, through national 
energy planning, a balance between coal, North Sea oil, 
natural gas and nuclear power,. The instruments for a na-
tional energy policy had beenr 
modernisation of the coal industrY1 
acceleration of the exploitation of North Sea Oi11 
creation of the National Nuclear Corporation1 ' 
a new 'nuclear programme. 
These measures signalled Conservative endorsement in prac-
tice of state intervention as a solution to energy pro-
blems~ This approach, which was applied to other types of 
problems during the Heath government, has been described 
as a "new corporatism involving close liaison between go-
vernment-and industry"8, and has been seen as an important 
change from the free market liberalism which was supported 
by the party throughout the 1950s. 
Energy conservation had come into the focus of the Conser-
vative Party.'From 1974 onwards, energy conservation was 
included amongst the policy objecti ves of the Party •. It 
was thought that savings in energy consumption could be 
achieved through voluntary cooperation of 'people' 9. The 
party was conf ident that energy pr ices- were a sufficient 
incentive for consumers to save energy. 
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The Conservative Party devoted renewed attention to nu-
clear power as a means of reducing oil imports. At the 
same time, increasing the nuclear component would reduce 
the mine workers' political power, which had just been am-
ply demonstrated. The Conservative Manifestos of January 
and October 1974 recommended the adoption of a larger nu-
clear programme, but at the same time bore wi tness to a 
new concern related to nuclear technology: it was stated 
that public safety must be paramount. Earlier, science had 
been presented as a guarantee of the safety of the techno-
logy; now public safety was to be guaranteed by the state, 
Le. from outside the scientific and technological commu-
nity. 
The Liberal Party made its bid for an energy policy in 
1974 and, like the other parties, its recommendations fo-
cused on the supply of energy. The Liberal Party recommen-
ded a policy which had at its core controlled exploitation 
of North Sea Oil and gas resources within the framework of 
a national energy policy, which would be prepared with due 
respect to the finite nature of fossil fuel reserves: 
"Energy policy should not consist solely of adjusting 
supply to meet whatever demand is created by market 
forces." (Liberal Party Manifesto, January 1974). 
~.number of measures were proposed for controlling energy 
demand through market forces: control of consumer prices, 
incentives for industries to invest in specific technolo-
gies or energy sources and government finianced energy 
schemes. The energy policy of both Labour and Conservative 
governments was critized for being ad-hoc and inefficient. 
Instead, govei~ment ought to strive towards a clearer de-
fintion of future energy priorities and efficient 
implementation. The party's recommendation of a market-
orientated. energy policy hence saw the market as an 
instrument for politically generated objectives, and it 
was clearly admitted that self-regulation was not 
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sufficient in the energy sector. The Liberal Party saw an 
acceleration of the nuclear project as a way of secur ing 
Britian's future fuel supply. 
whereas the main emphasis of all parties immediately upon 
the oil cr isis and the coal str ikes had been on future 
fuel supply, the focus shifted again from about 1976 and 
new issues were brought into the policy proposals of the 
poli tical parties. At the same time, internal discussions 
within the parties about the range and objectives of state 
energy policy became increasingly visible. 
We saw that in 1974 questions of health and safety related 
t 
to nuclear power' had entered the Labour ,', Party's agenda. 
This si~nalled a new awareness of: the importance of 
technologies for ~production and the' relation 'between 
direct effects (energy production) and external effects on 
other areas, such as pollution or risk of major disasters. 
By the mid-1970s energy technology had emerged as a 
separate issue for debate within the party. Renewable 
energy" technologies began to be debated, for example the 
1976 conference called for, increased efforts with regard 
to 'sustainable and natural sources of energy', while the 
Conferences of 1977'and 1978·both called for research into 
sources 'which are free, clean and, renewable' and I have 
the combined ,advantages of being 'pollution-free, not 
involving the working class in dangerous unpleasant work 
~nd not producing unmanageable waste as nuclear power 
does'. This shows that the renewable sources were seen as 
solutions . to 'problems;' which had . been e-xper ienced 'in 
relation,,' to particular fuels (nuclear power: 'waste 
management; 'coal: ': dangerous' mlnlng; oil: 
imports) as well'; as one problem' common' to 
producing ,technologies: pollution. 
. expensive 
all energy 
Whereas the conference decisions represent the solutions 
advocated by some specific majority within the mass labour 
movement, the parliamentary party had a different line on 
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energy technologies. A 1980 Labour Party discussion docu-
ment 10 affirmed the need to ensure future growth and in-
creased efficiency in energy production. This objective 
- was used as a yardstick against which to evaluate the me-
rits of different energy sources and technologies. Nuclear 
power was considered to be the only recognized technology 
able to provide sufficient energy in the future to sustain 
and improve· the standard of living, based as it was on 
"advanced scientific knowledge" (p. 32). Even though this 
may be seen as,repercussions of the technological optimism 
of the 1950s and 1960s, the discussion of the effects of 
nuclear power shows that the technology was being debated 
according to new criteria. The development of nuclear po-
I 
wer,. it was-stated, must be "condi tiona1, on public' accep-
tance7 arid the document held lengthy discussion of diffe-
rent aspects -of nuclear power: waste management, civilli-
berties (consequences of the necessi ty 'to protect nuclear 
facili ties against 'terror ism) and the proliferation of 
plutonium. 
Also in this document,· a . discussion of the potentials of 
renewable sources was found. It was concluded that: the 
technologies could in theory offer permament solutions to 
the country's energy problems, ,but it would demand an am-
bi tious R&D programme. It is well worth noting here that 
the Labour party's attitude to state involvement in energy 
technology R&D had changed sin~e the 1950s when the party 
lent unquestioning support to' nuclear R&D. The' only rene~­
able technology ,~ssessedas ,promising was tidal power; 
which is a 'capi ta1-intensi ve': -large-scale technology for 
electricty production. The technologies which seemed bet-
ter sui ted for' small-scale' use and '., for heating, such as 
,,' .., \ "':. ~-' • '< : ": ,-' ., ~! ., 
solar heat collection and bio-gas, ~ere evaluated to be of 
sma11si9~ific';nce in th;, future, and, as 'a conseq~ence, no 
pro~oia1s were made, for ~tate suppor~ for these 
technologies: their development ~as ~' ev~I'l . though this was 
~ot explicitlY stated, to rely on market 'forces. 
',.' ," "::: 
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This indicates an important new issue for Labour Party de-
bates about energy policy: energy technologies were now to 
be explicitly evaluated. within the process of evaluation 
- it became increasingly clear that there were no universal-
ly agreed criteria upon which evaluation could take place. 
Energy, and especially energy technolog ies, was becoming 
the issue of a, debate between different interests within 
the party, and new groups within the party became interes-
ted in these issues. The Fabian Society, which had, not 
earlier taken any interest in energy policy, became 
involved in the energy debate, and again technology was a 
major issue. Two points of view competed here. One argued 
I 
that the main objective of energy policy was defined by 
the need' ofv the working class for cheap and plentiful 
household energy as well as of industry for cheap energy 
in order to keep up productivity. The other view rested on 
the assumption that it was in the true interest of the 
working' class to support . the development' of technolog ies 
which did not have the drawbacks of the traditional energy 
producing technologies. These assumptions led to widely 
different evaluations of energy producing technologies. 
The 'first point of view led to de~rying renewable "e'nergy , ." 
because it was not seen to possess any potential for state 
controlled large scale energy production: 
"( ••• ) very few analysts would see the technically 
doubtful new sources as' potentially' having a major 
effect in' the next 30 years •. In ,these' cases the issue 
is whether to have a modest R&D budget or a very modest 
one." (Goode et.al., 1980, p. 21). 
Instead, the share of' nuclear power in energy supply 
should be increased' wi thin the context of tighter state 
control. The opposite view was argued in Fabian Tract No. 
47511 , w~ich recomm~nded that nuclear power should be 
phase~ out because of the infl~xibility~nd costliness~i 
the technology along with the' heal thand waste problems 
accompanying it. As the limi ted use, of renewable energy 
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technologies up till then was seen to rely on conservatism 
within the electricity industry, a state controlled intro-
duction of renewable energy would demand a restructur ing 
of the electricity, boards to ensure more direct trade 
union and government influence. 
The recogni tion of' problems related to technology was also 
reflected in the Labour party's attitude to state control 
of the energy sector from the mid-1970s~ Nationa1isation 
and strong; state control were stili at the basis of energy 
planning, but there was an increasing'~mphasis on th~ ca-
pabili ty of the' state to handle the external effects of 
energy production. The 1979 Manifesto maintained that pu-
.I 
blic ownership of the energy, industries guaranteed that 
these ,industries were 'run, in, a safe and responsible, way, 
but added: 
"We, shall maintain strict safeguards over the disposal 
of nuclear waste". (Labour Party Manifesto, 1979, p. 
14) • 
The Labour Party solutions' to . energy poli tical problems 
took" as its main assumption 'that "more "state 'control'" was 
needed. But problems had emerged in'relation to the policy 
process itseif: the, 1979 Labour- par~y 6onfer~nce called 
for a full public discussion of various sources of energy 
thus iridicating t that public accountability was'notregar-
ded as sufficient. The same conference, however, recommen-
ded trade union representation at all levels of decision-
making thus i~dicating that this' would solv.:' the problems 
of' accountabili ty. ,,' The ., dr i ve "towards increased' involvement 
of; interest g~oups into state 'energy decisionmaking' was 
al~o evident in the'1979 Manifesto: 
"We shall strengthen the democratic planning of the 
long term development of Br i tain' s own energy sources, 
backed by necessary powers, under full parliamentary 
control." (Labout Party Manifesto, 1979, p.13). . 
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what was meant by 'democratic planning' was not clear from 
the Manifesto; but perhaps smith (1983) gives the answer 
in the anthology "Renewal: Labour's Britain in the 1980s" 
-. where the need for planning is contrasted to the free-
market strategy of the Conservative government. Smith re-
commends re-establishment of the Energy Commission as a 
means of conflict resolution in energy planning: 
"In the commission, the competing claims of the energy 
industr ies, the need of industry _ and society, _ the vi tal 
concerns of the consumer and, of course, the national 
interest can be weighed and evaluated on the basis of 
informed and nationally motivated discussion and 
debate." (Smith, 1983, p. 54). 
I 
Hence the idea of state planning as the best way of serv-
ing the interest of the nation in general and the working 
class in particular- was, in a si tuation where conflicting 
objecti ves became increasingly visible, to be saved by an 
extension of interest participation in decision making. 
But we have just seen that even wi thin the ranks of the 
party itself conflicting cr iter ia' for • evaluating policies 
were' increasingly evident. It is' no't immediately ~bvious 
how these conflicts could be solved -to the satisfaction of 
all involved parties; but apparently' it was assumed that 
an identifiable national interest existed which could be 
agreed upon by everybody and serve as a common ground upon 
which the battle between industr ial interest, trade" union 
interest and consumer interest could be fought. 
A couple of interesting observations" can be drawn from 
this~ Firstly, it was now recognized that"th~ interests of 
trade" unions m.ight differ from those of the ~ationalised 
industr ies or of the general" public. Secondly, each of 
these interests were seen as different from the 'national 
interest', in contrast to the 1950s view that the national 
interest was identical 'to the int~rest of the trade unions 
which aga"in was "represented through the'" nationalised 
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industries. But still it was believed that corporative 
procedures would allow the different interests to be har-
monized within a framework of central energy planning. 
Also the conservative Party devoted an increasing amount 
of attention to problems related to the effects of energy 
technolgies and proposals for their solution from the mid-
1970s. The new issues which we saw to penetrate the Labour 
, ' 
Party policy also appeared here. The environment and pu-
blic participation were taken up in the 1979 manifesto: 
"All energy developments raised important environmental 
issues, and we shall ensure the fullest public partici-
pation in major new issues/". (The Conservative Party: 
Manifesto, 1979). 
The conservative Party still lent its support. to the de-
velopment of nuclear power, and in spite of the commitment 
to privatisation, of· the Conservative government from 
1979, no proposals have been made for a privatisation' of 
the 'nuclear indust~y., Whereas the. scope for, renewable 
energy was seen to be small, the 1978 Manifesto called for 
promotion of alternative sources" as well, as for energy 
savings and in, 1980, the Conservative ,Party, conference 
stated its commitment to research into 'new sources of 
energy,12. 
The national economic aspects of energy were, however, the 
most important focus for the Conservative Party •. Towards 
the end of thel970s new ,energy technologies were expected 
to, 'pay .. their, way'. The Conservative Party emphasized this 
point, and ,argued that renewable· energy" technolog ies would 
have to prove their efficiency in a free market. 
Whereas the Labour party argued that state control was not 
sufficiently_developed,:the Conservative Party argued t~at 
state control in the form. of nationalisation was an ob-
stacle to efficiency •. For instance, the Labour, govern-
ment's management of the North Sea enterprise. wascriti-
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cized for being inefficient and blocking productive 
investment from the private sector 13 • Likewise it was ar-
gued that the coal- industry ought to be made competitive 
and efficient through the removal of subsidies. The re-
liance on coal and hence the poli tical influence of the 
National Union of Mineworkers was annoying to the Conser-
vative party: a major rationale for encouraging the de-
velopment of other sources' of energy was getting - rid of 
the dependence on oil and especially coa1l4. Here, the 
North Sea resources were especially seen as a promising 
alternative which should be developed. 
The recommendations of ,the party with regard to the deci-
/ 
sion-making process -emphasized the need to get away from 
direct state involvement in energy 'production and supply 
and instead aim at a state control' of the energy sector 
through selective taxes and subsidies. Generally, however, 
economic efficiency of investments became 'increasingly im-
portant in the Conservative Party's arguments. The role' of 
the ~tate should primarily be within technological R&D. 
The concrete - policy recommendations, however, indicate 
that the party held strong priorities regarding the future 
structure of energy supply, and that these priorities were 
based on political rather than.pure1y economic considera-
tion. For example, the wish to move ~way from coal and to-
wards a higher proportion of nuclear power in the e1ectri-
- ci ty "supply could never be motivated solely by economic 
considerations~ As these-priorities would evidently influ-
ence R&D allocations' for energy technological projects, 
the market mechanism in the end would serve-only as a mi-
nor correction to politically determined government 
priorities. 
The-new issues of the mid-1970s were also ref1ecte~ in Li-
beralParty policy proposals. This party also considere~ 
range of energy technological' options. ' Interestingly' nu-
c1ear,energy, which had in 1973/74 been advocated as a so-
lution to' the problem· of possible future energy shortage 
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was seen to be a problematic option. The problems that 
were identified in relation to nuclear power once more 
related to the envi ronmental impact, in particular waste 
management. As alternatives, the Liberal Party recommended 
"fusion, solar, wave etc." {The Liberal Party: Manifesto, 
similar 
produce 
in' one 
the same 
1979)15. These technologies are only 
respect: they can be expected not to 
(negative) effects as· nuclear power. 
experiences of one specific technology 
used as the basis of an evaluation 
Thus, the negative 
(nuclear power) was 
of 'alternative' 
technologies. 
The Liberal Party policie's also signalled "the new 
I 
awareness of problems uin relation to energy 
decisionmaking. Like the Labour Party, it' recommended a 
re-establishment of the Energy Commission in its 1979 
Manifesto, and in addition it was recommended that the 
discussions within' the Commission should be thoroughly 
publicised. It must be remembered here that the Liberal 
Party was not, as the Labour and Conservative parties, 
tied to any specific interest within energy production. 
Summary. 
Party" political discussions in Britain about energy from 
1950-1980 developed markedly, in terms of the efforti that 
went into defining pr ior i ties as well as wi th respect to 
the awareness of political' 'and procedural' problems in 
state energy policy~ 
The debates of the 1950s in relation to energy focused on 
ensur ing the future growth of energy output in o'rde~ to 
provide sufficient energy for future economic growth. The 
poli tical parties agreed to this: over-all objective; the 
debates were on how best to ensure the expansion of energy 
supply. There was broad agreement. that ". nuclear power 
represented ,', a promising option in this' respect, that the 
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in! tial phases of the development had to be financed by 
the state, and that the detailed development of the 
technology should be left to the scientific community. But 
whereas the Labour, Party saw nationalisation as the best 
means of ensuring growth in the industries, the 
Conservati ve and Liberal Parties argued for more market-
oriented solutions. It was implicitly agreed, however, 
that government should not inter fere wi th the pr ior i ties 
of the single industry. 
During, the 1960s party poli tical interest in energy was 
almost absent. Only towards the end of this;decade did the 
Labour party react to problems concerning ,the future of 
I ' , 
the coal industry. By this time it was becoming evident 
tha~ a simultaneous growth in the fuel industries was not, 
as i t h~d been, believed in the 1950s, possible, and that 
cost of coal meant that its position in the .market was 
severely threatened by oil and potentially by nuclear 
power as fuel for electricity production. Against this 
background, the Labour Party began to take an interest in 
national fuel policy. 
The slow building up of problems in fuel ,supply and 
proposals for policies to repair, shortcomings in the 
system was" ab~uptly disrupted by the events, of, 1973/74. 
The parties' policy statements bear wi tness to ,the 
>.' '< 
e~p~rienced severity of the situation., Ensuring future 
fuel'~upplY came into the focus, of policy. The parties all 
r~acted ,by proposing an exte~sion of state _control of, the 
energy :sector. Common to all, three parties were 
recommendatIons for instantaneous extension., of the ,'. nuclear 
project 'an?: ~ntens,ified interest. in the prospects of using 
North Sea" oil and gas to .. replace imports as., well, as ,a 
renewed interest in look~ng into ' alternative '. energy 
sources. Whereas this call for fuel diversification was 
c~mmon to the parties as . was the implicit agreement that 
it should be orchestrated, by the, state, there were 
disagr~ement on particular strategies to obtain 
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diversification. The Labour Party, while recommending in-
creased efficiency in the coal industry, maintained that 
coal should remain the backbone of Br i tain I s energy sup-
ply. To the Labour party, the impact of the oil price rise 
on the national economy was the major problem, and it is 
in this context that e.g. the proposal for a state-initia-
ted shift from road to rail must be seen. The Conservative 
Party on the other hand was eager to get rid of the de-
pendence on coal and hence emphasized energy conservation 
and the potentials of the North Sea resources. The Libe-
ral Party emphasized the need to look at resource availa-
bili ty in a longer perspective. The parties also disa-
greed on the extent of sta~e intervention. The Labour 
Party recommended that tighte'r control should be obtained 
through nationalisation, while the conseryati ve and Libe-
ral Parties recommended a policy using prices as the main 
instrument. There was no questioning, however, that energy 
policy was now firmly being defined as a task for 'the 
state. 
When the immediate reactions -to the' oil/coal crises sub-
sided, the parties increasingly identified more fundamen-
tal proble~s in energy supply. and consumption. 'The envi-
ronmentalproblems which had first been identified in the 
latel960s ~ere now increasingly seen to result from ener-
gy production. Increa~inglY attention was being devoted to 
energy producing' technologies and their effects. In addi":' 
tion, the economic aspects moved increasingly into the fo-
cusof political debates about energy. There was a general 
recognition that energy production had wide-ranging ef-
fects, but not ~n the precise charact~r or relative impor-
tance of different' effects.' The Labour Party emphasized 
effects related to the workers in the energy industries 
,,' ' 
while the conservative Party saw the national economic ef-
fects as more important and the Liberal party was con-
cerned about the environment; Thus, there' was' no longer 
one overall and generally agreed upon objective of energy 
policies. ' 
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Instead, energy was the subj ect of poli tical discuss ion, 
both between and within the political parties at the end 
- of the 1970s. There was agreement that state energy policy 
should express the national interest" in relation to 
energy; but what exactly was to be understood by the 
national interest was no longer clear. 
Denmark. 
Before the presentation of policy statements of Danish 
poli tical parties, a few words need to be said about' the 
Danish political system. The Danish parliament is elected 
through proportional 'representation. This favours 
iepresentation in parliament of a larger number of 
relati vely small parties than in Br i tain16 , and frequent 
instances of coali tion governments. Dur ing the 1950-1980 
period, however, the Social Democratic Party (social-
demokr~tiet) was in government for 23 years, of which for 
14 years they ruled alone. The exceptions' to Social 
Democratic rule were the periods from 1950 to 1953, when a 
coalition between the Conservative Party (Det Konservative 
Folkeparti) and the' Liberal Party (Venstre) was in 
government" from '1968 to 1971,' when the ruling coalition 
consisted' of the Conserva ti ve Party, the Liberal Party 
and the Social Liberal Party (Det Radikale Venstre), and 
from late '1973 to early 1975 when the Liberal Party was in 
power. This'indicates:that in spite of the large number of 
poli tical' parties, only a' very limi ted number' have had 
direct influence on state policy. For this 'reason we shall 
concentrate below on the parties which have actually been 
in government and, only mention other parties insofar- as 
they are' assessed to ,have been influ'ential wi th regard to 
energy at particular points in time. ,,' 
During the 1950s and early 1960s, party political interest 
in energy was insignificant. Neither party political 
programmes, election" manifestos nor the party periodicals 
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of the major parties gave any mention to energy questions. 
Only the Social Liberal Party mentioned energy in relation 
to industrial policy during the 1950s. In the party's 1955 
declaration of principles (principprogram) 17· it was argued 
that the electricty industry ought to be made more 
efficient and that the state should cooperate with private 
industry to make sure that this happened. 
The Social Democratic· Party mentioned energy the first 
time in its declaration of principles in 1961. The 
emphasis was on the potentials of economic growth for 
creating social welfare. Here, science and technology were 
seen to playa. crucial role, and particularly nuclear 
power was~seen to hold a~potehtial for material progress. 
It was recognized. that nuclear technology involved the 
potential of destruction, but state control of the 
technology would . ensure that the.· population could enjoy 
the "Atomic age without fear". State. control of the 
technology would also serve to present the unfolding of 
the technology's inherent potential for· concentration. and 
monopolization. The party did. not during the 1950s or 
1960s concern itself with other ,aspects of energy, and the 
Programme of. Action .' of 1961 did not offer any concrete 
proposals for how, to go about' ensur ing social control, of 
-. 
nuclear power.' 
The Liberal Party's policy statements neither were 
concerned with' energy during the, 1950s and early 1960s. 
The· general . attitude to, the ,role of_ science and 
technology, however, was parallel to, that of the Social 
Democratic, par.ty: 
"The technical· and economic development have put. into 
man's hands hitherto unknown opportunities for creating 
.. a society in freedom and wealth". (Venstre, 1963, p. 
10) • 
The party emphasized that; the ,state ought to intervene 
only in matters of considerable-interest' to sOciety "which 
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cannot be solved satisfactorily in other ways" (op.cit., 
p.13). It is probably not too bold a guess that the 
development of nuclear power ranged among these socially 
important projects •. 
The conservative Party was also not concerned about energy 
through this period. 
Towards the end of the 1960s, the potential for social 
welfare through material abundance was generally seen to 
fade away. While the implications for the energy sector 
was not dealt with'separately, the Social Democratic Party 
Conference18 of 1973 observed that the increasing balance 
of payments deficits implied / a need to. reinforce state 
planning 'to restrict the growth in private spending. 
Also the Liberal party's attitude to growth had changed. A 
new declaration of pr inciples from 197019 observed that 
welfare included other aspects in addition to material 
prosperiti: Pollution'~as identified as a potential threat 
to welfare. Al~O it was observed that. the prices of coal 
and oil influenced the balance of paymentsne~ativel~.·As 
a contr ibution to solve these problems, the' Liberal Party 
recommended that . the, share, of electr ici ty be increased, 
and that nuclear _ power be introduced for electricity 
~roduction •. The use.of electricity for heating was thought 
by . the party to contribute less. to '(air-) pollution than 
the then prevailing individual oil burners. Again' it was 
observed that int,ensified st~te plannIng ~as_necessary. 
• .' - < ; ~ .'-. 
Likewise, t~e,conservative part~ noted that in the face of 
the increasi~g trade' de~ici ts', . incomes policy and loog-
ter~ economic' planning' was necessary to secure economic 
., .' 19 ' 
growth and employment. . 
Whilst the parties discussed how best to solve the 
, i 
problems in the national economy and the new' group of 
problems related to the environment, the oil pr ice rises 
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in 1973/74 focused the discussion sharply on the acute 
problems stemming from the country's dependence on oil. 
The Social Democratic Party, now in opposition after hav-
ing an election in 1973 which gave rise to the formation 
of a Liberal minority government, devoted considerable at-
tention to energy questions in 1974. The party monthly, 
'Vor politik' ('Our Policy'), opened its columns for ener-
gy political articles by leading social democratic politi-
cians. Energy policy was taken up at the annual meetings 
and incorporated in general policy statements. The situa-
tion was summarized by a former Minister of Trade, who, in 
considering the specific question of whether to introduce 
l , 
nuclear power made the following general observation: 
'''All in all' it may be necessary to consider ways in 
which society can gain influence on which sources of e-
nergy should be used for which purposes." (Erling Jen-
sen, former Minister of Trade: Atomkraftvarker -ja'el-
ler nej (Nuclear Power stations - yes or no). Vor Poli-
~, May 1974, p.4). 
In 1975 the party set up an energy policy committee, which 
fo;rmulated the official party posi tion in a leaflet enti-
tl~d . 'Energi' 20. The main emphasis here was on the need 
for state energy policy to reduce the impact on the Danish 
edonomy of possible future events like the oil crisis. 
He'nce : the main objective of state energy policy should be 
~~ducing dependence on imported oil through fuel diversi-
fication. The party recommended exploi tation of North Sea 
oil a~d'gas reserves and/or adoption of a nuclear program-
me. On the de~and side, the party recommended a decelera-
tion ", of' growth in energy consumption. International co-
~peration' through' the Internation~l Energy Agency sh~uld 
be'intensified in order to ensure distribution between na-
t'ions of available energy resources. Finally, environmen-
tal as well as 'social impacts of energy technologies 
s~6uld be taken into consideration ,in energy planning. ,-
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The concern about the effects of energy technologies show 
that althOugh the necessity for state energy policy was 
primarily defined in relation to the shock caused by the 
oil crisis, this was not the only factor present in Social 
Democratic discussions about energy. In addition to ensu-
ring fuel supply the state was also to evaluate and con-
trol energy technological development so as to ensure di-
versification, while avoiding the negative side-effects on 
e.g. the environment, which were seen as results of an un-
controlled technological development~ 
This kind of debate was not prominent within the Liberal 
Party, which held ,government ~t the time. The party's pe-
riodical 'Liberal' does~not "give evidence of, any energy 
political discussion until late 1974, when a number of ar-
ticles identified energy as an important component of the 
serious economic problems of the Danish nation 21 • This ob-
servation, however, did not. give rise to a party discus-
sion about energy policy. The .strategic discussions which 
must have gone before the presentation of the first propo-
sals for regulation of energy consumption must therefore 
have, taken place wi thin the closed circle around' the', go-
vern~ent.' But '" it is evident f~om th'e discussions of 'the 
economic aspects of the energi sit~ation: that the libe~a: 
lism generally advocated by the party was not seen as a 
proper solution to ,this ,kind of pr~blem. On the contrary, 
a high degree of state and 'ev~n. supranation'al control of 
energy revenues was advocate?) ust like' it was argued that 
'",' . ,. ' , 22 
consumption would; have to go down. 
The social iibe~al Party did not immediately react to the 
oil. cr ises by iSS!ling ~Olicy. statements, whereas, the Con-
servati ve party argued: that the si tuation called, for the 
creation of 'a proper, ~~t~?nal' e,nergy policy. Energy was 
discussed in the party monthly 'Vor Tid' (Our Time) which 
in February 1974, pres~~~ed the" party's, 'official energy po-
licy. 'The main' components of. t~is policy were: new Ie' is-, , ' " " , . ,,'. g 
lation 'creating economic incentives for energy conserva-
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tion and substi tution of other fuels for oi11 encourage-
ment for energy R&D1 state efforts to encourage exploita-
tion of the uranium reserves of Green1and1 plus introduc-
tion to nuclear power. 
Thus, for all parties, the objective of energy consumption 
growth was replaced almost from one day to the next by an 
objective to cut growth in energy consumption. Likewise, 
the necessi ty of a strong state energy policy was agreed 
upon by'a11 political parties regardless of their economic 
phi10sophy~ 
After the immediate panic following the oil crisis had 
/ 
subsided, energy policy stayed in the focus of discussions 
but new fssues were introduced. 
The Social Democratic Party still emphasized public owner-
ship as a solution to energy problems. A new declaration 
of principles from 1977 stated as objectives: 
"Public ownership of national energy resources. Public 
control of energy supply and development of environmen-
tally benign forms of energy, the development and util-
ization of which-is one way of ensuring independence of 
foreign and multinational interests." (Socia1demokra-
tie t , 19 7 7,~ p. 22) • . 
The confidence in science and techno1,ogy to solve the pro-
blems ac~~mp~nying an, increasing energy consumptio~ had 
I h' " 
disappeared ~ as had the assumption that growth in energy 
consumption was a necessary precondi tion of social wel-
fare~ It"wasobservced that: 
"New technology which is employed' in order to achieve 
the highest' possible degree ~ of competitiveness may 
clash with considerations of~ social and human values" 
(socia1demokratiet, 1977, p. 11). • 
specificallY, the attitude to nuclear 'power changed. In 
1976 . p. Hrekkerup, Social' Democratic Minister· of Trade, 
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argued that although the party was satisfied that the en-
vironmental problems related to nuclear power had been 
solved, the necessary investment was presenting a problem 
as it would influen~e the total investment capacity of the 
state decisively23. In addition, it became increasingly 
clear that the party did not want to be responsible for 
introducing the" technology without first having secured 
the assent of the whole party as well as of the popula-
tion, and the 1979 Manifesto stated that the party would 
ensure that" the introduction of nuclear power would be 
condi tional on a popular vote as well as the results of 
state financed inquiries 
disposal. 
into ,reactor 
I 
safety' and waste 
The objective to., get rid of oil was increasingly 
supplemented by new issues and problems. More state 
regulation was the answer -to these new problems. In 1978, 
the economic implications of the energy sector in general 
(and"not just of oil consumption) had come into focus. In 
the working programe of 1978, the necessi ty f<:>r planning 
in the widest. sense of the word was defended as the best 
means to ensure that production was "profitable in respect 
to economic impacts, resource conditions, pollution and 
social conditions." (socialdemokratiet, 1978, p.8). In 
this context, an,overall energy policy should be prepared. 
This policy· should emphasize strongly. subsidies for 
investments in ,energy conservation. as well as providing 
for laws which would make conservation mandatory. 
As oil" and nuclear power was not seen as. desirable long-
term propositions, the:intere~tl in"other sources of energy 
grew:- The policy statements from 1974 onwards emphasized 
the need ,for ,R&D into renewable energy, and also the North 
Sea resources commanded increasing "attention: Here again, 
the party called for increased state control of the 
resources, ". and·" in :: particular ,a publically owned oil 
pipeline from the North Sea was seen as an important means 
to ensure social control. 
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Heating planning, inter-scandinavian energy cooperation, 
natural gas, excess heat from power stations, regional 
price differences on energy, coal imports, inSUlation were 
just some of the issues for state energy planning mention-
ed in the party's working programme on 1980 24 • 
Also the Liberal Party had accepted the necessity of some 
kind of state regulation of the energy ,sector: 
"It has become evident that a reliable supply of energy 
is a necessary precondi tion for the existence and de-
velopment of any modern society. This precondi tion is 
not necessarily satisfied". (Venstre, 1978, p.5). 
I ' 
In other words, the market m~chanism was thought to be in-
sufficient when it came to ensur ing a stable supply, of 
energy. The proposed remedy was state energy policy. 'At 
the same time, the party advocated, as an important compo-
nent of a liberal strategy, the 'neighbourhood society,25, 
which involved decentralization of. decision-making. The 
party, never, however, considered a decentralization of 
energy decision-making, which was presented as strictly a 
matter for, on the one hand, the: fuel and' power, indus-
tries on the other, the state. 
An. overall objective, of energy policy in, relation, to the 
economy was the need" to put brakes on the growth wi thin 
the publiC sector., Energy po1icy,was seen as an instrument 
of economic policy: 
"A realistiC energy po1icy:is a precondition of conti-
nued economic development, of employment and hence of a 
high social standard." (Venstre, 1979, p.7). 
The basic components of Liberal energy' po1i cy27 were: 
" 
.. 
the structure and ownership of the energy indust i ' 
should remain intact, but the industries were tor e: 
in accordance with long (term national energy. Plans~c, 
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The energy industr ies should, to the largest extent 
possible, be exempted from taxes and duties. 
The state should only intervene in energy consump-
tion insofar as "general regard to the interests of 
community indicates that utilization of a specific 
source of energy is desirable" (Venstre,1978, p.9). 
In such cases, state subsidies, were to be the main 
instrument for implementing a shift to a new techno-
logy or source.' 
These principles suggest a somewhat tempered liberalism. 
The proposed measures served to support the energy indus-
try' (at that time' synonymous !wi th the electr iei ty indus-
try) while at the same time" providing for '.' state support 
for deveiopment of new energy sources and techno log ies. 
There' i~ Ii ttle' doubt that the party by • a specific source 
of energy' was thinking particularly about nuclear power, 
which recommended on the ground of expectations, that the 
technology would prove c6mpetiti~e with coal and oil based 
technologies. 
Hence the idea that state energy policy should be founded 
on 'an assessment of' the advantages and disadvantages of 
different energy technologies was, prominent here, too, 
even though the Liberal Party partly employed other crite-
ria than 'the' social' Democratic Party and partly arrived 
at-different results using the same criteria. For 
instanee~the~arty saw consideration foi the environment 
as an" integral part' of energy' technology choice, but 
argued that in this respect nuclear power was preferable 
to oil and eoa128 •. , 
Also the question of public partici~ation in energy 
planning was increasingly taken up; but it 'was argued that 
whereas it was .. "important to keep the population informed 
about society's planning of energy supply" (Venstre, 1978; 
p. 9), the' need for an' expert-based energy planning was 
"~I, 
maintained: 
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"The preparation of a long-term energy policy demands 
complicated technical and economic considerations. 
Hence it is necessary for democracy to make use of 
individuals who possess particular insight in different 
areas. The fear of expert-rule should not lead 
democracy to let itself be led by false prophets 
( ••• )." (Venstre, 1978, p.9). 
As a consequence, public concern .should be countered not 
by giving the population more say in the decision-making 
process, but by informing it. about "the truth of the 
matter" (Venstre, 1978"p.SO). In this way the party 
suggested ~he existence of an objective base of facts upon 
which an appraisal of energy, technologies could take 
place, which would then justify state subsidies for the 
technologies proven to be objectively superior., 
The public interest in al terna ti ve sources, on the other 
hand, was acknowledged: 
"The population takes a very great interest in wind 
energy, which, in a democratic society, it is nei ther 
possible nor reasonable to neglect." (Venstre, 1978, 
p.S7). 
This observation was followed up a year later 29 by 
recommendations for a sti~ulation of interest in 
'supplementary' :sources of energy, while. it was now 
observed that, introduction of nuclear power would have to 
await a satisfactory outcome of, safety assessment, and 
that, ' meanwhile, the share of coal and natural gas in 
~lectricity production should be increased. _ 
. ".' -
The Social Liberal Party also increasingly emphasized new 
dimensions of ~nergy policy. In" 1980 30 , the ,party 
emphasized the need for social control in relation to the 
North Sea, especially more political control of the state 
owned natural gas company was thought pertinent. Also the 
electricity industry was to be subjected;to social control 
to a larger extent. For. ins tance I cho ice of fuel for 
electricity production should, be decided by, parliament. 
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The interest in new energy sources was expressed as a re-
commendation for long-term support for renewable R&D, as 
well as a demands for increased efficiency in exploitation 
of North Sea reserves. 
Likewise, the conservati ve Party found energy an increas-
ingly important issue. Al though the party explici tly re-
fused increased state intervention in the energy sector as 
it would lead to "reduced security of supply and increased 
costs for citizens and industry alike" (Det Konservative 
Folkeparti, 1981, p. 37), the number of specific state ob-
jectives and measures suggested by the party increased 
from 1978. In 1978 energy was predominantly seen as im-t ' 
portant to industry and the introduction of nuclear power 
was recommended in order to ensure a stable energy supply 
to industry in the long term31 • In 1979 the energy spokes-
man of the party argued that long term ,state energy poli-
cy was a, necessi ty32. Such a policy should contr ibute to 
economic growth, but in addition it should take into con-
siderationenvironmenta1 impact and safety in operation of 
supply, technologies. The party's strong preferences for 
particular fuels and technologies would seem at odds with 
a non_interventionist philosophy. In 1981, however, the 
party's programme were more specific on the implementation 
of state energy p1anning 33 • It was stated here that prices 
should ,be formed in the ~ree market and not be artificial-
ly fixed. At the ,same time," however, 'the party, suggested 
that.nuc1ear powei sh~u1d be introduced witho~~ discussing 
the impact on the market mechanism of such a massive state 
investment. In contrast, it was a,rgued that public finan-
cial support for hydroe1ectr Ic pro'jects, geothermal heat 
, ' , . " ' , , ' 
wave power,' bio-gas, and' 1iquefication of bio-mass sh~uld 
be conditional on expert:"based eva1u~tio~ of' economic ef":' 
ficiency. : 
This Suggests that :the Conservative'Party h~d also adopted 
the assumption that the state was to determine 'the future 
combination of fuels and energy techno1ogi~s on the basii 
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of the national interest. Specifically, the party sugges-
ted that fusion power, solar energy and geo-gas would con-
tribute to the long-term solution to the 'energy 
problems'. These problems were mainly related to the 
national economic implication of energy investments. There 
estimated economic effiency should be a major criterion in 
evaluation of fuels ~nd energy technologies: . 
"The defini ti~n of areas" wi thin which utilization of 
natural gas lS required should amongst other, things 
depend on socio-economic considerations. ( ••• ) Combined 
heat'and power in many cases will be the most economic 
heating' method, and should therefore be, employed 
wherever possible." (Det Konservative Folkeparti, 1981, 
p.37). " I 
Finally it should be, br iefly noted that from 1976 other 
parties in the Folketing contributed energy policy 
discussion documents. For example, the small ~ 
Socialist party (Venstresocialisterne) in 1976 prepared a 
policy statement on energy in response to the growing 
public occupation wi th energy questions. The party 
observed that, it was not at all' convenient having ,to, 
prepare an energy policy at, a time when a campaign was 
mounting to mobilize the working class. The energy 
problems were seen to confuse politics~ as ,they 
"( ••• ) apparently appear to concern society as a whole, 
making it difficult to see through the class 
antagonisms" which are of course in the final analysis 
at the root of the problem." (VS Bulletin 1976 NO .162, 
p.19). 
~he party argued that nationalization would probably 
strengthen the ~n~erests of the rUling classes ,because of 
the centralisation of decision-making. At the 'same tim~, 
the party recommended the formation of an inter-
Scandinavian state/co-operative energy company without 
going into detail as to the proportional influence of the 
state '~ersus the co-operative sectors within such a 
company,. At any rate, it is, hard to, imagine that. such a 
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company would not involve a very high degree of centrali-
zation. 
Choice of energy technologies for the future was also to 
be a task for national energy policy of the Left Socialist 
party The party argued, again without specifying in any 
detail the implications, that compatibility with socialist 
ends should be the, main cr iter ion for technolog ical 
choice. within this framework, nuclear power was conside-
red an unacceptable technology because it would lead to 
"centralization and monopolization" (VS Bulletin 1976 
No.162, p. 19). On the other hand, it was argued that pol-
lution control in electricity production should be initia-
ted, and that this was possible exactly because "i t is a 
question ~ of relatively few central power c stations" (VS 
Bulletin '1976 No.162,: 'po 19). 
The party argued that energy conservation motivated by na-
tion~l ~conomic considerations would not be in the inter-
est of the working class., In the long term, however, a 
steady state economy would be desirable. The party's pro-
posalfor implementation of energy conservation is remark-
able: the wor king class mus t s imply by it'" se lf star t de-
mandi~g durable products just like ,they must demand land 
use plans which would serve to diminish the distance be-
tween" dwellings and place of work and thereby fuel con-
sumption-for transport. 
The energy policy proposals of the' party were typical of 
an oppositio~al party. The party ,was not ,worried'about"the 
national econ6mic implications of energy policy nor about 
the existinginfrastructural, and organisational condi-
tions. 
Summary. 
The development, of energy policy as a component of, party 
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politics has been marked in Denmark over the thirty years 
from 1950 to 1980. 
During the 1950s, energy was not taken up as a policy is-
sue by the Danish political parties, although we remember 
from chapter two that the Atomic Energy Commission was 
established during this period. The party programmes of 
the early 1960s discussed nuclear power as a means of 
creating prosperity. The discussion focused on economic 
growth, and the, parties were in agreement that the state 
should undertake to finance a nuclear project. The Social 
Democratic party recommended public ownership in order to 
ensure that the industry was run in a safe way. There is 
I 
no evidence, however, -of considerations regarding other 
sources of energy, let alone the -' ,interaction between the 
fuel sectors during this period. 
Towards the end of the 1960s, problems in-the economy' and 
increasing concern for the environment led some of the 
parties to consider the role of energy production in 
creating these problems. The Liberal party .resumed its 
campaign to introduce nuclear power but, the argument had 
changed. Nuclear power was no. longer needed in - order to 
facili tate: growth in energy consumption., Instead' it, was 
needed to replace .. energy forms" which gave rise to large 
import costs. In addition, the environment had become an 
important factor in the argument. 
It was .only . in. 1974, however, that the parties started 
considering_in any systematic way the role of the state in 
relation to· energy production and consumption. The 
immediate reactions to the oil-crisis show .. a .high.- degree 
of agreement on the short term' objective: ,replacing oil 
with other sources of energy~ Also the long term objective 
of fuel diversification as a guarantee.against future fuel 
crises-was generally agreed upon •. Energy was defined as a 
national interest:which demanded a national· energy,policy_ 
Growth in energy consumption was no' longer ~ an objective: 
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on the contrary all parties recommended that energy 
consumption should be cut either by mandatory conservation 
measures or by government incentives. 
After oil pr ices had stabili zed and energy policy 
established, the parties increasingly incorporated energy 
as an important policy issue in statements. The problems 
which had been visible already before the oil crisis were 
now seen to become increasingly conspicuous at the same 
time as the national economic problems did not subside1 on 
the contrary, the balance of payments def ici ts increased 
as did unemployment while inflation rates grew. This 
prompted the parties to consider the economic effects of , 
future choices of energy technology while at the same time 
acknowledging that it was necessary to take into account 
effects on the environment, on employment etc. An implicit 
agreement had been established that state energy policy 
was an· instrument for choosing for the future the fuels 
and technologies which were to be used in the national 
energy supply. There was however a growing dissent on the 
criteria for choice, the importance of different 
objectives and, following from this, on the instruments 
which the state should use in implementing energy policy. 
For example, the Social Democratic Party, which held 
government, was concerned about public acceptance of state 
energy policy and made the introduction of nuclear power 
conditional on a popular vote1 to the Liberal Party, 
public opinion about nuclear power was the result of 
misrepresentation of facts and this party considered the 
expected future economic advantages more important. 
The range of issues considered by the 
addi tion to the effects of particular 
par_ties grew. In 
technologies, the 
import of fuels was increasingly seen as a liabili ty and 
establishing an indigenously based energy supply 
increasingly became an objecti ve for the parties •. In this 
context, the North Sea reserves were given increasing 
attention, but here again the imposi tion of other 
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objectives resulted in different strategies for handling 
the oil and gas venture. The Social Democrats advocated 
extensive state control of the project while the Liberal 
and Conservative parties argued that consumers should be 
free to choose between fuels. 
The parties thus agreed that a national interest in energy 
policy existed; but there was no agreement as to which 
priority should be assigned to the policy criteria in pre-
paring energy plans. This uncertainty in identifying ener-
gy policy criteria and weighting them against each other 
did also, as we have seen, given rise to internal incon-
sistencies within the policy statements of single parties. 
/ 
General Summary: Political Parties 
The degree to which energy policy has commanded the inte-
rest of poli tical parties increased considerably dur ing 
the 1950-1980 .. per iod. Both countr ies wi tnessed the disap-
pearance of a consensus that growth in energy consumption 
was both a precondi tion for and a necessary· result of 
economic growth. This consensus during the 1950s and 1960s 
gave rise to policy statements which def ined the role of 
the state ,: in relation· to industry as supporti ve. In· par-
ticular, the·· state should encourage technological change 
in energy supply, and here the focus was on nuclear power 
which was thought capable of obviating future supply pro-
blems. 
This ,consensus has been replaced by a situation where the 
parties agree that the state,. should control the develop-
ments of the: energy sector, but where, _ at the same time, 
there;. is little agreement as to the objectives of energy 
policy" as . well as the means of control. This .. observation 
supports the hypothesis of a poli ticization of energy as 
regards the political parties. 
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We shall now seek to pull together the British and Danish 
developments in order to identity similarities and diffe-
rences between the two nations with respect to party-poli-
tical attitudes to energy policy issues over the period. 
During the 1950s and 1960s, the focus of energy political 
thinking in both countries was on the need to provide for 
economic growth. In both countries, nuclear power was seen 
by all political parties as potentially capable of provid-
ing for ongoing growth in energy consumption for a very 
long time. In Denmark there is little evidence of any dis-
cussion of other sources of energy. In Britain, however, 
public versus private ownership of the fuel and power ind-
! 
ustries were discussed by alr'parties. This discussion fo-
cused on~economic growth and both public ownership and m-
arket-or iented solutions were advocated as the best means 
to ensure economic growth. Also it'is well worth noting a-
gain that central state energy' planning (and not just 
planning for the' single industry), was" not considered' by 
any of the parties. 
From .. the late 1960s, the parties in both countries increa-
singly focused on the problems of keeping up economic 
growth on· the one hand and the problems accompanying 
economic growth on the other as they ·realized that 
continued expansion of all fuel sectors was inconceivable. 
Environmental problems' were also, identified in both coun-
t'r ies. 'In Br i tain, the coal industry presented a particu-
lar problem to the.Labourparty which advocated that'state 
subsidies were needed to maintain indigenous fuel produc-
tion. In" Denmark, the increasing costs of importing coal 
and oil were increasingly seen as a problem_ The Conserva-
tive c Party in .Britain· and the Liberal' ·Party in Denmark 
pressed for a,. new nuclear programme (Br i tain)' and· intro-
ductionof nuclear power- (Denmark) asa solution to these 
problems .' 
1973/74 in both~countries meant the breakthrough of gene-
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ral agreement that the national economic implications of 
energy production and consumption were so important as to 
necessitate some kind of social control of the development 
of the sector. Specifically energy policy should aim at 
fuel diversification. In Britain, the coal miners' strike 
only added to these problems. In both countries, all poli-
tical parties advocated that the adoption of nuclear pro-
grammes would contr ibute to the solution of the problems 
as would state encouragement for exploitation of North Sea 
oil and gas. But also there was general agreement that 
growth in energy consumption would have to be cut. Even if 
the assumption of a positive correlation between growth in 
energy consumption and social welfare was still being up-
/ 
held, it was being suspended" by the, necessi ty of reacting 
to the immediate economic problems. 
After 1976, the immediate. repercussions of the oil. and 
coal crises had subsided but the party views on energy po-
licy did not return to pre~1973 conditions. It was now ge-
. '~ 
nerally accepted in both countries and across all parties 
that state energy policy was a necessity because the pro-
blems arising from uncontrolled development in the energy 
sector had been seen to give rise to problems at the 
national level. 
Parallel to· the. growing recognition that dependence on 
coal and oil increasingly created economic as well as 
environmental problems, all parties considered 
alternatives. particularly the North Sea resources and the 
renewable energy forms were considered by all parties. 
There was no questioning of. the implici t assumption that 
the state was to plan energy, and that _ energy policy 
involved evaluation of different energy technologies. 
There was, also, agreement. that such evaluation. involved the 
establishment of socio-economic and . environmental impacts 
and studies of, safety in operation of, energy 
technologies. But how these, impacts were to be 
established, and how they were to be weighted against each 
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other was a matter of disagreement between parties. In 
addition new issues emerged which were initially only 
considered relevant by a limited number of parties, for 
instance the British Labour Party's concern about the 
impact of any particular energy technology on the living 
conditions of the working class. 
While the Liberal 
tended to countries 
system and argued 
they also 
and Conservative parties 
through advocate control 
that state intervention 
recommended specific 
in both 
the price 
should be 
minimal, 
strategies which would demand for their 
technological 
implementation 
extensive control ,e. g. as allocation of R&D expenditure 
/ 
for nuclear power. The British Labour Party and the Danish 
~ 
Social Democratic Party (and to a somewhat smaller degree 
the Danish Social Liberal Party) advocated strong state 
control of energy production and consumption, taking into 
account the demands of the population in general and the 
trade unions' in particular,' while at the ,~same time 
ensuring the economic efficiency of investments as well 
as taking into account the balance of payments. 
Comparing this development to the periodisation of chapter 
2. (see tables 2.3. and 2.4), we find that the stated 
policies towards energy of the poli tical parties contain 
for'different per iods the same elements (problems, issues 
~nd strategies) as are evident in' state energy policy of 
the per iod, although there is . a' number of exceptions to 
this pattern. The 1950s' period shows' a large degree of 
consensus between' parties adhering to different political 
philosophies that economic growth was absolutely 
desirable." Problems were identified as obstacles' to growth 
~nd technological change' was generally advocated as a 
solution to this problem. Also it was generally accepted 
that the state ought to support technological advance, 
particularly the development of nuclear power. This 
consensus was paralleled by policies creating a favourable 
climate for the development of nucleai power, improvements 
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of electricity infrastructure and (i n 
technological change in the coal 
energy industries were largely 
industry. In 
under public 
Britain) 
Britain, 
control 
whereas government was conservative for the most of the 
period. Denmark had a privately owned and controlled 
energy industry and for most of the decade a Social 
Democratic government. In nei ther 
the structure of ownership or 
industr ies changed dur ing the 
political dissent in both 
country, however, were 
control of the energy 
decade in spite of the 
countries about the 
appropriateness of public vs. private ownership. The 
industries were, in both countries, left to plan their own 
production and sales. 
/ 
In contrast, the difference between the state energy 
policies of Britain' and 'Denmark which" we identified in 
chapter two is not parallelled by differences between the 
policies of the parties of the two countries. In both 
countries, there was a marked absence of party poli tical 
interest in energy until the late 1960s. It was as if the 
problem of-state ownership as' well as the excitement over 
nuclear power had vanished suddenly. 
Towards" 1970 and up to 1973 in both countries political 
parties became increasingly concerned about energy in a 
recognition that the expected growth in energy consumption 
had led to problems that had not been foreseen. The 
-
cheapness of oil meant threats to the national economy and 
- in Britain - local" interests. In addition energy was 
identified as a source of pollution. These issues were 
identified by the political parties and ." transformed into 
policy statements which emphasized state control of energy 
production as a· remedy, but" surfaced in state energy 
policy only a.-couple of years later, -in 1974,' when state 
energy policy and planning'was" establi~hed "in both 
countries. In the late 1960s the governments of the' two 
countries again represented opposite political/philosophi-
cal traditions: Denmark had a Liberal/Conservative/Social 
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Liberal coali tion government, while Br i tian had a Labour 
Government. This difference may explain the total lack of 
energy policy initiatives in Denmark in this period 
compared to the British policy which involved attempts to 
coordinate sectoral energy policies within the Ministry of 
Technology as well as an important Fuel Policy statement 
of government. 
During the oil crisis and the British crisis the 
administrati ve capaci ty for dealing wi th energy was 
considerably increased in both countries. The political 
consensus on the need for the state to react to the crisis 
by developing an energy planning capacity was reflected in 
I 
the creation of state energyupolicy agencies, whereas the 
issues which had been identified from the late 1960s were 
now incorporated in state policy organisation and 
policies. Agencies, boards and councils were set up to 
deal with all conceivable aspects of energy in both 
countries. This happened in Britain under a Labour 
government and in Denmark under a Liberal government. 
Again it seems that the extent of state intervention was 
determined by the character of the actual problems rather 
than of the colour of government. But this panic-stricken 
consensus was soon to vanish: after. 1976 we see that the 
identification o~ still more problems connected to energy 
policy in both countries led to the parties adopting 
different and. contradictory positions on future energy 
supply. The state energy policies reflect this as an 
accumulation of still more . problems areas' and 
. considerations being dealt wi th in. policy statements, and 
still more advanced; modelling tools to deal with any 
conceivable. future variation in theassu~ptions about 
prices, environmental impact, employment effect of 
technologies e~c. 
Toward the end of the 1970s, state energy. policy 
increasingly .focused on economic constraints, whereas this 
focus was, not as sharp in the poli tical debate conducted 
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between and within the political parties, where other con-
siderations still dominated. The economic concern of ener-
gy policy was paralleled by similar concerns expressed by 
particularly the Conservative and Liberal parties of both 
countries. But there was no consensus on how to arrive at 
an energy policy from this criterion, as it was itself the 
subject of debate as to what should be understood by eco-
nomic efficiency and how it should be weighted against en-
vironmental effects, employment effects etc. 
Generally we 
energy policy 
the poli tical 
find that the shifts identified in state 
parallel shifts in the poli tical focus of 
parties and that these shifts have occurred 
/ 
regardless of the colour of government. Only in one 
period, from the mid-1960s to 1973/74, can differences in 
the-form and content of energy between. the, two nations be 
interpreted asa reflection of the political/economical 
philosophy of the party in power.' For the rest of the 
1950-1980 per iod, the issues in energy policy 'were 'taken 
up in parallel both by the poli tical parties of the two 
countr ies and in state energy policy. This suggests that 
the emergence of these issues were related not so much to 
the political philosophy of the poli tical parties as' to 
other· factors which we will' need to explore' further. But 
let us proceed to see how other political groups conceived 
energy policy issues during the same period. 
"3.3 Industrial Interests. 
We have hypothesized that energy industries influence 
state energy'policy. The aim of this section_is to examine 
this hypothesis. Following our general methodological 
principles, we, will examine changes in the policies advo-
cated by the industries. We will seek to establish whether 
the issues raised in the course of the period from.1950 to 
1980 have been reflected in state energy policy. 
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We want to examine whether parallels can be established 
between the industries' expression of policies in a given 
per iod and state energy policy issues of the per iod. In 
addition we want to examine whether the chronology of 
issues, problems and policy solutions advocated by 
industrial interests are parallel in Denmark and Britain. 
We want to suggest that not only the specific branch of 
industry directly involved in energy production commands 
influence over state energy policy. The cost of energy 
consumption to industry in general would suggest that 
these industr ies would seek to influence the pr ices of 
energy. If this is the case, attempts at influencing 
I 
energy policy could either take place through industr ial 
interest "organisations like the British CBI or through 
personal contacts at a high level. Such contacts, however, 
are difficult to identify and we have assumed that even if 
personal contacts were important, the objectives of the 
pressure they have brought to bear on policy 'formulation 
would be evident from policy expressions of the interest 
organisations. 
The. energy producing industries besides fulfilling 
possible statutory demands on their operation are assumed 
to, seek influence on state energy policy' to the extent 
that energy policy is seen by the industry to either 
threaten the future of that industry or offer the scope 
for better conditions within the industry. 
Having said this, it must be added that a survey of policy 
expressions over a thirty year per iod of all industr ies 
involved in energy production in Britain and-Denmark would 
be a mammoth task outside the scope of the present thesis~ 
We have, therefore, chosen to concentrat~ on one branch of 
the energy industry, the electr ici ty industry. The 
remaining industries' policies have been covered with the 
aim of establishing different patterns of industrial 
influence in the two countries and possible' conflicts 
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between the objectives of different industries. The multi-
national oil companies were excluded from analysis, as we 
have wanted to focus on national energy policy, although 
we are aware that the international aspect of energy is 
and has been important. We have, however, assumed that the 
. oil companies would seek influence directly through pr ice 
policies. 
As the previous section, this is divided into a British 
and Danish subsection and within each of these sub-
sections the material has been organized chronologically. 
Britain. 
I 
The Br i tish energy industry can be grouped into fuel in-
dustries, which extract and manufacture fuels into a form 
in which they lend themselves to consumption, and power 
industries which transform fuels into usable energy. Hav-
ing said this it must immediately be added that the bor-
derlines here are fudged. The different fuels demand dif-
ferent processes to be turned into end-use energy, and 
both the coal and gas industries sell fuels direct to the 
consumer for end use as well as selling fuel for e1ectri-
ci ty generation. The nuclear fuel industry represents a 
particularly complicated case, as the organisation behind 
fuel manufacturing and reactor technological development 
is very complicated. 
During the 1950s, the most important energy industries in 
Britain were the nationalised coal and gas industries, re-
presented by the National Coal Board and th~ Gas Council, 
and the nationalised e1ectr ici ty industry, the structure 
of which during the 1950s is shown in fig. 3.1. 
During the 1950s, the coal industry was faced with de-
mands for coal which exceeded the productive capacity 
within the available technology and access to labour. The 
- 141-
National Coal Board therefore called on the state for 
measures to ease this situation 34 . The most pressing 
problems identified by the Coal Board were the need for 
manpower in the industry. The solution to this problem 
advocated by the Coal Board was increasing productivity in 
the mines through a "technical revolution in our industry" 
(James Brown, deputy chairman of the NCB in The Times, 23 
May 1955, p.6). Besides these calls for support for 
technological change, there is Ii ttle evidence that the 
industry acti vely sought to influence state energy 
policies ei ther directly or through attempts to influence 
public opinion. Also there is little evidence that the Gas 
Council were concerned with issues not directly related to 
/ 
the statutory financial objectives of that industry during 
the 19505. 
That the energy industries went about their business of 
providing for an increasing demand for energy is confirmed 
by a comprehensi ve survey that we have undertaken of 
publications of the electricity industry. This survey 
showed, that the publishing activity of the electricity 
industry up to 1957 was sparse, and that the British 
Electricity Authority/Central Electricity Authority only 
published technical reports on aspects of electricity 
production, obviously aimed at a narrow readership of 
power station engineers and afficionados of turbine 
technology and electricity transmission methods. 
The 1956 reorganisation of the electr ici ty industry that 
eventually resulted in the set ting up of the Electr ici ty 
Council and the Central Electricity Generating Board 
portended an era of increasing poli tical activi ty by the 
industry aimed both at decisionmakers and the general 
public. 
The British electricity industry is under a statutory 
obligation to meet demand for electricity in the cheapest 
way possible. Obviously, this obligation is wide open to 
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Fig 3.1 The Structure of· the British Electricity Supply, 
1950s. 
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interpretation. In order to turn it into an operational 
target for production in the form of a number of watts per 
unit of time, it is necessary to specify how 'demand' and 
'cheapness' should be interpreted. Consumption is usually 
taken to represent demand, but sometimes a latent demand 
.. is assumed to exist, as we shall see. If we move into the 
future, the stipulated future demand may vary considerably 
according to the assumptions made about future energy 
consumption patterns, co-variation between economic growth 
and consumption growth and a number of other parameters. 
Likewise, the expected cost of particular methods of 
electricity generation is a matter of interpretation and 
depends on which assumptions are made about construction 
I 
times, fuel and other prices,Uinflation and interest rates 
and capacity factors as observed· by Ramage (1983). Ince 
(1982) has suggested that· the Central Electricity 
Generating Board when making and justifying these crucial 
assumption operates according to a particular ideology: 
"The corporate culture' within CEGB is unanimous that 
the cheapest, and best way of. achieving an efficient 
e1ectr ici ty supply is to have a large and fast-growing 
..... nuclear element in the CEGB' s power production, freeing 
it from OPEC, the National Union of Mineworkers, and 
other outside influences as well as giving the 
economies' of scale and low generating costs which the 
CEGB claims for nuclear power. People who disagree with 
this line of thinking are few in the CEGB, and tend to 
leave." (Ince, 1982, pp. 24-25). 
Below we shall investigate whether, the observation, has 
applied to the electr ici ty industry over the whole of the 
per iod, and we will also seek to establish which actual 
influence the industry has commanded· over the energy 
policies of Br i tain. ' 
Since its ,start· in 1956, the Electricity Council published 
the annual 'Electricity Supply', a popularized version of 
the Council's report & accounts'. This publication', as well 
as the ~imilar ,'Power Progress' published by ~ the Central' 
Electricity Generating Board from 1959/60, addressed an 
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unspecified audience, and may be seen as an attempt to in-
form the general public about the activities of the indus-
try. The publications reported present and future activi-
ties in a factual manner, but the choice of issues changed 
over the years. 
During the 1950s, there was little discussion about the 
relationship between the industries themselves and the po-
litical authorities. There seemed to be no need to call 
for support nor to seek to influence policies towards 
specific fuels. And although about 90 per cent of electri-
cal capaci ty was coal fired in the mid-1950s, the issue 
taking up most of the space in the industries' annual re-
l 
ports was nuclear power. The electricity industry had been 
involved ~ in investigating the prospects for nuclear gene-
rating as far back as 1"953 35 , and the industry supported 
the development of the technology strongly. The' develop-
ment of nuclear pwoer was reported as a 'remarkable story 
of progress' 36. The background for' this optimism could be 
seen in the observation that demand for electr ici ty kept 
growing, a~d that there was no sign of saturation37 • The 
arguments for nuclear power, however, were not phrased in 
terms' of' need'· for the output but in terms of the. techno-
logical achievement that a civil nuclear programme was 
seen to represent. 
This is also ~he impression one gets from reading the an-
n~al Report & Accounts of the United Kingdom Atomic Energ~ 
Auth~ri ty of the 1950s which presented nuclear technology 
as both well understood and safe. The scientific origins 
of the technology was often referred to and the technical 
feasibility of constructing a nuclear power- station' came 
to represent an argument for actually doing it. 
"The rapid advance in technique and 'the experience 
gained in designing the· Calder Hall station made it 
possible to consider a programme for the commercial 
production of power from nuclear energy." (UKAEA Annual 
" 
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Report 1954/55, p. 13). 
The confidence in science and technology was also evident 
from the industries' confidence that to any problems aris-
ing from nuclear power production, technological solutions 
would be generated. The Atomic Energy Authroi ty was well 
aware of the risks arising to human health from radiation, 
but was satisfied that these risks were 
"( ••• ) easily measurable and as well understood as 
those in any other undertaking and can be guarded 
against accordingly." (UKAEA Annual Report, 1954/55, 
p.13.) 
/ 
This confidence also explains the expectation of the Au-
thority that,- in the long run, siting of nuclear power 
stations' in remote areas would not be necessary, as well 
as the Authorities' official reaction to the fire in 1957 
in an e.xperimental reactor at the Authority's: Windscale 
si te 38 • According to the Author i ty Histor ian's Office39 , 
the accident, while doing only little harm, 
"( ••• ) caused a considerable shock, both inside and 
outside the Author i ty, and led to much heartsearching 
and many-investigations." (United Kingdom Atomic Energy 
Authority, 1979 II, p.13). 
The Author i ty' s Report & Accounts, however, did not hear 
any evidence of such concern. Instead, the opportunity for 
technological improvements provided by the lessons learnt 
'from the accident were emphasized: 
"Careful measurements have made possible_ an improved 
understanding of the relationship between, an increase 
above the normal background radioactivity, following an 
accident involving the release of radioactive 'iodine, 
and the eff~ct on the radioactive content of milk drawn 
. from cows grazing in affected pastures." (UKAEA Report 
& Accounts, 1957/58, p. 42). 
The apparent inconsistency between stating that nuclear 
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technology was well-understood and admitting that new 
things still had to be learnt about it was resolved 
through the concept of technological progress. Technologi-
cal progress would mean that even in the case of a fully 
developed and well-understood technology, it would be pos-
sible to gain new advantages by applying still more re-
search. In this way, it was for instance expected that a 
fall in capital costs of nuclear power stations of 30 per 
cent could be achieved 40 ; but even though the Authority 
attempted to map out future develop~ents, this was diffi-
cult: 
"Technological and scientific knowledge is growing so 
rapidly, however, that no firm long-term programme 
could or should be formulated." (UKAEA Report & 
Accounts 1957/58, p.15). 
From,the late 1950s and throughout the 1960s, the industry 
increasingly discussed the influence of government policy 
on their own activities just like there was increasing 
evidence of an increased awareness of the influence of de-
velopments in other fuel sectors. The main theme of the 
Electricity Council's publications of the 1960s 41 was the 
need to provide for the increasing growth in electr ici ty 
demand. Economic growth led to an increased "desire for 
comfort and labour saving devices" (The Electricity Coun-
cil, ·1964· II) and in this situation electricity was seen 
to offer . an efficient replacement for' hard-to-find 
labour42 •. Competi tion of the supergr id and increased in-
struments in the attempts to provide for the expected in-
crease in demand in the future. 
But at the same time, competltion from other_fuels; parti-
cularly gas, was beginning to make itself felt. - In 1966,· 
the Electricity council observed that the industry was in 
a difficult position trying to compete with the gas indus-
try, because it had stiffer financial objectives than the 
gas -. boards, had to pay a duty on fuel oil, and' finally 
was -given a limited freedom by government to choose which 
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fuels should be used in electr ici ty generation. The last 
two points clearly referred to government policy measures 
to protect the coal industry, which was now seen by the 
electricity industry as a constraint on its attempts to 
fulfill its main statutory objective. 
Also the nuclear industry had begun to make claims for go-
vernment attention. It pointed out that technological 
progress demanded investment: 
"The many spectacular achievements which were announced 
. then (in 1954 when the UKAEA was set up, T.A.) and have 
been announced since were the fruit of ten years' work 
which till then had been largely unnoticed. The rate of 
advance continues to be rapid; but further progress can 
only come from research 'that is increasingly complex 
and expensive, both in money and men, and it takes 
time." (UKAEA Report & Accounts 1958/59, p.4). 
It is tempting to see the systematization and development 
of electricity forecasting procedures in the 1960s as an 
instrument in a fight to convince government that the in-
dustry was of national importance and therefore deserved 
special attention. It must, however, be remembered that 
the. industry since 1957 had been required, under the Elec-
tricity Act, to publish an annual electricity demand fore-
cast for the following six years. Furthermore, from' 1963 
it was required that the official government target rate 
for economic growth was adopted as an assumption of the 
forecasts. within the framework of these requirements, 
there was ample space for interpretation. 
The actual forecasting procedure was a combination of 
trend extrapolation and simulation using a s~mple model of 
the correlation between economic growth and electricity 
demand. growth4~. As growth in electrici~y demand was high 
in these years, the forecasting method inevitably led-to 
forecasts expecting ongoing growth of size of 7-9.3% 
p.a. 44 In addition to the expected growth in demand, the 
adoption of still larger 'planning margins' allowing for 
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growth in excess of forecasts as well as for plant fail-
ure 45 led to adoption of plans for capaci ty increses of 
75% over six years or almost 10% p.a. 46 • 
The procedures for forecasting and planning and the indus-
try's presentation of these procedures suggested that 
electr ici ty demand was autonomous in relation to the in-
dustry. The electricity industry merely fulfilled its 
statutory duties by responding as precisely as possible to 
demand: 
."Modern research techniques are· being used to ensure 
that the industry's forecasts of future electricity de-
mand aare as accurate as it is possible to make them." 
(Electricity Supply 1963/64, p. 11). 
But at the same time, the electricity industry acted like 
a pr i vate industry trying to acti vely expand demand for 
its own commodity and obtain as large. a share of the 
'highly competitive' en~rgy market as possible 47 • This was 
evident also in increasingly aggressive marketing of elec-
tricity in the annual reports 48 • 
Finally, achieving a continuous' supply was an important 
objective of the industry. The Electricity Council cited 
the following achievements of the early and mid-1960s as 
important steps towards· the final aim of 99.9% continous 
supply49: 
the operational control systems for controlling load 
had been improved; 
automatic data-recording methods had been developed; 
the number of manned points had decreased. 
The industry went for increasing the size of single power 
stations .. because of the economies of scale ar ising. But 
the centralisation of electricity supply was seen to have .. 
the add i tional advantage of increasing control over the 
whole system and thus enabling a higher continuity, as in-
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dicated above. 
From 1969, there are indications that the relationship be-
tween the industries and the surroundings was increasingly 
strained as was the relationship between the industr ies. 
The National Coal Board called for government support of 
the industry, and the electr ici ty boards were put under 
obligations to purchase large amounts of indigenous coal. 
This move was not popular with the Central Electricity Ge-
nerating Board: 
"Constraints on the free choice of fuel ( ••• ) will have 
penali ties, which will extent into the future." (Power 
Progress, 1969/70). 
The Board also reacted to the increasing scrutiny of the 
industry by Select Committees. The reaction was phrased as 
a hope that the additional workload arising from inquiries 
and examinations would not become yet more onerous SO • The 
industry observed, however, that public concern about 
energy was mounting S1 , and reacted by increasingly empha-
sizing - in its publications the advantages of the indus-
try'i' owri product (fuel or electricity) as a strategic 
component ~f a' ~ational energy policy~ 
Also the nuclear "industry found its posi tion threatened. 
In 1971 the united Kingdom Atomic Energy Authority respon-
ded to the Green Paper on Research ~nd Development (cmnd. 
4814) by recommending that the Reactor policy Committee 
-should be consulted in order to ensure that the Central 
Electricity Generating Board, the Authority, the fuel ma-
nufactures and the nuclear power plant manufacturing in-
" ," 
dustry were given influence on" research pr-ior i ties. The 
Authority observed that introduction of natural gas had 
led to slow and irregular order ing - of nuclear power sta-
tions, and called on -government to recognize the impor-
tance-of nuclear power and a strong nuclear indust rY S2. 
- IS0-
Another indication that energy was increasingly politi-
cized is the considerable widening of the argument for nu-
clear power which can be observed in the nuclear and elec-
tricity industries', publications from the late 1960s on-
wards. Where the nuclear project in the 1950s and early 
1960s had been seen to follow on logically from the growth 
in energy demand and the need for technological progress, 
it was now argued that nuclear power was preferable to 
other energy forms because its environmental impact was 
negligible and its consumption of exhaustible resources 
small 53 • Also the safety of the technology was emphasized, 
but whereas the technology in the 1950s and early 1960s 
had been presented as inherently safe, the existence of 
/ 
the independent surveillance "of the Nuclear Installations 
Inspector'ate and the Radioactive Substance Committee were 
now presented as guarantees that the project was run in a 
safe way. These bodies, had existed for a number of years, 
the Radioactive Substances Committee from 1948 and the Nu-
clear Installations Inspectorate (under the name of the 
Inspectorate of Nuclear Installations) from 1959, but only 
in the late 1960s did the industry find it necessary to 
emphasize that nuclear technology was subjected to inde-
pendent scrutiny. Again this suggests, that the industry 
was'under some pressure to legitimize its activities •. 
The environment became an increasingly prominent issue. In 
1970 the Central Electricity Generating· Board observed 
that the quality of, the environment' and in particular the 
issues raised by pollution had received widespread publi-
city recently. The Board commented: 
"Care for the environment has always been an integral 
part of CEGB's policy in the siting, ,design and opera-
tion of their plant." (Power Progress 1969/70). 
This is true to the extent that visual ameni ty had been 
discussed earlier, notably in the early sixties', when un-
" ' 
dergrounding of high voltage power lines was considered54. 
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At the time, however, undergrounding was dismissed on the 
ground that it was too costly. Hence, until around 1970 
the electricity industry had not been concerned about 
'the environment' but about specific cases of environmen-
tal impacts of their operations; and furthermore, that 
- economic considerations had overriden the concern for vis-
ual amenity. 
The politicisation was also evident from the sheer amount 
of published material of the industries, which started 
growing about 1970 and have grown steadily since. The in-
formation efforts can be seen from the increasing use of 
new media like exhibitions, leaflets, films, packaged edu-
I 
cational material etc. as well as from the face-lift that 
the old media, like the annual reports, underwent55 • 
The energy crisis in 1973/74 found each industry was al-
ready defending the posi tion of its particular product. 
The crisis was therefore mainly used as yet another argu-
ment in the fight for government attention. 
The National Coal Board prepared the 'Plan for Coal' which 
made financial provisions' for an increase in coal produc-
, 
tion and sales as well as a capi tal investment of. £600 
million. to provide for new capacity to replace depletion. 
The plan was endorsed by the trade unions and the Labour 
government through tripartite discussions. The plan im-
plied an increase in coal-based electr ici ty supply. But, 
as we have seen, the nuclear industry was pressing for or-
ders, and the Central Electrici ty Board was reinforcing 
its pressure on government to get the approval of a pro-
gramme of American-built pressurized water reactors. 
The rest of the 1970s were marked by increasingly aggres-
sive marketing by the energy industries. The issues which 
had been raised around 1970, particularly the en'vironment, 
~ealthand safety, remained in' the focus of argumeni. But 
in addition, public opinion and choice of technologies 
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came increasingly into focus. 
The increasing fuel pr ices meant that energy took up a 
larger share of the costs of industr ial production. The 
Confederation of Br i tish Industry made efforts to gain 
., influence in energy poli tical decision-making, which in-
dicates that energy policy was increasingly considered an 
important field. A joint energy policy group was esta-
blished between the Confederation and the Department of 
Energy and the Confederation attended the 1976 National 
Conference on energy and was represented on the Energy 
Commission. Although the Confederation is generally in fa-
vour of free-market principles, since the mid-1970s it has 
I 
advocated national energy planning, especially as an in-
strument ~to ensure further development of nuclear power s6 • 
The electricity and nuclear industries increasingly recog-
nized the existance of an opposition against nuclear power 
and increased the activities to "explain nuclear power for 
the layman"s7. It was observed, that 
"There can be few technologies that have evoked so much 
comment yet are so Ii ttle understood as nuclear power 
• •• It is a complete enigma for many. And fear of the 
unknown has led to its erroneous assocation with atomic 
weapons and even into the realm of science fiction. The 
reality of course is quite different." Mr. S.C. God-
dard, ECng, MIEE, Systems Strategy Engineer, in CEGB, 
.. 1981 II). 
The. industry has sought to counter what is thought to be 
the result of ignorance by disseminating a large number of 
facts, i.e. mainly statistics about various aspects of nu-
clear power generation which. are presented as 'the facts 
about nuclear power,s8. 
Another new discussion was related to the relative advan-
tages of different energy producing technologies. This 
discussion appeared in the publications of the electricity 
industry around 1980, and mainly set out the advantages. of 
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nuclear power against the disadvantages of the 'capri-
'cious' technologies for utilizing 'so-called renewable re-
sources'59. 
The renewable energy technologies were dismissed as not 
economically viable: if it was possible to capture low 
cost wind energy, this would have been done long time ago, 
as "nothing stops people building windmills" (Central 
Electricity Generating Board, 1981 IV). At the most, re-
newable energy may be used as 'insurance technologies', 
especially wind power, which 
" ( ••• ) might become economic wi th very large machines 
of good reliability and a lbng life if fossil fuel pri-
ces rise about a factor two in real terms." (The Elec-
tricity Council, 1980, p.2l). 
We shall not discuss here the further implications of the 
contradiction between two statements, just note that the 
industry, while regarding cost-efficiency as important, 
was in internal disagreement about the level of invest-
ments which was to be assumed pr ior to an assessment of 
the relative cost efficiency of renewable technologies. 
Summary •.. 
Although the British Energy industri~s are under statutory 
obligations to produce particular forms of energy. under 
.specific financial requirements, they are actively pursu-
ing interests beyond these statutory objectives. 
During the 1950s, the industries aimed'at increasing out-
put and productivity as far as' possible. Technological 
change, especially the nuclear project, was presented as a 
solution to the problem of energy shortage, and there is 
no evidence of any conflicts between the fuel industries. 
From around 1970, the industries started more aggressive 
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campaigns to defend their positions. Public relations ac-
tivities were intensified, as were attempts to influence 
the process directly. In this process, the industr ies in-
creasingly saw each other as rivals. The coal str ikes of 
1972 and 1974 were used by the electricity and nuclear in-
dustries as yet another argument to increase the share of 
nuclear power, while the oil pr ice rise was used by the 
coal industry as an argument in favour of strengthening 
this industry. 
From the mid-1970s, new issues entered the publications of 
the industries. The industries discussed their products in 
terms of national energy policy which involved evaluation 
I 
of energy technologies, and the industries developed their 
own version of the cr iter ia which should be used in such 
an evaluation. Whereas the environment had been accepted 
as an important criteria for energy technology evaluation 
as -far back as about 1970, public opinion was only 
introduced around 1980 as an important issue, but negative 
attitudes to nuclear power was rejected as the results of 
ignorance. , 
Whereas government energy policy considered a wide range 
of energy sources from 1974, the electricity industry-only 
around 1980 started a discussion about renewable energy. 
The technologies were generally _rejected because they were 
not seen to be economically viable as a result of their 
incompatibility to the national grid. But scaling up of 
,especially wind machines was increasingly considered more 
seriously as they began to look economic. 
It will be noted that the basic attitude to -technological 
development of the 1980s differed radically from that of 
the ,.' 1950s. In the 1950s, the industr ies advocated 
technological change/progress, almost whatever the cost. 
As we are approaching 1980, the costs of technological 
developments, both in terms of state finances but also in 
terms of health, safety and the environment had become an 
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issue of debate within the industry, and the need to 
provide sufficient energy in the future had been replaced 
by a concern for the future cost of particular energy 
strategies. 
Here the industries favoured strategies emphasizing the 
energy form produced by the particular industry. 
Denmark. 
For a large part of the period from 1950 to 1980, Denmark 
imported all coal and oil for inland consumption. As a 
I 
result the electricity industry was for most of the period 
the onlY~Danish proper energy industry60. The electricity 
industry grew from independent companies which were either 
co-operative ventures, owned by local authorities, or by 
private (limited) companies. The industries were represen-
ted through the national interest organisation, Danske 
ElvC!rkers Forening, which was set up by the industry it-
self as far back as 1923, and was to represent the indus-
tries' in their dealings with the state. For example, 
Danske ElvC!rkers Forening holds three out of '12 seats in 
ElektricitetsrAdet ('The Electricity Council') which in 
1935 was given statutory powers to supervise electr ici ty 
production, exercise market control and advise government 
in electrical matters 61 • Although nuclear power has not as 
yet been introduced 'in Denmark, preparations for a nuclear 
project'were, as we have seen, initiated in the 1950s. The 
Atomenergikommission .( 'The Atomic Energy Commission') and 
its research centre at Ris0 represented interest in 
nuclear power. 
", 
During the 1950s, the level of overt political activity 
beside direct cooperation with government through e.g. 
ElektricitetsrAdet, was low. Danske ElvC!rkers Forening 
since 1954 issued an annual report 62 , but throughout the 
1950s and 1960s, it consisted solely of statistical inf6r-
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mation about production, sales etc. plus descr iptions of 
each undertaking. 
In the mid-1950s I the nuclear project was ini tiated, and 
Atomenergikommissionen set up. In 1956, a number of firms 
and undertakings within Danish industry, particularly from 
banking, insurance, the electr ici ty industr ies and major 
manufacturing industries, got together in DANATOM, a lobby 
which aimed at promoting nuclear power. DANATOM put most 
of their efforts into direct contacts wi th poli ticians 
and newspaper articles 63 • Hence, the nuclear organisations 
did ~otthrough the 1950s prepare policy statement on nu-
clear power. 
I 
The 1960s were quiet in respect to statements from the 
energy industr ies. The publications from the electr ici ty 
industry were limited to the annual statistical bulletin. 
Around 1970, the industry's public activities were increa-
sed. Danske Elva!rkers Forening· started issuing an annual 
report 64 • Here it was noted that recent legislation had 
important implications for electr ici ty supply. The most 
important legislation was limits for the sulphur-content 
in fuel oil for power station use a~d a price and revenue 
freeze in 1971. The latter measure 
"( ••• ) has been the cause of many difficulties related 
to the long-term economic planning of the electr ici ty 
undertakings." (Danske Elva!rkers Forening, 1972/73). 
Another problem encountered by the industry was related to 
consumption trends. It was observed that electr icity con-
sumption since 1970 had risen only by ~bout 7,5% p.a •. com-. 
pared to about_l0% p.a. during the 1960s. This loss,of mo~ 
mentum was explained as· a temporary phenomenon, .. and a 
prognosis for electr ici ty consumption of 10.3 % •. At the 
same time the industry's consumption of oil was assumed to 
be . for a large part replaced by coal, which was becoming 
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cheaper in relation to oil. Also nuclear power was consi-
dered a possibili ty, and the electr ici ty industry had ta-
ken ini tiati ve in a ser ies of preliminary investigations 
of siting possibilities. Elsewhere, in the leaflet 'Atomet 
i fremtidens elforsyning' 66 (' The Atom in the energy sup-
ply of the future'), it was argued that nuclear power 
would be necessary to supplement coal and oil, which would 
eventually be depleted. 
In the face of a growing recognition of the increasing un-
certainties about future government intervention as well 
as fuel price relations, Danske Elv~rkers Forening in 1972 
set up 'Elv~rkernes Energiudvalg ' ('the Electricity Supply 
I 
undertakings' Energy Committee') to coordinate the assess-
ment of nuclear technology as well as other energy politi-
cal issues 67 • 
Contact wi th the general public was another new concern 
for the industry. This was seen as a necessi ty caused by 
the need for further expansion of electr ici ty supply in 
the future: 
"Considering the expected activity of the years to 
come, Danish electricity supply will have to convey to 
the public the necessi ty of the interference wi th the 
environment which follows from the development." (Dan-
ske Elv~rkersForening, 1972/73, p.4.). . -
As a consequence, a press- and information service was set 
up in 1972, and issued the pamphlet 'Skal vi hal el over-
hovedet? I (I Should we have electr ici ty at all?') present-
ing electricity as a necessary precondition of prosperity. 
The 'oil price rises in 1973/74 led to an intensification 
of industry policymaking as well as of the marketing of 
electr ici ty. The industry ini tially reacted strongly to 
the increasing government interference in electricity sup-
ply and consumption, but in late 1973 made an agreement 
with the Minister of Trade to initiate a campaign for 
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electricity saving to avoid rationing of electricity. In 
1974, the industry was faced with 1) a proposal for an 
Electricity Supply Act, which implied that the development 
of the electricity industry was to be considered in the 
context of a national energy policy; 2) a proposal for a 
Nuclear, Installations Act; and 3) a proposal for a duty 
on electr ici ty. The electr ici ty industry reacted to this 
interference by arguing that the proposal represented a 
severe restriction on the freedom of action of the 
industries. 
The internal planning of the industry was also affected 
by the rapid changes in supply conditions. In the progno-
I 
sis for electricity consumption until the year 1990, an-
nual demand growth was expected at 8.5% compared to 10% 
previously. Danske Elv~rkers Forening commented: 
"It is one thing, that in certain areas energy has been 
wasted. But the correlation between the development of 
the domestic product of a society and its energy con-
sumption is to important to curb growth in energy con-
sumption out of hand." (Danske Elv~rkers Forening 
1973/74, p.3). 
In the following year, however, no long term prognosis was 
cited and, it was noted that only those power plant exten-
sions '. which were already underway would go ahead, while 
planned capacity increases of 160 MW were deferred. 
The campaign for nuclear power was intensified in spite of 
'the uncertainties about future electricity consumption. It 
was observed that the public debate about nuclear power 
had arrived in Denmark and that concepts like 'low energy 
, '" ~', i' , 
society' and 'zero growth' were being introduced 69 • The 
industry argued that. these concepts were unrealistic, and 
that growth in. ene~gy demand would be resumed in the near 
future. Public relations activities focussed on nuclear 
power, and it was argued that nuclear power was a central 
component of a realistic national energy po1i cy70. The 
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main arguments for nuclear power concentrated on the fol-
lowing aspects: 
1) In the long run and "under the assumptions used here" 
(ELSAM, 1975, p.' 28), nuclear power would prove compe-
titive with coal and oil~ 
2) Diminished dependence on oil would mean 
other sources for space heating. This would 
increase in the demand for electricity which 
to corne from nuclear power; 
demand for 
lead to an 
would have 
3) "Nuclear power is in certain circumstances environmen-
tally more benign than coal or oil fired power sta-
tions." (ELSAM, 1975, p.29). 
ELSAM agreed that nuclear 
health and safety as well 
cluded that: 
power raised questions about 
! 
as waste management, but con-
,,"It is the assessment of the electricity industry that 
the new techniques which are now available represent 
acceptable solutions to these problems." (ELSAM, 1975, 
p. 29). 
The Atomenergikommission also intensif ied its acti vi ties. 
The Commission in 1975 observed that the oil crisis had 
put nuclear power back on the agenda 71 , but also observed 
that more aspects had been introduced to the d iscussio'n: 
"Thus, the entire' topic of the environment is now in-
cluded with much. greater weight, 'and attention is In-
. creasingly directed towards control of economic growth 
in order to arrive at a lower rate of growth for total 
energy consumption.and stronger regard for other quali-' 
ties of life than mater ial prosper i ty." (Atomenergikom-
missionen, 1975, p.5). 
Now, industry outside the energy sector,also became invol-
ved in discussing energy policy. We have already mention~d 
OANATOM; but also Industriradet ('The Industrial Coun-
cil'), an organisation representing the interests of Da-
nish industry, increasingly participating in the debate 
about energy from 1973 .. In the face of uncertain price and 
supply condi tions related to energy in the' future the 'In-
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dustrirad set out to protect the interests of its member 
industries: 
"For the sake of production and employment, a future 
energy policy ought to give energy supply to industry a 
higher pr ior i ty than non- indus tr i al purposes." (Bre i-
tenstein, 1975, p.23). 
Again we note that the existence of state energy policy 
was taken ad notam: there was no questioning of the neces-
sity of state energy policy, in spite of the declared li-
beral pr inciples of the Industr irad. Instead, the Indus-
trirad concentrated on applying pressure to the state to 
influence the direction of national energy policy, espe-
,I 
cially the future of nuclear power. 
After the oil cr isis and for the rest of the 1970s, the 
industry kept increasing its public relations efforts. 
Towards the end of the 1970s, renewable energy and control 
of power supply emerged as important issues in the publi-
cations of the electr ici ty industry. All energy sources 
should be utilized, and utilization of solar energy was 
absolutely preferable to using fossil fuels 72 • In 1979 it 
was observed 73 , that these sources were not very well sui-
ted·for electricity production at the present stage of de-
velopment compared to nuclear.power. Only one year after, 
however, with,regard to wind energy, it was observed that 
whereas this energy form would not for some time be capa-
ble of supplying a large amount of energy, it would have 
to be counted for supplying electricity locally' in sparse-
ly populated areas74 • It was also noted that the experi-
mental wind machines erected at Nibe in collaboration be-
tween the Ministry of Trade and the electricity industry 75 
would contribute a saving of about 300 tons of oil a year. 
Nuclear power, which in 1979 was promoted by means of 
booklets like ELKRAFT's "Atomet i fremtidens el-forsy-
nin9", an update of the 1972 booklet, was still recommen-
ded by the electr ici ty supply, but now the claims to the 
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advantages of this technology were played down considera-
bly, and it was agreed that problems existed in relation 
to safety and waste. Finally, other sources, notably natu-
ral gas, were considered as candidates for future electri-
city supply. 
The electricity industry now emphasized that the interests 
of the industry necessarily coincided with the interest of 
the consumer as a result of the ownership pattern whereby 
local authorities and shareholders are in principle in 
control of the industry. This implied that siting of power 
stations involved conflicts between only two 'parties': 
the electrici ty industry (which represents the consumers) 
and the environment. 
Also heating was taken up as a new policy area. The elec-
tricity industry looking for new markets encountered the 
heating mar ket, for which regulation through the Heating 
Planning Act of 1979 was underway. The electricity indus-
try argued that more extensive use of electrical heating 
would contribute to independence from oil, and supported 
its 'claims with reference to an analysis of the socio-eco-
nomic impact of an increased share of electrical heat-
ing 78. It was argued that even though electr ical heating 
demands a larger input of energy than individual oil burn-
ing, in the future it would be necessary to include consi-
derations of the kind of fuels that' society wants to use, 
, . 
its pr ice and availabili ty as· well as the socio-economic 
costin terms of total private and public investments, fo-
reign exchange cost and gains in terms of oil savings. 
Industry outside the energy sector also intensified their 
campaign. to introduce nuclear power, which was now being 
presented as not only a cheap source of energy but also an 
important opportuni ty for Danish industry to come to the 
forefront of technological change: 
" ( ••• ) reg ret tably, Dani sh indus try is not given the 
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opportunity to work with nuclear power technology, 
which we could learn a lot from. And what we learn is 
applicable to other areas. ( ••• ) Danish industry needs 
the chance of working with advanced technology." (Di-
rector S.T. Lyngs0 in an interview in Dansk Industri, 
1977, no.9). 
DANATOM in 1980 issued a report which was distributed to 
poli ticians and industry 77 on the need of .the Danish so-
ciety for nuclear power. It was observed that electricity 
demand was stagnating, and that nuclear power would not be 
necessary from a supply perspecti ve. It was argued, how-
ever, that compared to other sources and technologies, nu-
clear power was preferable. Again the effects on the eco-
nomy, supply security and the/environment were emphasized 
as impor~ant' criteria for energy technological choices. 
The environmental effects of coal vs. nuclear power were 
even compared at a global scale, and DANATOM concluded: 
"To mankind, the use of coal is at least ten times as 
damaging to health than the use of uranium." (DANATOM, 
1980, p.18). 
Once more we note the widening out of criteria for techno-
logical choice in energy. 
Summary. 
The Danish energy supply was in a large part of the period 
based on imported fuels, and the electricity industry was 
the only Danish energy industry. Throughout the 1950s and 
. . 
1960s, there is little evidence of political activity 
short of direct contact to decisionmakers. _ 
Around 1970,_ the electricity industry and the nuclear 
establishment intensified their activities. The electri-
city industry was faced with political interference resul-
ting from national economic problems as well as with 
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a stagnation in the rate of electricity demand growth and 
rising oil prices. The industry strengthened its activi-
ties within a wider field of energy policy and intensified 
its public relation efforts. In addition, the plans for a 
nuclear project which had been moth-balled through the 
1960s, when supplies of oil were cheap and abundant, were 
now resuscitated. This development was given further impe-
tus by the oil crisis, which meant increased government 
pressure on the electricity industry, and presented it 
with strong market incentives to shift fuel consumption 
away from oil. At the same time industr ies outside the 
energy sector pressed, on one hand for s'ecur ing a cheap 
supply of energy for industry, on the other for nuclear 
! 
power which was thought to present new opportuni ties for 
industry.~ In spi te of the resistance of the electr ici ty 
industry towards the proposed measures for state control 
of the industry, in general it was accepted that some 
state planning of energy supply was necessary in order to 
secure fuel supplies in the future. 
When state energy policy was established as a fact by the 
mid~70s, the industries sought to influence decisionmaking 
directly as well as indirectly, through intensification of 
public relations ·activities. The industry increasingly ar-
gued for their technological and fuel-related preferences 
in ,terms of environmental and socio-economic effects~ To-
wards 1980, the industry increasingly enetered into energy 
planning' by prepar ing its own scenar ios. The assumptions 
of the early 1970s, that growth in energy demand would re-
turn by itself, was given up and replaced by attempts' to 
buy into the planned energy supply by presenting the most 
convincing scenarios. 
General Summary: Industrial Interests.' 
In Denmark as well as in Britain, the character of indus-
trial activities related to energy changed 'in the 
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years around 1970. Before 1970, the energy industries of 
both countries aimed at increasing output to fulfill a 
growing demand. Regarding energy technology, the indus-
tr ies outside the energy sector were mainly interested in 
nuclear power, which in both countries represented an op-
portunity for some industrial branches. The British energy 
industr ies sought to influence government more acti vely 
than the Danish, which is no doubt the direct result of 
public ownership and control. Public ownership meant that 
major investments had to be politically endorsed, while in 
Denmark the industry was free to extend its operations 
without political intervention. In both countries, how-
ever, the industry called for government involvement in 
I 
the nuclear project, which was seen as a matter of nation-
al intere'st. 
From around 1970, the industries in both countries were 
faced with obstacles to fUrther growth. In Britain, compe-
tition between the fuel and power industries was intensi-
fied, and in Denmark, the electr ici ty industry found its 
expansion curbed by slackening demand and government in-
tervention. Also in both countries, the industries had be-
gun worrying about the environmental impact of energy 
technologies, mainly in relation to nuclear power., These 
new issues parallelled government policies aimed at alle-
viating the effects of increasing trade defici ts and in-
flation, as well as incipient envfronmental concern pre-
sent in the legislation of both countries. 
Immediately after the oil crisis (and in Britain, the coal 
strike) the activi ties of the energy industr ies in both 
countr ies were intensified. In particula-r, the nuclear 
establishments and the electr ici ty industr ies pressed' for 
intensifying ~overnment involvement in nuclear power. The 
industries in both countries from this time on increasing-
ly sought to promote their product in terms of' national 
energy policy. At the same time public relations efforts 
were . increased considerably, indicating that the 
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industries perceived public opinion as an important in-
strument in secur ing their posi tion. Apparently, the in-
dustr ies now expected that the energy supply patterns of 
the future would be to a large extend poli tically deter-
mined. 
This interpretation is supported by the increasing tenden-
cy for the industries to argue in terms of national energy 
policy and in terms of the over-all consequences of par-
ticular technological choices. Whereas internal economics 
as well as fuel prices and prices of other fuels or energy 
forms were throughout the central concerns for the energy 
industries, . towards 1980 they increasingly phrased their 
arguments in terms of the so~io-economic impact, and the 
time-horizon of corporate plans was. correspondingly in-
creased. This development occurred after the adoption of 
long-term national energy plans with a time-lag of a cou-
ple of years, which leads us to conclude that the energy 
industry was trying to adapt to issues and methods in 
state energy policy while still pursuing some central con-
cerns, of which securing the position of the industry has 
been the most important. This is supported by the. atti-
tudes towards nuclear power vs. renewable energy. In both 
countr ies, the e1ectr ici ty industry actively promoted nu-
clear power as a means to extend electricity supply, 
whereas renewable energy was considered of marginal inte-
rest. But towards 1980, as state subsidies for renewable 
energy became available while nuclear power became· less 
economically attractive, the industry increased; its inte-
rests in especially wind energy. 
Looking back to our hypothesis, we find support. for the 
suggestion that energy was po1iticized~ We have found that 
the imp1ici t'assumptions of the energy .. industr ies about 
growth, about the role of state energy policy,. about cri-
teria for choice of energy technologies andabout~the role 
of the public changed considerably after 1970 •• These 'po_ 
1itical' concerns or issues were· contrasted by the 
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central concerns of the industries which were to maintain 
and possibly extend the domain of the particular industry 
and to pursue short-term economic advantages by e.g. using 
the cheapest fuel. 
We find, therefore, that the energy industries only refer-
red to the national interest after the introduction of 
national energy policy, and that the industry only pursued 
directions which were seen to be advantageous to the par-
ticular industry either in terms of the long term position 
of the industry in energy supply or in terms of short-term 
economic benefi ts. We are led by this to conclude that 
whereas the energy industry's interests have served as in-
I 
puts to state energy policy the industries have not been 
instrumental in defining energy as an issue of national 
interest. Nor have the industries themselves influenced 
the change in the range of issues taken up in energy poli-
cy. These issues occur in the industr ies' policies only 
after they were introduced into state energy policy. We 
shall therefore have to look to other groups in society to 
understand why energy came to be defined as a policy area 
and why new issues have been introduced into this policy 
area. 
3.4 Trade Union Interests. 
As wi th industry, trade unions can be divided into those 
whose members are directly involved in energy production 
and those whose members are not. Following the ,hypothesis 
that the attempts by a group to influence energy, policy 
are determined by that group's experience 6f the'material 
conditions related to energy and the hypothesis of a gene-
ral politicization, we would expect to find agrowing,num-
ber of trade unions involved in energy poli tical acti vi-
ties through the 1950-1980 period. In,this section we will 
investigate if this has indeed been the case, and if there 
is any systematic correlation, between a trade union's 
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position in relation to energy production and the date of 
its involvement in energy politics. 
As in the previous sections, this one is divided into one 
sub-section for each nation, and within these subsections, 
the account is chronologically structured. 
Britain. 
In Britain, the one union whose members' interests are 
tied most closely to energy production is the National 
Union of Mineworkers. Second, come the engineering unions 
I 
like the Electr ical Power Engineers' Association and' the 
Electricat, Electronic, Telecommunications and Plumbing 
Union, but these unions have members elsewhere than in the 
electricity industry. In addition to these, a large number 
of unions have a lesser percentage of their membership in 
the energy industries. Ince (1981) observes that even the 
unions with a direct interest in energy tend to have a 
smallish percentage of their membership working in' the 
field, spread thinly between different·· energy operations 
and concludes that this implies that apart from the mi-
ners, even the unions directly involved . in "fuel are 
obliged to look at energy in general as" well as' in terms 
of their own'm~mbers' interest. This conclusion, however, 
presupposes that the unions do look 'at energy at all, and, 
as we shall see, this has only recently been the case. 
During the 1950s and 1960s, only the National Union of 
Mineworkers . was" exp1ici tly .. concerned about the' future .; of 
British energy supply, and onlyin'terms of the 'future of 
the coal industry. The Union was,' ho~ever, . mainly con-
cerned about "wages and working condi tions in the short 
term. For example, when coal was' impor ted in" the· mid-
1950s, the mineworkers protested that this would not be 
necessary if the coal price was determined by market for-
ces. 'This would' mean a higher' price of coal· and the 
- 168 -
surplus of pr ice over cost could be used for improving 
working conditions in the mines 79 • On the other hand, the 
mineworkers did not resist very strongly the rundown of 
the coal industry dur ing the 1960s, when allowances were 
available for miners who moved to other pi ts or accepted 
voluntary redund ancy80. 
By 1971, however, a Fuel and Power Industries' Committee 
was set up under the TUC signalling a growing trade union-
awareness of the importance of energy. The Committee 
brought together members from all unions wi th members in 
energy industries and had as its first task to undertake a 
study of national fuel and power policy. The study warned 
I 
against over-reliance on oil in the light of stagnation in 
the national fuel and power industr ies and called for ex-
pansion of the nuclear programme and for securing the fu-
tureof the coal industry. 
The Fuel and' Power Industries Committee was given seven 
seats on the Energy Commission. Besides, the National 
Union of' Mineworkers was directly involved 'in tr iparti te 
decision-making together wi th the National Coal Board and 
government, which is probably why the engineering unions 
took a leading role in the Fuel and Power Industries! Com-
mi ttee. Hence ,through the '1970s the unions involved in 
energy production had direct, access to the energy deci-
sionmaking.process, and there was no motive to seek wider 
public support. 
After the oil crisis, the TUC's official policy has con-
sistently emphasized the need to expandinvestrnents in the 
coal industry as well as in the electr ici ty industry and 
nuclear indus tr ies. Th is obj ecti ve was reconciled wi th a 
call for', incieased energy conservation by recommending 
that domestic oil and gas production should be cut down8l. 
The TUC has been and is consistently committed to economic 
growth. The role of energy in economic growth has 
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therefore been a central concern of the TUC. As late as in 
1976 the TUC suggested that state energy policy should aim 
at providing sufficient energy for future economic growth. 
Specifically, it was seen as important to maintain and ex-
pand employment in the coal and nuclear industries. At the 
same time, the TUC recommended the creation of a central 
body with representatives from government, the unions and 
industry to advise on. energy policy. This indicates that 
energy policy was also seen as a means. of reconciling 
economic interests within energy supply. 
It was increasingly realized that economic growth was not 
returning even after the repercussions of the oil cr isis 
/ 
had subsided. Therefore, government energy policy increa-
singly came to be seen by the TUC as a means of creating 
economic growth and securing employment (as opposed to the 
earlier argument that energy policy should ensure that 
sufficient energy was present to fulfill the demands 
arising from economic growth). This argument was presented 
in 1979, when the TUC called for increased long-term 
investments in the energy industry in order to maintain 
the standard of Ii ving 82 , and repeated in 1981, when the 
TUC observed, that: 
"It is now widely understood that adequate and stable 
supplies of energy at reasonable prices are fundamental 
to possibili ties for economic growth in the UK and in 
the world economy." (Trades union Congress, 1981, p.S) 
The central concerns within this framework were directly 
related to the employment interests of the workers in the 
coal and nuclear industr ies 1 still the TUC recommended 
increased investments in these industries.' But 
increasingly these demands were sought to be reconciled 
with other considerations. 
Since 1977, trade union involvement in the energy debate 
had revealed an increasing number of inconsistencies. in 
the trade union approach to energy policy. In 1977, the 
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annual TUC conference called on national energy policy to 
seek a balanced development of energy resources. An impor-
tant component of such a strategy was an expanded nuclear 
programme, which would have to be 'socially acceptable'. 
This may be liked with the anti-nuclear opposition within 
the trade union movement. In 1977, the Amalgated Union of 
Engineering Workers - Technical Administrative and Super-
visory Section published a proposal for a national energy 
strategy which implied that energy policy should take as 
its star ting point an assessment of the country's energy 
needs. (as opposed to its revealed demand, which may in-
clude a large hidden waste of energy). Government should 
I 
actively support energy conservation and increased use of 
renewable energy and in addi tion should ensure workers' 
control for energy production. 
The increasing concern for·· new issues .. also made itself 
felt in" official TUC' policies. The 1979 Congress called 
.. 
for a policy review to provide the background for a debate 
within the trade union movement on different future energy 
optibns.Aspects of energy which were consider~drelevant 
for such a debate included: resources, health and safety 
and employment. The· congress called at the· same time for 
"maximum economy in use" and for "the fullest exploitation 
of all energy resources." (1979 Congress Resolution on 
Energy policy, cited in Trades Union Congress, 1981, .p. 
126). The review84 reveals how. the Fuel and Power Indus-
tries Committee and the TUC imagined that these apparently 
contradictory objectives were to be achieved. Conservation 
should be actively supported by state grants for insula-
tion etc., which was seen as an opportunity-for employment 
in contrast to those savings of energy which could be 
achieved through. high energy pr ices, and which would not 
necessarily lead to employment. On the supply side, it was 
argued that the North Sea resources ought to be exploited 
at a slow rate to ensure this indigenous source against 
depletion. On the other hand, the TUC did not seem to have 
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any scruples as to a possible depletion of coal: the coal 
industry should be given room for expansion by developing 
coal-to-oil and coal-to-gas technologies and by making the 
utmost efforts to increase exports of coal and protect 
Br i t ish coal from competi t ion from impor ted coal. These 
measures, the TUC argued, demanded a stronger energy poli-
cy and planning. The TUC proposed that a new Energy Com-
mission be set up which would have a tripartite membership 
drawn from the' TUC, the CBr and the Department of Ener-
gy85. This Committee would assist the Department of Energy 
in formulating and implementing a comprehensive national 
energy policy, and it was assumed that it would represent 
the relevant interests. The public interest in energy pro-
f 
blems was recognized, but it,· was observed that the prac-
tice of· public inquiries in,cases of ,energy projects would 
often delay projects: 
"There is no doubt that there is a need for public con-
sideration of the issues raised by such matters as the 
overall development of nuclear power. ( ••• ) At the same 
time, the TUC is concerned that the per iod taken to 
reach final decis ions should be shortened, if that is 
possible without impeding' a full examination of rele-
v~nt issues." (Trades Union Congress, 1981, p.125). 
But at the same time the anti-nuclear opposi tion was de-
veloping within the trade union movement, and by the start 
of '. the 5i zewell Inquiry in 1982 into the building of a 
pressurized water-reactor at the 5izewell power station, a 
trade.union consortium was formed against the plans. Fur-
thermore, the National Union of Mineworkers had declared 
its opposi tion to nuclear power which was now seen as a 
direct threat to the coal industry. 
By the early 1980' s, ' therefore, any agreement on a TUC 
energy policy"would seem to be the result ei ther of super-
ficialityor coercion within the movement. 
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Summary. 
Until 1971, trade union interest in energy policy in Bri-
tain was narrowly related to questions of wages and work-
ing conditions within the fuel and power industries. Af-
ter 1971, however, it was recognized that employment in 
these industr ies was threatened as the result of failing 
demand caused partly by increased imports of cheap oil, 
partly by government economic policies. Consequently the 
unions involved in energy production prepared for a more 
active participation in energy decisionmaking. 
Through the 1970s, the' National Union of Mineworkers had 
,I 
direct influence·on coal policies through tripartite nego-
tiationsMand, as a result, the official TUC energy policy 
was· dominated by unions in electricity and nuclear power. 
But it became evident increasingly from TUC policy state-
ments as well as from the emergence of an opposi tion to 
the official TUC line on energy, that the interests of the 
trade union movement could no longer be submerged under 
the,interests of the unions who had members in the energy 
industries. The new issues which were identified were re-
lated to the effects of energy production on the environ-
ment and on the working conditions of workers outside the 
energy industries. These issues were taken up in official 
TUC energy policy but not given much weight. It seems 
therefore safe to draw the conclusion that the introduc-
tion of these issues in Br i tish state energy policy has 
not been a result of trade union influence. 
Denmark. 
In Denmark, the reliance on fuel imports has meant that 
there do not in Denmark exist unio~s with interests in any 
particular fuel. The unions wi th a percentage of their 
membership in energy are Dansk El-forbund (the Electr ici ty 
Workers' Association), Specialarbejderforbundet i Danmark 
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(the General Workers' Union) and Dansk Metalarbejderfor-
bund (the Metal Workers' Association), which all have a 
considerable part of their membership outside the energy 
sector. The majority of Danish trade unions are organised 
in LO ('Landsorganisationen i Danmark', corresponds to the 
TUC). 
Up until 1974, there is no sign that the LO was concerned 
about energy matters. The organisations' official voice, 
LO Bladet, did not give any mention to energy policy or to 
any issues in relation hereto. 
After the oil crisis, however, LO Bladet observed, that 
" ," I 
the oil price rises had had a" serious impact on the Danish 
economy, Yand it was feared that the economic consequences 
would be passed on to theworkers 86 • Also in 1974, letters 
to the editor were concerned about nuclear power, both pro 
et' con: It was not" until May 1975, however , that the LO 
Energipoli tisk 'udvalg (Energy Policy Commi ttee)' was set up 
at an LO conference on energy87 to prepare a trade union 
policy statement on energy. The need for trade" union in-
volvement in energy policy was motivated by pOinting to 
the danger of leaving energy policy to the energy indus-
tries: 
"It is necessary that the interests of society, and 
among these the interests of the trade, union movement, 
are given decisive influence on these questions, {Le. 
questions related 'to energy, T.A)." (Landsorganisation-
en, 1976, p. 9). 
Hence, it was implied ;"that the usual labour market rela-
tions were no longer sufficient to' ensure trade union, in-
fluence on relevant questions in relation to energy. In 
order to achieve" influence, the LO recommended that energy 
supply should - in the future be' subjected to a larger de-
gree of public control,and that trade unions were given 
formalized influence, 'for · instance (in the. case of intro-
duction of nuclear power) through nuclear safety councils 
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which should draw their membership from the Industrial In-
spectorate, local authorities, the local population and 
the labour force of each station. Furthermore, a national 
energy policy was needed to secure future economic 
growth: 
"The experience of the past shows a close relationship 
between the growth in wealth and the growth in energy 
consumption - continued growth in a society wi thout a 
high consumption of energy is inconceivable." (Landsor-
ganisationen, 1976, p.8). 
Hence, state energy policy should have as its main objec-
ti ve to ensure a secure supply of energy. The LO thought 
that this could be achieved ~hrough an increased share of 
electricity in the. energy supply, and by introducing nu-
clear power for electricity generation, as it was thought 
to be cheaper than oll and coal in .. the long run. On the 
other hand, an increase in public transport and a general 
effort to save energy were presented as desirable objec-
tives that should be pursued actively by the state through 
a policy of duties. and. subsidies •. Consequentially, in ca-
ses . other than nuclear . power, .the obj ecti ve. of . lowering 
costs was overriden by other (implicit) .. objectives and 
the resulting technological preferences that were n~t ar-
gued in terms of cost but in terms of social desirability. 
Also avoiding environmental pollution was seen as an im-
portant criterion in choice of future energy technologies, 
but was not given. any weight in the presentation of the 
strategy preferred by the LO. 
After 1978, however, it became increasingly evident that 
there was no consensus within the LO as to-which criteria 
should be, adopted for future energy policy. There was dis-
agreement ,on ~hic~ properties.of a given energy technology 
should be. emphasize~ when eva~uating its advantag~s .or 
disadvantages to the working class as.wel1.as t~ the ~o~~­
lation. For example, the Metal Workers Association saw nu-
, , -", < " 
clear. power as an opportunity. to strengthen employment 
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within the traditional manufacturing indust ry 88, while 
other unions, notably unions and associations with members 
outside the manufacturing industries, and interestingly 
including Dansk El-forbund (the Electricity Workers' Asso-
ciation), argued that the cr iter ia for evaluating nuclear 
power (and by implication, other energy technologies) 
should, include a wide range of effects beside narrow eco-
nomic considerations. ,Effects that were mentioned by the 
unions included: risk of accidents, safety problems, waste 
disposal, risk to workers, threats to civil rights posed 
by secur i ty measures. As al ternati ves, the unions recom-
mended increase, of the R&D expenditure for' renewable 
energy, and use of natural gas, and increased conserva-
I 
tion89 • It is typical of these unions that'the employment 
or 'wagesYof their members did not depend directly on the 
future pr ice of electr ici ty, and the prospects of employ-
ment within a possible nuclear industry were not, relevant 
to these unions either. 
By 1980, the LO had revised its policy towards energy, and 
a policy review90 was issued in which the main objecti ve 
of growth in energy consumption was given up because it 
was observed that a-policy aiming at reestablishing econo-
mic growth was bound to cause severe problems regarding 
the balance of payments. Therefore, the objective of 
growth in energy consumption in the short term had to be 
replaced by a long-term objective' of growth, which was 
seen to depend on short-run energy efficiency and conser-
vation. In addi tion the continuing,' high oil pr ices were 
seen as an impetus to aim at increased use of' North Sea 
reserves. 
In order to implement these objectives the La recommended 
that the stat~ intensified controlcover energy Supply'and 
consumption •. On the supply. side, the "La recommended state 
control of the oil sector: a state policy for coal purcha-
ses which would ensure a stable supply: continued efforts 
to solve the problems regarding safety and waste 
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disposal in relation to nuclear power; and a policy to 
ensure utilization of renewable energy. On the consumption 
side, the heating plans should ensure rational use of 
energy; subsidies should be made available for conserva-
tion; public transport should be subsudized; and norms 
should be adopted for energy consumption of household ap-
pliances. 
Summary. 
Danish trade unions only considered energy policy an im-
portant matter after the oil crisis in 1974. Recognizing 
/ 
that the energy industries ··tried to influence the new 
state energy planning, the LO tr ied to press for particu-
lar trade union interests to be included in energy plan-
ning. Particularly worker influence on energy, production, 
e.g. in relation to nuclear safety, would guarantee that 
the industry was run in a safe way. It had become vital to 
ensure energy growth in order to secure, economic growth 
and employment. 
After 1978, there is evidence that whereas the trade union 
movement was in agreement that increased state control of 
energy production as, well as energy consumption was neces-
sary, there was increasingly disagreement over the objec-
tives which should be at the foundation of state energy 
policy. Although increased employment was an important ob: 
jecti ve for all unions,. there was disagreement on how to 
evaluate the employment effects·of different energy stra-
tegies. The unions in manufacturing tended to emphasize 
the employment effect of cheap energy and - power station 
construction, whereas unions outside manufactur ing tended 
to emphasize :the employment effects of conservation, just 
as they tended to put more weight on external effects of 
different technologies. 
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General Summary: Trade Union Interests. 
up to the early 1970s, trade unions were not involved in 
discussions about national energy policy, except in cases 
where such policies directly affected the immediate work-
ing conditions of the workers in an energy industry. In 
Br i tain, the existence of one trade union wholly relying 
on the development of one fuel, coal, has meant that trade 
union involvement through the 1950s and 1960s in energy 
poli tics was more visible than in Denmar k, where no such 
unions existed. 
This can also explain why the TUC fuel and power committee 
I 
was formed. in 1971, while the LO' s Energ ipoli tisk Udvalg 
was not formed until'after the oil crisis: by 1971 British 
economic policies were seriously interfering with. the af-
fairs of the energy industries while in'Denmark energy did 
not become a problem to the trade unions until they began 
to feel the effect of r ising energy pr ices on industr ial 
energy consumption as well as on the relationship between 
wages and household energy costs. 
Both in Britain and in Denmark"the unions most directly 
dependent on energy supply and pr ices were" at the centre 
of trade union energy policy preparation from the start. 
This resulted, in both countries, in the preparation of 
energy reviews and recommendations' for ! increased state 
control of the energy sector. The;different energy techno-
logies '. were evalua ted, on· a basis' of their expected capa-
ci ty for producing cheap energy,' for creating employment 
for the aforementioned trade unions, and demands were made 
that energy policy should include measures ~o ensure that 
workers' conditions lin the industries were'satisfactory 'to 
the unions. In both countr ies, the unions. called for in-
fluence in energy· decisionmaking, and. it .was argued that 
this would ensure that energy policy was in the ; national 
interest. 
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Towards the end of the 1970s, increasing fragmentation of 
trade union views on energy became visible in both coun-
tries. Unions whose members were not affected in their 
work by the effects of fuel pr ices and technologies in-
creasingly found that it was important to consider the ef-
fects of society's choice of technologies on the environ-
ment and on the health and safety of workers in the energy 
industries (even though these workers themselves were evi-
dently more concerned about their employment). The energy 
policy reviews of the TUe and LO from around 1980 show 
that these concerns were now considered important but that 
the main thrust of official trade union policy remained to 
be employment and economic growth. But both the LO and the 
I 
Tue countr ies admi tted that 'growth 'in energy consumption 
in the short run would damage the economy. Therefore, ac-
tive state measures to support conservation measures, the 
coal and nuclear industr ies (in Br i tain), and a Danish 
oil-and gas industry (in' Denmark) all of which would po-
tentially create employment, were recommended. 
We may now identify the following periods: 
the 1950s and 1960s: trade union attention to state en-
ergy decision-making only as this affected the single 
fuel industry. 
(in Britain only): the early 1970s: trade unions in-
creasingly affected by competi tion between energy· in-
dustries, Unions in energy industries attempt to secure 
the future of their own industries by influencing deci-
sionmaking. 
After 1973: industry in general affected by rising 
energy pr ices. Trade unions demand more state control 
to secure energy supply for industry. In addition, 
trade unions outside energy and manufacturing indus-
tries begin to make demands with background in external 
effects of energy technologies .(dissent on nuclear 
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power) and promote technologies which are seen to po-
tentially create employment in other sectors than the 
traditional energy-industrial sector. 
about 1980: dissent becomes visible as internal incon-
sistencies in official TUC/LO policies. Growth objec-
tive is submerged under the perceived necessity of hav-
ing regard' to national economic problems. Conservation 
strongly promoted. 
The increase in the range of issues which have, been con-
sidered important, the, growing intensity of trade union 
involvement, and the internal dissent within the trade 
I 
union movements of the two nations all lead us to conclude 
that a politicization of energy has taken place within the 
trade union movement. We note, also, that the adoption of 
issues related to the environment happened much later in 
the trade union energy policies than in state energy poli-
cy and political party policies, whereas employment -rela-
ted issues, which only emerged instate energy policy to-
wards 1980, were an important dimension in the 'unions' 
energy policy recommendations from the energy early 1970s. 
In addition, the division between an official trade union 
policy emphasizing the importance' of, stable energy' supply 
and a trade union opposition emphasizing the importance of 
a safe, environmentally beneficial energy supply, occurred 
in both countries at approximately the same time (1977-
78). Therefore, whilst agreeing with Ince (1981) that 
there has been a trend for unions outside the energy field 
to pass or propose motions generally in favour of conser-
vation and alternative energy and against _nuclear power, 
we must conclude ,that this trend is very recent, as is 
trade union interest in national energy policy. 
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3.5 Other Interest Groups. 
Whereas the previous sections have dealt with groups which 
are part of either the traditional political framework or 
in energy production and labour mar ket policies, we shall 
now look at groups who have voiced interests outside this 
system. We have seen in previous sections that after 1970 
both the political parties, the energy industries and cer-
tain trade unions at different points in time have ac-
knowledged the necessity for technological choices which 
are based on evaluations of a wide range of consequences 
of using specific energy technologies. In particular, all 
groups found it necessary to take into. cons ide ration the 
I 
environmental impacts of energy production. This has 
prompted ~us to look to environmentalist groups in order to 
investigate .the origin of this concern. 
The main environmentalist groups were identified through 
Ii terature on energy policy for Br i tain and from the re-
sult of previous work for Denmark9l ., Personal contacts 
with representatives of these groups led to identification 
of further groups in the field. As in. the previous' sec-
tions, the emphasis has been on illustrating the trends 
in the issues and proliferation of groups. rather than to 
provide an accurate map of all interest groups'involved in 
influencing energy policy. 
Britain. 
Having observed that the ; impact of energy on the environ-
ment was gen~rally agreed to be an importan~ policy crite-
ria in the 1970s while it .was not by any of: the 'aforemen-
tioned groups ~onsidered at all in relation to:energY'dur-
ing the 1950s and.1960s,' we now look to the environmental 
groups to find a possible link between energy and the en-
vironment in this period.' 
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During the 1950s and early 1960s, however, there is no 
evidence of such linkage being made either within or out-
side the organized environmental movement. The majority of 
groups that were later to form an opposition against 
nuclear power were not formed yet; while older interest 
groups that by the end of the 1970s were trying to 
influence energy policy, such as the Council for the 
Protection of Rural England and the Town and Country 
Planning Association, were not dur ing the 1950s and 1960s 
giving any attention to energy92. 
Around 1970, environmental concern mounted. Fig. 3.2 shows 
the dates of formation of British Environmental groups. We 
I 
can add that none of the groups formed between 1956 and 
1965 were at that time concerned about any aspects of 
energy production. 
The link between energy and the environment was first made 
by Friends of the Earth93 , an international environmental 
network centered around a London office. Whereas the acti-
vi ties of Fr iends of the Earth for the years up to 1973 
were" not directed towards energy, the link between energy 
and the environment was made in 1972 in a Fr iends of the 
Earth publication addressing the issues of the 1972 UN 
Conference on Human Environment. Here, it was observed 
that the' physical environment was threatened by the pre-
sent lifestyle of the western world. Economic growth was 
seen to produce numerous side-effects which could not be 
handled by the present economic and poli tical systems be-
cause these were geared' to the pursui t of short term eco-
nomic benefit. In the context of this prospect of a gene-
ral environmental 
specific problem. 
cr isis, energy was seen-to present a 
Potentially, damaging climatic effects 
could ar ise from a build-up of C02 in the air resulting 
from fossil fuel burn, which would also cause other forms 
of air pollution. The depletion of fossil fuels was also 
seen as a potential problem as were the prospects of ra-
dioactive pollution from nuclear power. 
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Fig. 3.2 Dates of Formation of British Environmental 
Groups 
Source: Lowe and Goyder (1983), p. 16. 
Zero~growth at a global level of population as well as of 
consumption per capita was thought to.be the only real so-
lution to ,these problems •• This was to be achieved partly 
through policies at the supra-national and national le-. . 
vels 95 to stop .economic growth, partly through a strong 
change of value orientation among' the population, away 
from wasteful growth and towards environmental values. 
Wi thin this percepti,on of the policy field, Fr iends of the 
Earth defined their own role as environmental crusaders, 
n ( ••• ) uncompromising in their defence of the environ-
ment . and uninhibi ted in the actions they' are prepared 
to'take" (Friends of the Earth, 1972~ p. 174). 
The organisation was, "prepared to take aggressive legal 
and poli tical action to ensure a better environment for 
everyone" (ibid.), and finally the organisation 'wanted to 
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focus public opinion on environmental 
active publishing policy and research 
issues. The activities and changes of 
(and other environmental groups since) 
ficulties inherent in this programme. 
issues through an 
into environmental 
issues of the group 
have shown the dif-
Generally, very Ii ttle time has been devoted to poli tical 
and philosophical discussions within Friends of the Earth, 
according to activists of the group. Rather, the organisa-
tion has seen it as a major advantage tha t the activists 
have managed to submerge political differences under, what 
by one activist was called, necessity, by another, the 
general consensus in the organisation96 .Throughout, this 
I 
necessity or consensus has been defined in relation to to-
pical" ~ environmental problems and the acti vi ties of 
Friends of the Earth have been reactions to specific en-
vironmental problems. Hence, it was only after 1973 that 
Friends of the Earth and other environmental groups tried 
to change acti vely energy policy. As a reaction to the 
aforementioned plans announced in 1973 by the CEGB to 
press' for ,a programme of American designed reactors, 
Friends of the Earth mounted a campaign in order to coun-
ter the plans 97 • The campaign concentrated on proving that 
the imported design was less reliable and safe than the 
British design for advanced gas-coIled reactor 98 • The cam-
paign methods included media coverage of the case against 
the Amer ican' design as well as submission of evidence to 
the Select Committee on Science and Technology in January 
1974. The rejection of the American design in 1974 has la-
ter been counted by Friends of the Earth as a 'victory,99. 
-1973 also 'witnessed the creation of the Ecology' Party, 
the original name of which as the People Party. The party 
>0 
grew out of circles connected with Friends of the Earth, 
the Conservation Society and the Soil Association in an 
attempt to put environmental concern 
form 100 .- The party differs radically 
parties by-not representing the economic 
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in a political 
from the 'old' 
interests of one 
group or class. Rather, the party claimed to represent a 
general human interest in preserving the environment. The 
aim of the party was 
" ( ••• ) to create a self-reliant communi ty based way of 
life within the framework of a stable economy and a 
just, democratic society, so that people may live in 
harmony with each other and the rest of the natural en-
vironment by acknowledging and adapting to the limita-
tions of Earth' s fini te resources." (ci ted here from 
The Ecology Party, 1981 II). 
This included working for an environmentally acceptable 
energy policy, but no specific recommendations were made. 
Also the Socialist Environment and Resources Association 
/ 
was set up in 1973 to ident'ify "the social and economic 
problems ~affecting the environment and to formulate socia-
list policies to deal wi th them." (quoted here from Lowe 
And Goyder,·· 1983, p. 73). At the time, however, none of 
these groups actively pursued any energy political strate-
gies. 
Also in 1973 the proposals for a nuclear power station to 
be built~ at Torness in South Scotland mobilized 
environmental groups allover Britain, and SCRAM, the 
Scottish Campaign to Resist the Atomic Menace, was formed 
in 1975 by members of Friends of the Earth, the 
Conservation Society, the National Farmers' Union of 
Scotland and the East Lothian Angling AssociationlOl • 
SCRAM argued against nuclear power in terms of 
Cost: the capi tal costs of nuclear power were too 
large and unpredictable: 
Need: The surplus capaci ty was considered too large 
already; 
Reactor safety: no existing reactor design was con-
sidered safe, and Torness was a prototype, thus not 
proven: 
Employment: it was argued that local job creation 
would be temporary and not offer opportuni ties for 
the local skills; 
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waste: no safe methods of waste disposal exist, it 
was argued; 
Visual amenity: Nuclear stations were seen as ugly; 
Liability: A nuclear power station, it was argued, 
represented a threat to the local population; 
Proliferation: no means existed for ensuring that 
plutonium could be kept within a closed fuel circle. 
Besides SCRAM a number of other groups were involved in 
the resistance against Torness: Friends of the Earth Scot-
land, the Lothian and Borders Anti-nuclear Group and the 
Torness Alliance. These groups were either ad-hoc groups 
or groups rooted in the environmental movement. From the 
I 
outset, the anti-nuclear groups were not concerned about 
having a" formative influence on state energy policy. The 
objecti ve of the groups was getting rid of nuclear power 
in general and stopping particular developments. The focus 
of the groups was on those effects of the existing energy 
technologies which were seen' as negati ve . and unintended. 
In most cases these effects were expected effects rather 
than experienced effects; local residents could not have 
any 'first-hand experience of nuclear power, and indeed 
verY,few people have first hand experience of the negative 
effects of nuclear power. 
Through the rest of the 1970s, opposition against nuclear 
power increased in terms of the number of groups inVOl-
ved, but in addi tion some of the groups began discussing 
energy policy in a wider sense. ~ When, -i t became known in 
1975 'that Br i tish Nuclear Fuels Ltd. intended to extend 
its fuel reprocessing facilities at its Windscale ~ite102, 
Friends of the Earth publicalli opposedth~ plans and de-
manded' a public inquiry into the plans. The inquiry was 
held in 1977. co. 19 groups, including Fr iends of the Earth, 
the Town and Country Planning Association, SCRAM, the So-
cialist ' Environment and Resources Association and the 
Windscale Appeal (an ad-hoc umbrella organisation compris-
ing 9 groups) were formally registered as objectors to the 
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development. This would suggest that these groups repre-
sented different concerns, but there is evidence of a 
strong network between the groupsl03. This indicates 
agreement on the central obj ecti ve of stopping the de-
velopment, and that political dissents had been submerged 
under this 'necessity'. 
All along, the anti-nuclear groups have been more concer-
ned about the external effects of technology than the wi-
der problem of how to ensure energy supply. This is also 
indicated by the groups' preoccupation with proving their 
case in terms of showing the exact kind and magni tude of 
negative effects which could be expected from the parti-
I 
cular development. The nuclear industry, it was argued, 
had their numbers wrong l04 , and it did not take full ac-
count of all relevant consequences. This kind of strategy 
made room for a new type of groups: the 'al ternati ve ex-
pert' consultancies like the Political Ecology Research 
Group, formed in 1976 wi th the aim of providing research 
support for political initiatives on environmental issues 
by means of 
. 
"C ••• ) critical review of government and industrial po-
licies, environmental impact and hazard analysis, and 
direct participation on inquiries, commissions and com-
mi ttees wi th the provision of planning aid and expert 
witnesses." (PERG information leaflet, n.d. (1979?» • 
From the mid-1970s, the 'environmentalist and anti-nuclear 
groups increasingly pointed to other . technologies as al-
ternatives to nuclear power as well as making recommenda-
tions for a comprehensive national energy policy; In-1978~ 
Friends of the Earth published 'Nuclear Times' which was a 
one-off Windscale 'newspaper' descr ibing in the language 
of tabloid newspapers the events surrounding the Windscale 
Inquiry: As an alternative, Friends of the Earth called 
for a national energy policy which should take as its 
starting point the following questions: 
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"- Who needs energy? 
- How much energy? 
- What kinds of energy? 
- For what purposes? 
- For how long?" (Friends of the Earth, 1978, p.19). 
As it will be seen, Friends of the Earth in effect called 
for a policy which did not take into account the existence 
of a system of energy supply. This is a consequence of the 
groups' own starting point: a realization that nuclear po~ 
wer was a logical consequence of a system that put a pre-
mium on growth. Assuming that the demand projections of 
the previous decades had, through economic mechanisms, io-
gically led to production of something that people did not 
need, i.e. waste of energy c~~pled with a host of negative 
effects, _ it was only logical to proceed by asking: would 
it be possible to plan the future energy supply from a 
preliminary assessment of what people actually do need? 
Here, the • soft energy path' 105 was seen to offer an al-
ternative. The Friends of the Earth 1978 version of such a 
path consisted,in a national energy policy geared towards 
energy efficiency and aiming to maximize the share of re-
newable energy in the energy supply •. A number of con-
straints to such a policy were identified: advantageous 
loans for small scale exper iments wi th renewable energy 
were difficult to obtain; the building industry was seen 
. . 
to be resistant to innovations like energy-efficient 
building designs; and the energy industry itself was seen 
to. represent an important constraint. Therefore the soft 
path demanded an active effort of the population. to demand 
from the state that it sought to control these powers that 
. . 
had produced the negative effects of energy production up 
till then: 
"It is therefore up to public opinion (you and I) to 
counterbalance the entrenched powers by demanding that 
we pursue the options of a soft energy path -and pursue 
them soon." (Friends of the Earth, 1978, p.ll). 
The observation that renewable energy was not being intro-
- 188-
duced in spite of the environmental benefits which render-
ed these sources preferable, led Friends of the Earth and 
other groups to demand a state energy policy which would 
actively intervene in technology choice. The years between 
1978 and 1980 witnessed the publication of several 'alter-
native energy plans', which all served to prove that other 
techno log ies would be more sui table for fUlfilling Br i-
tain's energy needs than the existing ones. Towards 1980, 
the alternative energy strategies increasingly emphasized 
the socioeconomic advantages of' renewable energy, so that 
Taylor and Sanderson were able to conclude that: 
"The economic and institutional arguments have thus be-
come and important part Qf any credible A(lternative) 
E{nergy) S{trategy." (Taylor and Sanderson, 1983, p. UK 
AES-3). 
At the same time, the number of groups that got involved 
in promoting long-term energy strategies increased. Pre-
existing· groups that had not earlier been interested in 
energy began promoting their version of energy futures. In 
1978 . the- British Society for Social Responsibility in 
Science, a socialist society of scientific '. and technical 
workers, had formed the BSSRS' Nuclear' Power Group~ This 
group was in 1980 renamed 'The Poli tics of Energy Group' 
"to clar i fy our direction" (Br i tish . Society for Social Re-
sponsibility in Science, 1981, p. 36). The' objective' of 
the group was to· emphasize the class dimension of energy 
policy. Although criticizing environmentalist approaches 
to energy policy for not identifying, properly the social 
mechanisms' shaping' the· energy technological structure; of 
society,' the .... Society ended up . proposing . almost the same 
thing: an alternative energy strategy, which was to take 
as its starting point the effects of technology, not on 
the' envi ~onmen't, but on. the wor kforce: " 
. "The above .programme (increased state inves~ment in 
energy conservation, regulation to ensure the introduc-
,tion of combined heat and power~ abandonment of " nuclear 
fission and increased energy R&D, T.A.) should be plan-
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ned in such a way as to optimise the job creation po-
tential of the various options and to minimize disloca-
tion." (British Society for Social Responsibility in 
Science, N.D., p.20). 
Also the Ecology Party in 1981 108 made its bid for a 
state energy policy. According to the party, the main ob-
jective of state energy policy should be to ensure that 
the impact.of energy production was as small as possible, 
even if such a policy had unpopular economic implications, 
like e.g. a tax on all energy. A new institutional struc-
ture was recommended which centred on the creation of 
energy use centres where citizens should be able to obtain 
advise on the efficient use of energy. In addi tion the 
I 
state should set standards for energy consumption of elec-
trical ~ppliances. That .is, the alternative strategy 
needed· strong state control. for' its implementation. The 
role of the.market was not discussed. 
As regards techno log ies and energy sources, the Ecology 
Party proposed that all nuclear stations should be stopped 
immediately; the use of coal should be reduced through 
energy conservation;' whereas the state should lend finan-
cial support to the rapid development of renewable energy 
sources. The' party did not discuss . the strategy on the 
background of the present political, technical and insti-
tutional setting, nor was there any discussion of the eco-
nomic implications for the state, the energy industries or 
the consumers. 
Finally, the Oistr ict Energy Author i ties proposed by the 
party should be under an obligation to develop 
" (.' •• ) renewable. sources in'. its. own' area, accord ing to 
district needs, and depending on the renewable resour-
ces available." (Ecology Party, 1981, para. EN 400). 
This suggests that the key parameters identified by the 
party were need and availability of local energy sources. 
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It was not discussed how the oistr ict Energy Author i ties 
should go about identifying needs, al though that raises 
qui te ser ious discussions. We may conclude that the par-
ty's proposals represented a thorough criticism of the 
status quo, but little guidance for those wanting to 
change it. 
But also established interest groups which were not prima-
rily environmentalist initiated attempts towards 1980 to 
influence state energy policy. For example, the Town and 
Country Planning Association voiced its concern about as-
pects of energy policy to do wi th land-use planning, and 
criticized the institutional setting of state energy poli-
I 
cy for not providing sufficient opportunity for public de-
bateandUpa~ticipation. Again a stronger state involvement 
was called for as ,current policies were seen to be "based 
too much on trends, too little on deliberate policies" 
(Town and Country Planning Association, 1978 I, p. 166), 
and the Association emphasized that it was important to 
arrive. at the right. energy. strategy, even if this would 
mean big costs in time and money. It hereby implied that . . 
the r~ght energy strategy could be. arrived at through an 
impartial assessment of the relative advantages of dif-
ferent technologies. But the Association, itself, presen-
ted its technological preferences without revealing the , 
assessment behind them. For example, no explicit reason 
was giv~n why coal and nuclear power should be given less 
attention in the future, whereas more weight should be gi-
ven to investigating 
It (~ •• ) the scope for and. need for investment in the 
development of alternative, renewable and benign sour-
ces of energy such as the sun, . wind and tides. It (Town 
and Country Planning Association, 1978 ~, p. 267). 
Generally economic arguments were given less weight than 
arguments related to the environment. 
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Finally the Council for the Protection of Rural England 
entered the energy debate, being concerned that 
" ( ••• ) in all the publ ic debate about the appropr iate 
patterns of future UK energy investment, a vital area 
of discussion was being neglected. This concerned the 
acceptabili ty at local level of a large number of in-
dividual developments." (The Council for the Protection 
of Rural England, 1979, p.3). 
The Council therefore argued that it was important to de-
velop a framework which would allow for balancing local 
interest against national interest in energy policy. 
/ 
Summary: Britain 
Before the early 1970s, there was no evidence of groups 
outside energy production or par liament concerning them-
selves with energy policy or planning. 
From the early 1970s, environmentalist groups like Friends 
of 'the Earth increasingly identified energy technologies 
(and in particular nuclear power) as a source of environ-
mentaL degradation. 
Only after the oil crisis, however, were attempts made to 
not only halt or stop developments but actively change the 
direction of future energy policy. The environmental 
groups reacted to the proposals for increasing the nuclear 
p~ogramme by trying to prove that nuclear power was not 
necessary, and that environmentally more benign alterna-
tives existed. Towards the end of the 1970s~a host of new 
groups as well as existing interest groups had taken up . " 
energy 'policy. as an important issue. The concrete 
proposals' for nuclear development, like Torness or the 
reprocessing plant at windscale, forced' the groups to 
develop pragmatic and tactical arguments in relation to 
the particular development. As cost was an important 
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argument here, the groups were forced to either prove that 
less costly alternatives existed or reject the relevance 
of using cost as a main criterion in energy decision-mak-
ing. 
The groups all agreed that the existing technologies had 
had unwanted effects on the environment, and ascribed this 
to insufficient energy planning. When it came to positive 
recommendations for alternatives, however, the consensus 
often claimed by the energy activists themselves (cf. 
Fr iends of the Earth who claimed to be' able to submerge 
poli tical differences under 'necessi ty') revealed itself 
as superficial. The groups agreed to the necessity of 
/ . 
state energy planning but there was no agreement as to the 
objectives and' basic assumptions that would have to be 
made. Some groups wanted to emphasize the environmental 
some local author i ty autonomy impact, some 
etc. 
employment, 
Hence, towards 1980 the notion prevailed that it was in 
principle feasible to control energy supply so as to ob-
tain' a desired state of affairs, but little agreement on 
the cr iter fa necessary to choose' between different future 
states of affairs. 
Denmark. 
In Denmark there was also no evidence of any interest 
group involvement in energy policy issues -before the early 
1970s. 
From the early 1970s, however, ,concern' mounted about" en-
vironmental issues and issues related '.to', energy and pol1u';' 
tion were discussed wi thin environmental and disarmament 
group fora. 
As already mentioned, the electricity, industry reacted, to 
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the oil crisis by presenting a proposal for a nuclear pro-
gramme. As a reaction to this step, activists with roots 
in the environmental and nuclear disarment groups formed 
the Organisationen til Oplysning om Atomkraft, OOA (' the 
Organisation for Informing about Nuclear Power'), which 
was presented to the public with these words: 
"The organisation, ,being cross-political, aims at as 
large a public support as possible. It is' formed by a 
group of individuals whose position towards utilization 
of nuclear power in Denmar k is cr i tical." (Organisa-
tionen til Oplysning om Atomkraft, 1974). 
The Organisation appealed to the Folketing (parliament) to 
place a morator ium of at legst three years on the plans 
for nuclear power. This would make room for 
"1) an inquiry into the problems associated wi th nu-
clear power; 
2) extended research into and renewed evaluation of 
other forms of energy; 
3) preparation of a long term energy policy which has 
regard to social and ecological considerations." 
(ibid.) 
In its early days, the Organisation was a closed pressure 
group who directed its activities directly towards govern-
ment, but during the 1970s increasing emphasis was put on 
mobilizing the public against nuclear power. 110 
'Another energy interest group, the Organisationen for Ved-
,varende Energi (' the Organisation for. Renewable Energy') 
was formed during the immediate post-oil-crisis years. The 
objective of this organisation was, to actively promote 
"an energy policy which has consideration for resources 
and environment and self-sufficiency based on renewable 
energy'sources." (Terney, o. et;al., 1980). 
The organisation has primarily attempted to protect the 
interests of individual renewable energy producers and 
e.g. by demanding increased state subsidies' for the de":' 
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velopment and utilization of renewable energylll. 
After the publication in 1976 of the first national energy 
plan, the Organisationen til Oplysning om Atomkraft and 
the Organisationen for Vedvarende Energi published the 
-. first alternative energy plan for Denmark l12 • The main 
objective of the plan was proving that, given the same ba-
sic assumptions and reduction in oil imports as used by 
the Ministry of Trade, an energy strategy without nuclear 
power was feasible. The plan assumed instead an increased 
use of natural gas, coal and renewable sources. In rela-
tion to the basic assumptions the authors commented that 
it was questionable whether the assumed economic growth, 
I 
if feasible, would be beneficial from a quali ty-of-life 
point of ~iew. Furthermore the groups remarked 
"In the very long term. we will naturally have to dis-
engage ourselves from dependence on fossil fuels, and 
in particular the reserves of oil and natural gas seem 
limited." .(Blegaaet.al., 1976, p.12). 
The Organisation thus argued for an energy policy which 
would serve to pursue objectives related to the environ-
ment and resources ,rather than to economic growth. Impli-
cit in the plan was the demand for a strong state control 
of energy supply. It also, implied, that it was possible 
for the state to choose a desired energy future among a 
number of possible futures, of which the Ministry's plan 
was only one. 
The -main activities of the Organisation til Oplysning om 
Atomkraft were still related' to preventing the introduc-
tion of nuclear power, and - when government -in 1976 chose 
to defer the decision on whether or not to adopt a nuclear 
programme,' this' was seen as a victory by the Organisation. 
Towards- 1980, whereas the Organisationen for Vedvarende 
Energi was not actively promoting national policy objec-
ti ves, ,this has been character istic of the Organisationen 
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til Oplysning om Atomkraft. Increasingly a fragmentation 
of the activities of this Organisation has been visible. 
This is evident in the 'Folkepjece' ('People's leaflet') 
which in 1979 was disseminated to all Danish households 
in an attempt to mobilize popular demands for an alterna-
tive energy strategy. The leaflet strongly appealed to the 
responsibility of the population: 
"We are going to choose ourselves what our energy fu-
ture will be like. But in order to be able to choose, 
we shall have to know the options." (Organisationen til 
Oplysning om Atomkraft, 1979 I, p.4). 
Two such futures were portrayed: on the one hand the con-
I 
trolled, expert dominated plutonium societY1 on the other, 
a Danish ~ provincial town provided wi th windmills and so-
lar collectors on the roofs. The question of the control-
ling mechanisms needed to arrive at this particular future 
as well as the questions of the social economic implica-
tions of the alternative technologies was not touched 
upon. 
In addition, the 'Organisation increasingly entered into 
~pecialisd discussions related to energy policy. Since 
heating planning was institutionalized in 1979, the Orga-
) , 
nisation has argued that further specialization" of coal 
based . combined heat and' power. production was poli tically 
and environmentally undesirable~ Likewise, the North Sea 
gas and oil negotiations were· made the issue of a 'North 
Sea Campaign' in 1980, in which the Organisation demanded 
greater state control over North Sea oil and gas. The Or-
ganisati~n also attempted to influence the emergency plans 
related to the nearby Swedish nuclear station, Barseback. 
Finally the Organisation was involved in evaluating ana-
lyses conducte'd by established research insti tutions of 
the prospects, in Denmark, 
disposal: 
for underground nuclear waste 
Most of these new issues have~political implications that 
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reach far beyond the mere rejection of nuclear power. Al-
ternative heating plans demand considerations related to 
economy, both as regards acceptable levels of investments 
and the structure of tariffs (should electricity prices be 
fixed to ensure that people consumed less electricity? or 
should differential tariffs take into account income dis-
tribution? etc.) The Organisation, being cross-political 
has only been able to 'submerge' differing opinions on 
such questions by center ing on the res istance to nuclear 
power. All the other campaigns have been less successful, 
partly because it has not been possible to devise a strong 
positive set of objectives for alternative energy plan-
ning. In this sense, the Organisation has fed on govern-
-' 
ment initiatives. It has been' able to criticise these ini-
tiatives ., but too broadly based to generate alternatives 
that would command consensus beyond the general recommen-
dation of a state energy policy which should emphasize re-
newable energy. 
Summary: Denmark. 
Only.'after .the oil crisis did a.political movement emerge 
which linked energy policy to the environment. The energy 
movement in Denmark was centered around the Organisationen 
til Oplysning om Atomkraft, which had as its main obj ec-
tive the prevention of the introduction of nuclear power. 
Immediately after the oil cr isis,. the group centred on 
this resistance, but towards 1980 it increasingly engaged 
,in criticizing state energy policy in other areas: and pre-
par ing al ternati ve . strategies. This became. complicated in 
the light of· the group's declared cross-poli tical stance 
that prevented discussion of basic economic~conditions in 
energy supply. 
General.summary:·Other Interest Groups. 
In both Britain and Denmark, groups, that were not direct-
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ly engaged in energy production or part of the traditional 
system of political decisionmaking, became involved in at-
tempts to change state energy policy from the early 1970s. 
Initially, the groups' acitivities centered on avoiding 
the extension/introduction of nuclear power, but after the 
oil crisis and for the rest of the 1970s, and that means 
after state energy policy was properly established, the 
environmental groups increasingly questioned the entire 
basis of state energy policy and put forward proposals for 
alternative strategies. 
In Br i tain, a large number of local and ad hoc groups 
emerged in reaction to concrete nuclear developments. In 
I 
Denmar k, there were no nuclear developments to react to 
the resistance to nuclear power centered on preventing its 
introduction by appealing to the state. This explains the 
existence in Denmark of only one large popular movement 
against nuclear power. 
As the groups in both countries were faced with demands 
for alternatives, they got increasingly involved in 
constructing alternative scenarios. In Britain, an 
increasing number of groups with different political 
starting points each developed their particular 
alternative which emphasized different dimensions of 
energy policy, but which were all presented as the 
solution 'to energy problems. In Denmark, the existence of 
a mass movement put constraints on the degree to, which 
,social and economic implications of different strategies 
could be specified. But in both countries, towards 1980, 
what ,started as resistance to nuclear power had developed 
intoia search for for alternatives. The conciete proposals 
would all demand for their realization instruments of 
state,control-~tretching far behind those of the present, 
but the groups have either played down this political 
point or argued that regard to 
justify an extension of public 
production as well as consumption. 
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the environment 
control of 
would 
energy 
3.6 Conclusions. 
The main aim of the previous sections was to establish 
the chronological order in which new issues have surfaced 
wi thin the energy policy perception of particular poli ti-
cal groups. We also wanted to establish whether this chro-
nology was parallel between Britain and Denmark. We wanted 
for each· group to establish its pr ior i ties and identify 
possible shifts in priorities; and finally we wanted to 
investigate if the number and character of political 
groups involved in energy political activities had changed 
over the thirty years form 1950 to 1980. 
I 
We find that our, account supports the hypothesis that a 
general politicization of the energy area has taken place 
in the period. We have 'furthermore been able to locate the 
beginning of this politicization to the years around 1970 
in both countr ies. Before. this time, only·. energy indus-
tr ies, trade unions and' to a limi ted extent, governments 
took an interest in energy production, and as· we have 
seen, planning· activities. were (seen with today's eyes) 
primitive and not subjected '.to discussions of, objectives 
or' alternatives. After 1970, the notion of a politically 
controlled rational energy planning has pervadedall-dis-
cuss ions of energy issues. The increasing number of 
groups trying to actively influence state energy policy 
also indicates' that energy policy, to an ,increasing frac-
tion of the population, represented a means for changing 
undesirable conditions, like pollution or unemployment.,; 
In' addi tion, we find that the' account· supports '. our hypo-
thesis .. that · changes in energy policy have -or iginated .' in 
response' to pressure from poli tical" groups. This causal 
relation cannot be proved in a scientific sense, but we 
have established that the new issues of state energy poli-
cy were taken up by poli tical· groups pr ior' to being incor-
porated in state energy policy. For example, working con-
ditions only became jan issue after. trade union activities 
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had highlighted these problems, and the environment only 
became an issue after the emergence of an environmental 
movement, and employment only became an issue after trade 
unions and political parties connected to the labour move-
ment had begun discussing the employment impacts of ener-
gy policy. Once these issues were introduced into the 
debate, they were soon adopted by all groups. 
Consequently, an increasing number of issues presented 
themselves as aspects of energy policy which had to be 
taken into account. 
For each class of groups we sketched a periodization 
wi thin the 1950-1980 per iod, the sub-per iods being mar ked 
/ 
by'a change in the range of issues considered by the group 
as important in relation to energy policy or a change in 
the methods used by the group for reaching its energy 
poli tical obj ecti ves. For all groups" and in both 
countries, the 1950s was a quiet period. The 1960s showed 
a building up of industr ial as well as national economic 
problems reflected by the trade unions and industr ies in 
concerns about the- future. The emergence of these 
~. 
concerns, prior to the institutionalization of planning 
oriented state energy policy, leads us to suggest that 
state energy 'policy emerged as a response to these 
concerns. 
The environmental concern of the early 1970s was reflected 
in the state energy policies of both' countries, but did 
not appear in the energy thinking of the energy industries 
nor of the'trade unions until the 'late half of the decade. 
This leads us to suggest~ that the introduction of 
environmental issues in state energy policy was prompted 
by the activities of environmental groups. 
In both countries -1973/74 represented a considerable break 
in energy political activities. The events of those years 
had'direct implications for the national economy and thus 
for .. government - policies. They represented an economic 
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emergency for governments, and the resul ti ng energy 
policies can therefore be interpreted as attempts to avert 
the most damaging consequences. 
After 1976, an increasing number of political groups in 
both countries sought to influence the objective and 
methods of state energy policy. These groups all took it 
for granted that energy production and distribution should 
be subject, to some extent, to planning, control and 
monitoring by the state. Also it was taken for granted 
that technological choices could and should depend on some 
kind of evaluation of the future consequences of the 
technologies concerned. At the same time, the opinions of 
I 
different groups as to which 'cr iter ia should be adopted in 
energy decision-making diverged. The energy industries 
tended to emphasize the importance of efficiency and 
economies of scale, trade unions emphasized employment 
etc., and the development of issues within each class of 
groups was parallel between the two countries. 
What remains to be explained now is why new issues arise. 
We have observed that energy has been policiticized in the 
sense that poli tical groups have brought new issues into 
state policy, but where did these issues come from in the 
first place? Why did the environment become an important 
issue in relation to energy? Why did the general 
conception of the role of the state in relation to energy 
technology change from optimism about the benefits of 
autonomous technical progress to the notion that the state 
should control technological change so as to avoid 
negative effects of technology in the future? 
In order to contribute an answer to these questions we 
shall have to investigate the remaining hypotheses put 
forward in chapter one. The following chapter will 
investigate whether changes in the economic and resource 
conditions can be shown to have had a decisive influence 
on the shifts just identified, whereas chapter five will 
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investigate changes in the perception of technology and 
political approaches to technological change. 
/ 
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4. ECONOMICS, RESOURCES, ENERGY SUPPLY AND CONSUMPTION 
4.1 Introduction 
In chapter two and three we saw that issues raised by po-
litical groups were reflected in state energy policy. This 
led us to ask why new. issues were originally taken up in 
relation to energy. What is the or igin of changes which 
for example make political groups look for new sources of 
energy, make second order consequences of energy technolo-
I 
gies an important issue, and why do these changes occur 
at particular points in time? 
/ 
The preliminary hypotheses suggest that the material con-
ditions which at any point in time face individual Q9nsu-
mers, political groups and state energy policy maker; in-. ' 
fluence crucially the scope for energy political ideas and 
actions. In order to investigate this suggestion, we shall 
need to specify what we are to understand by material con-
ditions. We shall suggest that economic conditions, condi~ 
tions . relating to resource availabili ty, . energy consump-
tion structures and energy supply structures all represent . . 
important determinants in defining the scope of' state 
energy p~licy as' well as the scope of proposals for chang~ 
ing the state energy policy. 
The previous chapt~r indicated that the energy policy re-
commendations of poll tical groups always involved assump-
tions about economic g~owth. Either an expected' future 
rate of econ6mic growth 'was thought to lead to a particu-
lar size of energy demand, or regulation of energy 'demand 
was seen as a means to control future e,conomic growth. In 
either case, w~~ould ~xpect that changes in these'~ssum~­
tions reflect changes in the actual economic condi tions. 
In addition, the economic conditions represent a potential 
constraint on any' energy political strategy insofar as 
they determine the spending power' of the single energy 
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consumer as well as the investment conditions in the 
energy sector. We will therefore expect to be able to show 
that changes in the groups' assumptions about economic 
growth have been preceded by actual changes in the na-
tional economy. 
The availabili ty of energy resources presents itself as 
an almost self-evident, constraint on the scope for energy 
policy. ,It is well worth noting, however, that resource 
availability is a relative concept, as Elster observes: 
"Resources are given in some absolute sense, but not in 
the more interesting sense ,of available resources, 
availabili ty depending upon extraction technology. And 
technology, in turn, obviously is not given, but sub-
ject to constant ch~nges." (Elster, 1979, p. 379). 
We will now go a step further than Elster 
that resource availabili ty not only depends 
and suggest 
on the de-
velopment of technologies which change constantly. We want 
to suggest that new resources are considered only if the 
use of tradi tional resources create problems, ei ther by 
the resource being insufficient, too expensive or by 
creating negative external, effects. Particularly we want 
to suggest that new resources are utilized if their use 
gives rise to immediate economic advantages for the con-
sumer, either the individual consumer or the energy indus-
tr ies. "If this is not ~he case, the introduction of a new 
-
resource demands state support. 
It is therefore to be expected that resource availability 
in itself only represents a limi ted constraint on energy 
policy. We expect, however, that the effects of using par-
ticular resources as well as the expected relative profit-
ability of different resources represent an important set 
of constraints. 
Furthermore we suggest that the structure of energy supply 
and ,consumption at any point in. time represents an 
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important constraint on the scope for changes. The physi-
cal structure of energy supply, power stations, power 
lines and pipelines, is assumed to specify to a certain 
extent the flexibili ty of the system for example, we saw 
in the previous chapter that the energy industries in both 
countries preferred technologies which were compatible 
wi th the existing supply system. We shall suggest, how-
ever, that this type o~ constraint is not and has not been 
absolute, but is itself subject to changes' in economic 
conditions, i.e. changes in fuel prices, in rates of con-
sumption growth and in available technology. Only in the 
short term, we shall suggest, does 
gy supply represent a constraint 
I 
the structure of ener-
influencing the short-
term profitability of different technological and fuel op-
tions. Over the 1950-1980 period, we will therefore expect 
to find that the energy supply structures of Br i tain and 
Denmark has changed according to economic changes and that 
attempts to change the structures have been successful to 
the extent that they. have been able to utilize economic 
mechanisms favouring the desired outcomes. 
Finally it is suggested that the structure of energy con-
sumption represents a short term constraint on energy po-
licy. We suggest that the level of energy consumption de-
pends on the price of energy relative to the income of.the 
consumer as well as the expected levels of prices and wa-
ges and the consumption in the previous period. The struc-
ture of consumption, I.e. which forms of energy are' used 
for which purposes, depends on the availability of supply 
options, but also on the pr ices of different options. We 
therefore· suggest that the success of attempts to . change 
the energy system depends. on whether the economic condi-
tions are favourable to the particular changes or can be 
manipulated so as to favour these changes. 
Following these considerations, it-is suggested that eco-
nomic circumstances in general and fuel and energy prices 
in particular represent the ultimate constrai~t to at-
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tempts to shape the future system of energy supply and 
consumption. The parallel development of energy policy in 
the two countries would then be accounted for by a paral-
lel development of basic economic condi tions, while the 
differences could be ascribed to differences regarding re-
source availability as well as different energy supply and 
consumption patterns. 
In order to examine these suggestions, we shall analyse 
for each nation the histor ical development of each of 
three factors: basic economic condi tions, ,resource condi-
tions and patterns of energy supply and consumption. We 
shall identify important changes in each of these condi-
tions and relate them to the changes we have identified in 
the previous chapters. 
As indicators of basic economic conditions, economic 
growth, real income and employment ~ have been chosen, as 
they have been assumed to be relevant to energy production 
and consumption. Changes in these parameters have been i-
dentified for both countries using textbooks on economic 
polici. 
The availability of resources 'is described in terms of the 
actual utili zation of resources. We are aware that this 
method does not give a full picture of the opportunities 
presenting themselves to decisionmakers, as these include 
also estimated reserves. There is, however, no mater ial 
that would allow for a direct comparison of estimated re-
sources between the two countries. Furthermore we have al-
ready seen that these estimates do not merely differ over 
time, but that different groups in society cite different 
estimates of future resource availability. 
Energy supply and consumption will be descr ibed in terms 
of changes in patterns of production and end use as well 
as energy prices, both fuel prices and end-use energy pri-
ces. 
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In order to enable comparison between Denmark and Britain, 
the analysis has been spli t into two sections, each des-
cribing the trends for each of the countries. 
The long period and the demand for comparability of data 
- between countries have posed great difficulties in finding 
suitable data. Whereas the local statistical pUblications 
of each country are Qften very detailed, differences in 
the data collection methods, the nomenclature and the 
units used means that direct comparison between these data 
is not possible. International statistics, in contrast, 
while providing for direct compar ison and. consistency of 
method over long periods, are often less detailed than 
I 
would be wanted. As a consequence of our emphasis on com-
parability between countries ~and consistence of method 
over the whole. per iod, we have used .international statis-
tical surveys as the basic mater ial and supplied local 
statistics only to highlight specific points. A major pro-
blem has been the absence of time series on relative pri-
ces of· fuels and energy as well as on distr ibution among 
different types of consumers of end use. energy. Whereas 
this supports the suggestion that energy consumption was 
not regarded a problem until the mid-l970s, it means that 
the. account of the development of energy pr ices and con-
sumptions patterns has to be supported by data which' are 
not immediately comparable between the two countries and 
across the whole period. 
4.2 Britain 
In,the,following sections we shall investigafe changes in 
the specific British conditions with respect to economics, 
resources. and energy supply and consumption. 
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The economy.l 
At the beginning of the 1950s, the western European econo-
mies were still plagued by the repercussions of World War 
Two. Br i tain had exper ienced severe shortages, especially 
with respect to fuel supply. Hence, from the early 1950s, 
economic policies aimed at re-establishing economic 
growth. Keynesian management was adopted by the Labour go-
vernment and was employed by the Conservati ve governments 
all through the 19 50s. Unemployment was small seen wi th 
today's eyes: 1.4% on average during the 1950s; and infla-
tion ranged between 0.6 and 4.5% p.a. 2 Upholding economic 
growth without increasing inflation and trade deficits be-
came a still more persistent / problem to which Keynesian 
management did not seem to provide the answer, and in 1961 
the Conservative government launched a limited form of 
planning in shape of the National Economic Development 
Council ('Neddy,)3, which comprised members of government, 
industry and the unions and whose main function it was to 
identify obstacles to faster growth and recommend measures 
for removing them. This approach is parallel to the con-
temporary approach towards energy as identified in chap-
ter two: the overall obj ecti ve was economic growth, and 
state activities were geared towards removing possible"ob-
stacles. In the energy sector, as we have seen, the 'ener-
gy gap' represented one such possible obstacle, which was 
sought to be averted by financial support for the deve-
lopment of nuclear power which were thought to provide the 
scope for almost unlimited growth. 
Our ing the early 1960s, these trends continued: unemploy-
mentwas low, inflation more fluctuating. But by the mid-
1960s, the national economy was causing severe problems. 
Economic growth was only upheld at the expense of a grow-
ing~ balance of payment deficit, and sterling was, accord-
ing to Budge et.al. (1983) "clearly overvalued". In this 
situation the Labour government successively applied dif-
ferent economic policies. Attempts to establish long-term 
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comprehensive economic planning through a newly created 
Department of Economic Affairs were given up against the 
background of a currency crisis, and instead ad hoc poli-
cies based in Keynesian ideas were adopted. A devaluation 
of the pound in 1967 only served to ease problems for a 
while. It is against this background that we get the first 
energy policy statements (see chapter two, p. 14 f.) which 
aimed at ensuring cheap energy for future expansion. The 
energy policies of this period may be interpreted as just 
one dimension of government attempts to tackle increasing 
national economic problems. 
By the time of the oil crisis, inflation had reached 9.2%, 
I 
and the policies for economic expansion of a Conservative 
governmeri't had aggravated problems. The increase in oil 
prices added to inflation and trade deficits: 
, "Energy, and oil in particular, now assumed macroecono-
mic significance through its effects in inflation, un-
employment, the balance of payments, and the value of 
sterling, but the high priority attached to developing 
the North Sea resources offered the hope that the acute 
balance-of-payments difficulties would be temporary." 
(Cheshire et.al., 1977, p.48). 
It was increasingly clear that the assumptions behind Key-
nesian management' did. not hold: 'unemployment as well as 
inflation were' simultaneously increasing, and increasing 
public expenditure (which was at almo~t '50% of GNP in 1975 
(Budge et al., (1983» did not solve the problems. In, this 
period energy policy was intensified, initially as a means 
of fending off the immediate problems raised simultaneous-
ly by the ' threatened fuel shortage and the balance of 
payments and inflation problems accompanying the oil cr i-
sis. 
As the 1970s wore on, it became clear that the problems in 
the economy were of a more' persistent" kind •. In attempts to 
ease the situation, a new direction of economic policy was 
tried out, first by Labour ,governments, later (after 1979) 
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by the Conservative government. Incomes policy and cuts 
in public spending, it was thought, would keep down 
inflation. Budge et.al. (1983) observe that "the very idea 
of using public sector spending as the major instrument of 
economic policy was new". (p .13). At the same time, as we 
saw in chapter two, the number of uncertainties related to 
energy grew, and 
establishing the 
strategies. 
increasing attempts were made at 
cQnsequences of different energy 
This brief account indicates that the changes in energy 
policy were preceded by changes in the national economic 
conditions, particularly the expectations for economic 
I 
growth· and the immediate fiscal problems facing govern-
ments. The following sections will investigate the rela-
tion between these macro-changes and changes in resource 
condi tions and condi tions related to supply and consump-
tion of energy. 
Resources. 
Traditionally, Britain has relied heavily on coal for its 
energy supply. But having said this, it can be noted that 
the use of energy resources in the British fuel supply has 
fluctuated considerably. Chesshire et.al. in an attempt to 
arrive at a periodization of energy policy since the Se-
cond World War, characterizes the periods by the resource 
condi tions seen to prevail in each per iod: 'Post-war shor-
tage' from 1945 to 1956 'The oil glut' from 1957 to 1967. 
Whereas we find these titles inappropriate as characteris-
tics of energy policy, they indicate trends in resource 
use, which are confirmed if we look closer at primary 
energy production cf. fig. 4.1 
As can be seen from the figure, British energy production 
declined from the mid-1950s until 1973, and rose again af-
ter that. The figures for the single fuels shows more 
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clearly the development beneath the overall changes. 
Dur ing the 1950s, coal dominated Br i tish fuel production 
totally, and indeed about 90% of primary fuel supply (the 
total amount of fuel at disposal after imports have been 
"added and exports subtracted), was supplied by coal~. In 
all, fuel imports (mainly oil) came to about 12% of 1950 
primary fuel supply. O~her sources played only a marginal 
role in the energy supply of the 1950s. Out of the 0.8-2 
per thousand of energy production which was primary elec-
tricity 5, the proportion of nuclear power rose through the 
1950s from 0% to about 35% in 1960 as a consequence of the 
development of civil nuclear power. 
/ 
During the 1960s, however, whereas coal was still the ma-
j or indigenous source its proportion of inland fuel pro-
duction was slightly falling. As can be seen from fig. 4.1 
two immediate reasons accounted for this: a steady in-
crease .in production of primary electricity (of which the 
proportion of nuclear electricity was increasing up to 78% 
in 1970 6), and towards 1970 the introduction of North Sea 
natural gas with an increase from 0.5 per thousand to 9% 
of fuel production over the decade. But also the produc-
tion of coal in absolute terms was falling at the same 
time as primary energy supply was increased by a stagger-
ing 18% over the decade from 1960 to 1970. There is no in-
dication that the reason for the decreasing inland fuel 
production was a physical lack of coal, and if anything, 
the development of extraction technology meant that it was 
possible to extract more coal than had previously been the 
case 7. Chesshire et .al. observe that lack of investment 
in the coal industry had meant that productivity could not 
be increased at a rate which would ensure that production 
matched demand ," and in this sense, the resource was not 
available. We shall, however, suggest that this' obstacle 
was only relative: had there not been available alterna-
ti ves : (oil) which, amongst other advantages over coal was 
cheaper, substi tution would not have taken place. In the 
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next section we shall seek to substantiate this assertion 
by analysing the changes in patterns of energy supply and 
consumption; for the present we shall limi t ourselves to 
observe that the analysis at this point seems to support 
the assumption that resource conditions in an absolute or 
.. physical sense contributes only in a limited way to an 
understanding of changes in the composition of a country's 
fuel supply. 
Hence, an analysis of indigenous energy production is not 
sufficient to understand the changes. Looking instead at 
the primary fuel supply enables us to assess the 
implications of energy consumption for foreign trade. Fig. 
4.2 shows the composition ofu~rimary fuel supply over the 
whole 1950-1980 period. 
The figure shows that during the 1960s up to 1973 imported 
: fuel achieved an increasing signif icance in Br i tish fuel 
'supply, and as we shall see the majority of these imports 
consisted of oil and oil products. This resource had be-
,come 'available' but again not just in the simple sense 
, " 
'of the word. Besides being physicially available, for the 
resource to actually be utilized, additional conditions 
", had "to be present. These condi tions will be investigated 
i in the following section. For now, we may observe that 
this introduction of oil as a major element in the British 
. fuel supply was not the result of a" planned development 
intended at producing this result. As we saw in chapter 
two, the energy policies· of the 1950s' and early 1960s 
aimed at increasing energy supply pr imar ily by supporting 
: the expansion o,f nuclear power and by promoting efficiency. 
{in the coal industry, whereas oil imports were not an ele-
. ment in this strategy. Whereas the proportion of nuclear 
! power in primari fuel supply grew from about 30 /00 in 1960 
; to about 3% in 1970 8 ," it is beyond doubt that, the (unin-
tended) increase during the same period of the ,. proportion 
. of oil from 25% to 46%9 was of greater consequenci for the 
development in the years to follow. 
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Looking again at fig. 4.1, we observe that after 1973 the 
composition of British fuel production changed dramatical-
ly. Firstly, inland fuel production which had been steadi-
ly decreasing started an upturn. At the same time, the re-
_lative importance of coal production kept falling. The 
growth in production is accounted for by a steady increase 
in the production of natural gas and -mainl¥ - by the 
build-up of an indigenous production of oil from the North 
Sea in the late 1970s. Again we must point out that re-
source availabili ty seems to have been of Ii ttle impor-
tance in this'change. The existence of oil reserves in the 
North "Sea had been assumed since the mid-1960s, when BP 
prospected for natural gas, but at that time recovery of 
, / 
this: resource was not considered to be worthwhile. In 
1970, . BP announced the first finds of commercially ex-
ploitable oil reserves, but it was only in 1975 that pro-
duction was ini tiated. This suggests again that utili za-
tion of resources depend on conditions which cannot imme-
diately be derived from the physical presence of particu-
lar fuels within a country. We shall therefore proceed to 
consider changes in patterns of energy consumption and 
suppply. 
Energy Supply and Consumption 
The development of the fuel composition of British energy 
consumption from 1950-1980 is shown in fig. 4.3 
By comparing with. fig. 4.1 we see that \ the inland 
consumption of coal roughtly, matched product;'on for most 
of the period so that a surplus was available for bunkers. 
The consumption.of oil, however, which' up to the end of 
the 1970s relied wholly on imports, increased rapidly 
through the whole period. 
During the 1950s, energy consumption per capita increased 
by' about 12%. This is a' growth of only about 1% p.a. or 
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very much below the growth rates which were expected for 
the period. In contrast, the average annual growth in oil 
consumption was 11%. In order to explain these trends we 
shall have to look into the purposes for which different 
fuels were used to see if changes in the patterns of ener-
.. gy consumption have supported an increasing oil consump-
tion. Fig. 4.4 shows the chang ing distr ibution of fuels 
among end uses. 
The figure shows that the pattern of fuel consumption was 
almost· constant during the 1950s. The increasing use of 
oil dur ing this per iod must therefore be due to replace-
ment of coal wi th oil wi thin the single groups of consu-
I 
mers, or to a development whereby the growth in energy c-
'onsumption came mainly from a growth in oil consumption. A 
major factor contributing to increased oil consumption du-
ring the 1950s was the increasing consumption of electri-
ci ty for a" number of purposes where coal had previously 
been used, e.g. domestic heating and industrial proces-
sess. Dur ing the 1950s, electr ici ty consumption increased 
from 6.1 mtce in 1959 to about 12.2 mtce in 1959. This is 
equivalent to an increase in fuel consumption in electri-
c! ty .. production from 28.4 mtce or approx. 13% of pr imary 
energy' consumption in 1950 to 44.4 mtce or approx. 17% of 
primary energy consumption in 195910 • About the background 
for this sharp increase, Reid and Allen observe: 
"Rising incomes and the growing popular i ty of domestic 
central heating, the advantages of electricity in terms 
of . cleanliness, convenience and flexibili ty, good ad-
vertising plus the )ack of competition from gas tup to 
the early 1960s, are all factors which have contributed 
to the rapid growth of domestic demand fO,r electrici-
ty." (Reid and Allen, 1970, p. 16). 
But this inciea~~ does not fully explain the increased use 
of oil. Although the use of oil in power stations was in-
creased during the 1950s, by 1959 coal and coke stiil ac-
counted for about 86% of fuel used for electricity genera-
tion1l • We shall therefore have to look for other 
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Fig. 4.5 shows the development of coal and oil prices from 
1955 to 1959. 
Whereas coal prices kept rising throughout the 1950s, the 
rise in oil prices were relatively smaller. This means 
that, in addition to .the advantages in handling etc. of 
oil over coal, there were increasing economic incenti ves 
to.prefer oil. 
The move away from coal and towards oil accelerated during 
the 1960s, where oil consumption actually overtook con-
. I 
sumption of coal. If we lookuagain at fig. 4.4, we notice 
that the U pattern of energy demand changed, if not drama-, 
tically, then at. least in a direction which supported the 
move away from coal. The maj or changes occurred in the 
pattern of transport. The consumption of energy for 
railways and water transport decreased, whereas energy 
consumption for road and air transport increased. The 
latter forms of transport use oil, whereas the railrods 
still 'used coal to a large extent by 1960. If we analyse 
the decline in the consumption of coal in more detail we 
find that in all markets save electricity production, 
consumption of coal fell drastically between 1957 and 
1967. Whereas the large decrease in the . use of coal for 
domestic heating was to a certain extent offset by 
increased use of coal for electr ici ty production, other 
losses were absolute; like the decrease in the gas 
'industry's consumption of coal from 26.4 mill. tonnes in 
1957 to 14.4 mill. tonnes in 1967, and the decrease in 
consumption for rail transport of 10.6 mill. tonnes a year 
following government's railway modernization plan of 1955 
aiming at replacing stearn locomotives by diesel or 
electric1 and finally a decrease in industrial consumption 
from 37.5 mill. tonnes in 1957 to 20.1 mill tonnes in 1967 
.following a general switch to oil, gas and electricity in 
industries. 
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Whereas some of the components of the shift from coal to 
oil were planned, like e.g. the railway modernization pro-
gramme, the most important factors, like the industrial 
users' swi tch to oil, were not planned at a national le-
vel, and the overall result, a massi ve increase in oil 
consumption at the expense of coal, was not intended nor 
foreseen. 
On the contrary, towards the end of the 1960s the result 
was increasingly seen as problematic as the stagnation of 
the coal industry became a political problem. As we saw in 
chapter two, it generated new policies aimed at protect-
ing the coal industry from competi tion, e. g. by forcing 
/ 
the electr ici ty industr ies to" burn coal. It has been sug-
gested13 .. that the shift from coal to oil would have been 
even more. significant had government not intervened. The 
point to make here is that government intervention in fuel 
consumption was to a large extent a reaction to' the 
consequences 'of government policies of the previous 
period. 
Alongside the shift from coal to oil, less _ spectacular 
structural changes -in energy supply and consumption pat-
terns took place during the 1960s. The share of gas infi-
nal energy consumption had been declining in the 1950s, 
according to Reid and Allen (1970) as a consequence of in-
ability to compete with electricity and' oil for domestic 
heating purposes. Our ing the 1960s, however, the use of 
gas once more -increased, both relatively and in absolute 
terms ~ These 'trends are not immediately apparent in fig. 
4.3 which shows fuel consumption in contrast to final 
energy consumption but, according to Chesshire et.al. 
(1977) gas' share Of. final energy consumption, rose from 
6.3% in 1960 to" 10.6% in,1.970. Be~ore 196~, gas was pri-
mar ily produced from coal and oil, and therefore in fig. 
4.3 gas consumptiori hidden in the figures ~oi cons~~Ption 
of these fuels. But the figure shows - at· least one factor 
.contributing to the' increase in gas consumption: the 
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consumption of natural gas increased. The cost of natural 
gas was considerably below that of town gas and 
competitive with oil and coal14 • This made gas an 
interesting option particularly for bulk consumers, pr i-
mar ily industr ies which used fuels to generate crude 
heat, and for whom the fuel cost was high as compared to 
the capital cost of switching from one fuel to the other. 
The development of the gas markets supports this. assump-
tion. Since the introduction of natural gas, the indus-
trial market has accounted for a rapidly increasing per-
centage· of gas sales, so that the proportion of natural 
gas sales for industry rose from 24% in 1967 to 54% in 
197515. / 
These changes in energy consumption during the 1960s were 
accompanied by changes in the structure of energy supply. 
Electricity production underwent a significant centraliza-
tion during the 19505 and 1960s. Table 4.1 shows the 
change in number of stations and the total installed capa-
city from 1950 to 1980. 
Table 4.1 Electricity Production: Number of Stations and 
Capacity, United Kingdom 1950-1981. 
_Year. 1950 1960 . 1970 1981 
Number of stations 274 234 193 108 
.' . ,., , .. 
Maximum output -
capacity GW 11.5 25.5 46.9 55.2 
Average output '. 
capacity/station 41.9 107.7 350.7 511.1 
Sources: Power Progress, various years; Central Elec-
tricity Generating Board (1983). 
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The table shows a simultaneos fall in the number of power 
stations and an increase in the capacity per station. A 
significant factor here was the introduction of nuclear 
stations with an theoretical output capacity of 600 MW per 
reactor. At the same time, however, the difference between 
the installed capacity and the actual availability of 
plant has increased, so that, overall, the excess capacity 
over demandincreased 16 • It is difficult to assess the re-
lative importance of this loss of efficiency against the 
gains in efficiency resulting from large scale generation, 
as the result crucially depends on the methodology, and 
involves the question of to whom to ascribe the costs of 
different supply structures: to the industry, to the sin-
I 
gle consumer or to the nation? It is beyond doubt, how-
ever, th~tto the electricitry industry, the advantages of 
centralization have been obvious, and during the 1950s and 
j, 
1960s, the industry planned for continued centrali zation. 
Therefore, the development of a centralized electricity 
supply structure represents yet another event which is a 
result of policies which were in the 1950s and 1960s ra-
tional solutions to the existing problems, (lack of ef-
ficiency and capacity) but which, under different economic 
and poli tical circumstances, have come to be interpreted 
as negative. Whereas the modern electricity plants are 
still able to produce energy in large quantities, they are 
not very efficient in terms of energy conversion, which 
has- led a number of groups particularly environmental 
groups to conclude, that electricity for a number of pur-
poses, e.g. heating, is not a suitable form for energy. 
The altered patterns of supply and consumption taken to-
gether imposed a new set of constraints on the scope for 
future energy strategies. The increased use of a collec-
, -
tive energy supply system for electrici ty and gas meant 
for the single consumer increasing reliance on supply in-
dustr ies. Also increasing electr ici ty consumption implied 
that choice of fuel, instead of being made by single con-
sumers, was increasingly decided at a higher level within 
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the industry and ultimately by government. This cleared 
the path for political debate on the relative advantages 
of different energy sources and methods of production. 
After 1973 the rise in total energy consumption was suc-
ceeded by an abrupt fall. The prices of oil products rose 
sharply after the oil crisis, and the biggest increase was 
in fuel oil. The changes in the prices of oil products are 
shown in table 4.2 
Table 4.2 Pr ices of oil products. Uni ted Kingdom 1971-
1980. $ per gallon. 
UNITED KINGDOM 
Premium'gasolene 97 RON 
Regular gasolene 90 RON 
Auto diesel fuel 
Household kerosene 
Distillate fuel oil 
Motor lubricating oil 
Bunker "c" fuel oil 
/ 
1971 1974 
0.69 1.30 
0.65 1.25 
. . . . 
0.27 0.62 
• • • • 
1976 
1.27 
1.25 
. . 
0.55 
0.56 
1979 
2.19 
2.16 
2.26 
1. 01 
1.80 4.80' 3.52 4.86 
4.61 15.12 16.01 23.37 
1980 
2.65 
2.60 
2.72 
1. 37 
· . 
• • 
• • 
Source: United Nations, Department of Economics and Social 
Affairs: Yearbook of World Energy Statistics. New 
York, 1983. 
; These changes were in turn reflected in the price of elec-
) tricity " which rose on average by 137%' between 1973 and 
~ 197817 • As we can see'from fig. 4.1., per capita consump-
tion as a result dropped to the level of 1960._ 
Consumers' expendi ture on fuel as a percentage of total 
consumer expendi ture decreased after a short and very 
small increase immediately after the oil crisis. The per-
centage spent on fuel has only var ied very slightly over 
the whole period, from 3.8% in 1950 over 5.4% in 1969 and 
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to 4.3% in 1980 18 • It must be assumed, therefore, that 
consumers react to fluctuations in energy prices by 
regulating the amount consumed. But the demand for the 
different fuels was not equally elastic: the expenditure 
~n electricity kept rising even in the face of increasing 
electr ici ty pr ices, while consumption of coal and petrol 
for private cars decreased. This leads us to conclude, 
that increasing dependence on collective systems of energy 
supply has impaired the speed with which the supply system 
adapts to changes in relative fuel prices at the level of 
final consumption. 
This development was strengthened by changes in the rela-
I 
tive distribution of energy consumption on different 
users;' As we saw in' fig." 4.4, industrial energy consump-
tion decreased relative to consumption in the domestic and 
public' sector. Whereas industry r s energy consumption, was 
often in the form of crude heat, the latter categories'of 
users consume energy mainly for space heating and electri-
city, i.e. exactly the energy forms,where the tendency to-
wards collective supply has been strong. We find,' there-
fore; that one result of the development in the 1960s and 
1970s has been a move away 'from individual fuel choice and 
towards 'collective supply and fuel choice. 
Summary: Britain. 
The achievement of high economic growth-was the main un-
derlying aim of economic policies' to the mid-l960s •. This 
followed a previous experience of shortage, to which 
growth represented: a' solution. We observed that, the em-
phasis' on growth was also behind the energy policies of 
the same ,period. The real experience of energy demand 
growth and economic growth mutually affirmed each other. 
By the mid 1960s, economic problems' became increasingly 
~pparent, and these were closely related to· economic 
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growth: expansion in the economy seemed itself to create 
problems which were in pr inciple incomprehensible to the 
dominant economic (Keynesian) paradigm. We have seen that 
energy policy was first attempted some years later in at-
tempts to regulate the use of different fuels. We see, 
~herefore, that the change in economic conditions preceded 
the change in the extent of state control of the energy 
sector. The oil crisis ,broke this pattern: fuel conditions 
suddenly achieved a significant impact on economic condi-
tions. Energy became a vi tal factor influencing the ba-
lance, of payments and inflation negatively and adding to 
the general economic 'problems. By the mid-1970s, it was 
becoming clear that Keynesian management no longer provi-
/ 
ded a solution, and incomes '·policy and monetarism was a-
dapted. This corresponds wi ththe observation of the pre-
vious chapters of an increasing tendency to emphasize the 
dimensions of energy policy to' do wi th public' spending, 
not only the, size of investments but also long term costs 
and profits. 
Also resource utilization underwent important changes dur-
ing the per iod. The chronological analysis of these chan-
ges supports the suggestion that a' new resource has been 
employed only if the existing ones posed economic or pol~ 
itical problems to which the new resource was seen to of-
fer a solution. Thus, nuclear power offered a solution to 
the problem of achieving fast growth in the coal industry, 
natural gas offered a cheap and less bulky form of energy 
than oil etc. We observed that the decision to adopt new 
resources have been taken at different levels. The deci-
sions " to utilize nuclear power 'was taken by government, 
whereas the decision to introduce oil was takin by consu-
mers of 'primary fuel. We concluded that the physical avai-
lability of a given energy resource has been of less 
importance than the' degree to which it ei ther seems to 
6ffer a solution to energy problems at the national level 
or to the consumer. We suggested that the consumer's 
choice of energy is predominantly guided by the, relati ve 
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pr ices between fuels and the pr ice of energy relati ve to 
the level of income. 
Looking at energy ~onsumption and supply over the period, 
we found that the shift from coal to oil in the 1950s and 
"1960s . was parallelled by a shift in energy consumption 
from coal to electricity. This was not a planned develop-
ment but nevertheless jt significantly influenced the con-
ditions for energy policy after 1974. Before the institu-
tionalisation of energy policy in the early 1970s, the 
tendency to move energy decisionmaking away from the sin-
gle consumer and towards centralized energy industries had 
already been underway for a long time, supported by the 
I 
results. of decisions taken by the same consumers to shift 
their energy consumption towards the collective supply 
systems •. As we saw in chapter two, these changes in sup-
ply structure remained outside the sphere of politics un-
til they had been identified as causes of problems in re-
lation to the environment. 
We shall now proceed .. to investigate whether the role of 
the mater ial condi tions in relation to energy policy. has 
been similar in Denmark. 
4.3 Denmark. 
As it is soon clear to anyone investigating Danish energy 
policy, . except for North Sea oil and gas r - the country is 
not endowed wi th indigenous fuel resources (according to 
the present .. def ini tion of I resources I ) • In the following 
sections we shall investigate the. implications hereof for 
Danish. energy policy compared to the British situation. 
The economy. 
Whereas the general trend of economic development in Den-
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mark has been parallel to that of England, it also differ-
ed in a number of respects. At the beginning of the 1950s, 
Denmark was still decisively dependent on agricultural 
production. This produced a situation where the protective 
policies of the European countries towards their own agri-
cultural sectors led to balance of payment difficulties 
for Denmark whose beginning industrial expansion implied 
increased import of production equipment, which was only 
to a very limi ted extent produced locally. This in its 
turn prompted the governments of the 1950s to employ con-
tractive" economic policies. Because economic growth was 
rather slow in Denmark, and this unemployment rates were 
high, over 8% throughout the 1950s19 • This explains, at 
/ 
least in. part, why the • energy gap' was not an issue in 
Denmark "~in the 1950s. The slow economic growth meant 
that there was no reason to worry about the growth in 
future energy suppplies. 
From 1957, the national economic condi tions became more 
favourable as a consequence of improved terms of trade. 
This gave rise to increased investment activity and as a 
result~ industrial production increased by 30% from 1957-
1960. From 1960, unemployment started falling", and 
economic growth took off.' Economic growth· throughout ,the 
1960swas largely financed by increasing balance of 
payments deficits. We have suggested earlier that the main 
problem in relation to energy during this period was. now 
to expand supply at a rate to match the apparently ever-
increasing demand. But we have also observed that dur ing 
the ,1960s the Danish state did not.. attempt any 
regulation of the'energy sector to ensure that sufficient 
energy was produced. We. shall suggest, that this was not 
because the problem, did not exist, but because the 
historical development of Danish energy supply had meant 
that it could be solved by the private energy 'industries 
themselves without any loss of profits. ; . 
The oil cr isis. hi t the' Danish balance of payments even 
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harder than it did the British. This is in accordance 
with our observation that the Danish efforts in devising a 
coherent framework for energy policy in order to avoid si-
milar events in the future were more intense than the pa-
rallel British activities: in Denmark, the nationl econo-
-, 
mic implications were relatively more severe. 
After 1975 the macro-economic trends have been similar to 
those in Britain: stagnating economic activity, increasing 
unemployment and high rates of inflation. Attempts to sti-
mUlate the economy in 1975 led to further increases in the 
balance of payments deficits, and towards 1980 incomes po-
licy and spending cuts became the most important elements 
/ 
of Danish economic policies. v Again this is in accordance 
with the~increasing weight on the national economic impli-
cations of different energy. strategies in energy policy 
towards 1980. 
Resources. 
The development of fuel production in Denmark 1950-1980 is , 
shown fn fig. 4.6 
Total fuel production during the period was only 0.1 -0.2% 
of British energy production. This implies that even con-
sidering that Denmark is a much smaller nation than the 
United Kingdom with a population of approx. 9% of the Bri-
tish, the fuel industries have been of less importance in 
the Danish economy than they have in the Br i tish. Up to 
1970, 'brown coal and lignite dominated inland fuel produc-
tion. This production declined after 1960 and by 1973 it 
-
had stopped. By 1973, however, production of oil had begun 
in the North Sea. Fig.4.7 shows that Denmark did not rely 
on its own ~eso~rces for fuel supply. On the contrary we 
have to go as far back as 1955 to find primary fuel supply 
exceeding imports. The access to imported resources has 
been of much greater importance than the access to indige-
nous fuels. During the 1950s, the production of brown coal 
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and ligni te never accounted for more than approx 5% of 
fuel supply. During the 1970s, the proportion declined 
even further, so that by 1973 Denmark was wholly dependent 
on fuel imports. After this time indigenous fuel produc-
tion achieved an increasing significance, but in 1980 pro-
"duction still accounted for only 1.5% of primary fuel sup-
ply. To establish why ligni te fell out of use and why an 
indigenous oil production was initiated after 1973, we 
shall have to look into patterns of energy consumption. 
Energy Supply and Consumption. 
The; develo~ment in energy consumption in terms of amount 
and'sources is shown in fig. 4.8. 
The;figureshows,that during the 1950s, solid fuels domi-
nated the Danish fuel supply. The energy supply was mainly 
based on imported coal while indigenous sources played 
only a minor role. But the proportion of oil in the fuel , 
supply increased rapidly, so that by 1973 it accounted 
for about 90% of energy consumption. 
Regrettably, a survey showing distribution of final energy 
consumption by end user does not exist for the whole pe-
r iod. Fig. 4.9 however, although not immediately compara-
ble to the data for Br i tish consumption, shows the most 
important trends. 
Fig. 4.9 shows that during the 1950s,· the domestic and 
public sectors consumed almost half of total energy con-
sumption and that this percentage was increasing. Rather 
than implying that heating conditions were necessarily 
better in· Denmark than in Britain, this indicates, that 
energy consumption in industry both relatively and abso-
lutely played a smaller role in Danish energy consump-
tion. At that time industrial growth had not yet started 
in Denmark, and there was no heavy industry of any signi-
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ficance in the country. The only industries with a signi-
ficant use of fuel were the tile, cement and glass indus-
tries. These industries contributed significantly to in-
creasing oil consumption: an increase of 30% in energy 
consumption from 1948 to 1956 was obtained solely by oil 
use 20 • Also in the domestic sector the shift from coal, 
brown coal, and lignite to oil started in the 1950s, as 
did the increase in electricity consumption, which in the 
public sector increased from 2% in 1984 to 5% in 1963 21 • 
Changes in the ,relative prices of fuels during the 1950s 
do not· provide sufficient explanation of this shift. In 
reality, the average price per calorific unit of oil pro-
f 
ducts only undercut the price of coal between 1955 and 
1957. Furthermore, we have seen that the state did. not in-
terfere in energy consumption at this date, so the. shift 
to oil was not the result of a conscious policy either. We 
shall therefore have to look for other types of explanan-
tion. 
Coal was, during th~ 1950s and early 1960s, mainly impor-
ted from Britain and Poland. The British coal policies of 
the early .1950s meant that the home market was given 
highest priority. In comparison, oil offered an apparently 
secure: and limi tless . supply of, energy, which furthermore 
offered less bulky storage and easier transport, factors 
of -importance especially to large consumers .. such as' power 
stations or industries. 
During the 1960s, this development accelerated. As fig. 
4.8 shows; ~the:relative'weight of oil'ln fuel consumption 
rose at a still increasing rate. Two major sources of. this 
development were the continued increase in the use of. oil 
for, supplying crude heat for industry and the increasing 
use of electr ici ty for' domestic purposes as well· as in 
smaller industries 23 • Electricity consumption increased 
during the 1960s at an average annual rate of 9.7%24. 
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This leads us to consider the changes in the structure of 
energy supply accompanying the replacement of solid fuels 
wi th electr ici ty and oil as major end use energy forms. 
The concentration of electricity supply which we observed 
in Britain also happened in Denmark. In 1961, 98% of Da-
nish electricity was produced in 16 stations and the re-
maining 2% of 150 smaller stations; in 1973, 18 stations 
produced 99.3% of electricity, while only 15 stations pro-
duced the remaining 0.7%25. 
Consequentially, by the end of the 1960s Denmark was al-
most totally dependent for fuel on Middle East oil, and 
energy consumption was to a very large extent dependent on 
collective electricity supply./ This did not, however, give 
rise to state attempts to ensure fuel diversification un-
til after the oil· cr isis, when the consequences of this 
development were suddenly revealed. 
After 1973, the proportion of solid fuels increased rapid-
ly and,· this time solid fuel meant coal which offered an 
immediate substitute for oil. It is well worth noting that 
the shift from oil back to coal occurred before state 
energy policy had created a framework· of control in the 
form of electricity and oil duties, which were only intro-
duced in 1977. By then coal consumption had already been 
considerably expanded at the expense of oil. A primary ex-
planation of this is the increase in oil prices, which is 
shown in table 4.3. 
For example, the tile, cement and glass industries in 1975 
used 44% less heavy fuel oil than in 19.10, and dur ing the 
same interval increased their use of coal by 434%26. Look-
ing at table 4.3 we find that ,the price of fuel oil more 
than' quadrupled which obviously presented a sui table in-
centive for switching.to coal. 
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Table 4.3 Prices of Oil Products. Denmark 1971-1980. $ per 
per gallon. 
DENMARK 
Premo gasolene 97/98 RON 
Regular gasolene 92 RON 
Auto diesel fuel 
Household kerosene 
Distillate fuel oil 
Light heating oil 
Motor lubricating oil 
Bunker "c" fuel oil 
Medium fuel oil 
LPG 
1971 
0.74 
0.69 
0.24 
· . 
• • 
3.62 
5.21 
• • 
• • 
1974 
1. 39 
1.35 
0.69 
· . 
6.00 
16.00 
• • 
/ 
• • 
1976 1979 1980 
1. 45 2.84 3.34 
1. 40 2.80 3.30 
1.45 1.87 
0.57 1.38 1.80 
0.64 1.42 • • 
• • • • 1.68 
6.41 10.37 • • 
14.90 · . • • 
•• · . 44.68 · .. · . 
Source: United Nations, Department of Economics and Social 
Affairs: Yearbook of World Energy Statistics. New 
York, 1983. 
As shown in table 4.4, the pr ice rise was also reflected 
in electricity prices, but not in full. 
Table 4.4 Electricity Prices. Denmark, 1973-1980. 
DENMARK 
Copenhagen 
Ore .. A 
B 
C 
D 
1973 1978 1979 1980 1981 
26.90 53.50 52.80 66~00 87.60 
23.20 
18.30 
11.00 
46.40 
38.20 
27.'00 
45.60 
37~30 
26.00 
58.80 
49.90 
38.00 
80.30 
69.70 
56.00 
The consumers are categorized into four types of household 
consumers, on the basis of their specific consumption pat-
tern. 
Source: Uni ted Nations, Department of Economic and Social 
Affairs: Yearbook of World Energy Statistics. New 
York, 1983. 
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This was reflected in a continued increase in electricity 
consumption even after 1973. The growth rate, however, was 
considerably smaller than before the oil crisis: only 4.9% 
a year. 
The supply structure underwent important changes during 
the 1970s. Collective heating systems, i.e. district heat-
ing and. combined heat and power systems by 1982 accounted 
for 49% of total consumption for heating 27 compared to 30% 
in 197528 • There was no state regulation of heating before 
1979; but from the late 1960s, local author i ties posses-
sing heating facilities often attached easements to build-. / 
ing sites demanding that the dwellings built there must be 
connected' to collective heat supply. Throughout the 1970s, 
an increasing percentage of this heat was supplied from 
combined heat and power stations, so that the electr ici ty 
companies increasingly dominated energy supply29. Again, 
it must be noted that this development had started before 
state energy policy stated that an increase in combined 
heat and power production was in the national interest, 
and 101'1g before heating planning was instituted. Hence, 
the energy supply structures which had emerged indepen-
dently of government energy policies were conducive to the 
development of state energy policy because these struc-
tures meant that energy decisionmaking increasingly took 
place at an aggregated level of supply. 
Summary: Denmark. 
The previous section has considered the developments in 
-. 
the Danish national economy, in resource availabili ty and 
resource . production and in energy consumption and supply 
structures in relation to the developments of policy and 
of political group involvement in energy which was consi-
dered in the previous chapters. 
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We found that macro-economic changes could be identified 
preceding major shifts in state energy policy issues. 
Changes in state energy policy issues were seen to follow 
changes in the dominant economic-political paradigm. 
Changes in the use of energy resources in Denmark during 
the 1950 to 1980 period were not determined by availabili-
ty of indigenous energy resources~ on the contrary, Den-
mark relied increasingly on imports of oil, even though 
the existence of North Sea oil was known by the early 
1960s. Only after the rises in oil pr ices following the 
oil crisis in 1973 did North Sea of1 achieve any signifi-
cance, but even so, oil was predominantly replaced by 
I 
coal, another imported fuel. We observed that these 
changes in resource utilization preceded energy policies 
geared at regulating fuel supply, whereas on the other 
hand they had a large impact on energy policy by defining 
a' range of problems to which energy policy represented a 
reaction •. 
The most significant change in resource utilization pat-
terns was found to follow results of decisions taken - by 
sin'gle consumers moti vated by the re1ati ve advantages of 
fuels in terms of price and a number of secondary factors 
(secondary because they would not have counted, had the 
pr ice been higher): ease of storage, cleanliness, comfort 
in .use. This change, which consisted in a shift towards 
oil and electricity, began in the 1950s but continued un-
til 1973. The shift to electricity meant that by 1973 the 
fuel change was, for a large part ini tiated by power sta-
tions rather than individual consumers,. but i~ was imple-
mented . through' the market mechanism whereas elements - of 
government energy strategy which involved the introduction 
of technologies that; were not immediately profitable, 
like nuclear power or renewable energy techno1ogies,'were 
not implemented. 
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4.4 Conclusion. 
We set out in this chapter to investigate how far material 
conditions, which we defined as conditions related to mac-
ro-economic trends, resource availability and utilization, 
and energy consumpti.on and supply, could be shown to be 
reflected in state energy policy and vice versa: how far 
had state energy policies actually managed to alter these 
conditions? 
wi th regard to the national economic condi tions, the de-
velopment from 1950-1980 in Britain and Denmark were 
broadly similar, except that economic growth was lower in 
Denmark than in Britain during the 1950s. We found that 
this was~reflected in a difference identified in chapter 
two regarding the importance which was attached by the re-
spective governments to the need to expand energy supply. 
Furthermore, we are now able to conclude that ,the issue of 
whether to plan energy supply was in both countries close-
ly bound up wi th the amount and character of problems in 
the economy in general. Looking back to chapter three we 
observe that out of the political groups, only the parties 
initially picked up the importance of the energy sector to 
the national" economy. This implies that only. the parties 
as groups can have; been instrumental in the central 
change in the supposi tions underlying energy policy about 
the_relationship between market control and state coordi-
nation. 
with regard to resources, we found that changes in the re-
source priorities of state energy' pol~cy could not be 
ascribed to changes in the relative physical availabili ty 
of different energy sources. Instead we found that new 
sources were only considered if they were thought to offer 
comparative -advantages to those previously used, either 
economic' advantages' or for example" cleanliness'. Hence, 
the desirability of a new :sourcecould not be understood 
independently of' knowledge about the· problems which were 
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identified as results of using the traditional sources. 
The change in resource utilization have run parallel in 
the two countr ies: a shift from coal to oil dur ing the 
1950s and 1960s and a shift away from oil and towards coal 
plus North Sea resources after 1973. These changes have 
been essentially unplanned, whereas the planned changes 
like the introduction of nuclear power in Britain and - at 
a much smaller scale "":' of renewable energy have remained 
of relatively much smaller importance in terms of total 
energy supply. We saw, however, that the resources which 
were chosen exactly because they were interpreted as 
advantageous, later came to represent a problem exactly 
because their use became universal, c.f. the dependence on 
oil. 
/ 
wi th regard to energy consumption, we saw again similar 
trends in the two countries: a significant trend during 
the 1950s and 1960s in both countr ies was a general' in-
crease in electricity consumption, especially for domestic 
purposes. From 1970 the decreasing importance of 
industr ial energy consumption in both countr ies added to 
the importance of this development. Also in the1970s, 
collective heating was developed or extended in both 
countries, in Denmark as district/CHP heating, in Britain 
as natural gas heating. This development, which was a 
resul t of individual decisions based on an assessment of 
the relative . advantages of electr iei ty. and district 
heating over kerosene lamps and wood or coal stoves and 
fires, • later came to represent constraints on the 
individual scope for fuel choice. In addition, however, 
these 'micro'-decisions produced other results at the 
national level which were never intended nor expected •. 
They produced an~ggregatechange in resource utilization, 
but in addition the concentration of production facilities 
also implied a concentration of pollution. A large number 
of less spectacular power plants were replaced by few, but 
conspicuous, stations each having a greater impact on the 
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surrounding environment. In chapter three we observed that 
this was increasingly recognized as a negative effect of 
centralization after 1973, whereas there is no sign that 
it was originally p,redicted that this effect could become 
a future problem. 
We find that the account supports our suggestion that the 
emergence of new groups in the energy policy field and 
changes in the attitudes of existing groups reflect 
changes in the mater ial condi tions in the field. We have 
found that the poli ticization of energy was preceded by 
major changes in the economic condi tions as well as the 
patterns of energy supply and consumption. But we also 
/ 
found that the changes in resource utilization depended on 
changes in the patterns of energy supply and consumption, 
and that these changes emerged as aggregate results of 
state energy policy, individual decisions with energy im-
pacts, and; finally state policies in other fields than 
energy. This suggests a 'closed system' of energy consu-
mers, energy producers and the state, which produces solu-
tions to energy problems as they emerge, but which does 
not have the capaci ty to foresee the problems that ar ise 
as aggregate or long-term results of applying those solu-
tions. 
This conclusion, while adding to our understanding of the 
origin of resource related issues, does not immediately 
contribute to an understanding of the or igin of the idea 
prevailing in energy policy from the mid-1970s that one of 
the main tasks of energy policy should be a comparative 
evalua~ion of ,energy techno~ogies founqed in _ assessments 
of the totality of their possible future consequences. We 
sh~ll therefore in the next chapter discuss the historical 
development of the notion, of state controlled technologi-
cal change. 
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NOTES TO CHAPTER 4 
1. The following section is primarily based on Budge et.a1. (1983). 
2. Cf. Budge et.al. (1983) table 1.1 p.7. 
-3. Op.cit. pp.6-8. 
4. Chesshire et.al. (1977), p. 38. 
5. I.e. electricity generated from sources other than the tradition-
al fuels, e.g. hydro, nuclear power, wind or solar (photovoltaic) 
cel1s. 
6. See Chesshire et.al. (1977) table 2.2 p. 38. 
7. See Reid and Allen (1970) pp. 90-93. 
8. Chesshire et.al., op.cit. I 
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5. THE POLITICAL CONSEQUENCES OF THE EFFECTS OF TECHNOLOGY. 
5.1 Introduction. 
The preceding analysis led us to conclude that even though 
concrete changes in energy policy could be explained by 
reference to changes in energy prices and resource availa-
bili ty, we were still left to explain the poli tici zation 
of energy that was identified in chapters two and three. 
Specifically, we were left,to explain the emergence of new 
I 
groups trying to influence energy policy as well as the 
tendency for both these groups and energy policy decision-
/ 
makers to express energy pOl'i tical questions in terms of 
choices regarding energy technologies based upon compara-
tive evaluations of the effects of these technologies. 
Addressing these problems, we suggested, in a preliminary 
hypothesis, that the emergence of new groups and' changes 
in the attitudes of existing groups reflect reactions to 
negative experiences of the effects 'of energy technologies 
on ~ the physical environment as well as on social condi-
tions and the quality of life. Furthermore, that' these 
exper iences have contr ibuted to the poli ticization of en-
ergy as well as to attempts at devising new methods of so-
cial 'evaluation and control of' technology. Finally, we 
suggested that the negati ve exper iences of technological 
effects have been common to the industrialized world' and 
hence'also to Britain and Denmark.' 
Having suggested' that the poli ticization of _ energy re-
flects '. negative experiences of technology,' we have also 
implied 'that a c~ange has taken place in the experience of 
technological effects. More'specifically, we shall ,suggest 
that in the early p~rtof the 1950-80 period, the effects 
of technology on society were generally interpreted as 
beneficial, and policies were therefore focused on improv-
ing conditions of technological change. In contrast, from 
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the early 1970s, the same technologies were increasingly 
seen to contribute to the creation of new problems in the 
industrialized world: environmental degradation, urban 
congestion, growing unemployment to name but a few • 
. , 
with respect to energy we saw a shift in the policies con-
cerning the technolog i cal aspects of energy around 1970. 
During· the 1950s and 1960s energy policies in both Bri-
tain and Denmark were primarily geared to supporting 
technological change in energy production. After 1970 po-
licies were increasingly concerned with avoiding the nega-
tive effects of existing technologies and looking for new 
technologies which might possibly solve some of the pro-
/ 
blems created by the existing ones. New criteria were 
adopted 'with respect to the performance of technologies, 
and attempts were made" at comparative evaluation of energy 
techno~ogical systems. 
At the same' time, political groups voiced demands for 'al-
ternative' energy technologies to be introduced. We ob-
served that these groups often emphasized the need for.so-
ciety- to minimize' the negative effects of technology 
either through strengthened state regulation or aided by 
a"new, ecological morality which would induce the indivi-
dual to consider the large scale effects of her/his be-
haviour. 
We shall now concentrate on the implications of these pa-
rallel developments by isolating the' technological compo-
nent : and pos i ting energy technology policies and" policy 
proposals in a framework of science and techn:>logy policy 
and policy proposals. Centering on the' hypothesized shift 
around' 1970 we shall need to look, first at the 'previous 
per iod: .. which role was \ defined for the' state in relation 
to technology? 
Which types of technologies did governments support? Which 
effects. 'were expected. to arise from technological 
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change? Were there any cr i ticism of technology policies? 
If so, who were the critics? 
We shall then proceed to analyse changes in technology po-
licy. Our hypothes is suggests that these changes reflect 
the pressures of political groups who react to problems 
which are 1) seen to be created by the application of 
technology, 2) seen to.be so severe as to demand immediate 
political action, and 3) seen to be inextricably bound up 
with and therefore insoluble through the economic system. 
If this. is the case, we need to show that the technology 
policies of states and supranational agencies reflect such 
problems. Also, we will want to show that the specific is-
I 
sues involved emerged in critiques of contemporaneous po-
licies affecting technological change by concerned indivi-
duals and political groups prior to being defined as poli-
cy issues. We want to establish that any changes in the 
focus of technology policy has been preceded by pressures 
from 'below'. 
As we intend to demonstrate that the poli ticization of 
technology was a phenomen not limi ted to a few nations, 
this chapter will, in addition to Danish and British 
sources, to a large extent make use of policy documents 
from supranational agencies such as the OECD and the EEC. 
For these agencies, as well as for Denmar k and Br i tain, 
the development of science and technology policy will be 
traced' in terms of the issues, objectives and the docu-
ments. In· order to document the origins of concern; we 
shall have to look for possible sources of the critique 
of the official policies. possible sourc.es include single 
scientists directly involved with scientific/technological 
programmes, groups of citizens directly affected by large-
scale technological developments, and pressure groups pro-· 
testing .against specific types of technological develop-
mente If. such cr i tiques have preceded policy statements, 
we might expect that this would be ;reflected in some way 
in the policy documents e.g. by references in more or less 
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precise terms to the groups or individuals who have raised 
the critique. Also we would expect that such critiques 
would be mentioned in later scholarly work on the effects 
of technology. Finally, we would expect some media 
coverage of e.g. protests against particular technological 
projects. 
The format sketched here raises a number of specific me-
thodolog ical problems notably in relation to def ini tions. 
Attempts to def ine 'technology' raise problems similar to 
those encountered in chapter one with respect to the con-
cept 'energy policy'. As will be evident from the above, 
the object of the present chapter is not 'technology', but 
the changes over the 1950-l98~ period of the ways in which 
society has tried to influence technological change and 
the, extent to which these attempts have been interpreted 
as successful or as failures. Therefore the definition of 
technology by political decisionmakers is itself a subject 
of investigation as was the case wi th energy. We shall 
need, however, to make some specifications in an attempt 
to aid conceptual clarity. 
As Langdon Winner (1977) observes, 'technology' in to-
day's everyday use tends to cover a large class of pheno-
mena including both things (tools, machines, implements), 
acti vi ties, and social structures l • Furthermore, there is 
one interpretation which is not included in Winner's ob-
servations. 'Technology~ has frequently been interpreted 
as ,a ,particular form of knowledge or applied knowledge 2 • 
;' . 
The content of the concept 'technology' has, we shall sug-
gest, varied, historically according to, the character, of 
problems in the real world demanding poli tical attention. 
Winner (1977) observes that: 
," In, pas t decades' the term ( , technology', T. A. ) had a 
very specific, limi ted and unproblematic meaning.' Per-
sons who employed the term spoke of a "practical art", 
"the study of practical arts" or "the practical, arts 
collectively". ( ••• ) Most people spoke directly of 
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machines, tools, factories, industry, crafts, and engi-
neering and did not worry about "technology" as a dis-
tinct phenomenon." (Winner, 1977, p.8). 
To the extent that this is the case we would suggest that 
this conceptual change reflects a change in the nature of 
the actual problems facing people, so that the increasing 
use of the general and abstract term 'technology' would 
suggest that problems are no longer seen to be located in 
a single piece of machinery but in the system of which 
this machinery is only a small part. 
Bearing this in mind we shall adopt a very simple working 
defini tion of technology, whi9h is adapted from Petersen 
(1985) : 
By technology we shall understand instruments or techni-
ques both material and social which are used by human be-
ings for transforming or shaping the natural or social 
conditions given at any point in time. 
This definition is clearly inspired by the Marxian concept 
of the forces of production3, but in contradiction to this 
concept it includes as 'technology' means for transforming 
social (as well as physical) reali ty. Hence, the object 
of the following investigation is the extent to which the 
state.has regulated the development of such "means and the 
extent· to which it has been seen by a wider public to be 
successful in this pursuit. We shall concentrate this 
discussion on issues relevant for energy policy, while on 
the other hand we shall only inquire into the whole field 
of policies for industrial technology insofar as knowledge 
about .these policies is relevant to the" understanding of 
energy technology. policies. 
, , 
What follo'ws is an investigation into the development of 
issues raised by the policies for science and technology 
of the western industrialized world between 1950 and 1980. 
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The investigation will concentrate on statements about the 
exper ienced effects of existing technolog ies and on the 
policy recommendations made in response. Furthermore, in 
the course of the investigation we shall seek to establish 
the chronological process through which the effects make 
themselves felt as issues for state policy. 
5.2 The 1950s and 1960s: Technology as the Means for 
Growth. 
The first indication that the objectives and scope of 
technology policy betwen 1950 and the late 1960s was quite 
different from what was later~to be understood by 'techno-
logy policy' can be got from later attempts to describe 
the' shift. In a report to the Secretary-General of the 
OECD . on new concepts for science, policy, the per iod from 
the end of the 2nd World War and up to 1967 is descr ibed 
as an era "in which the attitude towards science and tech-
nology was optimistic and hopeful" (OECD, 1971, p.39). In 
terms of policy, this meant that: 
, '''much of' the thrust of science po1i cy4 as it developed 
within the OECD area ,was concerned with bringing the 
level of total R&D expenditure as a fraction of GNP 
. up towards that of the Uni ted States ( ••• ). In this 
thrust, R&D was regarded as a valuable investment in 
its own right, almost independent of its subject matter 
{provided it was sufficiently advanced and "sophistica-
ted") . and independent of. coupling ,to the operational 
problems faced by governments". (Organisation for Eco-
nomic Co-operation and Development, 1971, p.40). 
We shall now suggest that the optimism' expressed in 
science policies was the result of 
tion between technological change 
prevailing in the 1950s 'and 1960s. 
experienced co-varia-
and economic growth 
Petersen (1985) sug-
gests that this period was one of more or less constant 
growth in which few conflicts threatened social stability, 
because of the prospect of' a continued,' increase in the 
total sum of resources which would (at least in theory) 
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remove any obstacles for re-allocation to the benefi t of 
al1 5• We shall suggest that this interpretation of the 
role of science and technology was conducive to technology 
policies which to a large extent left decisionmaking to 
'experts', i.e~ scientists and developers. In addition, we 
shall show that the seeming efficacy of technological pro-
gress led to general acceptance of the idea that a scien-
tifically managed society was both feasible and desira-
ble6• 
By the beginning of the 1950s, government intervention in 
the industrialised world was characterized by fast growth 
in government R&D funding. This growth has been described 
I by the OECD as: 
" ( ••• ) so rapid and so continuous that people were not 
far from regarding it as an inevitable phenomenon, vir-
tually outside the area of poli tical choice." (Organi-
sation for Economic Co-operation and Development, 1971, 
p.38). 
The interventions were, however, fragmented and not foun-
ded in- intentions to manage or control a broadly defined 
field of technology. Single specific technologies, like 
nuclear power, were heavily subsidized. Also scientific 
and technological education was supported in an attempt to 
aid the development of science, in particular physics and 
related areas, which was expected to -contr ibute to tech-
nological progress by supplying new inventions. 
Before we proceed to look at the ways in which policies 
dealt with technology in this period, let us have a brief 
look at the attitudes to science and technology of the pe-
~iod ~s' they have been described by scholars writing with 
the advantage of··hiridsi~ht. 
Petersen (1985) argues that during the 1950s and -early 
19605 science and technology seemed to have become an au-
tonomous force in society: one invention automatically and 
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inevitably led to the next. This is in agreement with the 
interpretation of the GECD referred to above, and sug-
gests that the 1950s model of the processes of invention -
innovation -development -practical innovation underlying 
science and technology policy differed radically from la-
'ter interpretations. This seems to be confirmed to some 
degree by the def ini tions of technology offered by the 
contemporary philosophical cr i tique which was preoccupied 
wi th the consequence for humani ty of technological 
change 7 • These early critics drew their concerns from the 
assumption that modern technologies would indeed succeed 
in doing what the developers wanted them to. After nuclear 
weapons everything seemed possible: 
I 
"A technique is a rational discipline designed to as-
sure the mastery of man over physical nature through 
the application of scientifically determined laws" 
(Simon, 1951, p. 173). 
"Technique .. is the totali ty of methods rationally ar-
rived at and having absolute efficiency ( ••• ) in every 
field of human activity." (Ellul, 1954, p. xxv). 
These definitions imply that the most important feature of 
techniques was thought to be their efficiency as means of 
control. It is important to remember, however, that these 
defini tions were proposed by philosophers trying to in-
quire into the nature of the rapid technological change 
which· they saw as something new and important. Consequent-
1ytheir conclusions cannot be taken to be descriptions of 
the actual processes of technological change nor of the 
role· of governments in technological change. We shall 
therefore have·· to have a closer look at . the elements of 
the· 'model' of technological change "imp1ici t - in the as-
sumptions of government policies and interest group policy 
recommendations regarding technology during the 1950s and 
early 1960s •. 
In chapter two we observed that the main foci of energy 
policies in Denmark and Britain in the 1950s and· early 
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1960s were economic growth and technological progress. In 
chapter three we observed that these foci reflected a ge-
neral consensus amongst poli tical groups about the abso-
lute desirability of economic growth. Technological change 
was seen to contribute positively to economic growth by 
removing obstacles to growth. For example, automation 
would contr ibute to greater eff iciency in production and 
thereby help to avert a threatened shortage of labour. The 
apparent success in applying science and technology to 
single problems in relation to economic growth led politi-
cal groups to conceive of technological change as pro-
gress. For example, the Labour Party in 1958, summed up 
the past achievements of science and the expectations de-
rived from these experiences: H' 
"In the last two decades alone these (scientific, T.A.) 
discoveries have led to a range of powerful new indus-
tries: atomic power stations: jet engines: plastics, 
synthetic fibre and rubber. All these products are the 
frui ts of pure and applied research. To a very impor-
tant extent our future prosperity will be determined by 
what science can discover and by how rapidly we can 
translate these discoveries into industrial produc-
tion." (The Labour Party, 1958). 
Also,' the popular literature abounded with fanciful vi~ 
sions of new technologies, new products, andg~neia1 mate-
r ia1 abundance, for example Gabor (1963) • foresaw' nuclear 
powered ships" synthesized fuels, totally, automated fac-
tories and automated systems for the purchase of, household , 
goods. At the same time, economic growth was the unques-
tioned objective of national and supranational policies. 
Petersen (1985) upon analysing the objectives of OECD po-
licy st~tementi'of this period concludes .th~t: 
"It ii growth which is to create the basis for full em-
ployment: gro~th, which is to ensure .abetter standard 
of living, and growth which is in the final analysis to 
pay for the welfare state." (Petersen, 1985, p.211). 
In both Britain and Denmark, governments sought to create 
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favourable condi tions for economic growth. In both coun-
tr ies, state intervention dur ing the ear ly 1950s was mi-
nimal8 , but as the rate of economic growth in both coun-
tries remained low, towards 1960 new measures were intro-
duced in both countries with the aim of stimulating econo-
'mic growth. These measures included the establishment in 
Br i tain of the National Economic Development Council9 and 
the introduction in Denmark of specific growth-enhancing 
policy measures e.g. a system of taxes favouring private 
industry, large public spending especially in the building 
sector, and increased spending on higher and further edu-
cation. 
Technological, change was generally thought 
to economic growth. From the observation 
gical change had facilitated new material 
to contribute 
,that technolo-
possibilities, 
there was only a short step to assuming that material wel-
fare for a majority would inevitably accompany technologi-
cal. change. So far, the results of scientific technology 
could be interpreted as being to the benefit of the large 
majority. Increasing productivity gave rise to specula-
tions e.g. by Simon (195l) that unskilled workers would in 
the near future be able to enjoy unprecendented mater ial 
welfare. In the same vein, Gabor (1964) observed that 
"For the first time in history' we are now faced wi th 
the possibili ty of a world ,in which only a minor i ty 
need work, to keep the great majority in idle luxury." 
(p. 104). 
This may sound like idealist speculation easily dismissed 
as '. unrepresenta ti ve. There' are ind icati~:>ns, however," that 
ideas very much like these were common currency in the pe-
riod. For example, a Trades! Union Congress statement on 
technology. in 1965 concluded that technological change 
would in the futurecontr ibute to improved conditions for 
the working, class. Automation in industry would lead to 
unskilled workers being replaced to a still larger degree 
by skilled workers. This would lead to an improvement of 
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the skill level of the working class, higher wages, and 
less toil and dirty work in the industry. It was also 
foreseen that the distinction between white collar and 
boiler suit jobs would increasingly be blurred by the in-
troduction of new production equipment. Economic growth, 
"aided by technological change, would make it possible to 
change the major pre-occupation of society. 
" ( ••• ) from that of feeding, clothing and housing its 
people to that of providing for everybody the services 
and opportunities previously enjoyed by a minority." 
(Trades Union Congress, 1965, p.25). 
Technological progress was thought to hold the promise of 
increased generalised welfare: and welfare was most fre-
.quent1y interpreted as synonymous to material prosperity 
in terms of the 'services and opportunities' mentioned 
above, but first and foremost in terms of increased and 
generalized access to buy ,increasing amounts and varieties 
of consumer goods: 
. "Today the housewife in the supermarket goes into a 
trance while she heaps her precious goods into. her 
trolley in careless rapture. Who could be sorry for 
her?" (Gabor, 1964, p.9l). 
Indeed, remembering postwar shortage, who could, in the 
1950s and early 1960s, be sorry faced with the prospects 
of being able to. consume more commodities? With respect to 
energy, technological' change also seemed to contribute to 
increased welfare. For example, the Danish Social Democra-
tic Party in its 1961 programme stated that technical and 
scientific progress would lead to socia~ progress and wel-
fare, in particular, the adoption of peaceful-nuclear po-
werwould lead to prosperity, and-similar statements were 
found in:. other party programmes of the time. Considering 
the problems exper ienced in relation to energy supply at 
the-time: pollution from open coal fires, having to 'store 
in each home fuel' which was either dirty and bulky (coal) 
or dangerously inflammable (kerosene), the new technolo-
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gies (nuclear power, small oil burners) and the accompany-
ing promises of more of the same must have been compelling 
to the energy consumers of the 1960s. 
But also at a larger scale technological change offered 
solutions to existing and expected problems. For example, 
as we have seen, civil nuclear power, developed into a 
commercial stage, was expected to remove the specific ob-
stacle to exonomic growth presented by the exhaustion of 
known energy sources. contemporary writers, projecting 
this expectation further into the future, foresaw that the 
introduction of nuclear fusion would solve both the pro-
blem of the exhaustion of fossil fuels and the possible 
heal th and safety problems. ar.ising in connection wi th the 
use of fission, as well as other hitherto unknown techno-
logies lO • 
In this 'model' of the relationship between science, tech-
nological change, economic growth and social welfare, en-
ergy consumption played .an important !ole. We saw in chap-
ter 2 and 3 a general consensus dur ing the 1950-1970 pe-
riod about the close interrelationship between growth in 
energy consumption and economic growth. Growth. in energy 
consumption was both an indication of increased welfare 
and the precondition for economic growth. 
, ,t '. 
Later charges that tec~nological change in this period was 
.. ' autonomous' in the sense that it was not state control-. . 
ledll are somewhat beside the point. During the 1950s and 
1960s, the governments of Europe and the US were heavily 
involved· in science and technology. The, involvement,. how-
.. 
ever, did not seek to prevent any development, and. the 
state did not intervene in detailed choices of technology 
wi thin its policy areas . (e. g •. choice of energy producing 
technologies).; It would be more appropriate to say that 
state intervention was market-oriented in. this period. 
Governments. sought to ensure that. the precondi tions for 
technological progress were present by creating a favoura-
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ble climate for the processes of invention and innovation. 
For example several analyses were made in Britain between 
1955 and 1960 of the future need for scientific and engi-
neering manpower in order that sufficient resources were 
allocated for education and training12, and in Denmark, a 
technical-scientific research council (Danmarks teknisk-
videnskabelige Forskningsrad) was set up to monitor tech-
nical and related scientific research and the education of 
researchers: 
" ( ••• ) in order to support and coordinate the Danish 
contribution within these areas for the benefit of so-
ciety and its industry." (Lov om oprettelsen af det 
teknisk-videnskabelige forskningsrAd (Act on the crea-
tion of the technical-scientific research council) ci-
ted here from Sidenius (1984), p. 285). 
In'addition to this, subsidies were allocated for the de-
velopment of technological areas in which commitments had 
already been established, such as nuclear power and other 
technologies derived from military research, e.g. superso-
nic transport and space technology. These technologies 
wer~ regarded" as promising in terms of their potentials 
, ' 
for economic growth, national prestige, military advan-
tages over other parts of the world and not least in terms 
of the expected" technological • spill-over' to other sec-
tors. 
Later criticisms of this strategy have frequently ascribed 
it "to technological euphoria, e.g.' the abovementioned re-. 
port from the OECD observed that: 
"If the world was in trouble (the paragraph refers to 
the period' from 1961 to 1967) ,it was because it had 
too ,little, or, the wrong, kind, of science -or had not 
learned to use it effectively." (OECD, 1971, p. 39-40). 
Whether or not 
thoughts of the 
guessing, however, 
the creation of 
this 'is a precise 'description of - the 
decisionmakers we cannot say: beyond 
is the increase in R&D expenditure and 
" 
e.g~ state financed nuclear research 
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establishments in a number of countries including, Britain 
and Denmark. 
It would also not be true to say that the technological 
developments of the 1950s and 1960s were unplanned. On the 
contrary, as we saw to be the case in electricity produc-
tion, planning was a necessary accompanyment to increases 
in scale, and the introduction of new technologies had to 
be forecast in order that the existing networks could be 
adapted to it. This, however, was planning within the sin-
gle technology area, not to be mistaken for the ideas of 
comprehensive planning of the whole technology field which 
enters the political agenda by the end of the 1960s. 
I 
The. emphasis on advanced, .large scale technologies was a 
consequence of seeing technological change as a means to 
achieve economic growth and welfare was an emphasis on ad-
vanced, large scale technologies. This is a logical impli-
cation of emphasizing productivity and efficiency in rela-
tion to the specified target (the classical example here 
being 'putting a man on the moon'). With respect to energy 
we have already seen' that during the 1950s, a number of 
projects were ini tiated wi thin new technology fields. The 
nuclear power projects are conspicuous examples of state 
involvement in advanced technology, but we should not for-
get that projects investigating possible uses of wind and 
solar energy were also initiated in bdth Britain and Den-
mark. The' interest in. these projects waned during. the 
1960s parallel to the shift. observed by· the OECD from a 
period of "public faith in the efficacy of science, and 
high poli tical prestige of scientists ( ••• ) above all in 
the United Kingdom and the United States" (OECD, 1971, p. 
39) to a phase in which focus was more on allocation of 
resources and on'~he direct role of science and technology 
in economic growth. 
Hence, the 'technological change' which attracted politi-
cal attention during the 1950s and 1960s was of a particu-
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lar kind: it was rational, efficient, large scale, and 
prestigeous. I Technology optimism I was optimism related 
to specific technologies: nuclear power, automation, aero-
space, and electronics: Similarly, the science which was 
to be developed was first and foremost physics and related 
-, 
branches of science: chemistry, mathematics and -to a les-
ser extent - biology. At the same time as we note this 
trend in state involvement in technology, the idea that 
these technologies represented per se progress was re-
flected in the media. We have already seen in chapter 
three that the notion of progress in relation to technolo-
gy, esp. nuclear power, was utili zed in the public rela-
tions mater ial of the energy industr ies and nuclear lob-
bies~ Nuclear power in parti~ular seemed 
symbol of the prestigeous technologies13 
science, high risks and the promise of high 
suitable 
involving 
yields: 
as a 
high 
"The _ Sellafield Project is perhaps the most exci ting 
development in this country: it rises improbably on 
Cumbria's sea-fringe and even when shrouded in mist 
( ••• ) - the br illiant construction lights are a beacon 
seen from afar- a symbol of the future which is being 
made here today". (Leading article, The Times, 29. 
March 1950). 
Another characteristic of the 1950s and 1960s view -of 
science and technology was the expectation that the side-
effects, which would accompany technological change, would 
be mainly beneficial. Side-effects, or 'unintended effects, 
are effects which ar ise in addi tion to the pr imary, 'in-
tended' result or the main instrumental purpose of techno-
logy. ; For example, the main purpose of civil nuclear tech-
nology is production of electricity, an~ the main purpose 
of automation of coal production is increased productivity . ' 
in coal production. Emphasizing the economic dimension, 
'externalities' are costs or unintended effect benefits 
which accrue to other than those bearing the primary 
costs and benefi ts of a cer tain technology14. Using these 
terms it becomes clear that many of the expected benefits 
to'be derived from technological changes were in fact side 
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effects: putting men on the moon or producing electricity 
by means of nuclear fission was expected to produce a 
• spill-over' which could also be descr ibed as 'external 
benef its': sc ient i f ic prog ress, economic growth, national 
prestige. As we saw in chapter two, besides the general 
expectations of economic growth created by technological 
change, each political group was convinced that technolo-
gical change could bring particular benefi ts to its mem-
bers. For example, it was generally expected that new 
technologies would increase productivity by replacing wor-
kers with machines. Generally, this was interpreted as an 
unmi tigated blessing. But it was also interpreted posi-
tively by particular groups. For example, neither the 
trade unions of Britain nor .of Denmark protested against 
rationalisation, as long as new, jobs were available: on 
the contrary, the new technologies seemed'to offer poten-
tials for a general upgrading of the skills and wages of 
the working class. 
This does not mean that nobody was aware of the possibili-
ty of adverse consequences of the technological develop-
ments. Concern about the negative side-effects of nuclear 
power raised from two different constituencies: single 
scientists working in the field and having _ direct, expe-
rience with the technology and people directly affected by 
the effects of large scale technological developments. For 
example, in 1950 plans for opencast coal mining were op-
posed by the inhabitants of Worcester, who feared that 10-
cal"farmland would be damaged and the water supply pollu-
ted15 : in 1955 th~ united Kingdom Atomic Energy Authority 
had to change its plans of disposing for radioactive mate-
> .'
rials in disused mines in Gloucestershire because of local 
protests16 • 
But although the fire in the experimental reactor at Wind-
scale in 1957 "caused" considerable shock, both inside and 
outside the Author i ty" (Uni ted Kingd,om ,~tomic Energy Au-
thority, 1979, II, p.13) and although Wynne (1982) 
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observes, that the subsequent milk ban caused "growing 
disquiet", there is no evidence of any sizeable public 
concern in relation to the issue, in fact Wynne also ob-
serves, that the only criticism over radioactivity levels 
and standards came from two scientists, one of whom worked 
-, 
at Calder Hall. 
On . the basis of these observations of the character of 
concern about the negative external effects of technolo-
gies, we find it warranted to· conclude that such concern 
in the period was limited in more than one sense. Firstly, 
it was limited to those who had a first hand experience of 
a particular, technology, ei ther by being involved in the 
development of that technology or by being directly af-
fected by one' or more. of its physical consequences; se-
condly, it was not concern about' 'technology' in general 
or 'negative external effects of technologies' in general. 
It was concrete concerns related to effects which were 
either known to occur and known to be dangerous or'effects 
which were directly experienced as negative (the milk 
ban). It was suggested afterwards that in the case of nu-
clear power this 'lack of concern' about negative externa-
.lities was the result of the secrecy involved and the cen-
tral role of experts which were at the same time employees 
in the nuclear industry, the result being a manipulated 
public: 
".There was thus a tight social network controlling the 
public interpretation of science in this field." (Wyn-
ne, 1982, p. 23). 
. 
There is no doubt' that the nuclear project w~s kept se-
cret. The interesting point is not whether or 'not this w~s 
the case, but r~ther whether it mattered to' the public 
concerned.' The above quotation by Wynne suggests that pu-
blic concern is ever' latent, and that it ca'n be manipula-
ted and suppressed by powerful groups in society in con-
trol of the media. We think that this is an insufficient 
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explanation for reasons which will be thoroughly 
discussed in the following chapter, but a few points can 
be made at this stage. The extreme secrecy involved in the 
early nuclear project and other projects of military 
origin were not generally characteristic of technological .. 
developments during th 1950s and 1960s. On the contrary, 
we have seen that the energy industr ies made available 
technical information about other technologies for energy 
production and distribution. But also among these 
technologies were some that were later identified as 
sources of negative effects, as we shall shortly see. 
Furthermore the cr i ticisms (of nuclear as well as coal-
based technologies) appear only in the 1970s in spite of 
the public having had full access to any_ necessary infor-
mation about the technicalities of e1ectr ici ty supply for 
decades. This seems to confirm that there was no latent 
concern to suppress by means of the secrecy surrounding 
nuclear power. In fact, Wynne appears to modify the 'con-
spiracy-thesis' when he observes that the 1950s were cha-
racterized by "a euphoric climate" of rapid growth (p.17), 
and later that. "Science, and atomic energy in particular 
possessed unprecedented political status' and national 
prestige." (p.20). So whereas the evidence is ;inconclusive 
when it comes-to assessing the reactions of the public to 
the new technologies of the 1950s and 1960s,-we can con-
clude that at the policy level, negative external effects 
were not given much attention, and" no available evidence 
indicates that any concern existed about the issue nei-
ther in the public nor in political groups. 
As regard the expected benefits from t~chnological change 
in the' energy' sector, the introduction of " nuclear: power 
and 'extension of ~lectricity supply w~s 'gen~r~lly believed 
to contribute to a 'cleaner. environment. In Britain, the 
exper~e~ce of 'local pOll~tio~ fr~m open boal fires leading 
to the, Clean Air Act of 1955 naturally, focused -,- att~ntion 
on technoiogies'~~ich c~uld be ieen tdsolv~ this proble~: 
In Denmark, owing partly to the smaller', size of cities, 
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partly to the early introduction of district heating, air 
pollution was not for the major i ty a direct exper ience, 
and. the argument that nuclear power and electr ici ty were 
'clean' forms of energy was not very important until pol-
lution from the collective supply systems began to affect 
people more directly. 
Another expected benef,i t of adopting new and more effi-
cient technologies for energy production was the resulting 
abili ty to utilize hitherto unavailable resources, or us-
ing the existing ones more efficiently. As we have seen, 
energy. policies were aimed at expanding supply, and in 
this perspective, the consumption of energy resource was 
I 
crucial insofar as it represented a physical constraint on 
this expansion. Therefore one role of the new technologies 
was to push forwards the resource limit or even get rid of 
it, as it was expected the development of fusion power 
would. 
A somewhat different dimension of the 1950s' and 1960s' 
view of the role of technology in society shall be briefly 
mentioned because it appeared as a target for criticism in 
the 1970s debate on technology. We are talking here of the 
transfer of scientific models of problem-resolution to de-
cisionmaking in areas . of social and political problems. 
Both. Winner (1977) and Petersen (1985) point to a remark-
able interest amongst poli tical and s'ocial scientists. in 
developing methods of rational decisionmaking during. the 
1950s and 1960s. Citing contemporary political philosophy, 
Petersen is able to conclude: 
"The way we handle technology is simply influencing our 
notions about the ways in which other fields ought to 
and should be, handled. We are able to deduce from cy-
bernetics to society and, Etzioni, to propose· gran-
diose solutions as to how the active society might 
work. This transfer or contamination from natural 
scientific and technological thinking also led to con-
ceptual exclusion of problems, solutions and alterna-
tives which could not be dealt with as a consequence of 
the new, stringent demands on the (social and politi-
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cal, T.A) sciences." (Petersen, 1985, pp. 244-245). 
Our findings affirm this interpretation as regards energy 
policy. In chapter two we saw that the objectives of the 
energy pOlicies of the 1950s and 1960s were to develop me-
~hods and techniques that would ensure that energy supply 
would at any time be able to meet a demand which was in-
terpreted as autonomous in relation to national poli tics. 
within this general framework we found a shift in the em-
phasis from the early 1950s, when physics and atomic tech-
nology were expected to contribute directly to solving so-
cial problems, to themid-1960s when forecasting and plan-
nirig increasingly came int6 prominence, indicating a 
transfer of scientific ideas and methods into energy poli-
/ 
tical decisionmaking • 
.. ' 
Summary: the 1950s and Early 1960s 
During the 1950s and early 1960s, the effects of applying 
technology to an increasing number of problems in society 
were predominantly expected to be positive. These expecta-
tions included technology in general, not just energy 
technologies, and they were·common to the whole OECD area 
including Britain or Denmark. Looking at science and tech-
nology policy and keeping in mind the problem def ini tions 
and policy solutions of the political groups identified in 
chapter two,· we found that at least among these groups, a 
considerable degree of consensus could be identified about 
the desirability of an accelerated development of natural 
science' and science-related technologies and the increased 
application of technology in all areas of society. Effects 
of 'science and technology which were identified as posi-
tive were intim~tely bound up with economic growth, and 
technological change r was generally thought to support 
economic growth. Different political groups identified 
different effects of economic growth and technological 
change as positive. The labour movement and the socialist 
- 265 -
and social democratic parties emphasized the potential for 
redistribution and the possible elimination of certain 
types of jobs. The conservative parties, on the other 
hand, saw technological change as a benefit to industry 
but also as a guarantee of social welfare. What is impor-
tant to note here, however, is that all groups in society 
seemed in this period to agree on the desirability of a 
development in which science and technology was to play an 
increasingly important role. The negative effects of 
science and technology were only identified by individuals 
or groups who were either scientists, directly involved in 
research in the fields which were generally portrayed as 
prestigious, or citizens who experienced directly the 
visual impact of, or environmental pollution from, large-
scale technological developments. But such experiences 
were not reflected by the political groups or in official 
policy statements where optimism reigned: they were still 
. . 
isolated experiences and could still be interpreted as se-
parate and special problems, not inherent to economic 
growth or 'technology'. 
" 
5.3 The Early 1970s: New Problems are Identified 
The (apparent) consensus did not last for more than appro-
ximately two decades: towards the end of the 1960s, the 
negati ve effects' of science and technology' began to make 
themselves felt. This phenomenon has been observed in most 
later· political writing on technology and society. Offi-
cial .' policy', statements on science and technology policy 
from the earlyl970s referred to the em~rgence of new pro-
blems in relation to' science and technology-as a major 
reason for the: need to develop new' forms of science and 
technology policy, including increased social control of 
technological change., In the 1971 OECD report on 'Science, 
Growth and Society' it was observed that although high le-
vels of economic achievements based on technological ad-
vances had produced widespread prosperity, they had alter-
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ed "man's environment and his working conditions" (OECD, 
1971, p.ll). As a result, new problems faced the political 
decisionmakers: 
"Today poli ticians and the public are more cr i tical of 
demands for further expansion (in allocation of funds 
for R&D, T.A.) and are seriously concerned by actual 
and potential undesi rable "side effects" of scienti f ic 
and technological developments." (OECD, 1971, p.ll). 
In this statement there is still some doubt about the sig-
nificance of these 'side-effects'. Two years later, howe-
ver, there was no doubt: in 1973, Francois Hetman in a re-
port to the OEeD on technology assessment was less ambi-
guous on these matters. He observed that an expansion pe-
r iod in pcience and technology had come to an end, and 
that legislators and the public questioned both the costs 
and ·benefits of research but also the very objectives of 
the scientific/technological venture. As for the reason 
for this, there was no doubt: 
"The unwanted· and often unforeseen side effects of 
technology are clearly manifest: ( ••• )". (Hetman, 1973, 
p. 5). 
This signals the beginning of a criticism of science and 
technology which was founded in the observation that 
rapid technological change had had unwanted effects. What 
had become of the optimism of the 1950s and 1960s? 
We . have already observed that single scientists, espe-
cially physicists and atomic scientists, back in the 1950s 
voice~ s~me concern about the application of research~ and 
that these concerns were limited to military technology on 
one hand and civil nuclear power on the other. At the root 
of these concerns were <two entirely different sets of is-
sues. Firstly ~ the et,hical and philosophical questions in-
volved in the development and subsequent use on human be-
ings of atomic weapons after 1945, caused a large number 
of scientists to question the role of scientists in the 
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development of mili tary technology. The secrecy involved 
in nuclear projects was heavily criticized, and the close 
relationship between civil and military development of 
atomic technology meant that this cr i tique was applied to 
civil projects as well 17 • Secondly, when the civil pro-
., 
jects were well underway, critiques were raised about the 
safety of the power plants. At least some atomic scien-
tists were less sanquine than the edi tors of The Times 
who in a leading article in the early years of civil nu-
clear power confidently proclaimed that: 
"The technical problem of nuclear power production is 
solved. No major difficulties are seen from the stand-
point of safety or that of disposal of radioactive 
waste. Nuclear power now mo~es out of the realm of in-
vention into that of ordinary commercial economics -the 
realm in which the questions are not 'how' and 
'whether', but 'how much' and 'how soon'." (The Times, 
16 February 1955). 
The same year, the President of the British Association 
for the Advancement of Science in a speech to the British 
Rotary Club18 warned that the multiplication of power 
plants' of the current design was premature unless these 
plants were needed for military purposes. Also, the Wind-
scale accident in 1957 and the subsequent inquir ies .re-
vealed that a number of scientists felt concerned about 
the practical handling of safety, the setting of standards 
for radiation and finally the poli tical demand made on 
them' to arrive at certain conclusions regarding the ha-
zards connected to radiation19 • 
It has' been suggested that these concerns were systema-
tically suppressed by the state, the me~ia anfr the nuclear 
industry in unison 20 ; and that the single scientists soon 
gave up their involve~ent faced wi th the tempting career 
prospects offered by the military-industrial complex 21 • 
But these suggestions do not contribute to explaining why 
technology did actually come to the fore as a' poli tical 
problem around 1970. If a power-elite had successfully 
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suppressed any concern about technology up till then, why 
did they suddenly stop doing it and by so doing, opened up 
a wave of cr i ticism and public scrutiny ? In order to 
begin answering this sort of question, we shall have to 
have a closer look' at the cr i ticism of technology: Who 
-voiced it and on behalf of whom? And what exactly were the 
nature of these negative side-effects of technology? 
Towards the end of the 1960s, as we have seen earlier, ,the 
abili ty to achieve continuous economic growth was being 
seriously taxed by national economic problems in both Bri-
tain and Denmark. The laissez-faire policies of the pre-
vious decades were identified as the sources of obstacles 
to future growth: inflation, ,_ Itrade defici ts, bottlenecks 
in particular sectors. In this si tuation the first plan-
ning oriented energy policies emerged. These policies were 
indicative of attempts to solve the economic problems by 
replacing the apparently insufficient market mechanisms by 
deliberate control. The future, it seemed, no longer took 
care of itself. Looking into policies for science and 
technology, we find the same tendency: it was increasingly 
thought necessary to forecast future trends in order to 
identify and, if possible, avoid future obstacles and 
disadvantages, just like it was thought possible to iden-
tify and support those trends that would benefit the eco-
nomy22. ,', Like the laissez faire, policies, the freedom, to 
inv_ent and develop was identified as a source of pro-
blems. Hence the OECD, in a report in 1967 on technologi-
cal forecasting observed: 
"Technological forecasting is a major input and - in 
. ,view of the potential harmful effects of new technolo-
gies generated at the present. pace and implying in-
creasingly far-reaching consequences is perhaps of 
foremost concern." (Jantsch,;1967, p.1S). 
r 
The exact nature of' these harmful consequences was not 
spe1t out in any detail in the report, but we can get some 
hints from its proposa1~ for objectives~ subject are~s and 
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methods for technological forecasts. It is pointed out 
that in "areas such as health, urbanization, and crime 
prevention", it might be desirable to make assessments of 
cost/effecti veness for social goals. This indicates tha t 
these were problem areas which were seen to be connected 
to the unrestricted process of technological change. 
Still, however, it was believed, that the application of 
science and technology, in the form of forecasting techni-
ques and rational decisionmaking could solve these pro-
blems, and although it was conceded that "the selection of 
goals is the most difficult task for social technology" 
(Jantsch, 1967,p. 91. Emphasis in original), was not 
thought inconceivable 23 • 
I 
only a few years later, the problems appeared on the one 
hand, more clear-cut and precisely defined, but on the 
other hand analysts of technology policy were less opti-
mistic as to what could be achieved merely through the ap-
plication of new methods and techniques in planning based 
on comprehensive forecasting: 
"Technology creates all sorts of economic, social, and 
"environmental problems. In conjunction with its obvious 
and oft-praised benefits, technology has transformed 
regional into national and supernational economies, 
modified or destroyed. social and political institu-
tions, and been the direct cause of massive environmen-
tal deterioration. All this is now widely recognized." 
(Mitcham and Mackey, 1972, p.l). 
Let us· examine one by one the problems that were identi-
fied as being conseque.nces of technology, directly or in-
directly, by the OECD policymakers, and compare this to 
the contemporary poli tical-philosophical critiques of 
technology to see if we can identify the new problems that 
had apparently emerged since the mid-1960s. 
, 
"Faith in economic growth has been replaced by a feel-
ing of unease in the face of the prospects opened by it 
and has been shown to be insufficient in itself to re-
spond to the aspiration of mankind for a better way of 
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life. What is more, far from bringing only benefits, it 
is accompanied by more or less traumatic effects". 
(DECO, 1971, p. 26) 
At the general level, economic growth aided by technology 
had not brought with it the expected welfare in the west-
ern world. Hetman (1973) observed: 
"Contrary to the belief in the genuine beneficial in-
fluence of technology on economy, economic problems do 
not disappear but are shifted if not exacerbated, by 
the emergence of new urgent issues. In modifying econo-
mic structure in an assymetr ic way and more rapidly 
than can be understood and accepted in social terms, 
technological change intensifies rather than diminishes 
the urgency of economic problems. " (Hetman, 1973, 
p.43). / 
In ,particular, the benefits arlslng from technological 
spill-over from a military scientific establishment taking 
up a still larger proportion of available resources was 
questioned 24 • The increasing amount of commodi ties avail-
able to consumers - an important aspect of economic growth 
- was thought a mixed blessing 25 because, although the 
single consumer may benefit by access to a more varied se-
lection of goods, it may be at the expense of the dete-
rioration of the general living conditions of himself and 
others 26 • All in all, it was argued, the increase in per 
capi ta GNP had not led to proportional increases in wel-
fare1 for example, it was suggested that 
,"( ••• ) among the residents of central cities, the,dete-
rioration of urban mass transportation may represent a 
more serious decrease in living standard than the abi-
'lity to purchase a television set represents an in-
crease." (OECD, 1971, p.26). 
More specifically, it was suggested that the growth pro-
cess,produced side-effects "of a highly non-linearcharac-
ter, appear ing rapidly and creating a new collective need 
, , 
for their abatement and control, often with' almost a 
threshold effect" (op.cit. p.28). It is these side-effects 
that were often seen as the result of the application of 
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technology in the growth process, and were most often re-
ferred to as the reason why social control of technology 
should be attempted 27 . 
Economic growth came under criticism from other sides dur-
ing these years. The 'Limits to Growth' debate 28 followed 
the publication of 'Limi ts to Growth' 29 and 'A Bluepr int 
for Survival'30 in 1972. It is well worth noting, that 
these studies were published only after a concern about 
economic growth was being picked up by agencies like the 
OECD. It is also noticeable that theoretical critiques of 
technology linking technological change to the structure 
of capi talist economic growth only surfaces later still. 
Whereas the environmental pfoblems had been discussed 
since th~ late 1960s, it was only in 1974 when David Dick-
son wrote 'Alternative Technology30 that the link was made 
in theory between these problems and the economic and 
technological growth processes. As, is evident, the pro-
blems identified in relation to economic growth did not in 
themselves indicate a special role for technology in 
creating these problems. We shall therefore have to' look 
more ~losely into the issues which pointed to technologi-
cal change as a main cause. . It' is worth noting, that con-
cern, about the effects of economic growth was already 
showing in the policy documents of a high-level body like 
the OECD when these studies were published, so the studies 
cannot have inspired those documents. Furthermore, whereas 
the policy documents clearly linked economic growth, tech-
'nology change and unwanted effects, it would yet be some 
years before philosophical critiques linking economic pro-
cessesto technological change and discussing the possibi~ 
lities of creating an 'alternative technology' began3l • 
The most-important set of problems were related to'the en-
vironment •. Pollution of the environment: was mentioned-as a 
ser ious side effect of economic growth by the OECD . in 
1970, and a year later environmental pollution wasidenti-
fiedasone ofa number of-
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"( ••• ) cumulative effects resulting from technical 
choices and mass production, themselves the result of 
adopting efficiency and economy as the sole criteria of 
desirable growth." (OECD, 1971, pp. 30-31) 
Hetman (1973) ascribes "the obvious pollution and general 
environmental degradation" (p.5) to technology: and pro-
tection of the environment and nature is among the four 
most important priorities for science and technology poli-
cy defined by the EEC.33 
As we have seen, pollution was by no means a new and un-
known problem in the late 1960s. Among other things, the 
production of energy had for some years created problems 
in . relation to air pollution / and also large-scale inci-
dents like the Windscale fire had occurred causing a con-
siderable impact on the environment. Further back still, 
Dickson (1974) mentions examples of major environmental 
problems arising before Christ -in connection with de-
forestation in the Middle East. 
Also public concern about the environment is not a new 
phenomenon as observed by Cotgrove (1976, 1978, 1982)~ 
Lowe and Goyder (1983): and Q'Riordan (1981). All of these 
authors agree, however, that there has been an upsurge of 
in environmental interest since the late 1960s. For in-
stance, Lowe and. Goyder, investigating the dates of the 
formation of British environmental groups, found that 
whereas-six such groups were founded between 1946 and 1955 
. and eleven between 1956 and 1965, the- number rose to 22 
between 1966 and 1975, and the -character of the groups 
changed. Whereas the early groups were mainly concerned 
wi th - ameni ty or _ conservation, often in terms of species 
protection or protection of particular types of habitat, 
the new'groups concerned themselves more often with issues 
ranging across a wider field of questions related to the 
environment, and in particular there was an upsurge of in-
terest in issues related to reS9urces and to environmental 
pollution34 .Sandbach (1981) quotes British and American 
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studies of public concern about the environment showing a 
sharp increase in media interest in environmental issues 
from 1969-72 followed by a slow decline. Sandbach conclu-
des that the results of content analysis of selected news-
papers do not necessar ily reflect a genuine public con-
cern, as the political stance of any newspaper is bound to 
influence the weighting of issues within that paper. 
Whereas we shall not in this place enter into the dis-
cussion of the role of the media in creating public opi-
nion, in casu public concern about the environment, it is 
beyond doubt that the media and certain political agencies 
referred to such a concern as one of the motives for dis-
cussing these issues. Pollution, together wi th the other 
side effects of growth and technological changes, "arouse 
discontent that is not expressed in precise alternative 
concepts of the types of environment ( ••• ) desired." 
(OECD, 1971, p.660). Somewhat less precisely, Hetman 
(1973) referred to 'charges' against technology: 
"Technology is charged wi th a savage exploi ta tion of 
'nature and a respectless misinterpretation of freedom 
to use natural resources and to consider the planet as 
an'object to dominate." (Hetman, 1973, p.34). 
This suggests that the emerging environmental concern was 
thought to be so widespread and serious as to demand poli-
tical attention. At the same time both the reports indica-
te. that this concern itself represented an incorrect or 
overly negative interpretation of the ability of the ,poli-
,tical system to handle environmental problems. This does 
not imply, however, that the existence or severity of en-
vironmental problems was denied by the.OECD: they are just 
interpreted differently. Thus, it is admitted-that 
, "Many. aspects of developed societies are approaching a 
condition that may be described as the precursor of sa-
turation, in the sense that things cannot go on growing 
much longer in some lines without reaching fairly fun-
damental limi ts. Indications of saturation are present 
total population, pollution of the environment, in the 
size of urban conglomerations, in traffic, in informa-
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tion overload impinging on the individual, even in hig-
her education and perhaps, in the view of some people, 
in the production of knowledge." (OECD, 1971, p. 21). 
But it is impor tant to note that in add i t ion to these 
'fairly fundamental' limi ts, the environmental problem as 
seen from the policy-making bodies had two dimensions: the 
physical problem itself on the one hand, and the public 
concern about this problem on the other. 
Closely related to environmental problems, resources were 
identified as a major problem area. The resource area was 
considered a top priority in the EEC science and technolo-
gy policy strategy as a problem that should be considered 
I 
in drafting an OECD policy for science and technology35. 
Again, t;o dimensions of the resource problem were addres-
sed:· the problems raised by the accelerating use of raw 
mater ials on the one hand, and the public perception of 
this problem on the other. For example, Hetman (1973), 
while observing that "the depletion of natural resources 
through the unheeding exploitation of nature" (p.33) was 
mentioned as one unfortunate consequence of technological 
change, did not see this as a real problem. This conclu-
sion was built on the observation that in the past a major 
role of technology had been to create new resources· and 
helping to exploit the tradi tional ones. We have seen, 
however, that in the energy sector, where the effects of 
resource shortages (if not absolute, then in effect) had 
been experienced during the war, there was considerable 
concern both within the industries and governments to seek 
to avoid future resource shortages by promoting technolo-
gies which would use new resources. .This concern, while 
not· ini tially very strong, was strengthened considerably 
in the face of. a threatening oil shortage and the expe-
rience:of rapid price ~ises. 
Another problem that could be ascr ibed to technological 
change· and economic growth was the danger of increasing 
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unemployment. Whereas the environmental and resource pro-
blems as mentioned above were cited as major problems re-
lated to technology by the OECD in the early 1970s, this 
was not the case with unemployment. This may immediately 
seem paradoxical, as the main purpose of applying techno-
logy in production throughout history has been that of in-
creasing eff iciency by replacing human labour wi th 
(quicker, more eff icient) machines. Looking into the phi-
losophical 1i terature on aspects' of technological change 
during the period, we find that while this aspect has 
certainly not been overlooked, very different conclusions 
have been drawn from it. In the more speculative writing 
of • commentators such as Williams (1955) and Gabor (1963) 
observations of the increasing/displacement of labour were 
coupled with the prevailing expectations for unlimited 
economic growth. The resu1 t was predictions for 'the Ie i-
sure society , in which, the a'uthors feared,' there would 
be a danger of widespread existential problems because 
some people ~ou1d not be . able to derive meaning from a 
life in leisure. We can safely say, that these predictions 
proved wrong in failing to'identify one of the most impor-
tant social problems of the'1970s:unemp1oyment. 
How com~, then, that the OECD reports which, as we shall 
see later propos~d evaluation of·' technology on the basis 
.' . 
of an assessment of the whole range of consequences, over-
looked the employment consequences of technology? Firstly, 
whenthe'OECD ~eports'were ~ritten in~1971 and 1973,unem-
'p1oyment' was not yet a large problem. Secondly, ·we o b"': , 
served ". ~bovethat an 'important dimension of the' problems 
. related to resources and the environment was the public 
concern pushing these problems to the fore. ~ But in 1971 . . - . 
and 1972, direct individual experiences arising from unem-
~ . ' 
ployment were as yet ,relatively few and scattered, while 
the effects on the, environment were beginning to make 
themselves felt. Later, in 1975, in a framework fo; evalu-
ation 'oftechno1~gy assessment projects, pr~~ented by 'the 
OECD it was stated that a particularly important aspect in 
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any assessment of technology was to consider impacts on 
employment opportunities 36 , and in 1977 the EEC under a 
programme for industrial research gave priority to 
projects which would contribute to the creation of job op-
portuni ties in' industry37. But by this time, the effects 
- of growing unemployment was not a prediction but an expe-
rience in Western Europe. Even so, in policies for energy 
technology considerations of employment effects were not 
made until some years later. We must conclude that, in re-
ali ty, technology' assessments only" considered already ex-
per ienced effects of particular types of technology. The 
capacity to foresee new types of consequences, which is so 
crucial to the technology assessment concept, was in' rea-
" 
lity non-existent. . I 
Another type of side-effect was the risk~ to life 
presented 'by the operation of particular technological 
installations (most prominently nuclear power plant and 
chemical factor ies) as' well' as by the' problems resulting 
from mass use of technologies: Road accidents, air plane 
accidents etc.) ~ Again, what mattered most to the policy 
makers of the OECD was the social acceptability of risks; 
The OECD observed that technological progress inevi tably 
involved some level of risk, and that for some reason 
widely different standards applied as to the social 
acceptability of these risks: 
"For example, every developed nation accepts an 
'enormous annual death toll from motor-car accidents, 
but views wi th great alarm the possible damage from 
low-level radiation; from nuclear power plants."· (OECD, 
1971, p. 77). ' 
We saw earlier that the question of' safety in nuclear 
operations was considered an important problem by the 
anti-nuclear, movement: ~he word 'safety' was used loosely 
to ~ea~'saf~ty'against a number of possible risks associa-
ted with using nuclear technology: health hazards to wor-
;, 
kers, operational risks, (accidents wi th consequences for 
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the local community and the environment), and risks aris-
ing in the associated operations: fuel production repro-
cessing, and transport (including the possibi1i ty of ter-
rorists acquiring radioactive materials for use in acts of 
political terror). 
The quotation above indicates that a certain irrationality 
seems to guide public acceptance of different kinds of 
risk38 • But in addition we have observed that, at least 
until recently, the safety of other forms of energy tech-
nology than nuclear power was not an issue commanding nei-
ther public nor po1i tical interest save trade union de-
mands for safety in mines. Also, as observed by the OECD, 
obj ecti vely very dangerous and heal th-threa tening techno-
logies (like the car) have not been the subject of public 
debate to the extent that nuclear power has. In relation 
to nuclear power, the question of safety was only raised 
by anti-nuclear groups in the early 1970s, at a time when 
the industry and government had for quite a long time been 
aware of the costs arising from the risks, and had 
established institutions to deal with them. The novel 
aspect of the 'risk' discussion was that 'risk/safety' at 
a general level was seen as a problem associated with all 
kinds of .technology. 
The development of certain technologies was also seen to 
cause problems in relation to social .integration. The OECD 
observed that: 
"In human relations, conflict and misunderstanding are 
evident between generations, between labour and manage-
ment, and between the academic, corporate, and govern-
ment segments of society. These conflicts-arise in part 
from genuine divergence of interest and values, in-part 
because the very size of institutions and groups tends 
to restrict··communication outside of particular groups, 
in spite of the in6reased ease of communication."(OECD, 
1971, p.19). 
This. problem was seen to be exacerbated by the trend to-
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wards large corporations and bureaucracies which organised 
work in such a way as to maximize control and predictabi-
lity for the organisation, and the OECD feared that this 
trend would fur ther strengthen "social atti tudes of the 
Luddite type, hostile to technology and to technology 
decision-making in general." (OECD, 1978, p.29). 
In relation to energy, this type of effect began to show . . 
in the mid-1970s when the anti-nuclear group increasingly 
focused their critique on the inertia in the political 
economic, and technical institutions making up the 'energy 
establishment'. The groups, who had 'tried to influence 
energy policy, had increasingly' had to confront the fai-
lure of their attempts to cQnvince governments that the 
traditional energy strategies were irrational. A search 
~, . 
began for reasons for this, and this search was parallel-
led with a preoccupation among a certain' group of theo-
rists e.g. Winner (1977) with the' idea of imperatives in-
-~ . : :. 
he rent in the technologies of contemporary societies: 
"Technological imperatives appear' in public delibera-
tions as generalized 'needs' or 'requirements' - for 
example, the need for an increasing supply of electri-
cal'power - which justify the maintenance and extension 
of highly costly sociotechnical networks." '(Winner, 
1977, p •. 259). 
,;~ " 
The abovementioned problems all had to do with the finan-
cial and political dysfunctions - loss. of investment, pu-
bl~c protests - which had been side-effects of technologi-
. cal development dur ing ,the per iod of economic growth. But 
in addition came the problem complex or syndrome resulting 
from all these problems,occurring at the same time. Deci-
sion-makers began to worry about the possible consequences 
of the growing public mistrust in science and technology:. 
"Scientific research became associated in the minds of 
many with war, and with environmental and socialdegra-
dation resulting from large-scale application of tech-
nology. ( ••• ) Interestingly enough, the' attack ,on 
science and technology came from both right and left. 
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From the right they were viewed as wasteful pastimes of 
scientists of doubtful value to industrial development, 
from the left as instruments of economic and military 
domination and irrrelevant to the pressing social pro-
blems of the day. High-technology industry was regarded 
as regressive in its impact on income distribution, and 
science itself anti-egalitarian in its organisation and 
mores. Economic growth ceased to be regarded as an un-
mixed blessing." (OECD, 1971, p. 40). 
In this way, the OECD summed up the observed 'disenchant-
ment'. Three things may be noted in this connection: 1) 
it was suggested that the disenchant was associated with 
the large-scale application of technologies; 2) the dis-
enchantment seems to have been connected to particular 
types of technology: when it was' suggested that science 
I 
and technology was viewed by" the right as wasteful pas-
times of ~ scientists, it, is obvious that the charges were 
, ' , 
not against those technologies that could immediately be 
seen to be of direct use in the production process, just 
like it was suggested that the disenchantment of the left 
was closely related to 'high-technology'; 3) the disen-
chantment with science and technology was thought' to 
spr ing from the same source as the disenchantment wi th 
" ., 
economic growth. It is evident from the followingOECD 
reports on technology that this diffuse disenchantmentre-. ' . 
presented a serious problem to the decisionmakers.' The 
first chapter in the first comprehensive report on techno-
logy' a;sessment 39 was devoted to "Disenchantment' with 
Technology.and Technological Progress". A distinct uncer-. " . ~ 
tainty . characterized the interpretation of this 'disen-
'chantment' at this stage: 
"What are these attitudes?, As. far as the public at 
large is concerned, they are practically unknown and 
what can be learned by bribes about reactions to speci-
fic projects is confusing and contradictory." (Hetman, 
1973, p.2l).~ . , . 
With respect to energy' technology and energy R&D~ we have 
seen that a comprehensive criticism of the role of science 
in'~~eating problems e.g. in relation'to nuclear power on-
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ly occurred in the mid-1970s. This means that the oil 
crisis and the establishment of energy policy as an impor-
tant element in public policy preceded coherent expres-
sions of discontent with science and technology. Before 
that time the 'discontent' existed only to decisionmakers 
~ interpretations behind the motives of isolated actions and 
protests against particular technological developments and 
demands from groups li~e Friends of the Earth that long-
term environmental and social considerations should re-
place short-term economic rationality on the other. 
Both the increased economic and political signif icance of 
unwanted side-effects of technology and the fear of grow-
ing public discontent interpreted by decisionmakers as re-
sults of ~inability in the part to control technology. It 
was observed that in the past science and technology po-
licies had merely managed to underpin a technological de-
velopment which increasingly had produced negative ef-
fects. The hope that a free development of science and 
technology would aid the fulfilling of the aspirations of 
all social groups in the industralized world had not come 
true,' on the contrary, it had created serious problems. In 
this light, the sum of problems could be interpreted as 
one administrative problem: that of control: 
"As technology is directed more towards the solution of 
,problems that have large social and administrative com-
ponents, the autonomous approach to technology is even 
less appropriate today than it was in the 1960s." 
, (OECD, 1971, p. 45). 
The tools which had been developed towards the end of the 
1960s to deal with the emerging uncertainties accompanying 
technological change, e.g. technological forecasting and 
systems analysis, were now criticized for having severe 
r 
limitations .under conditions of technical uncertainty, 
conflicting goals, 0 and implici t non-scientific" value 
judgements 40 • It was now realized that the problems ,in 
controlling technology were more complex and had strong 
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political dimensions. The borderline between technology 
and politics was getting blurred. 
Summary: the early 1970s. 
using the succession of issues in OECD reports on science 
and technology policy as an indicator of problems in rela-
tion to technology, we found that in the years immediately 
after 1970 a growing realization that 'laissez-faire' 
technology increasingly produced problems which were left 
for governments or supra-national poli tical insti tutions 
to solve: 
/ 
- economic growth had led to increased prosperity but not 
to . increased welfare, and had increased the pressure on 
governments for 'non-market' commodities. This situation 
was exacerbated by the unexpected effects created by 
large-scale application of certain technologies. 
- . the positive side-effects of technological change had 
failed to appear. For example, the spill-over from milita-
ry and aerospace technology had not led to the expected 
advances in civil technology. Instead, the technologies 
developed -.during the 1950s and 1960s were seen to. give 
rise to large costs to society in relation to the environ-
ment, resources, employment, social integration, and gene-
ral public mistrust in science and technology. 
Taken together, these problems were interpreted by the 
OECD decisionmakers as reasons for extending the public 
control of technology. 
with respect to energy technologies, of the above problem 
areas only the-environmental effects of energy production 
and risks arising ~rom the use of nuclear power received 
any attention before the oil cr isis. These problems had, 
. as we saw in chapter three, been raised by groups like 
Friends of the Earth. Earlier we have termed the emergence 
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of new groups and issues' the politicization of energy'. 
Now we see that demands that energy policy should take 
into consideration the results of using specific types of 
technology were parallelled by a widespread recognition 
that economic growth and technological progress had failed 
'. to redeem the 1950s promises of a future in abundance. 
If, as we have suggested, changes in state energy policy 
reflect actions by poli tical groups in society, then we 
would expect that this 'politicization of technology' 
would have influenced the assumptions underlying state 
energy policy before the oil crisis. In chapter two we ob-
served that around 1970, state energy policy was intensi-
f ied in both countr ies, albeJ, t most markedly in Br i tain. 
This observation alone, however, is not sufficient to 
establish whether these changes were influenced by the po-
Ii ticization of technology. Before this can be done, we 
need to look at the development after the oil crisis, in 
particular we shall have a look at the new policies and 
methods that were introduced: could they be seen as at-
tempts, to solve the problems related to technology? We 
shall seek to gauge the impact of the oil cr isis and its 
effects on the technological strategies of energy policy 
in order to evaluate it against the impact of technologi-
cal effects against. Finally we shall discuss some of the 
'paths not taken': the alternatives and utopias which re-
p~esent different attempts to develop the critique of 
technology into coherent alternatives for social develop-
ment. 
5~4Remedies against Technological Problems. -
"Change ~annot be left to follow the logic of technolo-
gy alone: society must adapt itself, both to moderate 
innovation according to' needs and to avoid undesirable 
side-effects." (OECD, 1971, p.77). 
According to the OECD reports, and to the hordes of mode1-
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builders attempting to provide new tools for decisionmak-
ing in this field 41 , what was needed was new instruments 
which would allow social goals to be impressed on techno-
logical change. Let us therefore have a look at these new 
instruments which were adopted in state energy policy and 
discuss the assumptions on which they were founded. 
until the late 1960s, ,government attempts to control the 
negative side-effects of technology were clearly identifi-
able as reactions to isolated and well-defined problems 
whose solution depended on state intervention. For exam-
pIe, the Clean Air Act is one such isolated reaction to 
the specific problem of pollution from coal-fires. In both 
countr ies, nuclear power seemed to be an exception from 
thisrul~ as standards for permissible levels of radiation 
were set prior to initiating the programmes. But whereas 
civil'" nuclear power could not have generated negative ex-
periences, the risks were known from the military uses, so 
in th is sense, nuclear policy was reactive. This conclu-
sion is strengthened by our observation that the standards 
through the period the policies were adjusted as expe-
rience grew. 
In the late 1960s, the first reactions to the beginning 
uncertainties relating to technology emerged in energy po-
lici'as ,an increased interest in forecasting energy demand 
and supply. The main rationale was t~ ensure in the future 
a match between energy supply and demand. Conjectures 
.about possible developments in the technologies for energy 
production were used to adjust the forecasts, but the pre-
" c, , 'c ~ 
dictions, appear to have been based on information from 
<"~ • .. 
within the energy producing industries, rather than in 
formalized technology forecasting of the sort that is de-
scribed by e.g; Jantsch (1967). The beginning of the 1970s 
was marked in both ?ountries by the adoption of new objec-
tives in state energy policies. External effects of energy 
production in fields unrelated to energy increasingly at-
tracted attention, beginning with consequences for the en-
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vironment and safety of workers and the population, widen-
ing out to include the consequences for future resource 
availability (after the oil crisis) and consequences for 
employment, civil liberties, social integration etc. This 
development of focus is reflected in the recommendations 
-. of the OECD for future technology policies. The central 
instrument of such policies was to be Technology Assess-
ment. To see if the discussions about Technology Assess-
ment have influenced energy policy, we need to know the 
basic principles of technology assessment. 
'Technology Assessment' is an exceedingly imprecise term, 
but it is usually used to denote a method or procedure 
which aims at providing poli tfcal decisionmakers with in-
formation- about the consequences ~f technological develop-
ments 42 • -In policy statements of the early 1970s, the term 
was frequently used to denote rather grand schemes which 
should replace traditional policies towards science and 
technology: 
"The.general aim of technology assessment is to evalu-
ate the social costs of existing civilian and military 
technologies in the form of pollution,' social distrup-
tions, infrastructure costs, etc., to anticipate the 
probable detrimental effect of new technologies, to de-
vise methods of minimizing the costs, and to evaluate 
the possible benefits of new -or alternative technolo-
gies in connection wi th existing or neglected social 
needs." (OECD, 1971, p. 82). 
Hetman (1973) defined the control of technology as a pro-
ces~ analysis, fore~asting and.assessmen~ 6f techn~logical 
futures o. leading to; decisionmaking, and descr ibed the cen-
tral elements of such a process: 
"1) Monitoring and abatement of negative side-effects 
of- existing' technologies and development of socially 
acceptable alternatives. ° 
2) Screening and o· selecting of new technologies result-
ing from already known or attainable scientific re-
sults. 
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3) Need for original R&D in the development of new and 
desirable technologies in relation to changing social 
goals and future priorities." (Hetman, 1973, p. 65). 
But this concept of . technology assessment was so broad as 
to allow for a variety of interpretations when it was 
translated into proposals for poli tical practices or in-
sti tutions. As an example of the problems ar ising at the 
theoretical level, one can counterpose two distinctly dif-
ferent interpretations of technology assessment: 
"Technology Assessment is a policy-oriented tool. It is 
to provide decisionmakers with perceptive,' impartial 
information about possible negative first as well as 
second and third order consequences of not yet fully 
developed technologies orw'projects. Consequences in-
clude ~beside economic and safety distinctions, social, 
regional, local and class-related consequences." 
(Maa10e, 1982, p. 15). 
Technology assessment thus defined is only a small subset 
of Hetman's broad-ranging social techniques. Maa10e does 
not address the 'active' aspects of technology assessment 
to do with developing and selecting alternatives, and nei-
therdoes.he include Hetman's third aspect, the.search for . . . 
desirable technologies. Also narrow, but with a quite dif-
., . 
ferent point of view is Elliott and Elliott's (1977) .des-
cr iption of the .. idea of technology assessment: 
"The idea is to constitute a special institution, man-
ned by specialists, as a watchdog body, charged wi th 
monitoring public and private sector technological 
plans and projects, with regard to the public interest. 
This body would report to government ( ••• ) and advise 
on the. desirabi1i ty in the long term of proposed pro-
jects." (Elliott and Elliott, 1977, p.130). 
This model incorporated, in addition.to the monitoring and 
preparation of-~onsequence analyses, an advisory function. 
The. technology assessment institution should not just draw 
. . 
up the consequences of technologies but also. evaluate 
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their desirability in terms of the public interest. This 
idea was strongly objected to by proponents for 'neutral' 
assessments, like Carpenter (1973): 
"( ••• ) Technology assessment does not make decisions. 
( ••• ) The comparison of options may show that one is 
clearly outstanding. However, the results should be 
presented without advocacy permitting the political 
process to add its context to a neutral objective as-
sessment." (p.366). . 
The imp1ici t assumption that assessments can be objective 
or neutral seems naive against the background of the as-
sessment format outlined by OECD (1971) and Hetman 
(1973). On the other hand, if the idea of technology as-
/ 
sessment is' narrowed down to" a method. for analysing the 
quantifiable consequences of particular technologies on 
well-defined impact areas, there is more scope for such 
, , 
claims. Looking at, the practical exper iments wi th techno"': 
logy assessment, narrowing down of the assessment concept 
is exactly what has happened. In reali ty, 'Social Assess-
ment of Technology' or 'Technology Assessment' soon became 
labels attached to very different studies. The OECD Com-
; 
mittee for Scientific and Technological Policy in 1978're~ 
viewed 15 studies which had been made available to the 
commi ttee by the, .DECO member countr ies, as representative 
examples of work. in the field . of social assessment of 
technology43, and found that the actual practise was far 
removed from the original ideals: 
"( ••• ) Most of them can be labelled technical-economic 
feasibility studies, broadening the analysis of both 
technical and economic aspects in comparison with more 
conventional types of studies." (OEC~, 1978, p.42). _ 
A 'proper' social assessment of technology,. according to 
the committee, ~ou1d not be partial. but would have to es-
tablish a "systemat~c inventory of the possible impacts on 
society" (p.42) including "besides the usual technical and 
economic ones" (ibid.) the impacts on individuals, social 
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groups, the environment and value systems and taking into 
account the options of "those social groups who have pre-
viously been considered as external to the decisionmaking 
process" (p.43). 
- The few proposals for technology assessment of energy 
technologies were character istic of the tendency to focus 
on single technologies, known and measurable consequences 
and quantification of impacts. Neither in Denmark nor Bri-
tain have energy technology assessments been attempted. 
A German study reviewed in OECD (1978) was concerned ex-
clusi vely wi th the effect of nuclear power plants on the 
pollution levels of water resources and the atmosphere. 
Quite a different angle was .,used by Sinclair (1973). who 
review British practices and experiences involving evalua-
tions of technologies 44 • Sinclair suggested that the con-
cept of risk in terms of the cost to society of technolo-
gical hazards-should be central to technology assessment: 
"( ••• ) the rationalization of national R&D policies may 
be effectively assisted by the interconnection of the 
relative risks arising from alternative technologies 
with implicit numerical valuations." (Sinclair, 1973, 
p. 37). 
Using this approach it would be possible to allocate, for 
instance, R&D expenditure in such a way as to optimize the 
prevention of risk over a number of. activi ties in terms 
of social costs. As examples of such activities, Sinclair 
mentio~s e.g. agriculture; pharmaceuticals, steel hand-
ling, nuclear electricity and highrise'flats. '. 
Even though neither comprehensive technology assessments 
including energy technologies nor 'partial' assessments 
like those s ke tched above we rea t t~mpted in Br ita i n or 
Denmark a number of techniques were being' adopted which 
addressed related problems. 
In chapter two, we saw that, both in Britain and Denmark, 
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procedures were 
energy policy. 
was thought to 
adopted to ensure the public acceptance of 
For example dissemination of information 
ensure that the public became aware of the 
technical and economic problems in relation to energy po-
licy. In Britain, planning inquiries was adopted as an in-
Mstrument to ensure that the public was heard in large de-
velopments. Again it was characteristic that procedures 
were either ad hoc as in the case of the information cam-
paigns or directly transferred from other areas as in the 
case of the public inquiries. 
The adoption of techniques like EIA, environmental impact 
analysis, was another reaction to specific problems ar is-
ing e.g. in the siting of ne~/power stations. In a report 
on methods for predicting and monitoring social and econo-
mic effects of power stations 45 , i twas()bs~.rved that, 
most likely, power station proposals would become the oc-
casion for sharper debate in localities i~ the future. The 
increasing tendency to question the need to expand elec-
tr ici ty capaci ty, represented a potential obstacle to the 
expansion of the electricity supply: 
"( ••• ) if such opinions gain" further currency, there 
would be increased difficulty in local consultations in 
using the normal justification that there was a need 
for new capacity in the national or regional interest, 
whether or not the technical arguments were sound." 
(Power Station Impacts Project, 1981, p. 14-15). 
In this situation impact analysis should serve as means of 
providing answers to cr i tical questions. about the impacts 
of the planned developmen~s. Fig 5.1 shows the conceptual 
model of impacts used in the project. It will be observed 
that the technological project (' the power station') is 
given. The task is restricted to modelling effects of this 
particular deveiopment in this particular local area. Ob-
viously this·· kind of model is a very long way from the 
systematic approach looking into consequences of' whole 
technological systems against the background of assess-
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Fig. 5.1 Conceptual Model of Impacts of Power Station De-
velopments. 
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Source: PSI Research Team: Power Station Impacts. 1: The 
Socio-Economic Effects of Power Stations on their Localiti-
es. Oxford: Oxford Polytechnic, 1979. p. 6. 
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ments of soc ial ends. Furthermore, the impact assessment 
takes place in the implementation of energy policy, not at 
the level of national energy policy formulation. For the 
general public this means that they get involved, if ever, 
only at a stage when it is a question of accepting or re-
jecting a specific proposal. 
That only fragments of the originally grand schemes to 
counter disenchantment with growth, science and technology 
found their way into energy policy making was also evident 
in Danish energy planning. In the 1981 energy plan, the 
following aspects of energy policy were qui te Ii terally 
treated in watertight compartments: 
raw materials 
~ 
the natural gas project 
coal supply_ 
power plant economy 
renewable energy 
means of control in ~nergy policy 
the environment 
energy conservation 
energy R&D 
international energy policy cooperation 
long term perspectives in energy planning. 
The number and character of the issues reflect an aware-
ness of the complexity of the field, but in reality these 
issues are never brought together to form a consistent 
·whole. 
The fact that the last two examples both dat~ from 1981 is 
not accidental. Although the rapid. theoretical develop~ 
ments in theori~s and models for social control of techno-
logy took place around 1970, the issues relating to dif-
ferent kinds of impacts or consequences of energy techno-
logy only emerged state in energy policy at a much later 
date (again wi th the exception of issues related to the 
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safety and environmental impacts of nuclear power). In 
chapter two and three we saw that new methods were only 
adopted in energy policy when new problems appeared and 
were translated into specific demands for change by one or 
more of the political groups. This implies that the adop-
tion of instruments addressing problems related to the im-
pacts of energy technologies signify the existence of ma-
ter ial as well as political problems in this field. When 
we stress that mater ial problems are a precondition for 
the adoption of new methods, it is because we want to 
stress that pressure from a political group indicates the 
existence of a problem. But this indication is not suffi-
cient to conclude that the state will react to the pres-
sure by adopting the means suggested by the group. For ex-
ample, in spite of the fact that environmental groups had 
promoted renewable energy since the late 1960s, it was 
only' after oil pr ices had begun their rise that any re-
search into these technologies was initiated, and this 
goes' for both countr ies. Still, however, the bulk of ener-
gy R&D was devoted to the technologies that were seen to 
have caused environmental problems but which still repre-
sented solutions to the central problem, the dependence on 
oil, i.e. coal burning, nuclear power, gas' burning. At 
the same time increasing efforts were mounted to seek to 
alleviate the problems of the 'tradi tional technologies t 
by what is usually termed 'technical fixes': increased 
control;of the labour force at nuclear power plants, high-
er~chimneys at coal fired stations etc. In terms of.short 
. term cost, these solutions were obviously most attractive 
and so were attempted. 
Hence 'the social control of energy' in Denmark and Bri-
tain after the oil crisis was only oriented towards a 
very limited spectrum of consequences of which the most 
important was savings in terms of imported oil., As the 
general economic cr is is deepened in both countr ies, the 
importance of this objective increased, and, in this light 
the· emphasis on supporting indigenous production of oil 
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and gas must be seen. 
Summary: Remedies against technological problems. 
The observations made here support the' suggestion that, 
whereas the poli tical concerns sparked by the increasing 
inabili ty of the economic and poli tical systsem to cope 
wi th unwanted effects of technological change are reflec-
ted in the adoption of new methods in the implementation 
of energy policy, these concerns have not influenced the 
central issue in energy policy which in both Br i tain and 
Denmark remained the economic impact of society's use of 
energy. The problems related ,t'o the effects of technology 
were in a sense superimposed on this central concern. So-
lutions to them were recommended by political groups who 
experienced a particular set of effects as negative and 
consequently demanded changes of policies that would (or 
would seem to) solve this particular problem. 
Against this background we shall now briefly review a num-
ber of 'alternatives' which' are more or less consistent 
attempts at prescribing solutions to the whole complex of 
problems related to growth, science and technology. We 
shall discuss briefly also why particular elements in such 
strategies must (in the present context, at least) be re-
garded as utopian whereas others have already been incor-
porated in state energy policy-making. 
5.5 Alternatives and Utopias. 
Above we 'reviewe~ policy solutions to problems arising 
from the.effects of technology •. These changes in technolo-
gy policies were pa,ralleled by a theoretical development. 
The· policy-or iented the or ies had in common an acceptance 
of the basic economic and political structures of the'ca-
pi talist industr ialized world: they represented solutions 
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in theory to problems raised by technology assuming that 
the basic economic and poli tical structures remained in-
tact. Parallel with this kind of theoretical development, 
we find quite a different and distinctly more radical ap-
proach to the same problems. 
Theoretically you can do anything, so why not create a so-
ciety which is the positive mirror-image on all counts of 
the present, problem ridden world? A 'soft technology com-
muni ty' : 
"ecologically sound 
small energy input 
low or no pollution rate 
. reversible mater ials and renewable energy sources only 
functional for all time 
craft industry 
low specialization 
communal uni ts . 
village emphasis 
integration with nature 
democratic politics 
technical boundaries set by nature 
local bartering 
compatible with local culture 
safeguards against misuse 
dependent on well-being of other species 
innovation regulated by need 
steady-state economy 
labour intensive 
integrates young and old 
- decentralist 
general efficiency 'increase with smallness 
operating modes understandable by all~ 
datechnological accidents few and unimportant 
diverse solutions to technical and social problems 
agricultural emphasis on diversity 
quality criteria highly valued 
food productions shared by all 
work undert~ken primarily for satisfaction 
small units self-sufficient 
science and technology integrated with culture 
science and technology integrated with other forms of 
knowledge 
weak or non-existent work/leisure distinction." 
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eClar ke, R.: Soft Technology: bluepr int for a research 
community. Undercurrents 2, 1972. Cited here from Sand-
bach, 1980). 
These pr inciples do in fact in the or ig inal text mir ror 
_ the principles or characteristics of 'hard technology'. 
This list of pr inciples resembles very closely the pro-
blems identified by the OECD, but the theoretical solution 
here consists of negating the problems and presenting the 
sum of negations as a solution, regardless of the interre-
lations between the single components. 
That this kind of utopia became the focus of attention for 
a whole branch of social science from the mid-1970s46 can 
- I 
be explained by the fact that elements of such a utopia 
was present in the arguments used by environmentalists in 
the debates in relation 'to energy, technology and the en-
vironment. Much discussion has centred around the possible 
existence of a coherent set of values underlying the uto-
pian ideas, whether they have been termed 'post-materia-
list values,47, or the 'Alternative environmental para-
digm'. The latter was described by Cotgrove (1982) using 
factor analysis based on a survey of opinions on a number 
of issues related to the environment. The survey included 
a sample of the general population and sa,mples of indus-
trialists, trade unionists and environmentalists. The fol-
lowing dimensions were identified: 
Core values 
Economy 
Non-material (self-actualization) 
Natural environment instrinsically valued 
Harmony with nature 
Public interest 
Safety 
Incomes related to need 
Egalitarian 
Collective/social.provision 
Polity Participative structures (citizen/worker 
involvement) 
Non-hierarchical 
Liberation 
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society 
Nature 
Knowledge 
Decentralized 
Small-scale 
Communal 
Flexible 
Earth's resources limited 
Nature benign 
Nature delicately balanced 
Limits to science 
Rationality of ends 
Intergration of fact/value, thought/feel-
ing. ' 
Quite a lot of mental energy went into the examination of 
these values: Are they internally consistent? Are they 
really commonly held by environmentalists? Which assump-
tions would have to be'made in order to arrive at a soc ie-
I 
ty founded on' values like these? These were just some of 
the questions asked by social scientists and others' in-
quiring into these issues. For example, inconsistencies in 
the soft-technology 'paradigm' might imply that no agree-
m'ent could be reached even on basic pr incip1es, and that 
would lead to problems even at the apparently wholly prac-
, , 
tical level: 
"Equipment that is simple to operate may be complex to 
manufacture 1 that which is simple to manufacture may 
require great skill, to operate. Trying to· make every 
aspect simple may reduce output to even lower levels 
than soft technologists (and certainly trade unionists, 
T.A.') would be prepared to tolerate. At current costs 
devices like windmills or solar collectors do not pro-
_ vide" cheap power, and if economies of scale are to be 
foregone, could they ever be feasible alternatives? 
.', These and a thousand questions' like them form a vast 
and challenging research-and-1ife programme for all 
those looking for another alternative." (Harper, 1973, 
p.303). 
Harper's sOlu'tion to this was 'a long, 'social' revolution' • 
He . saw 'evidenc~ of the beginning of such a revolution in 
alt~rnativ~ science,' in alt~rnative economics, utopian 
communi ties and the emergence of cr i tical theor ies about 
, , ' 
capitalism, imperialism, . technocracy and a1ienati6n • 
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But, as we have seen, society is not a package-deal. While 
in some corners of society. it might have been be possible 
to recognize the contours of 'alternative' ways of life, 
the mainstream of economy and politics was still concerned 
with economic growth, employment and other traditional 
items. 'Just like the OECD ideal of the consequence-orien-
ted society was a package-deal of which only fragmented 
ideas and isolated models were adopted in policy-making, 
so these utopias represented package-deals, and more 
challenging ones, in that they assumed the abolition of 
economic rationality. But just like the OECD's ideals, 
fragments of the utopian ideals appeared in issue-specific 
policy recommendations. 
/ 
An example of such.a theoretical single-issue. strategy is 
Amory Lovins' (1977) 'Soft Energy Paths'. Lovins suggests 
that a" soft' technology which is environmentally' benign 
and efficient: wi th respect to energy consumption can be 
implemented through government action. According to 
Lovins, technologies are 'soft' if they possess the fol-
lowing characteristics: 
1) They use renew~ble energy;~ 
2) theyare·diversified; 
3),they are flexible and .. relatively 'low' technology, not 
in the meaning of being unsophicated, but rather easily 
understandable; . 
4) they are adapted to the need for net energy with regard 
to scale and geographical distribution. 
5) They are, adapted to the need for net energy with regard 
. " to' quali ty of energy48. ' .' , 
. " ,',' ,,"'f. , ., 
Energy te'chnologies like these could be implemented, ac-
~ording' to Lovin~, by increasing government intervention 
in the en~rgys·ecto~. ,He proposed a three-step strategy:' 
1) Correction of institutional barriers that prevent a 
spread of energy conservation; 
2) removal of, subsidies to conventional' fuel- and power 
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industries; 
3) gradual attainment of correspondence between energy 
pr ices and the cost of replacing the dwindling supply 
of cheap fuels 49 • 
These measures should be ini tiated by government, where-
.. upon the market mechanism would do the job of replacing 
'hard' with 'soft' technology. Lovins argued that the 
adoption of soft technologies would give rise to 'econo-
mies of small scale'. For example, a decrease in capi tal 
costs of power production would result from mass-produc-
tion of small-scale production systems. Industry just had 
to be convinced that such a strategy is profitable: 
"This will demand a phi1o$6phy of production or iented 
towards technical simplification, low replacement 
costs, - slow obsolescence, high re1iabi1i ty, many uni ts 
and low gross earnings 7 but these are well known con-
cepts of mass-production. The resistance of industry 
towards this would probably dwindle when the possibili-
ty of prof it was perce i ved." (Lovins, 1977, p. 60) (Em-
phasis added). 
The approach whereby the state provides the mar ket with 
incentives for producing particular items in particular 
ways presupposes a consistent long-term planning, and in-
deed Lovins recommended the adoption of a planning horizon 
of ,50 years. In the absence of.political consensus, such a 
strategy seems highly unrealistic. In addition, Lovins 
suggested that the adoption of a soft energy path would 
be an important step towards a new social order. Lovins 
was not very clear on this point. On the one hand, he em-
phasized that the soft energy path was consistent with a 
liberal society and wou1d,yie1d advantages for all social 
groups (p.41, 174)7 on the other, he argued that choice of 
technologies imply choice of values, and that soft techno-
logies implied values like frugality, simplicity, 
diversity, local community, humility and craftsmanship 
(p.77). 
At a still more practical or pragmatic level, we (as we 
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saw in chapter three) find the alternative energy strate-
gies put forward by the different political groups. These 
strategies relate to the 'soft-technology paradigm' in a 
similar way that the technology assessment studies relate 
to the idea of technology assessment. The alternative 
.. energy strategies promoted, as we have seen, particular 
(renewable energy-) technolog ies wi thout paying much re-
gard to the political and economic context. 
In practice, as we have seen, the renewable energy techno-
logies were introduced, albeit as yet at a small scale, 
into the energy supplies of both Br i tain and Denmark as 
one possible solution to the problems inherent in the tra-
di tional energy-producing techno log ies. But the introduc-
tion of these technologies did not change the basic econo-
mic or organisational structures of the energy supply of 
ei ther country. They were introduced only to the extent 
that they seemed to represent viable solutions to the tra-
ditional technologies. 
2.6 Conclusions. 
These observations of the interrelationships between the 
complex problems interpreted as related to economic growth 
and technological chang"e, the. theoretical 'solutions' to 
t~ese problems, and the reactions of the political system 
prompt us to ask with Hahn: 
"While technology may often be identified as a causal 
factor, it usually is not the controlling decision ele-
ment. Has technology for some reason been singled out 
to be the whipping boy? Or is it just mC5're handy as a 
relatively more tractable and explicit feature to mani-
pulate in complex policy level decisions? ( ••• ) Why 
don't we he"ar the, phrases economic assessment, social 
assessment, environmental assessment or assessment? 
(Hahn, 1973, pp.,1014-101S). 
Against the background of the above review, a first answer 
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would be: we do hear them. We have seen that both the ori-
ginal concepts of technology assessment and the alterna-
tive strategies represent frameworks for such • total as-
sessments'. The question is therefore: why don't we have 
them? 
At this stage of the analysis it is possible, based on our 
observation of the historical development of energy poli-
cy, to give a number of good reasons for this. The analy-
sis seems to suggest that changes have been brought about, 
not by design, but by a complex process in which political 
groups have reacted to what they exper ienced as negative 
conditions by trying to,change these conditions. Also they 
have looked for theoretical explanantions as to why the 
contemporary social structure produced undesirable re-
sults, and for possible solutions. 
But, in addition, our analysis has shown that in spite of 
calls for evaluation of non-economic effects of technolo-
gies, the economic factor has consistently been of grea-
ter impor tance. , 
This chapter, together wi th the two preceding chapters, 
has given support to the hypothesis describing the. ele-
ments of historical processes involved in the changes in 
energy policy. They have also given support to the hypo-
thesis,. that this process, has been common to Br i tain and 
Denmark. We' have still to discuss the theoretical . back-
. gro~nd for th~se observations. To ,this discussion we turn 
in the next chapter. Here we shall investigate in more 
depth .. the problem still before ~s: w~at is the relation-
ship between' changes . in policy. and changes in the real 
problems that this policy addresses? What is the role 
played by the state? By industries? By individuals? By po-
Ii tical groups? Which process (or processes) links pro-
blems to 'reactions? 
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NOTES FOR CHAPTER 5 
1. Winner argues that the use of the word technology falls in one or 
more of the following categories: 
a) Objects usually referred to as technology: tools, machines, in-
struments etc. Winner denotes these objects apparatus. 
b) Technical activities: routines, skills, methods, procedures. 
Technical activities are distinguished from other types of 
activities by being purposive and rational. Winner terms these 
activities technique~ 
c) The present-day use .of technology furthermore refers to organi-
sation, 1. e. such social arrangements which are rational-pro-
ductive (like firms or research establishments). 
d) Finally, 'technology' is used to denote networks which combine 
people, apparatus and organisations across distances (e.g. 
telephone systems or electricity grids). 
(Winner, 1977, pp. 11-12). • 
2. See e.g. Jantsch, (1967), p. 15; Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development (1971), p. 17. 
3. See for instance 'Capital', vol. 1. Sandbach (1980) represents a 
narrower interpretation of technology ina Marxian framework, 
using 'technology' as synonymous to 'fixed capital'. His inability 
to uphold this definition (e.g. the Green Revolution. is described 
as a technology) indicates some of the problems inherent in a 
direct application of Marxian terms to' phenomena outside the 
sphere of production.' 
4. 'Science policy' is defined 
technology, as well as 
understood" (Organisation 
Development (1971), p. 37. 
5. Petersen (1985), p. 331-339. 
here as "policy for the development of 
policy for science as ordinarily 
for Economic Co-operation.. and 
6. According to OECD, op.cit. the period from 1961 to 1967 was 
characterized by science increasingly being related to a wide 
.. range of national problems "beginning with health and extending 
into the social and economic domain generally." (p.39). 
7. In Mitcham and Mackey (1972) several philosophical essays from the 
. 1960s are reprinted. Ellul (1954) represents the earliest compre-
hensive critique of the social consequences of technology. 
8. See Budge et.~l~ (1983);,Hansen (1972). 
9. See section 4.2 
10. Gabor (1964) saw nuclear fusion as "our boldest hope", while wil-
liams (1967) was contemplating the introduction of new materials 
and techniques to replace coal and oil. 
- 301 -' 
11. The 'laisser innover' explanation attributing the main thrust in 
technological change to market forces and skills of particularly 
capable entrepreneurs is referred by Hetman 1973 and attributed to 
inter alia Myron Tribus. 
12. See the Advisory Council on Scientific Policy: Scientific and En-
gineering Manpower in Great Sri tain 1959. Cmnd 902 xx. London: 
HMSO 1959; Ministry of Labour: Scientific and Engineering Manpower 
in Great Britain. London: The Ministry of Labour and the Lord 
President's Office, 1956. 
13. Cammilleri (1984) observes the success of the First International 
Conference on the Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy in "establishing 
nuclear power as the symbol of modernity and progress." (p.13). 
14. For this interpretation of side-effects, unintended effects and 
externalities we are indebted to Winner (1977) and Hetman (1973). 
15. The Times, 17 July 1950. 
I 
16. Op.cit. 29 January 1955. 
17. Camilleri (1984) describes the reactions of the Los Alamos 
scientists after the implications of the project had become clear 
and observes that the scientists were sharply opposed to the 
military. Also in Britain. scientists were concerned about the. 
nuclear project. The Council of Atomic Scientists'Association 
complained about the secrecy of the project which they thought 
conducive to protection of vested interests, inefficiency and lack 
of public influence in influencing the objectives of the project. 
The. Council proposed that reports should be issued at regular 
intervals through the HMSO (The Times; 23 January 1950). 
18. Sir R. Robinson quoted in The Times, 6 September 1955. 
19. wynne (1982), pp. 20-23 documents this concern by referring to the 
inquiry reports published after the accident. 
20. See wynne (1982), pp. 22-23 • 
. , . 
\ 21. See Camilleri (1984), p. 13 f. 
22. Jantsch (1967) strongly emphasizes the need to be able to identify 
technological potentials and limitations so as to be able to 
increase efficiency in resource allocation, by identifying and 
hedging against major risks of loss of inv~stments. ' 
23. "The problem is to break out of the extended present, the 'logical 
future' and, select, for a normative approach, the best feasible 
anticipation in order to make it the 'willed future' C ••• ). To 
achieve this most difficult task,. a feedback system must provide 
the framework for the evaluation of alternatives." (Jantsch, 1967, 
p. 92). 
;. 
24. OECD (1971) cites the example of Japan, having the smallest mili-
tary budget in percentage of GNP and the highest growth among in-
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dustrialised nations (p.43). 
25. Ibid, p. 35 f. 
26. The classical example is that of the car, which to the individual 
represents increased freedom to travel. When, however, car-
ownership becomes common, it is accompanied by traffic congestion, 
traffic accidents, pollution etc. The result is that the benefits 
from car-ownership to the individual decreases, and that general 
living conditions are negatively affected. 
27. For example, a committee under the Danish Teknologir!det (The 
Technology Council) in 1980 published a report on technology 
assessment in which it was observed, that "The Criticism of 
technological development to a certain extent derives from 
uncertainty with respect to certain consequences of technology 
( ••• ). At the global level pollution and ruthless exploitation of 
resources have given rise to problems which for their solution 
demand changes in the development process. Within each separate 
nation technological. change. has' impacts on e.g. employment and 
patterns of consumption, and" a sizeable proportion of public 
expenditure in health and social services is due. to technological 
change." (Teknologivurdering i Danmark, 1980, pp. 8-9). 
28. See O'Riordan (1981)' p. '52 ff. 
assumptions and conclusions of' these 
reaction to their publication. 
29. Meadows et.al (1972). 
30. Goldsmith et.al. (1972). 
31. Dickson (1974). 
32.0ECD (1970), ch. 5. 
for a discussion 
studies as well 
33. The European Economic Communities Commission (1977 I). 
of 
as 
the 
the· 
34. These conclusions are drawn on the background of the research done 
by Lowe and Goyder (1983) on the central concerns of environmental 
groups. 
,35. OECD (1971); Hetman (1973). 
36.0ECD (1975), p. 30. Interestingly, it is observed that the assess-
ment projects evaluated in the study did ~ot consider this aspect 
in any depth. 
37. The European Economic Communities Commission (1977 I). 
38. Slovic and Fischhoff' (1979) and Elster (1979) discuss different 
aspects of the use,of 'risk'. Slovic and Fischhoff here cites a 
study in which different risks associated with thirty technologies 
were ranged on nine qualitative scales by the persons 
participating in the study. It was found that the benefits of 
nuclear power were evaluated remarkably low, while the risks were 
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seen as extremely high. 
39. Hetman (1973). 
40. OECD (1971), p. 47. 
41. Cetron and Barthocha (1973) give an overview of models in techno-
logy assessment. A comprehensive evaluation of technology assess-
ment projects is found in OECD (1975), while proposals for 
participatory structures for social control of technology are 
given in Boyle et a1. (1977). 
42. Technology Assessment as a concept was first formulated in the US 
Congress' Science, Research and Development Committee. (See 
Hetman, 1973, p. 54f~ Cetron and Bartocha (eds.), 1973). 
43. OCED (1978). 
44. The inquiry by the Roskill commission into the siting of a third 
London airport is frequently cited as the case which has most 
closely resembled technology assessment in Britain. For 
discussions of the inquiry and its results, see e.g. Hetman (1973) 
p. 20 f~ O'Riordan (1981) p. 16. In the event, the site chosen on 
the basis of a comprehensive cost-benefit analysis was rejected 
after it had been met with "public outcry" (Sinclair, 1973, p. 
64). The implications of this chain of events are not recognized' 
in Sinclair's proposal for a technology assessment methodology. 
45. Power Station Impact Project (1981). 
46. See e.g. Cotgrove (1975, 1976, 1978, 1982)1 O'Riordan (1981), 
Sandbach (1981)~ Gorz (1978, 1981)1 Goodwin and Taylor (1982). 
47. This term was used by an opinion poll on attitudes towards science 
carried out for the EEC by polling institutes in 8 countries, 
among them Britain and Denmark, in 1977. Here, three categories of 
value systems were identified by using an index constructed as 
follows: the persons questioned were asked to choose from four 
items the most and second most important goal for society. The 
answers were then categorized as follows: 
Second priority 
A B C D 
A 2 1 2 
First B 2 2 3 
priority C 1 2 2 
0 2 3 2 
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Items: A: Keep order in society 
B: Increase people's participation in government decisions 
c: Fight rising prices 
0: Guarantee freedom of speech 
Scores: 1: Materialists 
2: 'Mixtes' 
3: Post-materialists 
According to this scale, the survey found that the following 
percentages of the British and Danish population supported these 
'value-systems': 
total 
1 
2 
3 
DK% 
44 
49 
7 
100 
48. Lovins (1977), p.57. 
49. Ibid., p •. 37f. 
UK' 
43 
52 
5 
100 
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6. ENERGY POLICY AND SOCIAL PROCESSES. 
6.1 Introduction 
So far we have described and analysed in some detail a 
tiny fraction of history, namely that of energy policy 
from 1950-1980. We shall now remove ourselves somewhat 
from the fascinating and confusing maze of empir ical de-
tail and ask if this history makes sense to us. Clearly, 
as a description of a policy field it makes sense, but is 
there something more to be learnt from it? In other words, 
is there a theory which will allow us to understand this 
development, i.e. the changes that we have recognized 
, 
across the energy policy field? 
In each of the previous chapters we have begun by present-
ing the specific set of problems addressed by that chapter 
followed by a presentation and discussion of the particu-
lar -hypothesis due for investigation in that chapter. The 
subject matter of the present chapter, however, differs 
distinctly from that of any of the previous chapters as we 
are now returning to our original intention of establish-
ing a theoretical framework for understanding the proces-
ses underlying changes in the energy policy field.' This 
involves arguments of a more theoretical nature than those 
of the previous chapters. Considering this, and bearing in 
mind that we are suggesting an explanatory framework which 
may appear unusual or controversial, we have chosen to 
-display, prior to the presentation of the hypotheses, the 
argument that has led to their formulation. 
-
The description of the historical development of the ener-
gy field pointed to the importance of investigating the 
processes involved in change or transformation from one 
- . 
period to the nextL The analysis also suggested that ele-
ments which must be explained include: the process whereby 
consensus dissolves and is replaced by conflict; the 
rejection of the ideas and values and objectives; the 
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process whereby new problems are identified; the process 
whereby elements of a new or 'alternative' solutions gain 
consent; the process which gives rise to formation of po-
litical groups representing new ideas, goals and solu-
tions; and the process whereby the purposi ve changes that 
are initiated in one period e.g. by means o~ energy poli-
cy, at a later date corne to be experienced as predominant-
ly negative. 
The pertinence of emphasizing a diachronic perspective 
(i.e. a perspective which emphasizes the relations between 
events across time rather than stressing functional causal 
relations between phenomena ~hich may be deduced on the 
basis .of an analysis of one particular section of history) 
is clear~if we consider the implications of the historical 
changes we have witnessed in the energy policy field. Dur-
ing the 1950-80 period a number of sub-periods were iden-
tified which were characterized· by different conceptuali-
zation of energy problems and different patterns of reac-
tion to such problems. Within each, period, these patterns 
changed li ttle - we may say that' each per iod exhibited a 
stereotypical pattern of reactions. We: identified such pe-
riods of stereotypical reactions first in state energy po-
licy. We then saw that the political groups·also exhibi-
ted such patterns of reactions within similar periods. The 
1950s . and 1960s (up to about 1969) could in this way. be 
interpreted as one period which was characterized by a 
high degree of political consensus regarding the 
. objectives of state involvement in the energy field, . the 
role: of energy .in creating economic growth, and. the role 
of" economic growth in.securing social.welfare!" 
In relation. to energy, this consensus was· expressed in a 
shared belief in, the s desirability. of . rapid' technological 
change ('progress'),and-bY'implicit agreement on non-in-
terference of the state:into the.day-to-day affairs of the 
energy industries. 
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Now, we have put forward some suggestions for factors 
which might explain this particular si tuation wi thin the 
energy policy field, but doing so does not contribute to 
answering the question as to why the situation changed. 
Which processes did contribute to changing it? Why could 
the consensus not be upheld? This question is raised if we 
observe the situation after 1970. During the large part of 
the 1970s, the energy policy field became increasingly do-
minated by state activities in the form of planning, while 
at the same time political conflicts in energy became in-
creasingly evident. We have seen, that the range of issues 
in energy policy widened out considerably -indeed, a wide-
spread acceptance of the neeq for state 'energy policy' 
which, as we remember, was a term little used before 1970, 
was itself one of the indicators of changes in the general 
interpretation of the energy policy field. 
It ~as observed that the politicization of energy reflec-
ted changes in the economic and material conditions. But 
this merely prompts a new question: why and how did these 
conditions change? Firstly, we have observed that even 
though. some sectors remained unchanged or followed stable 
trends, they were subject to a major re-interpretation by 
the newly' emerged environmentally or iented poli tical 
groups, and that fragments of this re-interpretation 
spread, to the rest of the political groups. Secondly, 
changes in economic and mater ial cond i tions such as the 
rate of economic growth, energy prices, accumulating pol-
.lution to name but a few examples, do' not 'j ust happen'. 
These changes are not causeless: on the contrary, changes 
only come about by human action. The· changing conditions 
of the economy, resource base etc. are themselves results 
of human activity including state energy policies. Figura-
., . 
tively speaking, both 'individuals and political ~roups ~re 
at any time confronted wi th a 'landscape', an existing 
physical and social reality. Even if they are no~able to 
comprehend the social structure, it is nevertheless' the 
basis of whatever they choose to do, whether they act to 
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change it or to preserve it. The sum of human activity 
brings about a new landscape, which is different from the 
earlier one, and that landscape now presents itself as a 
new set of conditions. Therefore an identification of a 
causal relationship between for example the price of ener-
gy and attempts to control the development of energy pro-
duction politically does not explain why the whole energy 
policy field changes over time the way it has been shown 
to. 
For . any particular development in energy policy we may 
identify a number of possible causes. In this way we ar-
rive at an interpretation of a chain of causes which link 
.' 
together changes at the levels of policy, political ideas, 
and economic and technological;development.The problem is 
that these chains themselves seem, tochange;over:time. The 
logic involved in the development of 'energy policy in the 
1950s .' and 1960s has been shown to be substantially 'dif-
ferent from that of the 1970s. This suggests that, we 
should adopt, in addition, to the perspective which allows 
for identifying causes 'transversly! i.e. between the eco-
nomic and material conditions, the political ideas and the 
p'olicy reactions wi thin a per iod, a perspective which con-
centrates on the; llong i tudinal' aspect: that change across 
time needs to be made the central object of our theoreti--
6a1 investigation. We shall 'suggest that the theory of ~o-
cia1 change advanced by Petersen (1985), in his major work 
on 'planning' and social change represents such a perspec-
tive. But first we shall discuss the, advantages of this 
perspective over alternative: interpretations of social 
change when analyzing change in the energy policy field. 
As we have seen, changes in the ,material and economic con-
di tions ,can be 'interpreted, as results of human acti vi ty. 
As to why the patterns of activity change, we shall,. have 
to investigate why individuals and groups change their 
patterns of behaviour. In other words, we shall focus on 
changes 'in ,motiviation, on the; process by which 
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motivations change and are finally expressed as changes in 
e.g. the objectives of state energy policy. 
We may now specify our problem further: Which process con-
nects the ideas, interpretations, problem-identi f ications 
and policy proposals of one period to the changed state of 
the phenomena addressed by those interpretations in the 
subsequent period? And why do the interpretations themsel-
ves change? 
We shall now briefly review a number of theoretical propo-
si tions which address one or more aspects of changes in 
the energy policy field to se~ if we may find useful con-
tr ibutions towards explaining' the processes of change. A 
difficult~ here is that many theoretical contributions ad-
dress one specific aspect of the energy policy field as we 
have defined it We have chosen to divide these theories 
into two groups: Group 1: The theor ies wi thin this group 
emphasize the relationship between two elements within the 
energy policy field: the influence of political groups on 
policy formulation or the efficiency in the implementation 
of energy policy~ group 2: Theories within this group em-
phasize the historical dimension, analyzing the develop-
ment of one· or more of the above elements. 
The first group of contributions is characterized by being 
oriented towards specific problems i~ energy policy at the 
time of writing. Starting by defining a set of problems, 
. investigating their causes and drawing up guidelines for 
future action appears to be a rational recipe for improv-. 
ing policies. But this procedure cann,ot be adopted if we 
want to analyse the process of change which has taken 
place in the energy policy field. This is precisely due to 
the 'problem-or(enta~ion of these contributions. These con-
tributions are, as 'a rule, partial and ahistorical, as we 
shall shortly demonstrate. 
For example, Tietenberg (1976) conceptuali zed the energy 
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problem in terms of "the import vulnerability problem, the 
balance of payments problem, and the foreign policy pro-
blem" (p.36). As we have seen, however, these had not been 
the main dimensions of the energy problem in the 1950s and 
1960s, when the problem addressed by most governments 
(which was not conceptuali zed as an energy problem) was 
one of providing. sufficient fuel in the future. Ince 
(1982) identified the problems in British energy policy as 
a failure to adopt certain technologies (renewable energy 
technologies, but also combined heat and power and flui-
dized bed combustion). Again, this problem is specific to 
the historical context of the author, and can therefore 
not provide a starting point for an analysis of change in 
, 
the ,field. Certainly the problems are seen as' results of 
the circumstances and policies of the past, but the his-
tor ical process, including the question of why problems 
are, identified as policy problems is not the object of 
reflection. These theories are 'within a period': within a' 
paradigm with its own guidelines for classifying social 
reality. The events of the past are therefore evaluated 
in the light of this paradigm, as when Tietenberg (1976) 
observes' that the' sever i ty of the impact of the 1973 oil 
crisis upon the U.S. economy represented 
.. ( ••• ) a classic case of the failure of piecemeal, se-
quential policy, because, while each policy had a cer-
tain logic behind it in terms of the limited objective 
it attempted to satisfy, taken as a ,whole, the package 
was rather devastating." (Tietenberg, 1976,p.13). 
The quotation confirms the existence of a theoretical pro-
blem regarding the identification of political problems in 
a" historical period. Tietenberg contends that the piece-
meal, 'sequential policies (a descr iption which is itself 
indicative of- a post hoc evaluation, as those policies 
according to our investigation were originally thought to 
be as rational in' relation to ,a long term objective of 
providing for a growth in energy ,demand) were based in a 
'certain logic'. If such policies were generally thought 
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to provide solutions to the 'energy problems' as these 
were conceptualized in the 1950s and 1960s, how come that 
they could be seen to have failed in 1976? Apparently be-
cause new problems that were not foreseen had occurred 
which were at least in part the result of these policies 
e.g. leaving fuel choice to energy consumers led to a de-
pendence on oil but the dependence only turned into a pro-
blem later, partly because economic growth could not be 
sustained, partly because of the activities of OPEC. 
A similar cr i ticism may be raised against the 'al terna-
tive' theories l • These point out that the past policies 
which assumed a positive correlation between growth in 
, 
energy consumption, GOP growth and welfare have produced 
negati ve ~ consequences, (for example, adverse effects on 
th~ environment) that the benefi ts from increased energy , 
consumption have not been evenly distributed, and that the 
continuation of these "political trends will eventually 
lead to resource depletion. As a contribution towards the 
solution of these problems the authors recommend the adop-
tion of one particular version of 'the alternative energy 
strategy'. Such strategies assume that the problems which 
they address can be rationally solved by the adoption of a 
long-term state energy policy which acti vely supports, a 
change from fossil fuels to renewable energy sources. But 
the assumptions of these theor ies are def ined by a set 
of specific topical problems. Comparing, for instance, the 
alternative energy plan drawn up by Danish researchers in 
19762 to that of 1983 3 (of which, incidentally, four of 
the co-authors were also co-authors in 1976), we find that 
the latter stresses employment and p~blic investment to a 
larger degree than the first, which is'in iccord with the 
increasing severity of these' problems, .. but raises the 
questio~of t~e validity of the theoretical ,foundation of 
these plans across time~ Looking· back, ,we remember that 
the optimism for nuclear power in the 1950s was of a simi-
lar character to the' optimism wi thin certain' groups for 
wind-generated electricity today. This is an indication 
\ 
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that the theoretical contributions to 'a better state 
energy policy than that of the past' can contribute little 
to increasing our knowledge about the processes which have 
made the policies of the past unacceptable, as they are 
tied to the problems of a particular period. These contri-
butions are subj ected to contemporary policy values, i. e. 
policy-or iented 4• But policy values depend themselves on 
historical circumstances. Therefore, policy oriented 
theories are not very suitable for an inquiry into histo-
rical processes. 
Furthermore, the policy-or iented contr ibutions are as a 
rule partial, not just in the sense of being partisan, or 
, 
addressing specific parts or "aspects of the energy policy 
field, but also in the sense that change is explained by 
referring to conditions or events exogenous to the theore-
tical framework. An example of partiality in this last 
sense, which also illustrates why we must refrain from ex-
plaining change across time if we adopt a partial frame-
work, . can be drawn from the work of Camilleri (1984) on 
the role of the capitalist state in the development of nu-
clear power in six countries. In·the concluding chapter of 
this ambitious piece of work, Camilleri after having sta-
ted that one of the tasks of the state is that of legiti-
mizing the activities of the nuclear industries, observes: 
"The preoccupation with legitimacy assumed a particular 
significance during the 1970s when nuclear energy be-
came the subject of intense and widespread controver-
sy." (p.180). 
Viewed as an empirical statement, this is in agreement 
with what we have found above. But Camilreri uses this 
statement as an explanation. In this explanation, a major 
explanatory factor (public opinion) is introduced like 
deus ex machina to explain the increasing efforts of the 
state in the six countries to legitimize the nuclear pro-
grammes of each country. Remember ing the questions which 
we asked above, we may note that we are back to the ques-
I 
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tion of why this controversy occurred at this specific 
time (and not at an earlier date). To Camilleri, changes 
in public opinion represents an important but inexplicable 
modification on the logic according to which the state 
supports the accumulation of capital in the nuclear indus-
try. 
In a similar way, theoretical contributions concerning the 
role of technology in social change and the significance 
of poli tical groups in policy typically locate the cause 
of changes in their field of analysis outside the scope 
of their theory. Quite often these contributions start out 
by observing that the si tuation has changed, so that for 
, 
example "technology is a word whose time has come" (Win-
ner, 1977, p.4), or "The rise of the environmentalist 
movement is but one example of a growth in public interest 
which in various ways challenges economic individualism 
and the market ideology" (Cotgrove, 1982, p.v.). These de-
velopments are then explained by referr ing to changes at 
another level. For example, Andersen (1984) observes that 
a demand for analyses of the relations between technologi-
cal'change and economy has emerged as a result of struc-
tural crises, which have made it plain that the models·of 
growth and.regulation of the 1960s no longer suffice. Here 
the process of change once more becomes exogenous, in this 
case, located in 'structural crises'. 
This leads to, what we could call, the paradox of partial 
explanantion. On the one hand, theor ies concerning each 
of the above-mentioned fields (energy policy I technology 
and the r'ole of groups in poli tics) tend" to regard deve-
lopments in the other fields as external, - arb! trary, or 
even . (as is the case· of the role assigned to" poli tical 
groups in certain theor ies of energy' poli cy5) irrelevant. 
On :the other han~1 there exists within each of these 
fields a large body of literature suggesting that the de-
velopment of that particular field 
tance to our knowledge about the 
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is of crucial impor-
world. The resulting 
theoretical problem is almost topological: which phenomena 
and changes in phenomena are 'within' and which are 'with-
out'? How are we to distinguish between factors which 
should be explained and those which are explanantory? It 
seems to depend on our stance. We may explain the forma-
tion of anti-nuclear groups by the increasingly evident 
adverse effects of nuclear power. But we have also seen 
that these effects to some extent are visible exactly be-
cause they have been interpreted and publicized by the 
anti-nuclear movement. Chains like this one can be esta-
blished between the different levels of the energy policy 
field just like we have ourselves attempted in the pre-
vious chapters. Instead of just concentrating on one as-
pect, we have sought to establish connections across the 
whole field but so far, the analysis is still partial in 
the sense that it does not specify the process (orproces-
ses) . underlying the changes which have been identified.· 
We might expect that theor ies explicitly addressing the 
histor ical development of energy policy could contr ibute 
greater insight into the process of change. Here we find 
discussions which involve considerations of the process 
involved, as when Lindberg (1977 II) discusses whether the 
Ipr~sentl situation ·in energy policy might be interpreted 
as a I search phase I in which new interests challenge' the 
existing insti tutions and practices. The implications of 
such an interpretation are however not elaborated any fur-
ther. Poulsen (1978)' represents a somewhat different per-
spective. Following Offe 6 , he interprets changes in energy 
policy asa historical expression of '"changing social de-
mands on the steering capacity of the political and admi-
nistrative system." (p.34). These· changing_ demands stem 
from the existence·of an "objective problematic condition" 
(p.ll). This suggests, that action is. conditional on the 
existence of problems •. This' leads us on to ask: under 
which circumstances is a specific set' of condi tions de-
fined as an objective problematic condition? Poulsen. does 
not approach this question· short of . referr ing to events 
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which caused policy changes, e.g. the 1974 oil crisis. 50-
10mos (1980), in his ambitious and comprehensive thesis on 
the political economy of energy policy in Britain from 
1960-1978, suggests like Camilleri (1984) that problems 
are defined by the needs of (energy) capital. 5010mos ana-
lyzes the development of the entire energy policy field, 
yet again changes in energy policy are explained by fac-
tors exogenous to the theory, for example he notes that 
the need of the state to have regard to groups· of 'econo-
mic agents' (presumably the trade unions and particular 
energy industries?) means that the state cannot adopt a 
unified policy in the interest of capitalism. Again we 
find that a perspective focusing on energy policy is in-
sufficient for understanding the process of change under-
lying the . historical development. We also find that these 
theor ies are firmly located wi thin the problems of their 
own time: the histor ical analyses of energy policy is a 
phenomenon of the 1970s. These analyses seem themselves to 
be reactions to problems of their own time. They reflect 
, 
the p~li tical problems. related to energy supply emerging 
around 1970, and by doing so they impose the interpreta-
tion of problems of the 1970s on historical facts of ear-
lier periods. But when the problems of one period are ta-
ken as the starting point, we cannot understand why. the 
conditions now regarded problematic came to be regarded as 
problems. 
In order to avoid the problem of partiali ty, we may turn 
to theor ies addressing problems related to social change 
in-general rather than within one particular field. 
At first glance, dialectical materialism seems to offer an 
answer· to the search for' a non-partial theory which ad-
dresses the dynamic inherent in society. But,the,problems 
indentified~by Marxist· theories through history have 
closely fo llowed those defl'ned by 'bourgeOl's" th ' eory, 
which indicates that the understanding of the central dy-
namics of history is in fact limited. The new . issues 
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emerging from the change in the energy policy field, e.g. 
energy as a <policy problem, environmental degradation, re-
sources problems, had not been expected or pred icted by 
Marxist theory pr ior to their' actual emergence as policy 
problems. This constitutes a problem insofar as Marxism 
makes claims to knowledge about the central levers of so-
cial change. Poulantzas (1968) for example, sets out to 
analyse the poli tical superstructure of the state in the 
capitalist mode of production. Before embarking on the 
analysis, he observes that theory is always bearing on 
real, concrete processes, and that the aim of any process 
of thought is knowledge of the real objects. Nevertheless 
the analysis remains far removed· from social rea1i ty and 
centres on the ability7 of the'po1itica1 structure to con-
tain class conflict and contr ibute to the maintenance of 
capi talist relations of production. Regarding the actual 
political situation, Pou1antzas observes that 
"The state's various political functions ( ••• ) can only 
be grasped theoretically in the ir interrelation, i. e. 
inserted in the state's global political role." (Pou-
1antzas, 1968, pp. 53-54). 
According to pou1antzas, the global political ro1e.of the 
state is that of being the cohesive factor in. the social 
• < 
formation, but that does not give us any clues as. to why 
its concrete functions change, across time, or what they 
may be like. 
At the most concrete, . Poulantzas is concerned about the 
1egitimatory function of the capitalist state, i.e. its 
contribution to upholding the ideologies which ensure that 
class conflict is avoided. Now,. both the role of the 
state in general and its1egitimatoryfunctions in parti-
cular were in ,~he focus of Marxist theory at the time when 
Pou1antzas wrote t~is~. tater ~ such ;analy~es were largely 
given up, together .with the very abstract structuralist 
approach, and since the, mid-1970s, Marxist, research has 
concentrated on more concrete issues. For example, the 
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• familiar I issues related to energy and the environment 
were made objects of Marxist analyses 9 which recognized 
and tried to incorporate into theory the emergence of new 
poli tical actors beside the social classes. For example, 
Sand bach (1981) observes that: 
"The environmental lobby has recognized the implica-
tions for civil liberties of continuing the nuclear po-
wer programme ( ••• ), Anarchists and Marxists have also 
emphasized the possibilities of alternative technolo-
gies furthering the possibilities of workers I control 
as well as being less dangerous to the physical and so-
cial environment." (Sandbach, 1981, p. 127). 
On the other hand, repercussions of the functionalist con-
cept of the state are still present in these theories. For 
example, 'Sandbach immediately after the above observation 
suggests that the state serves the objective interests of 
capital, and so, 
"The environmental lobby has been deceived into the be-
lief that the state is an impartial mediator in a plu-
ralist society." (Sandbach, 1981, p. 128). 
This leaves us' wi th more questions than answers. Where 
does the self~preserving structure ,wi th its power to cre-
ate false consciousness end and where does the true recog-
nition begin? Why did the system ever allow the emergence 
of an environmental, lobby? The Marxist framework in this 
case. seems to provide categories which allow for an in-
terpretation of the contemporary reali ty but the histor i-
cal processes underlying changes in this reali ty remain 
inexplicable. 
In add i tion to this,' problems inherent in tracing policy 
forms back t~. the dynamics of the forces of production 
give rise to specific .theoretical problems. A concrete de-
monstration of this point is Lindberg' s (1977 I) observa-
tion. that changes in energy policy exhibit striking simi-
laritiesacross different modes of production lO • This in-
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dicates that the relations of production may not be of any 
great importance in explaining the development of a policy 
field. 
But this implies that Marxist perspectives applied to con-
crete policy fields end up as ahistoric reactions to topi-
cal problems unable to explain the social dynamic which 
have turned the author's own gaze towards exactly these 
problems. 
Similar objections can be raised against adopting a libe-
ral perspective. The history of liberalism shows liberal 
theories themselves as subject to 'vogues'. Liberal philo-
sophies of histor ical. development locate the dynamic of 
society firmly with individuals to the extent that the 
existence of social collectives is denied any significance 
in historical change: 
"This view (e. g. that social sciences study the beha-
viour of social wholes) must be rejected as naive. 
( ••• ) the belief in the empir ical existence of social 
wholes or collectives, which may be described as naive 
collectivism, has to be replaced by the demand that so-
. cial phenomena, including collectives, should be ana-
lyzed in terms of individuals and their actions and re-
lations." (Popper, 1963, p. 341). 
. . . 
This approach, for reasons symmetrical to those mentioned 
in relation to Marxist· theor ies, is blind to society' s 
shifting emphasis on . the individual and the collective. 
Indeed, . Petersen (1985) shows 12 that Liberal theories 
emerge in political debates at specific points in time as 
a reaction to social and economic problems in society and 
'a political alternative to contemporary Soci~list notions. 
It would now seem that we are back to square one. We have 
demonstrated that theories which would seem:to address so-
cial and historical change are themselves subject to 
change •. Far from explaining why the poli tical pr ior i ties 
of societies change, political and social scientific theo-
- 319 -
ries reflect these changes. If this observation is cor-
rect, it will also be the case with any theoretical pro-
positions we ourselves are going to make. We can not de-
tach ourselves from the history of which we are ourselves 
part. This would seem to land us in a relativist mire from 
which we cannot escape. At the same time, however, it 
provides us with an insight which could serve as a footing 
allowing us if not to escape the mire then to draw some 
lessons from being stuck in it. 
We are referr ing here to the implications of the insight 
that social and political theory seems to reflect, always 
after the event, the deve10pm~nt of new themes in social 
life and politics. Events de~~ribed as crucial always seem 
to have originally come as a surprise to political scien-
tists. Not only events like the oil crisis, but also more 
gradual developments like the restructuring of energy con-
sumption that made the oil crisis possible, ,or the emer-
gence of a popular oPPosi tion to nuclear power, were all 
unexpected. Could this indicate that the development of 
societies is in principle undiscoverable as Petersen 
(1985) suggests? Elster (1984) seems to make suggestions 
along these lines, when he observes, that 
"We have not - and will probably never get - the theory 
about eneralsocia1 e ui1ibrium (including a theory of 
ynamlc mec anlsms) w lC wou be necessary in order 
to speak with any certainty about the more comprehen-
sive global net long-term equilibrium effects (of in-
stitutional changes, T.A.) (Elster, 1984, p.30). 
Elster I S aim, however, is not so much to investigate why 
this must be so, ,as it is to. suggest a relevant and ,just 
policy model in the light of. this conclusion. We shall re-
turn to the qlJestion of the relationship between social 
and political theory and social, and poli tical practice, 
including the scope for alternative, policy suggestions. 
But before we do .so, we need a theory which would explain 
why the real developments keep surprising those who 'claim 
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to possess knowledge about the levers of social change. We 
need a theory which would not try to circumvent the obser-
ved unpredictablity of social change but instead take it 
as its starting point. In other words, we need to ask: if 
the development of societies is undiscoverable in advance, 
can we explain why this is the case? 
The perspective suggested by Petersen (1985) implies that 
any action, including social and political theorizing, can 
be understood as a reaction. Therefore we should seek to 
explain the process that defines the relationship between 
a given social reality and the reactions which either up-
hold it or change, it. Above we observed that the actual 
socio-poli tical·' development take even theor ists who claim 
insight into change by surprise, that social and political 
science may' be interpreted as reactions to problems in a 
society's established way of handling its affairs, and 
that a major preoccupation of political theory is that of· 
prescribing future strategies either for particular poli-
tical groups or for the' state. This seems to support Pe-
tersen's (1985) suggestion that societies develop through 
a prOcess which we may tentatively liken to that of 'trial 
and error'. If society progressed by a· tr ia1 and error 
process, this would explain why policy is always reactive, 
e.g. why attempts at long term, comprehensive energy' plan-
ning were not initiated in any nation until the emergence 
of an 'energy problem'. 
As a theoretical suggestion, this is. yet a mere skeleton 
and raises more questions than it answers. We need to'look 
carefully into the assumptions' and', implications, of adop-
ting a perspective along these lines. We need to answer 
questions like: which, factors contribute to periodic de-
velopment which we h~ve identified within the energy poli-
cy field? What constitutes 'error'? How are 'errors' iden-
tified'and by whom? What is the relationship between 'er-
rors" and the 'trials' which are adopted? What is the re-
lationship between the activities of individuals and 
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groups and the aggregated results of these activities? 
At this point of investigation, in order to focus the in-
vestigation into these issues, we find it warranted to 
present our hypothesis concerning these questions. 
6.2 Elements of a Trial and Error Theory of Social Change. 
The following section builds on the ideas and theories put 
forward by Petersen in his book on planning and social 
change as well as in our discussions about these matters. 
Above we suggested, that viewing social change in terms of 
a process of tr ial and error.' might prove a frui tful ap-
proach. More specifically, we want to put forward the fol-
lowing hypotheses: 
1) The process underlying changes in the energy policy 
field contains' elements of tr ial and error. Wi thin this 
framework, changing attitudes of different groups may be 
interpreted as reactions to conditions which only gradual-
ly . come to be experienced as negative compared with the 
expectations against which they are measured. This applies 
to one-off events like the sudden rise in oil prices of 
1973/74 as well as to the experience of environmental pol-
lution and other effects of technology. 
2) The~ interacting external effects of technologies as 
well as inconsistencies between behaviour at the micro-le-
vel and the exper ienced resul ts . at the macro-level imply 
that attempts at purposive state control of the energy po-
licy "field, e~g. in relation to the 'application of parti-
cular energy technologies, will lead to counterfinal and 
in principle unfores~eable results. 
These' hypotheses call" for a closer specification and ex-
planation. What do we mean by trial-and error? 
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Let us consider in some detail a very simple example of a 
process of tr ial and error: An old lady takes her home-
grown vegetables to a market once a week. How does she fix 
the price of each particular sort? Probably, she will look 
around for someone selling the same type of product, and 
her exper ience will t.ell her to fix the pr ice close to 
their prices. If, however, she is the only one wanting to 
sell, say, leeks, that day, she cannot use that method, in 
which case she will probably rely on experience: what was 
the pr ice like last year? The precise calculations which 
she makes, consciously or unconsciously, before fixing a 
price is not so important to us as is the .observation 
that she does not fix the price arbitrarily, but uses her 
exper ience • The same holds tr u'e even if she would want to 
mar ket an entirely novel product,· an exotic fruit never 
seen in the market before. She would still rely on expe-
r ience regard ing the level of pr ices commanded by other 
types of fruit as well as exper ience-based estimates. of 
the willingness of customers to pay extra for novel and 
exotic-looking fruits. She may, however, overestimate. the 
latter, or. she may just in general be a greedy .01d woman 
trying to squeeze customers. In this event, she may expe-
r ience 'er ror ',i.e. failure to sell at the fi xed pr ice. 
She may decide. to try and wait for some time, but if she 
consistently fails to sell her produce, she will probably 
embark upon a new 'trial' e.9,. she will lower ,the price. 
This she will do until she experiences a satisfactory 
sale, i. e. a sale. which. is satisfactory measured by. her 
expectations. Note that this process does not ensure that 
an economic optimum wi11ever.be reached, as the yardstick 
of error as well as"satisfaction is the expectations which . . 
exist prior to each trial. -
From this simp1e.example, .we. may draw a few observations: 
We have assumed that the person who markets a good relies 
, "¥ - - , 
for as. long as p~ssibleon behaving stereotypically. Only 
when this results· in an error, i. e •. when the. guidelines 
provided by the market and ,the seller's experience is not 
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sufficient information to fix a price which will attract 
buyers, will she embark on a new 'trial', a new price, un-
til a harmony between expectations and results is achie-
ved. 
This indicates that a process of trial and error involves 
two different types of behaviour: a stereotypical pattern, 
which is upheld for as long as the per son exper iences 
harmony between expectations and results, and a searching 
behaviour which has two phases: 1) recognition of failure 
of the stereotypical behaviour to achieve harmony between 
expectations and results; 2) attempts to remedy this si-
tuation by adopting a new rule (a price). In the case that , 
this is successful, it may 'turn into a new stereotype, 
which will then be adhered to until new problems are en-
countered. 
Still, the example only bears on individual .behaviour. If, 
as we have suggested, a similar process is discernible at 
the level of society, we shall have to investigate whether 
it is warranted to - interpret social behaviour. in similar 
categories. 
Let us first assume that groups in society as well as in-
di viduals may develop stereotypical behaviour. Is it pos-
sible to find any evidence to support this assumption? 
Firstly, 'we may observe, that the mere identification of a 
group ~ group demands that the group is bound together 
, ei ther by formal rules or by common values and norms re-
flected in a common pattern of reactions. We may think of 
the anti~nuclear groups which, as we saw in chapter three, 
., -
have developed· a set of shared values on the basis of a 
shared reaction to nuclear power. Along these lines, 
Cotgrove (1982) suggests that values are relevant to si-
tuations, I.e. that individuals have different scales of 
value operating in different areas of their .life. If poli-
tical groups are formed by individuals who share the ex-
perience .• of particular problems, . this would make sense. 
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within this framework, the working class in a Marxian 
sense may well be conceptually defined as a class (the 
class in itself), but it would only have an impact on so-
ciety as a poli tical group in the situations when it was 
recognized as such by its members (the class for itself), 
and not merely by theorists. 
If individuals corne together to form groups out of a 
shared wish to do something about a particular set of pro-
blems, they may exper ience that belong ing to a group en-
hances their abili ty to influence those problems. If the 
group can be seen" as' successful, or at least potentially 
successful, in counter ing the, particular problem or pro-
vidi~g a convincing vision~f an alternative state of 
things, this reaction may be strengthened. A stereotypical 
behaviour will be developed. For example, a stereotypical 
reaction within grass root groups toward the emergence of 
new problems consists in mounting campaigns which follow 
set rules, e.g. selling badges and stickers to raise 
money, arranging demonstrations etc. Taking the analysis 
one step further, we may assume that such interpersonal 
stereotypes' are developed also between the members of a 
society. We need only think of language to make sure that 
this is indeed the case; but is it the case of other types 
of acti vi ties as well? The" notion of social condi tioning 
implies that interpersonal stereotypes do exist: that so-
ciety is bound together by behaviour which is guided by a 
set of shared norms and generally established methods for 
,handling specific types of problems. We need only consider 
a fragment of our own daily routines to accept the plausi-
bility of this suggestion. The original motives for ac-
cepting a particular pattern of reactions need not be part 
of the conscious mind of each individual for her to behave 
'stereotypically~ For as long as behaviour in accordance 
with' norms, rules a~d accepted' methods b,ring about. s~'ti's­
factory results, there is no need for the ind i vidual to 
inquire into her' own motives: she unquestioningly accepts 
that certain behavio~r is 'the do~e thing'.' 
Having explained what can be understood by 'stereotypical 
behaviour' in the context of society, we move to the next 
step in the process: that of change. If societies tend to 
develop stereotypical behaviour, how do we explain the 
emergence of problems and cr ises in societies? We have 
suggested that we shall have to look for some sort of er-
ror; but how are we to understand 'error' in a social con-
text? Following the example of individual trial and error, 
error would denote condi tions exper ienced as unsafisfac-
tory in relation to previous expectations. We need there-
fore to' explain what kind of problems may develop in so-
cieties, and why these come to be regarded as· problems, 
deficiencies or unsatisfactory conditions. 
Whilst we have concluded that the development of interper-
sonal stereotypes is a precondi tion for social integra-
tion, we have not implied that this integration is ever 
achieved in full. The notion' of stereotypical behaviour 
does not imply that conflicts cease to exist. Conflicts 
between different groups in society may for example arise 
if these groups make claims to the same resource, and in 
this.·6ase conflict resolution' mechanisms may, themselves 
turn into stereotypes. For example, in the 1950s' and 
1960s, the stereotypical solution to conflicts between the 
working class and capi tal was compromise, negotiation and 
wage rises. 
(" ' 
Also there seems to be evidence that stereotypical. beha-
viour at the level of society per· se ,may be a source of 
error. 'Stereotypical' does not mean. static: indeed, ste-
reotypical behaviour may result in the highly dynamic de~ 
velopmentof certain. parameters of.sciciety.-Consider, for 
example, the population growth in the third world result-
.ing from the stereotypical reproduction patterns which de-
rive their original rationality from the need to ensure 
someone to look after, the parents in their old age, but 
. . 
which, given altered conditions, produce highly irrational 
results. Likewis~, the ster~otypical political patterns of 
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the industrialized nations in the 1950s and 1960s derived 
their rationality from the aim of maintaining economic 
growth. Later, however, economic growth was identified as 
a source of social problems. 
We can point to a number of mechanisms which each may con-
tribute to this apparent tendency of stereotypical beha-
viour to produce counter final results. The phenomenon of 
crowding provides an illustration. An activity, e.g. vi-
siting a small Greek island, may be a pleasant experience 
for the first tourists who experience an original, un-
spoilt natural and cultural environment. Yet, as this ex-
per ience is made available to the major i ty by the tour ist 
industry, its precondi tions cease to exist: the invading 
mass tour ism annihilates the or iginal society and, creates 
its own culture. In this case, activities originating in 
an intention to spread a benefit to a wider group leads to 
the destruction of the original benefit. 
Crowding, or the disjunction between the results of a gi-
ven·· activity pursued by a small number of people and the 
results of the same activity if pursued by everyone, has 
been identified by several authors as an important impe-
diment to social ,rationality. Hirsch (1977). shows that in 
periods of economic growth effects of this kind arise in 
liberal economies, even wi th the aid of specific correc-
tives by state intervention. Examining cases like subur-
banisation, public transport, and the use of landscapes 
for leisure purposes, Hirsch finds. that the piecemeal 
choice made by each individual is not, under conditions of 
economic growth, a valid. guide to what individuals would 
choose if they could see the results of - their choices 
along with other peoples' choices: 
"Since the piecemeal choices between the opportunities 
that are available through market choices at any given 
. ,time involve unintended and at times undesired reper-
cussions, choice in the small does not provide· choice 
in the large." (Hirsch, 1977, p.1S). 
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Hirsch locates the source of counterfinal results of so-
cial action within the state-modified liberal paradigm and 
the politics that go along with it. We may, however, find 
indications to show that other political stereotypes would 
produce counterfinal results as well. Elster (1984) sums 
up four distinctions significantly influencing the rela-
tionship between the purpose of social change and the re-
sults: 1) local versus global effects: 2) partial effects 
vs. net effects: 3) short term vs. long term effects: and 
3) transi tional effects vs. equilibirum effects. Out of 
these, the first two distinctions have particular signi-
ficance when we consider the effects of stereotypical pat-
terns of reactions at the level of society. We have argued 
, 
that such behaviour is developed because it initially ap-
pears to' be efficient in solving the most pertinent 
problems of society. But ,Elster, argues that it is not 
valid to infer from the' success or failure of a small 
scale institutional chang'e a~y, .conclusions regarding· the 
effects of introducing the change at the large scale. 
Elster refers, here to the example of, socialist communes 
which, he argues, have been successful because they were 
able' to profit from the technology developed by the 
surrounding capitalist society. These prerequisites are 
closely connected to the isolated character of the 
experiment and would disappear if the change was adopted 
at a large scale. 
The distinction between partial effects and net effects is 
based on the observation that any, change may occur in a 
number of stages. When we ~va1uate the change afterwards, 
it is in terms of the net, effects. These may, however, 
bear 1i tt1e relationship ,to" the partial effects which we 
wanted to' obtain by initiating, the change. According to 
. Elster" ,the poin~, of, this observation, is that even if, one 
(and one may a1so,be a social ins~i~ution like a Depart-
ment, of Energy or a po1i tical group trying to, influence 
energy policy) possesses precise and correct knowledge a-
" :'. , 
bout a causal relation, this is of little relevance if one 
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does not recognize the different effects that may arise 
from the action which one initiates to reach the intended 
result, and which may cancel this out. This argument re-
quires the assumption that any action bears with it a mul-
titude of consequences which cannot be analysed beforehand 
because of the immense complexitity of social systems, 
which means' that individual activities, group activities 
and state activities interact in space and time. Popper 
(1963) cites as an example of these 'unintended consequen-
ces of intentional human action' the man who wishes to buy 
a house' in a certain district and thereby unwittingly con-
tributes to raising house prices in that area, while Free-
man (1977) uses th~ example of ,car-ownership: 
"The individual who buys a car did not and could not 
have worked out the long-term consequences for the ur-
ban' environment of millions of similar decisions. Nor 
indeed did the suppliers. Yet the social costs may well 
be so great that they",negate the ,private benefit to 
most consumers ( ••• ) (Freeman, 1977, p. 82). 
The relationship between' different kinds 
their implications can be illustrated 
of effects 
if we think 
and 
of 
thrc)wing pebbles into a pond. If more than one" pebble is 
thrown, the inter ference of the waves soon makes it ex-
tremely difficult to predict how the banks will be af-
fected by the waves. Now'it may be' objected that that is 
exactly what science and social science is for: in the 
case of the pebbles, although the ~ave patterns seem very 
complex, a theory of waves will enable us to predict the 
, ' " , 
interference' patterns and the final impact on the' banks. 
Likewise, popper (1973) proposes that the main task of so-
cial science is to trace - the unint~nded. consequences of 
intentional human actions. But' as "the a~g~ment presented 
above' seems to suggest, this may be in prlnciple impossi''': 
'ble. Consider" again -the example of pebble:-throwing: while 
we are busy throwing pebbles and analyzing wave-patterns, 
the pebbles pile up in the pond, causing it to flood. This 
consequence might have 'been foreseen had we looked for it, 
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but we were not. We were too absorbed being in the partial 
and immediately visible disturbance of the bank resulting 
from the waves. 
If the energy policy field has developed by trial and er-
ror, then we would expect to find periods of stereotypical 
behaviour here, too. And indeed, we have observed that 
the energy policy field for a number of years from 1950 up 
to the late 1960s was dominated by a consensus view, and 
that this phenomenon was not restr icted to single nations 
or even -to capi talist economies. We have dur ing this pe-
r iod identified the stereotypical behaviour of different 
groups in society. We may mention e.g. the general propen-
sity to solve diverse problems by increasing the consump-
tion of energy (think e.g. of kitchen utensils solving the 
problem of time-consuming housework at the level of house-
holds or the introduction of labour-saving machinery in a 
period of decreasing unemployment in the firms) J. the ten-
dency of the energy industries to cpncentrate and rationa-
lize operationsJ and, the recognition that the' possibility 
of a future energy' gap" necessi tated state investments in 
new -and efficient means of energy production. These pat-
terns of reaction were reflected in the generally accepted 
dogma,itself a stereotype, that growth in energy consump-
tion was a necessary precondition for as well as a neces-
sary result of economic, growth. This dogma was instantly 
verifiable and was supported by actual social activities. 
This would explain why it became almost universally accep-
ted' to the degree that' it was a self-evident policy as-
sumption and also throws light on the fact that it was ac-
cepted throughout the industr ialized world including so-
cialist nations; as shown· by Lindbe'rg (1977). This fact 
has not been explained convincingly by established theo-
ries addressing the ~nergy policy field, whether the dogma 
has : been seen as a result of insufficient theoretical 
knowledge, , or ; as an expression of an' ideology determined 
by the inherent tendency to accumulation in the energy in-
dustry. 
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As we have seen above, there is some reason to think that 
the adoption across society of any type of stereotypical 
behaviour will lead to negative and unintended results, 
and the description of the development of the energy poli-
cy field seems to confirm this. We have recorded the re-
sults of the policies of the 1950s and 1960s as they were 
interpreted by particular poli tical groups, and seen that 
a number of problems were identified, e.g. increasing en-
vironmental pollution or dependence on single fuels. We 
must assume that these effects were the unintended re-
sults of the stereotypical behaviour of the consensus pe-
riod. 
We indicated earlier that theidenfication of 'error' was 
conditional upon expectations against which an achieved 
result could be measured. As observed in the example of 
individual trial and error behaviour, the fixing of an 
original price, as well as the 'incentive to change the 
pr ice, was der i ved from a set of' expectations' regarding 
the.sales. We may trace this expectation back to an objec-
tive (not necessary conscious) of earning money; and per-
haps .. even further back to an original goal of self-preser-
vation. But where do objectives originate?Pet~rsen (1985) 
suggests that objectives and values arise out of a tension 
"between expectations and experience. This tension could 
also be termed 'need', but note that it is not need in any 
objective, original, or absolute sense of the word. Dis-
cussions of need in such terms seem to us to be less 
fruitful, as they 'tend to distract us from the fact· that 
need is an experienced .condition. Therefore it would be 
more correct to say that new objectives can only arise 
when individuals or groups exper ience conditions as in-
tolerable or. unbearable measured 'by their expectations, 
and at:the same time are convinced that these conditions 
are not" necessary~ i:e. they could bedifferent.-We shall 
therefore examine closer the suggestion that social change 
aris~s out of experienced need, and that the experience of 
need is itself conditional upon the ability to visualize 
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absence of the condition which is experienced as negative. 
Petersen (1985) suggests that groups and societies may al-
so in this way 'recognize problems'. Evidently, in the 
final analysis it is always individuals who recognize pro-
blems; social collectives are not endowed with senses. But 
when, as we have seen a group can developed its own pat-
tern of reaction, this involves also the group (or socie-
ty) developing ideas, norms and values. We shall suggest, 
that these goals are themselves subject to a process of 
trial and error. In order to explain this suggestion, let 
us assume that a particular group recognizes a problem in 
society, i.e. a set of conditions which are thought to be 
unsatisfactory. The group seeks an explanation of the 
emergence of this problem. To find this explanation they 
may consult theorists, either comtemporary authors or re-
searchers· sympathetic to the cause of the group, or his-
torical theories which seem to offer relevant interpreta-
tions of policies and actions of the previous period and 
explanations of why they have failed to achieve the 
ideal which served as justification. As an example of such 
criticism we need only think of the emergence in the 1970s 
of a widespread criticism of GNP as an indication of wel-
fare 13 • At the more general level· we have seen that the 
relevance of economic growth as a social objective was 
subjected to increasingly harsh attacks. by political 
groups. Parallel to this, theories emerged to explain 
why economic growth and growth in energy consumption 
failed to contr ibute to generalized social welfare· whilst 
at·the same time creating problems especially in relation 
to the natural environment. 
We suggest that these events indicate social recognition 
of 'error' i.e. the extensive recogni tion that the actual 
results of social. a6tions have increasingly departed from 
the ideal which once served as justification for these 
actions. We have suggested that the political groups with-
in society may be seen as an embodiment or an impression 
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on the social structure of the problems recognized by in-
dividuals in previous periods. Hence we may interpret e.g. 
the organisation of the working class as a result of pro-
blems created in the process of industrialization. This 
also gives us a clue as to why new groups appear in so-
ciety as an indication of 'error'. As long as the errors 
experienced by individuals in relation to expectations can 
be contained wi thin the poli ticial structure, there is no 
motive for forming new groups. Therefore we may assume 
that small 'errors', isolated cases of unexpected problems 
(like e.g. the Windscale fire) may be 'patched up' within 
the existing social structure. When these problems become 
persistent we would expect the formation of new groups as 
, 
the existing political groups are rooted in the sterotypi-
cal behaviour and the world-views of earlier periods. The 
general problem of the recognition of 'error' is illustra-
ted in fig. 6.1. 
The diagram is' intended as a visual representation of an 
idea; we do not want to suggest that any of the depicted 
categor ies are measurable. The argument which we seek to 
illustrate in this way goes as follows: if our assumptions 
regarding the role of ideals are correct, the expectations 
created by. the successfull application of a certain (ste-
reotypical) behaviour will tend to exceed the actual re-
sults. This does not need to give rise to the identifica-
tion of an error in the system. As. long as the level of 
-
satisfaction (always, we remember, defined in relation to 
the ideal) continues to rise, the world-views, values and 
obj ecti ves can be upheld; they seem to produce pos i ti ve 
results, and can be expected to do so in the future. This 
will in its turn cause the level of' expec.tation to rise 
further. At some point in time, however, we have 
suggested, that the results of the' actions which are in 
accordance with the methods prescribed by the shared ideal' 
will fail to satisfy the expectations. An "error' is 
recognized. 
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Fig. 6.1 The Development of 'Errors'. 
expectations 
,error 
satisfaction L-_________________________________________ ~ time 
Initially, as we have suggested, and as our empirical ana-
lysis corroborates, 'error'is recognized by particular 
groups in society. In order to explain how errors come to 
be universally recognized, it is necessary' to investigate 
in more depth the concept of social myth. Until now, we 
have spoken of the objectives and values of groups and so-
ciety as if they ,were given. We have suggested, that they 
are subject to trial and error, but ,have not specified the 
phases of this process. Petersen (1985) suggests that the 
e~perience of tension between expectations and results 
leads to widespread recogni tion of the myth-character of 
the. world-views which gave rise to the expectations;, and 
he concludes that both the laissez-faire pgradigm and the 
paradigm of controlling and planning· the future has re-
vealed themselves as myths. This" 'myth-cr isis' will then 
give rise to-a sear~h for new explanations and new"inter-
pretations. In this' phase (where 'error' is recognized),a 
number of different myths will: compete,' until finally one 
is adopted as the 'dominant myth which gives ·rise to a new 
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tr ial. And once th is has happened, the myth is no longer 
seen as such. It is adopted exactly because it provides 
hope that the promises it holds can be redeemed. Myths, 
then, are social ideals. The obvious example of a myth is 
the notion of a utopia, a society which is 'nowhere' and 
in which all evils exper ienced in a histor ical present 
time can be seen to be overcome. But also socio-economic 
paradigms or political theories may be viewed as potential 
candidates for social myths. This is brought out by Pop-
per, when he observes: 
"The course of history is never shaped by theoretical 
constructions, however excellent, although some schemes 
might, admittedly, exert so~e influence, along with ma-
ny other less rational ( ••• ) factors. ( ••• ) All social 
engineering, no matter how much it prides itself on 
realism and on its scientific character, is doomed to 
remain a utopian dream." (Popper, 1957, p. 47). 
It should be noticed that Popper was mainly concerned with 
showing that 'histor icism' (read Marxism) was a pseudo-
science.' His own suggestion for 'piecemeal social engi-
neer ing' does· not, as we can see today, escape the above 
consideration, and the reason for this is to be found in 
the "argument itself. Even though, as Popper correctly ob-
serves, there is by necessity a distance between theory 
and reali ty, this does not imply that the course of his-
tory is not shaped by historical constructions. Although 
the application of theories do not ,yield the intended re-
~ults, they do yield other results; even though the social 
cond i t'ions do not-" bear the intended impr int of the myth 
guiding the behaviour of its members, they nevertheless 
bear an imprint on this myth, even if this is not instant-
ly recognizable as such. 
Thi~suggests.thatany theoretical construction bearing on 
societ'y' might serve' as a myth. According to our theory, 
however, to become the lodestar of society . the myth 
should in some way be connected to those cond i tions of 
the previous period that were regarded as negative by 
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creating a distance to these conditions. This requirement 
echoes Goodwin and Taylor's (1982) 'prerequisites for a 
thoroughly constructive or reconstructive political theo-
ry' : 
"1) a conception of society as an artefact (unlike Na-
ture) capable of being purposefully altered by man him-
self; 
2) the conviction that progress, ~ improvement is 
possible; 
3) an analysis of socio-poli tical life which is free 
from _ fatalism, the que sera, sera attitude which nega-
tes from the outset human attempts at change, and also 
free from reliqious deference ( •••• ) ." (Goodwin and 
Taylor, 1982, pp. 23-24). 
This suggests that political theories can never be 'true', 
that they are al~ays relative to the historical situation 
which has prompted their formulation. This is explained by 
Goodwin and .Taylor as a result of "the fact that our quo-
tidian politics is, in theory, about finding ways to uto~ 
pia and, in practice, ab~ut compromise between entrenched 
interests'~ (Goodwin and Taylor, .1982, p.35). This observa-
.' ~ 
tion bears specifically on- utopias; 
Taylor themselves observe, utopias 
myth: 
but as Goodwin and 
are only one kind of 
"The devices just descr ibed (ideali zation of the past 
and criticism of the present; justification of the pre~ 
sent reference to a hypothetical. past; justification of 
the present by reference to a - hypothetical present; 
constructive criticism of the present via and ideal al-
ternati ve; inversion of the present for. cr i tical pur-
poses; and justification of the pr~sent by reference to 
a worse future, T.A.) can be viewed as ways of removing 
current social restraints and culture-specific elements 
( ••• ) In this respect, the Golden .. Age, the state of na-
ture, utopia and the rest can be designated-the salient 
myths of poli tical theory since,. like myths, they at-
tempt to portray eternal ver i ties about human nature 
and ideals; in an imaginary or symbolic form." (Goodwin 
and Taylor, 1982, p. 27). 
But having observed this, Goodwin 
another concept, the 'constructive 
- 336 -
and Taylor 
political 
introduce 
theory,14. 
This seems to suggest a distinction between theories which 
descr ibe cond i tions which are not real i zable (u topias or 
myths), and theories which are constructive in the sense 
that they may serve as guidance for action to change 
society. But this distinction is only possible as seen 
from a par ticular point in time. Here, now, the 'Golden 
age' theories or Laissez Faire have been revealed as 
myths, because the promises they held were not redeemed. 
For the original protagonists of these theories, they were 
constructive political theories. 
Now we can see how one myth may be replaced by a new. Ifa 
group in society recognizes an error which reveals the 
myth-character of the traditional world-views and 
paradigms, it will seek to create for itself a new ideal: 
a potential myth. We would therefore expect that as the 
number of c errors grow 
still more proposi tions 
(as we have said that they will), 
will appear which puts the old 
myth into doubt and puts forward alternative solutions to 
the experienced problems. These completing myths enter 
into a process of trial and error. We may say that they 
are. tested out, not in a ' just' or ' rational' way, but 
nevertheless the test will eventually show which proposal 
can be generally accepted as the new myth. 
We may see the politicization of energy as one aspect of a 
recogni tion of error. The proposals .for . alternative energy 
~trategies then becomes understandable as contributions to 
a.new myth, each representing a negation of that aspect of 
the present which a particular group exper iences as most 
problematic. Renewable resources to replace exhaustible 
resources, when resource depletion ·is seen to threaten 
future energy supplies and the environment1 .. decentralized 
provis,lon of energy . , . 
consumer Vls-a-V1S 
'soft' technologies 
these' are . examples 
1950s and 1960s as 
,to overcome alienation of the energy 
the centralized efficient industrY1 
to replace 'hard' technologies1 all 
of . interpreting the results of the 
problems and posing the solutions in 
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terms of negations. 
Having said that a new myth emerges out of negations of 
the negative results of the previous period does not imply 
that we can predict the content of the new myth before it 
has been established. As Goodwin and Taylor observe, there 
is no such thing as the opposite of a social institution. 
So we must imagine that to each problem, several 'nega-
tions' exist, i.e. imagined conditions where the specific 
problem would be overcome. 
A new myth would therefore be established if trials on the 
basis of a -certain theoretical proposition (' the adoption , 
of renewable energy will be a benefit to the economy, the 
environment and democracy') could be generally interpreted 
as successful. The myth would then serve as the basis of a 
new tr ial. - Wi thin such a tr ial social action would in-
creasingly be brought to correspond to the myth, new ste-
reotypes would be created, and eventually this will give 
rise to new problems. 
We may now interpret the development of the energy policy 
field during the period 1950-1980 in terms of a process of 
trial and error. We have already discussed the 'calm' pe-
riod stretching from 1950 to about _ 1969. We may now see 
the period from 1969 to about 1978 - as a period in which 
the _ expectations of economic growth, including the idea 
fhat growth- in en~rgy consumption contributed to economic 
growth and welfare, were increasingly recognized asa myth 
In this light, the oil crisis15 only accelerated this 
deeper crisis. The adoption of new instruments and methods 
in energy-policy,can now be interpreted as partial trials, 
as can the emergence of renewable' energy exper iments. Al-
though we cannot yet clearly see the contours of -the m-yth 
that m~y replace tha~ of the 1950s and 1960s, the' a~alisis 
has shown the contours of some propositions which 'seem to 
be generally accepted, and which may therefore be seen as 
potential elements of a new myth: economic efficiency in 
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energy production and use, e.g. energy conservation should 
be encouraged, and dependence on energy imports should be 
avoided. There also seems to be a tendency to prefer more 
decentrali zed solutions. These propos i tions seem to be 
generally accepted, although it is still early days to as-
sess whether they will in the final analysis contribute to 
a myth which will command the active support of the whole 
of society. 
If the energy policy field, together with the rest of so-
ciety, develops through' processes of tr ial and er ror, we 
can also understand why both similar i ties and differences 
can be identified looking at the development of the energy 
policy fields of two differen't nations. Different condi-
tions at ~ any point in time will lead to different inter-
pretations, different negations, different myths and 
therefore different trials. But at the same time, some 
problems are common to more than one country. The develop-
ment of the· international economy has, as we have seen, 
had a profound impact on the scope for energy consumption, 
and other types of international events, like the oil cri-
ses,. have had a similar impact in the two countr ies. Fur-
thermore, the internationalisation of information dis-
semination means that individuals or groups of different 
countries increasingly have access to the same information 
and explanations when looking for solutions to a myth-cri-
sis. This implies that a proposal can be adopted as ·the 
basis of tr ials in different countr ies, irrespective of 
its origin, as long as it seems to provide a credible al-
ternative to the myth in crisis. 
The theory of tr ial and er ror seems· to u~ to provide a 
consistent framework for analysing social change. But a 
problem. remains: if, as we think, theor ies about society 
are themselves subject to this process of trial and error, 
they are ei ther reflections of the dominant myths of a 
consensus period or negations of earlier theories attempt-
ing to explain why the earlier interpretations gave rise 
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to problems and prescribe solutions to these problems. But 
if this is the case, why have we discovered this process? 
The theory tells us that we are bound to reflect our posi-
tion in time and space; but at the same time the theory 
puts forward statements about the nature of the process. 
_. This seeming paradox is resolved if we remember that the 
theory is being formulated in a per iod of rapid change. 
Having lived through a period which has displayed a marked 
shift in priorities in the social sciences, it has 
prompted the ini tial question: wh ich process is gu id ing 
the introduction of new issues, interpretations and 
methods into our field? Looking to the policy field, we 
found that the question was important not only in relation 
to the development of theor ies' about society but also to 
those ideas about society embodied as policies and 
political conflicts. Secondly, in ,accordance with the 
theory, we make no claim to having arrived at a final 
truth. We are only trying to make sense out of history as 
seen from our particular point in time. 
We have still to discuss the implications for the future 
of the theory of trial and error. This we shall do in the 
following section, which addresses the consequences of 
adopting a chronologically relativist view of social 
change. 
,. 
- 340 -
6.3 Consequences in Theory - Consequences for Theory. 
Looking at the energy policy field today, we find that it 
is populated by decision-makers and would-be decision-ma-
kers each trying to impress their version of the most de-
sirable future onto reality. What are the consequences of 
the theory of trial and error for those attempts? We may 
elici t two types of consequences: 1) consequences of the 
trial and error theory for the (real) development of the 
energy policy field and 2) consequences of the tr ial and 
error theory for future attempts to change the energy po-
licy field. 
Of course these two are deeply'interconnected. We must em-
phasize that the trial and error theory bears on our know-
ledge about historical processes, and therefore on our 
knowledge about the processes involved in changing the 
energy policy field. The immediate consequences of the 
theory are therefore not of the:same status as the conse-
quences of a theoretical' advance in physics for space-tra-
vel. The theory does not immediately contribute to a 
c~ange of the future configuration of energy sources, for 
example, it tells us how such configurations are likely to 
come about. If changes happen through tr ial and er ror , 
then a new configuration emerges out of the old, but not 
in the sense that it can be predicted: 
n( ••• ) the ,new myth and the new society is a possible, 
but not necessary, result of the old society. The 
change has happened through thinking and active beings 
reacting 'to condi tions, creating new myths and exper i-
menting with new solutions." (Petersen, 1985, p. 26.). 
A consequence of the theory is that a revi talisation of 
old myths iS,likely to fail, because these myths have been 
revealed' as such. The 1970s,crisis in energy supply in-
volved a gradual realization that ,a market-dominated ener-
gysupply, had produced negative ~onsequences. As a 
solution, state regulation was increasingly tried out. But 
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in other spheres, negative effects of increased state 
regulation was already emerging, creating a crisis for the 
myth of 'the planned society'. We will therefore expect 
that proposals which involve increased state control are 
unlikely to be realized. Likewise, we do not expect propo-
sals for market control of the energy sector to be rea-
lized in the immediate future. The organisation which will 
eventually emerge will probably involve both elements of 
state control and elements of decentralisation and, proba-
bly, regard to the environment on. the one hand and econo-
mic efficiency on the other will be important elements. 
The consequences of. the theory of trial and error for the 
attempts to change the energy. policy field follows in part 
from what has been said above. The theory suggests that 
the goals and values which inspire social change are out 
of the reach of theory. These goals and values are genera-
ted in the' process of social. change by people, indivi-
duals, and groups who react to.their surroundings •. Realiz-
ing that the results of social, change are unforeseeable 
may give .,rise simultaneously to, hope and disappointment. 
Disappointment may stem from the .. sha tter ing of a convic-
tion that the future may be known, hope from the promise 
that Ii ttle . is determined •. From these observations, and 
from the observations of . the previous paragraph, we may 
conclude,that the probability that the 'alternative energy 
strategies' will be realized is small. They demand a pre-
sently unacceptable level of state control and, planning. 
Faced with. the evidence of the failures of past genera-
tions . of energy planners to foresee the, problems of the 
future, the scenario-makers proceed within,the myth of the 
planned society, and are therefore likely to_fail. 
This is indir~ctly supported by one of the more thoughtful 
scenario-makers, ,Chapman (1975)., He observes: that the 
'scenar io' approach to, policy suffers from, ser ious draw-
backs. A crucial assumption of scenarios is consistency of 
policy over time, and this rarely holds. In addition, the 
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uncertainties associated with future fuel supplies, tech-
nological change etc. lead Chapman to conclude that possi-
ble variations' in the future results of policies may lead 
to the peculiarity, that under some conditions there might 
be no difference between the outcomes of policies which 
represent different objectives. On this count alone, ener-
gy scenar ios should not be accepted at face value. But 
there are additional problems which are related to the 
status of these 'strategies'. As 'strategies' of one group 
of individuals (although, as we saw in chapter three, usu-
ally masquerading as 'the national interest' or 'a socia-
list approach to energy policy,16), they are only myths: 
proposals for strategies which could be adopted by socie-
ty. Everyone is free to create' his own utopia, but nobody 
is free to realize it. 
As we have seen, elements of such strategies may be in-
corporated into the dominant myth through group actions •. 
In the present situation, however, this does not increase 
the chance that anyone strategy could be' adopted as a 
unifying theory. On the contrary, we have seen indications 
that· fragments from these strategies are reflected in 
group ideas and that the imprint left on the ~ctual energy 
structure, which is highly state controlled, reflects the 
degree to which the political groups are able to command a 
poli tical major i ty on pursuing particular elements of the 
strategies . (think e.g. of state. subsidies for' wind-
machines). This degree, we have suggested, is' intimately 
.. 
connected wi th the perceived failure of existing systems. 
In this way, the pure theoretical context wi thers away, 
, ~ ." 
and the real results are born in the impure context de-
fined by the experienced successes -and failures of the 
existing institutions and practices. 
Finally ,we can' p<?int to a specific set of problems which 
arise from the 
most proposals 
future. Often 
a~sumptions about stat~ 
for a version of the 
it is uncr i tically 
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control inherent in 
al ternati ve energy 
assumed that the 
alternative future can be brought about by changing the 
assumptions of state energy policy, and most often this 
would mean a greater emphasis on collective rationality. A 
multitude of collective rationales are proposed, ranging 
from the need to avoid a climatic disaster 17 , over the 
need to avoid pursuing "an energy policy which is un-
ashamedly geared to the interests of capital" (Spence, 
1984), to Lindberg's three (1977 III) 'policy principles': 
1) "Energy conservation and a phased transi tion toward a 
more labour-intensive economy should become pr imary goals 
of national policy". 2) "The development of renewable, 
nonpolluting, relatively low-technology, and decentralized 
sources of energy supply should receive priority over fos-
sil fules and nuclear fusion": 3) "The transition to an 
energy-efficient economy based on renewable resources will 
require that the industrial nations develop a positive un-
exploi tative international strategy" (Lindberg, 1977 III, 
pp. 364-366). 
But. the mere fragmentation of, poli tical groups ind ica tes 
that appeals to the collective rationality may at present 
be at the best inefficient. Furthermore the idea (itself, 
we may observe, a myth) that the state should execute the 
collecti ve will through an energy policy in the interest 
of society does not at present fulfill one of the require-
ments 'of a would-be myth:: it must be able to elici t ac-
tion. The alternative energy strategies show a desirable 
end state, but what do we do, living in" a world of coal-
fired electr ici ty,' to get ourselves there? The calls for 
state action seem a highly inefficient way to. promote a 
proposal for a new myth.-Hence we find ourselves in an ab-
surd si tuation that while great parts of ~he populations 
of both Britain and Denmark in theory agree that something 
ought to be d~ne about energy supply structure,at the same 
~. 
time these are the' people who uphold the structure by 
the stereotypical behaviour which is guided by the rejec-
ted myths "of state regulated economic growth. A new myth 
has yet to be found. 
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6.4 Conclusions 
We find it warranted to conclude that the changes in the 
energy policy field contain elements of a process of trial 
and error, in which individuals and groups react to condi-
tions which are experienced as intolerable against the 
background of their expectations by actively trying to in-
fluence those conditions and by producing visions of a 
future condition in which the experienced tension is dis-
solved. 
In the present situation of 
would-be myths for achieving . 
an ongoing battle between 
the right to interpret the 
world, a possible task appe~rs for a critical social 
science: to contribute towards ascertaining that the pro-
posals which are brought forward do not just represent 
retrogressions to earlier conditions. We must criticize 
attempts to restore credibility to the myth of free-market 
rationality as well as attempts to propose a return to a 
preindustrial stage •.. These myths have been left behind be-
cause amongst other things they produced unacceptable re-
sults. We may investigate the assumptions of new proposals 
in order to see whether they address the above-mentioned 
problems.· If we sympathize with particular political 
groups, instead ,of providing theories to show that the 
practice of that particular group is eventually in the 
true interest of society, we might instead investigate the 
practice of the group' in the context of the· policy" field 
in which it. is operating and seek to identify the· trends 
which under the present situation work for the strategy of 
the group and which worked against it. 
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NOTES FOR CHAPTER 6 
1. See e.g. Chapman (1975)1 Leach et. ale (1979)1 Bacon and Valentine 
(1981)1 Flood (1983). 
2. Blegaa et. al. (1976). 
3. Hvelplund et. al. (1983). 
4. For example, Tietenberg (1976) observes that policy-makers need to 
minimize negative outcomes of energy policy in order to ensure be-
ing re-elected. But the complexity of the issues involved in ener-
gy policy decisionmaking necessitates that theoretical analysis is 
brought to bear on these issues 
" ( ••• ) to collect the relevant, available information and sys-
tematize it so that it provides the quantity and quality of in-
formation needed to reach a decision within the constraints im-
posed on the analysis." (Tietenberg, 1976, p.5). 
Addressing energy problems from' a poll tically different point of 
view, Ince (1982) also defines the role of theory as a means to 
political ends: 
"The aim of studies of this kind is not only to persuade the 
Department of Energy or other official bodies to change their 
minds and abandon their plans for a nuclear. future. Instead, it 
is to point out to the trade union members, local authorities, 
and the general public that well-researched alternatives to' 
established energy thinking exists and may even offer them more 
than the present official plans." (Ince, 1982, p. 189). 
Also the -articles in Lawrence (ed.) (1979) as well as a number of 
the contributions in Lindberg (ed.) (1977), although more criti-
cal, essentially adopt this rationale. 
5. See e.g. Lindberg (1977 II) pp. 336-338; Tietenberg (1976). 
6. Offe, C.: Strukturproblemerne des Kapitalistischen Staates. Frank-
furt am Main, 1973. 
7. We use the word 'ability' on purpose, .as there is recurring evi-
dence in Poulantzas analysis that the social structure is thought 
to be endowed with the purpose of sustaining the capitalist mode 
of production. According to Poulantzas, the function of the state 
specifies it as: 
"( ••• ) the cohesive factor (which) necessitates its specific 
intervention in that instance which maintains the determinant 
~ of a formation, namely the economic" (Polllantzas, 1968, p. 
55) • 
This inherent functionalism becomes even clearer when the role of 
ideology., is. -considered and Poulantzas states that the juridical 
and ideological structures, which are themselves determined in the 
last instance by the structure of the labour process, conceal from 
the agents of production the fact that their relations. are class 
relations (p.130). 
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8. Alternative Marxist interpretations of the state and the questions 
related to legitimizing capitalist relations of production all 
stemming from the late 1960s and early 1970s can be found in Ha-
bermas (1973) ~ affe (1972) ~ Altvater (1972) ~ Lapple (1973) ~ Milli-
band (1969). 
9. See e.g. Lindberg (1977) and Camilleri (1984) on energy policy~ 
Sandbach (1981) on technology and environmentalism. 
10. Lindberg's analysis is based in studies of inter alia Hungary, In-
dia and the u.S. 
11. See e.g. Popper (1957, 1963) ~ Hayek (1943). For a discussion of 
the political commitments of the philosophers belonging to the 
Vienna Circle, see Ravetz (1984). 
12. See Petersen (198S), pp. XXV-XXXI and p. 15-17. 
13. See e.g. Hirsch (1977) 1 Hvelplund (1980) addresses the relation-
ship between GNP and energy policy and concludes that the emphasis 
on GOP growth in the economic theories underlying energy policy 
leads to highly irrational results in a situation of environmental 
degradation and deteriorating social conditions for large frac-
tions of the population. 
14. This includes a demand that the myth must prescribe a plausible 
development taking the present state of affairs into account. As 
Chapman (197S) observes: "No matter how much choosing you do you 
cannot change the laws of thermodynamics, nor can you choose to 
make the OPEC countries reduce the price of oil, nor can you 
choose the UK to have a warmer climate. 
15. tf we regard the global social system, the oil crisis may itself 
be explained in terms of trial and error. Analyzing only a limited 
geographical area evidently specifies certain events as exogenous. 
The theory of trial and error, however, in emphasizing unpredicta-
bili ty of social change is not invalidated by the occurrence of 
'one-off events' as are determinist theories. 
16. See e.g. Ince (1981) or Spence (1984) 
17. Chapman (197S). 
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7. LEARNING FROM THE PAST? 
The present piece of work centres on change in the energy 
policy field. The aim of the study was to descr ibe and 
compare the historical development of the energy field in 
the 1950-1980 period in the United Kingdom and Denmark in 
order to establish which factors had contr ibuted to chan-
ges in the field and to establish a framework for evalu-
ating current conflicts in the field. This aim sprang from 
earlier work on Danish energy policy, which had indicated 
that the objectives, issues and methods of energy policy 
had undergone changes that could not be reduced to the im-
pacts of variations in fuel prices and other resource re-
lated conditions. It was observed that these changes were 
accompanied by the emergence of new political groups try-
ing to influence the agenda of state energy policy as well 
as changes in the energy poli tical atti tudes of existing 
groups. 
Against the background of these observations of the Danish 
energy policy field. we formulated eight hypotheses about 
change in the energy policy field. 
The hypotheses specified the factors that were expected to 
influence energy policy and the relations between' these 
factors. In addition, it was suggested that the process of 
change could not be understood solely from analyses of 
. these factors or the relations between them, but demanded 
a framework for understanding social change in general, 
and it was suggested, that the I tr ial-and-error-theory of 
social change. developed by. Petersen (1985) represented 
such a framework. 
,The first hypothesis concerned the nature of change during 
. the period of analysis. We suggested that within this pe-
riod,' a politicization of energy had taken place in' the 
industrialized World, and therefore in Britain as well as 
Denmark. This was founded in observations of the Danish 
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energy policy field, where we had observed a politiciza-
tion characterized by the emergence of new groups attemp-
ting to influence state energy policy as well as by in-
creasingly intense political conflicts over energy related 
issues. We then suggested that changes in the energy po-
licy field were directly influenced by the activities of 
poli tical groups. We' observed that the groups presently 
attempting to influence state energy policy included the 
political parties, trade unions, industries within and 
outside the energy sector and different types of interest 
groups, e.g. anti-nuclear groups. We therefore suggested 
that we would expect· to find the objectives and attitudes 
of those groups reflected in energy policy. 
Next, we wanted to establish the importance of changes in 
the material conditions in the energy policy field. We 
suggested that the emergence of new groups and changed at-
titudes of existing groups reflected ch~nges i~ conditions" 
related-to the provision of energy, such as access to 
energy resources, changes in the relative prices of energy 
sources as well as rises in the prices of energy relative 
to'income. 
In particular, we suggested that . the emergence of new 
groups reflected reactions to negative experiences of the" 
effects· of particular energy' technolog ies, "especially nu-
clear power. We suggested that' these negative exper iences 
were mainly related to effects on the environment, on so-
cial conditions, and on quality of life. 
The major changes in" the energy policy field" and in the 
relations between the abovementioned factors, we sug-
gested, was parallel in Britain. This' would be the case 
if, as we assumed, the economic conditions and energy 
technologies have to'a, large degree been common to 'the "in-
dustrialized world. 
Whereas these hypotheses described a'static model of cau-
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sal relations between the material conditions in the ener-
gy policy field, the poli tical groups reacting to these 
conditions and the objectives, issues and methods of state 
energy policy, the last two hypotheses concerned the pro-
cess of change itself. Following Petersen (1985) we propo-
sed that this process of change contains elements of trial 
and error. Finally we suggested that attempts at purpo-
sive, long term planning for the energy sector will lead 
to counterfinal results whose nature is in principle un-
foreseeable. This hypothese was partly a consequence of 
the suggestion that the process of change in the policy 
field contains elements of trial and error, partly it as-
sumed that we should be able to point to inconsistencies 
between micro behaviour and macro results which would con-
tribute ,to unpredictability in the development of the 
field. 
In chapter one we presented these hypotheses and discussed 
the principles and methods for a research aimed at 'test-
ing' the hypotheses. The nature of the hypotheses meant 
that they could not be confirmed or refuted in the usual 
scientific sense. We concluded, however, that a analysis 
emphasizing a chronological perspective as well as a 
cross-national compar ison, would allow us to evaluate the 
plausibili ty of our suggestions and consequently of the 
proposed theoretical framework. Therefore, the analysis 
was widened out to include Britain in addition to Denmark. 
The period of inv7,stigation was set from 1950-1980 which 
was thought sufficient for allowing us to evaluate the 
preconditions of the changes which have brought about the 
present conditions of the energy policy field, yet clearly 
delimited. 
Chapter two descr ibed changes in the obj ect i ves,. issues 
and methods of state energy policy in the two countries 
during the period. In order to examine the hypotheses 
about the 'origin of such changes we first had to locate 
and describe these changes. We identified four sub-periods 
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characterized by different approaches by the states to en-
ergy. In both coun tr ies, the 1950s was mar ked by fragmen-
ted and market-or iented fuel policies aiming to support 
and further economic growth in the energy industr ies as 
well as in general. This type of policies was continued 
through most of the 19 60s, but we saw, par ticular ly in 
Britain, that the fragmented approach increasingly created 
problems. Unforeseen competi tion between different fuels 
created political difficulties, and (in particular in 
Britain) the nuclear, technology, although heavily sub-
sidized, was increasingly recognized to demand for its 
safe operation very strict controls. 
The per iod from about 1969 in Br i tain and about 1972 in 
Denmark was marked by the emergence of state energy policy 
institutions and of a number of new methods and procedures 
to ensure a coordinated development in" the energy policy 
field. This process was accelerated bY,the oil price rises 
following the OPEC embargo in 1973. Finally, towards the 
end of the 1970s, there were signs in both countr ies of 
accumulating differe?ces in ~ccommodating a, wide spectrum 
of objectives in state energy policy. This was evident in 
;~ rapidly inc'reasi n9 number of issues, considered by energy 
policy agencies. Amongst, these issues" cost was, the most 
important. 
After identifying the nature of the_changes in state ener-
gy policy, we turned in chapter three to, the poli tical 
- , .,... .[ 
groups, for each class of groups we descr i bed changes in 
the groups' energy political attitudes as well ,as the ac-
- .' ' 
tivities which it undertook to influence state energy po-
licy. We found that - this descr iption' supported our hypo-
thesis of a politicizationof energy around 1970. We found 
that the in~en$ification of st~te initiatives in the ener-
~ - ,. '. , 
gy sector had been preceded by i~creasing - acti vi ties by 
" ' .". , ~ . 
the poli tical parties a~, well as by the emergence, of, new 
environmentally or ientated groups. We also found that the 
adoption of new types of issues in state energy policy re-
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flected campaigns from specific groups emphasizing the im-
portance of that particular issue. Each of the new issues 
of the 1970s: the environment, employmen t, advantages of 
small versus large scale operations, safety of operations, 
had its own constituency. Finally we observed that the 
politicization was also evident in a multiplication of 
groups each advancing their own version of a future energy 
policy serving the national interest. 
The proposals of the groups were shown to contain elements 
of solutions to problems identified by each particular 
group as pressing. Seen in this light, the energy policy 
recommendations can be understood as attempts to show that 
the present condi tions, including the future that would 
follow if no changes' were made, is not necessary. The 
proposals can be understood as reactions to the conditions 
experienced by the memberi of the groups. As we had 
suggested, these conditions were '. related to, on· the one 
hand pr ices of and acc'ess to energy, on the other the 
effects of energy technologies: the problems identified by 
the groups weri mainly related to, on the one hand macro-
economic effects of energy policy, on the other hand 
effects, real and potential, on the environment, including 
future resource availability. In· addition, technology 
seemed' to .. pose a separate set of' problems. Some of the 
environmental groups 7 interpreted the whole' range of 
problems as results of the development of a particular 
type of technology, 'I hard I technology, symboli zed 'by nu-
, ' 
clear power, and their proposals centered around the idea 
that better, less polluting, less centrali zed, technolo-
gies ought to be furthered. 
In chapter four, we looked for changes in the national 
economies, in the trends of energy supply and consumption, 
and in the resource base and found support for the 
suggestion that the reactions of the groups reflected 
changes in the material conditioris. We found that the 
embryonic energy planning of the late 1960s sprang from a 
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wish to counter balance-of-payments problems which 
beginning to look like a constraint on economic growth. 
The account made it clear that resource availibility does 
not represent a determining factor. Resource availabili ty 
was seen to depend on technology, and the introduction of 
new resources was seen to have depended on whether the 
tradi tional resources gave rise to problems, and whether 
the new resource was thought to represent a . solution to 
these· problems. We also saw that the particular problems 
that the groups identified and reacted to in the 1970s 
. were the unpredicted results of decisions of the 1950s 
and 1960s. We observed that some of the conditions, that 
were thought undesirable in the.1970s, e.g. dependence on 
electricity and. oil, were not themselves unpredictable in 
the· 1950s . -on the contrary they were both predicted and 
intended - it was. the. interpretation . of these cond i tions 
. as unwanted that was. not predicted. In other cases, the 
problem. was. unpredictable, yet still a result of the 
policies of the 1950s and 1960s. The OPEC embargo was only 
possible because of policies emphasizing growth in energy 
consumption and free. competi tion between fuels. The 
different impact that the embargo had in Britain and 
Denmark also .supports this· observation. Britain had 
. subsidized its nationalized coal industry, while Denmark 
having no local' industr ies demanding protection, had not 
placed any restrictions on the . use of oil. As a 
consequence, the shift to new methods on energy production 
was much more radical in Denmark than in Br i tain, where 
the traditional production of coal was upheld, giving rise 
.. to problems later when· the problem related to oil had 
.. vanished. 
We had suggested, th,at the emergence of new groups and the 
change of attitudes of the existing groups also reflected 
reactions to. the g-roup members' exper iences of the effects 
of energy technologies , and chapter two had supported this 
suggestion. In chapter five we inquired into the problems 
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identified in relation to technology by political agencies 
in order to evaluate the significance of this factor. We 
concluded that a considerable shift could be observed re-
garding the experience of effects of technologies, and 
that this shift occurred about 1970. Before that time, 
technological change was generally expected to yield main-
ly positive results, and the natural sciences were by all 
poli tical groups interpreted as a progressive factor in 
society. This reaction of the early 1970s suggested that 
'laissez'faire-technology' had led to the accumulation of 
results which were generally interpreted as negative. The 
reports from Denmark, Britain and the OECD pointed to the 
extra burdens put upon the states to counter environmental 
problems arising as the external effects of particular 
technologies, frequently citing nuclear' power as an 
example, and observed that· an efficient use of public 
finances was difficult, as long as the formulation of 
technological objectives was' left· to scientists and the 
industry. Looking at a number of theoretical proposals for 
avoiding the negative effects of technologies, ranging 
from r~commendations for" Technology Assessment to utopian 
designs emphasizing small-scale,; decentralized technology 
developed with regard to the environment, we concluded 
that elements of these. theor ies corresponded. to elements 
of the world-views of the political groups. 
In chapter six we tried to pull together the observations 
of the previous chapters. We had suggested that the pro-
cess underlying changes in the energy. policy field con-
tained elements of trial and error, and that the nature of 
the process meant that attempts at purposive, long-term 
state control of the energy sector·· would lead to counter-
final results of an unforeseeable nature. 
After specifying the phases of a process of· tr ial and er-
ror, we concluded that our observations supported ;such a 
hypothesis. Following. Petersen, we, suggested that per iods 
of stereotypical behaviour would lead to the accumulation 
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of a tension between expectations and exper ienced cond i-
tions for fractions of society. At first, individuals, 
groups and poli tical agencies would seek to dissolve the 
tension by applying 'more of the same', i. e. by reacting 
streotypically. But if the tension developed, at some 
pOint it would be recogni zed as 'error', and the wor ld-
views of the previous per iod together wi th the paradigms, 
theories and methods going with it would be revealed as a 
myth. A search would then start for new theories, methods 
and objectives which would make up an image of a future in 
which the particular set of problems creating the tension 
did not exist. This search would be accompanied by action 
aimed at solving the same problems. Eventually out of the 
competing myths, one would become the dominant myth of so-
ciety, and consequentially would no longer be interpreted 
as a myth •. The new myth would lead to the adoption of new 
types of stereotypical behaviour and new theories would be 
developed within the new paradigms belonging' to the ne'w 
myth. 
Our account of the development of the energy policy field 
displays phases which fit well with the phases of the pro-' 
cess as described above. We concluded that whereas theo-
riesaddressing state energy policy as well as theories of 
social change were located within the myth of one particu-
lar per iod and thence incapable of understanding the pro:" 
cess of which the myth is an element, Petersen' s theory 
offers a comprehensive understanding of the relationship 
between beliefs (including values and . theor ies) and expe-
rience in creating change. 
" 
In addition, we concluded ·that our observations supported 
the hypotheses that purposive, long term state energy po-
licy would lead to counterfinal and unforeseeable results. 
We reached this conclusion partly as an implication of the 
trial and error hypotheses, partly because of the ob-
servation that such a policy would demand a presently un-
acceptable extent of state control, and partly as a 
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consequence of a discrepancy between micro-behaviour and 
the aggregated results of this behaviour. 
On the basis of these conclusions we finally evaluated 
some of today' s proposals for future energy policy, and 
concluded that whereas we cannot predict the objectives 
and issues of future energy policies, we expect certain 
issues to be prominent for some time to come. Among these 
issues, we suggest that the cost-efficiency of energy 
production and consumption and the environmental impact 
of energy technologies will be important. 
Whereas we are satisfied that we have fulfilled the aim of 
this thesis, we do want to point to a number of issues 
which have arisen along the way and which need further in-
vestigation. It is evident that the trial-and-error theory 
is not predictive. On the contrary, the theory states 
that, social change is in principle unpredictable •. In 
other words, anon-determinist theory of change. Therefore 
we shall not make any policy recommendations on the basis 
of our account. This does not mean that the adoption of 
this framework should not be of any wider consequence •. The 
framework still needs support and refinement. For example, 
we think that the process whereby one particular myth· is 
adopted as a dominant 'myth is as yet insufficiently 
explained. Likewise, we think that the relationship 
between material or technological inertia and the changes 
which are .brought about by the myth-creating activities of 
political groups ought to be discussed in more depth. 
Therefore we would recommend that social science research 
emphasizes projects involving work across specialization 
and topics and across time in order· to achieve knowledge 
about· the process itself as well as about the present 
tendencies. ' 
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